UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE SANTA CATARINA
PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM INGLÊS E LITERATURA
CORRESPONDENTE

RHETORICAL INEPTNESS IN TEXTS WRITTEN BY LINGUISTS

por
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Dissertação submetida à Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
para a obtenção do grau de MESTRE EM LETRAS

FLORIANÓPOLIS
Fevereiro de 1995

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am happy to acknowledge my gratitude to

the **Federal University of Alagoas (UFAL)**, where I teach English, and

the Federal University of Santa Catarina **(UFSC)**, where I met people with invaluable academic knowledge.

I am in large measure indebted to my patient Supervising Professor, **José Luiz Meurer**, for the improvements incorporated since the first draft, and his wide-ranging expertise.

I should like to express my particular thanks to my first teacher of English, **Vanuse Cardoso Ribeiro**, for her estimulating zest for teaching.

My particular thanks go to my mother, **Anavra Moreira**, my second cousin, **Maria Amália**, my sister, **Rita de Cássia**, my bosom friends, **Paulo Fernando**, and **Jackçon Lal**, without whom ...

Esta dissertação foi julgada adequada e aprovada em sua forma final pelo Programa de Pós-Graduação em Inglês para a obtenção do grau de

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ABSTRACT

Text linguists posit that *signals* are overt micro features that play an important role in the *rhetorical organization* of written discourse, the lack of which may give rise to the phenomenon of *rhetorical ineptness*, which is detrimental to textual interpretability. In spite of the consensus regarding this theoretical and practical position, the rhetorical organization underlying a number of texts in the content area of linguistics seems to be inept. In this microstructural, descriptive and qualitative text analysis, I investigate rhetorical ineptness in texts published in English, applying Hoey's (1983) and Tadros' (1985) theories to five chapters written by the linguists: Wallwork (1969), Corder (1974), Bolinger (1980), Widdowson (1979), Gregory and Carroll (1978). The investigation revealed that there are *under-signalling* and *mis-signalling* in the rhetorical scheme of the analyzed discourses as the *circumstances* of *textual implausibility*. I propose the micropattern typified as *Rhetorically Organized Predictions*, regulative, global, local, persuasive and co-operative metatexts, binary cotexts (V) ~ (D), of written scientific discourse. The micropattern maximizes the *synergy cohesion-coherence*, eases the production of *text frames* as a pedagogical potential, and helps persuade the reader to move toward the *secularized modernization* of knowledge, science, and technology.

INCONGRUÊNCIA RETÓRICA NO DISCURSO LINGÜÍSTICO

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1995

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RESUMO

Lingüistas em análise textual afirmam que *sinalização discursal* é um dos microfatores relevantes na *organização retórica* do discurso escrito, sem o qual o discurso pode promover a *incongruência retórica* em detrimento da interpretabilidade textual. Não obstante o consenso em torno dessa posição teórico-prática, a organização retórica de um número de textos escritos por lingüistas parece incongruente. Nesta dissertação investigo a presença de incongruência retórica no discurso lingüístico publicado em inglês, aplicando o referencial teórico de Hoey (1983) e Tadros (1985) em cinco capítulos de livros-texto escritos pelos lingüistas Wallwork (1969), Corder (1974), Bolinger (1980), Widdowson (1979), Gregory e Carroll (1978). A investigação revelou a existência de *sub-sinalização* e *pseudo-sinalização* na estrutura retórica dos discursos analisados como *circunstâncias* de *implausibilidade textual*. Proponho o micropadrão tipificado *Predições Retórico-Organizacionais*, caracterizado como metatextos reguladores, globais e locais, recursos de persuasão e cooperação, cotextos binários (V) ~ (D) de discurso científico escrito. O supradito micropadrão maximiza o *sinergismo coerência-coesão*, viabiliza a produção de *estruturas textuais de informação* como recurso pedagógico e ajuda a persuadir o leitor à *modernização secularizada* do conhecimento, da ciência e tecnologia.

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TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS

A, B, C, D, E, F	Portions of chapters analyzed
(Wallwork 1969: 1 - 13)	Author-date system of analyzed portions of chapters
Small printing type in single-spacing	Transcribed portions of chapters
Italics	Illustrative material quoted in the analysis from the transcribed portions of chapters
LIGHTFACE UPPER-CASE	Plain-sense, and follow-up, questions
1), 2), 3), etc.	References to sentences, or parts of sentences, from transcribed portions of chapters
(11:8)	The first number: an orthographic sentence; the second number: the original page of the chapter in which a sentence is printed
(...)	Omitted material
( )	Signalled, mis-signalled, explicit, actual or pseudo members of prediction, for instance, (V1) ~ (D1)
[ ]	1. Material suggested by the researcher; 2. amended, under-signalled, implicit, inferred, contingent members of prediction, for instance, [V1], [D3]
	1. Paragraph indentation of original chapters; 2. amalgamated predictive members, for instance, (V1-V2), (V6-V7]

Boundary between (V) ~ (D) members of the same pair of prediction, for instance, (V4) ~ (D4i) ~ (D4ii)

A member actually, or not actually, fulfilled, or provided or realized, in or by another member, for instance, (D4ii): [V15] ~ (D15)

CHAPTER I

THE RESEARCH

INTRODUCTION

Linguistics is a main axis that branches into three dichotomies, namely, synchronic versus diachronic, theoretical versus applied, and microlinguistics versus macrolinguistics (Lyons 1981: 34 - 37). Within macrolinguistics, one area that has notably expanded its scope recently is Sociolinguistics. Fasold (1990: ix, 65 - 66) acknowledges sociolinguistics to embrace that which De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) specify as "a newly emerging science" (p. xi) whose evolution is "marked by interdisciplinary co-operation" (p. xiii). The science is that "of text and discourse" (p. xi) and it is differently termed by different linguists. For instance, De Beaugrande and Dressler (op. cit.: 14) term it "text linguistics"; Enkvist (1987: 26) terms it "discourse linguistics"; Fasold (op. cit.: et passim) terms it "discourse analysis", etc.

Fasold remarks that discourse analysis is a general heading that is divided into the following two branches: 'the study of texts' (i.e., text analysis), and 'the study of interactive events' (i.e. the study of dialogic interactions or interactive events analysis or conversation analysis). In McCarthy's historical overview of discourse analysis (1991: 5 - 6), conversation analysis concerns both the modes of discourse behaviour stemming from cultural backgrounds and interactive goals,

and the modes of conversation stemming from problems in interactive events. It is an American tendency based on ethnomethodological criteria to be applied to the analysis of interactive events. Text analysis entails the analysis of both oral and written structures of texts. It is a British tendency based on structural linguistic criteria to be applied to the analysis of written and oral discourse.

Differently from McCarthy, and Fasold, James (1980: 102 - 103) states that there is "no reason" for such "distinction" between the studies of 'written texts' and 'dialogic interaction'. In his simplified classification, however, he considers discourse analysis and text analysis as two macrolinguistic areas, both of them concerned in greater or lesser extent with aspects of cohesion and coherence.

The differing views on discourse analysis led Schiffrin (1987: 1 - 3) to state that the new domain is a discipline that has grown into "a vast and ambiguous field," and she supports her claim by considering, for example, some definitional problems related to the new study. The vastness and ambiguity notwithstanding, McCarthy (op. cit.: 7) observes that the discipline into which discourse analysis has further advanced

> finds its unity in the description of language above the sentence and [in] an interest in the contexts and cultural influences which affect language in use. It [the heterogeneous discipline of discourse analysis] is also now, increasingly, forming a backdrop to research in Applied Linguistics [sic], and second language learning and teaching in particular. (Emphasis added.)

Developments abound with theory and practice in the applied, synchronic macrolinguistics. Most particularly, in the British structural text analysis of the written medium of expression (within the domain of discourse analysis), to which I devote my dissertation, recent practical and theoretical developments have been proposed by structural text analysts, or "text grammarians" (McCarthy, ibid.: 6, 168 - 169). The theorists intend both to highlight the need to view the organization of written texts in broader terms than highlighted by traditional developments, for

instance, in rhetoric, and to fulfill the need. Theoretical frameworks are proposed as "stimulation" to those who want "to know more about how discourses are organized" and "to mend either their own or others' damaged discourses" (Hoey 1983: 1 - 3). Such theories relate "conventions of language to ... constraints in the reader ['s comprehension]" (Sanford and Garrod, 1981: 12). The 'constraints' as condition (derailment, mismatch, etc.) experienced by the reader may be circumstanced by overlooked 'conventions' (misuse of macro and micro features) in discourse. Accordingly, such theories offer an expanded theoretical conception of the role of organizational microfactors and macrofactors, for instance, discoursal patterns and rhetorical signalling, as crucial determinants to what I call *textual plausibility*: the balance between coherence and cohesion.

Two theories, to name but a few, representative of the way text analysis has accounted for the means whereby encoders and decoders succeed in using language to create and process written scientific information, are: (1) the theory of the *rhetorical organization* of discourse (i.e. the microstructure, the micro level), which alerts writers and readers to the *rhetorical ineptness* resulting from *mis-signalling* (or *miscueing*) and *under-signalling* (or *undercueing*) (see Hoey 1983: 179 - 183; Bamberg 1983: 420); and (2) the theory of the *categories of prediction* (see Tadros 1985) in discourse, which contributes with many 'rhetorically regulative microfeatures' (see Hoey, op. cit.: 179; McCarthy and Hewings 1988: 3; McCarthy, ibid.: 168 - 169) to the interpretability of written text (or written discourse).

While, theoretically and practically, organizational microfeatures and macrofeatures are crucial determinants of the texture and quality of written discourse, I place the emphasis here on the micro-level features, most particularly on explicit discourse *signalling*, which Hoey sees as "an important aid to discourse analysis" (ibid.: 54), and Tadros as "the mechanics by which the interaction [between writer and reader] is produced" without ambiguity (ibid.: 3, 6).

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Even though there is general agreement among linguists (as writers) that signals are overt micro features that play the important role of paving the threads of discourse in favour of the relationship between a writer's non-linear writing and a reader's linear reading (cf. Hoey, op. cit.: 177), it remains to be investigated how linguists help this relationship to occur, that is, how linguists help the reader not to lose the threads of discourse produced by them. Put differently and specifically, linguists' written discourse remains to be described in terms of 'rhetorical organization' (in Hoey's use of the term), which involves the plausible display of signalling. The oversights or failures to signal (or to focus or to form or to cue) relations may give rise to 'rhetorical ineptness' (in Hoey's use of the term) in written discourse (or written text).

The present study is a microstructural, qualitative, and descriptive text analysis of rhetorical ineptness in texts written by linguists. Rhetorical ineptness within discourse is the phenomenon caused by 'mis-signalling' and/or 'under-signalling', in Hoey's (op. cit.: 180) use of the terms, or by *undercue*{-ing} and/or *miscue*{-ing}, in Phelps' use of the strictly comparable terms (in Bamberg 1983: 420). Under-signalling (or undercueing) stems from a lack of rhetorical signals/cues, or a lack of clearly signalled content relations, or of clear pathway, in the writer's discourse that is *coherent*, though (Hoey, op. cit.: 180 - 183). Mis-signalling (or miscueing) stems from the use of misleading or conflicting predictive and/or predicted information, from "problems of unrealized expectations" for the reader, from unfilfillment in predicted cotexts, in the writer's discourse that is fragmentary and, thus, *not coherent* (id., ibid.). More specifically, in the present dissertation, rhetorical ineptness refers to the rhetorically inept use of cohesive signals of organizational

prediction in detriment to coherence in texts written by linguists. Again, ineptness is given rise to by mis-signalling and under-signalling.

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY

I specify the written discourse of the content area of linguistics for analysis due to 'hardship' experienced by myself as a reader of English as "the second language" (Littlewood 1984: 2 - 3) when processing linguistic texts as 'raw' teaching content material for my linguistics classes. I typify such reader of English as a second language for linguistics teaching as a *specialist learner*.

McCarthy (op. cit.: 148) defines the 'specialist learner' as the reader who "tend[s] to have precise reading and writing needs." Under *precise reading needs* is meant here the content area reading that results from 'textual plausibility', that is, a balance between the ease with which the present reader (representing the specialist learner) can build a scenario (Sanford and Garrod 1981) in his mind (i.e. content coherence) and the rhetorical organization (i.e., rhetorically organized predictive and predicted cohesion) of written texts. Also, under *precise writing needs* is meant here the content area writing of 'information structures' that results from 'textual plausibility', that is, a balance between the ease with which the present reader can write cohesive and coherent information structures with a minimum waste of time/effort and the rhetorical organization of linguistic material. Information structures constitute, for instance, "text frames" (cf. McCarthy and Hewings, op. cit.: 7 - 10, et passim) or "pyramid diagram" (Solon 1980: 594 - 596) or "mapping" (Hanf 1971: 225 - 230, 270), written from 'linguistic texts' as 'raw' content materials for the teaching of linguistics. Admittedly, text frames (either as pyramid diagrams or maps) are a "pedagogical potential" (McCarthy and Hewings,

op. cit.: 9), or "an effective learning strategy" (Moore et al. 1982: 10), in classroom activities.

According to conventional reckoning, the term 'hardship', which I have used in the first paragraph of the present section, denotes 'difficulty' (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 1981). The two terms, 'hardship' and 'difficulty', however, are most general because either one may be "applied loosely to any troublesome *state of affairs*" (emphasis added) (The Cassell Thesaurus 1991). A state of affairs (i.e., situation) encompasses both *circumstance*{-s} and *condition*{-s} (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, ibid.; The Heritage Illustrated Dictionary of the English Language 1975). The state of affairs I refer to is that in which some hardship or difficulty (experienced by myself as a specialist learner) is the condition as resulting from a definite circumstance. In this dissertation, circumstance and condition connote specific qualities, as follows. Circumstance is a lurking 'cause': the 'something' that hinders or impairs the present specialist learner's reading course, and that demands time to reread passages, and endurance to attain comprehension as backing to the writing of text frames. Condition is a 'result' of the interfering circumstance: the derailment in the content area reading course, the recourse to much time to reread, and much effort to attain comprehension due to discursive disruptions in the passages.

In accordance with the three following perspectives of linguistic comprehension, namely, *schematic*, *cognitive*, and *psychological*, I as a specialist learner will next try to express in particular words the circumstance, or better, the basis for the condition. In the schematic perspective, text comprehension is

> an **interactive process** between the reader's [formal and content] background knowledge and the text. Efficient comprehension requires the ability to relate the textual material to one's own knowledge. Comprehending ... entire texts involves more than just relying on one's linguistic knowledge. (Emphasis added.) (Carrell and Eisterhold 1983: 556)

As for the interactive process, Carrell and Eisterhold state that it entails *top-down predictions* (i.e., the reader's conceptual predictions through top-down processing) and *bottom-up information* (i.e., the incoming or the input information through bottom-up processing), and that both must be compatible (cf. op. cit.: 553 - 573). Meurer (1991: 172 - 174) imparts that bottom-up processing "goes from specific to general" and top-down processing "goes from general to specific." He also states that "readers derive meaning by the interplay of ... [both] processes" (p. 173).

In the cognitive perspective, likewise, Bransford and McCarrell (1977) consider linguistic comprehension the *cognitive contributions* of the comprehender as well as the *linguistic characterizations of the input sentences* to be a must (emphasis added) (p. 389). For the two researchers, cognitive contributions depend on "the comprehender's ... activated knowledge of his [or her] world" (op. cit.: 384), which they call "nonlinguistic information" (p. 389). Cognitive contributions enable him/her to make use of "the cues specified in *linguistic input* to create some semantic content that allows him/her to understand" (emphasis added) (p. 389). Thus, cognitive contributions are "prerequisites for achieving a *click of comprehension*" (emphasis added) (p. 385), that is to say, for 'meaning' which "is 'created' [sic] rather than stored and retrieved" (p. 385).

Finally, in the psychological perspective, Sanford and Garrod (ibid.) refer to the interactive process above-mentioned by characterizing it as a "contract between writer and reader" for a *situational model* (i.e., a "thematic" scheme or a "mental representation"), which establishes the connection between knowledge and comprehension. From the situational model created in the reader's mind by the writer's *linguistic object*, the reader draws *lexical*, *extrapolative* and *evaluative*, textual *inferences*. Lexical inference is "called for in solving problems of lexical ambiguity or nominal reference" (ibid.: 5); extrapolative inference is called for in solving problems of, say, "the sequence of intervening events," or elliptical

information, to be found "beyond" two "actually given" events in text; and evaluative inference is called for in solving problems of "value or significance of an event" that depends on the reader's knowledge of what may happen in a certain context (ibid.: 6). Inferences head towards *linguistic configuration* (i.e., meaning) of the text. In short, the linguistic object activates the reader's *knowledge structures*, or *mental model*, which come{-s} from long-term memory, and the resultant overlap (or *integration* or interactive process) constitutes the final linguistic configuration of the text (op. cit.: 5 - 11, 38, 52, et passim).

From Carrell and Elsterhold's, Bransford and McCarrell's, and Sanford and Garrod's perspectives of the interactive process of knowledge and comprehension, I as a specialist learner, can then express in particular words the detrimental condition determined by a combination of circumstances. Reading texts in linguistics, I have experienced, as the condition, a derailment in comprehension (or in linguistic configuration). There is at times a mismatch between my formal-and-content-schematic knowledge structures (or situational model, or mental model; or cognitive contributions; or top-down predictions) and the hidden schema of a number of texts (or bottom-up information; or textual material; or linguistic objects; or linguistic input) written by linguists. Conceiving of, and devising, the obstructed condition schematically, cognitively, and psychologically, I have undertaken to identify the obstructive circumstance by resorting to a "procedural approach" to achieve textual plausibility. In other words, I have used cognitive procedures that mediate between cohesion and coherence through questions and inferences that are supposed to lead to the ease comprehension of the scientific formulations in the texts (McCarthy, op. cit.: 27 - 28), and to the ease production of text frames. In order to achieve this, I have proceeded as follows.

First, I have tried to create the phenomenon of "coherence" that I regard as substantiated by what I call the *cophenomenon* of "cohesion." Refraining from

commonplace extremisms in this research, I consider that coherence and cohesion {co-}*alesce* to favour *synergy* or *synergism* (Ayto 1989: 371 - 372) of meaning and 'to form' plausible texts. Enkvist (1990: 14, 17) defines coherence as "the quality that makes a text conform to a consistent world picture and is therefore summarizable and interpretable"; and Sanford and Garrod (ibid.: 53) as semantic "knowledge of how things necessarily work." Enkvist (ibid.) defines cohesion as "the quality resulting from overt, grammatically describable links on the textual surface"; Sanford and Garrod (ibid.: 20 - 21) as "syntactic mechanisms," and McCarthy (op. cit.: 27 - 28) as "cohesive markers" that are signals encoded in the surface of text, and are "not absolute," or better, not independent. Importantly, however, linguistic configuration does not depend on the syntactic mechanisms and semantic links only, but on the processing of the linguistic object by the decoder.

Secondly, thus, I have also had my pragmatic receptor knowledge activated by the linguistic input in order to be able to make lexical, extrapolative, and evaluative inferences as defined above (Sanford and Garrod, op. cit.: 5 - 6). Enkvist (op. cit.: 20) defines inference as "the adding of information not explicitly ... [put] on the textual surface" (ibid.: 17). Positively, Bright and McGregor (1970: 31) affirm that inference is "one of the most useful skills of the expert reader" which may, however, "be hindered by [materials] at too high a density."

Third, with the help of *plain-sense*, and *follow-up*, *questions* (consistent with my special interests - see page 13) which are seen as *sine-qua-non* for any success in my inferences, I have dialogued with the original expository discourse unfolding, read it more perceptively, directed my attention to content interplay, clarified, or qualified, rhetorically organized predictions in texts. I take for granted that "Any question demanding inference from what is said is a proper one" and "Any question which helps the [reader] to understand more fully, probe more

deeply or imagine more exactly is a good question" (Id., Ibid.: 89). Here selectively, plain-sense questions help clarify references by lexicon; follow-up questions help clarify rhetorical organization, propositional and contextual relations, summaries, intentions, situations (Id., Ibid.: 1970: 87 - 89).

Fourth, in the cognitive act of question posing, I have adopted interactively, and under Hoey's leading theory of rhetorical organization, Tadros' theory of categories of signposting prediction (as the basic rhetorical framework to the present structural text analysis) so as to answer my questions. Fifth, in the point-to-point treatment of a number of reading texts in linguistics, I have labelled textual segments formed from the (V) ~ (D) binary relations as text-based structural information units, whereby I have deduced rhetorical ineptness in such texts. Such ineptness puts paid to the rhetorical organization of text, to even reading, comprehension, and the eventual writing of text frames.

Despite my procedural approach just described, the mismatch (or resultant condition, difficulty, hardship, derailment, etc.) has still evinced in some reading passages. Sixth, I have most carefully and unremittingly revised the step-by-step treatment of the texts in such a way as to try to make the 'top-down predictions' and the 'bottom-up information' simultaneously compatible and interactive. In my evaluation, unless I persisted to cope syntactically, semantically and pragmatically with the mismatch, I could not attain comprehension, nor write text frames, free from time-consuming difficulties.

After preliminary questioning regarding the possible disruptive circumstance (or cause) of such resultant condition (i.e., lack of ease to comprehend troublesome reading passages in detriment to text framing), I felt that a number of linguistic texts fail to provide sufficient *control centers* (see further Francis 1986: 39; De Beaugrande and Dressler, op. cit.: 95), or *textual clues*, for an effective bottom-up processing mode to activate appropriate formal and/or content

schemata. Put differently, it seemed to me that the texts I had read failed to signpost relations among prospective and retrospective parts of discourse and, thus, also failed to guide the reader safely and evenly through the predictive and predicted parts. My impression has been that some of these texts are characterized as *rhetorically inept*. As such, rhetorical ineptness seemed to be the obstructive something, or better, the circumstance that contributed to the attendant condition the researcher has experienced as a specialist learner in the above-mentioned state of affairs. The ineptness seemed to be the major cause to the experienced derailment in comprehension and the consequent difficulty in constructing text frames.

Rhetorical ineptness gives rise to *textual implausibility*. The circumstance causes a number of these texts to be - at certain points - dismantled pieces of information as to rhetorical organization and content relations. Textual implausibility thwarts the reader's expectations as determined by formal/content schematic knowledge plus text-related organized predictions. Thus, the problem seems to be data-driven (i.e., to lie on the text), not conceptually driven (i.e., not to lie on the reader).

OBJECTIVES

This dissertation is a tentative microstructural descriptive text analysis which applies the recent theoretical framework posited by Tadros (op. cit.) to a corpus of five selected chapters written by linguists, to investigate the phenomenon of rhetorical ineptness as proposed by Hoey (op. cit.) and as expanded by the present researcher (in the second and third chapters).

Rhetorical ineptness, which stems from *a lack of* rhetorical organization in texts, is here seen from the perspective of mis-signalling and under-signalling as

presented in the previous sections. It shall be clear that the description is tentative. As such, I intend to make no claims to comprehensiveness regarding rhetorically organized signalling and simple/complex patterning of rhetorically organized predictions inherent in the data to be analyzed.

DATA

A corpus of portions of five factual, self-contained chapters, culled from textbooks written in English was selected for the purposes of the present investigation, namely: "What is Language?" (Wallwork 1969: 1 - 13); "The Significance of Learner's Errors" (Corder 1974: 19 - 27); "Another Case in Point: The Jargonauts and the Not-So-Golden Fleece" (Bolinger 1980: 125 - 137); "The Teaching of Rhetoric to Students of Science and Technology" (Widdowson 1979: 7 - 17); and "Code" (Gregory and Carroll 1978: 75 - 85). The motivation to choose these specific texts is that they have been raw teaching material for my linguistics classes.

The corpus was analyzed according to Hoey's and Tadros' theoretical considerations, here merged into one whole, as previously anticipated and further elaborated in Chapter III. In the analysis proper, the first chapter was analyzed as texts A and B. The other chapters were analyzed as texts C, D, E, and F, respectively. All the writers selected are well-known linguists.

HYPOTHESES

In light of the bipartite theoretical framework on signalling to be summarized in Chapter III and applied in Chapter IV, the following hypotheses will be investigated: (1) there are published texts written by linguists that can be characterized as

rhetorically inept discourse because, more specifically, (1.1) they have a lack of (i.e., they have less than enough of) intersentential signals, or of clearly signalled intersentential relations (which is typified as the phenomenon of under-signalling) and (1.2) they have misleading signals and a lack of fulfilled predictions (which is typified as the phenomenon of mis-signalling).

ANALYSIS

'Plain-sense' and 'follow-up' questions, 'lexical', 'extrapolative' and 'evaluative' textual inferences, already defined, were sine-qua-non for the analysis of mis-signalling and under-signalling in the corpus. A plain-sense question deriving from lexical inference focuses on references and lexicon, for instance, WHAT DOES *IT*, ENCODED IN 13), REFER TO IN TEXT Z? or WHAT ARE THE SURFACE REGULATIVE SIGNALS IN THE ENUMERATION STRUCTURE UNDER ANALYSIS? or DOES THE WRITER'S CHOICE OF WORD IDENTIFYING THE FIFTH LANGUAGE FUNCTION HELP THE READER MAKE A COHESIVE LINK WITH THE FOUR PRECEDING FUNCTIONS? or HOW ABOUT *NOW* AS A DISCOURSAL TRANSITIONAL CONJUNCTIVE ROLE? A follow-up question deriving from extrapolative inference focuses on sequence (propositional, contextual relations) of events, elliptical information, rhetorical organization, intentions, summaries, in texts, for instance, WHICH TWO INTERPRETATIONS DO THE MIS-SIGNALLING FEATURES PROMPT THE READER TO CREATE BETWEEN THE PROSPECTIVE 13), 14), 17), 18), AND THE RETROSPECTIVE 11) IN TEXT Z? or WHY IS THE PROSPECTIVE MEMBER OF PREDICTION (V11) PART OF THE RETROSPECTIVE (D4I) IN TEXT Z? or WHAT IS IMPLICITLY SIGNALLED IN THE SECOND GROUPING OF PAIR

PATTERN? or WHAT STRUCTURE OF PREDICTION DOES THE ADDRESSOR TRY TO CONSTRUCT FOR THE V MEMBER OF THE SECOND GROUPING? A follow-up question derived from evaluative inference focuses on evaluation of input information on the part of the reader, for instance, WHY DID (D4i) SUBSUME A MIND-BENDING COMPLEXITY? or WHAT PROMPTS THE PRESENT READER TO VALUE (V5) AS MIS-SIGNALLED? or WHY IS [D3] A DATA-DRIVEN PROBLEM? or HOW INCONGRUOUS AND CONTRADICTORY IS THE TITLE? or HOW NONSTANDARD? As such, questions and inferences may be interchangeable.

ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION

In this chapter, I referred to the present research by displaying the introduction, problem, justification, objectives, data, hypotheses, analysis, and organization. In Chapter II, I will sketch four profiles of classical ancient rhetoric, namely, the sophistical, moral, pedagogical, and philosophical, thereby extrapolating implications related to the four rhetorical profiles and Hoey's connotations of 'rhetorical organization' and 'rhetorical ineptness'. In Chapter III, I will report the background rational, which is the coalescence of Hoey's 'rhetorical organization' theory and Tadros' categorized 'prediction' theory in text. In Chapter IV, I will analyze transcribed portions of the five chapters selected as data for this research. In Chapter V, I will draw conclusions.

CHAPTER II

FOUR CLASSICAL PROFILES OF RHETORIC AND IMPLICATIONS FOR HOEY'S NOTION OF RHETORICAL ORGANIZATION AND RHETORICAL INEPTNESS

In this chapter, first, I will sketch four defining "profiles" of rhetoric arisen in the Classical period of Ancient history as marked by the boundaries of historical periodization and underlying chronology. Next, from the sketch of the four profiles as prototypes of classical ancient rhetoric I will extrapolate implications inherent in the relationship between the denotational meaning of the term 'rhetorical' and the connotational meaning added to the term 'rhetorical' that premodifies the terms 'organization' and 'ineptness' as in the phrases posited by Hoey (ibid.: 179 et passim) in discourse analysis.

The two modern linguistic terms "rhetorical organization" and "rhetorical ineptness" are basic to my dissertation. They are, however, seemingly explicit noun phrases in meaning, that is, the denotation of 'rhetorical' in the terms is not actually explained by Hoey (ibid.) in his theoretical framework on *focused relations* in discourse. The conventional meaning of 'rhetorical' needs to be explained because its denotation is important to my understanding of the implications inherent in the connotation Hoey associates to 'rhetoric' in the two modern nominal phrases: 'rhetorical organization' as *one* possibility of description of discourse, the lack of which produces 'rhetorical ineptness' (id., ibid.).

The foregoing term 'profiles' is here a "hypernymic" term that embraces four "hyponymic" rhetorical 'manifestations' (Quirk et al 1985:1439; Nuttall 1982:77-78), developed around doctrines of philosophical schools in Ancient history. The reference that I make to 'manifestations' is most evident in the following illustration: "This riot is only one manifestation of people's discontent" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary 1989). The instance implies a cause-and-effect relationship in which the causative 'discontent' generated a behavioral 'manifestation'. So, 'manifestation' is an effect that took the form of the effective 'riot' visible to local people in that scene. By analogy, 'the Sophistical rhetoric', for instance, is a 'manifestation' of the causative 'Empiricism' (as an ancient philosophical school). In the new cause-and-effect relationship, Empiricism generated an intellectual 'manifestation' from basic attitudinizing conventions which is the resultant Sophistical profile of rhetoric. By attitudinizing conventions I mean attitude-influencing standards, agreement on certain practices, values or attitudes, principles having active consequences. Thus, by revealing hyponymic noun phrases (formed with the determiner in definite specific reference 'the' plus denominal adjectives denoting philosophical styles plus the common count-noun in my classificatory sense as the noun phrase head 'profiles'), similar to 'the Sophistical profile' (Quirk and Greenbaum 1973: 59-125), I will be listing four different manifestations from attitudinizing conventions which will satisfy the present need for the hypernymic 'profiles of rhetoric in Ancient history'.

As far as historical periodization and chronology are concerned, I will focus specifically the Classical civilization of Ancient history in Cellarius' European periodization of history based on Exiguus and Bede' Christian chronology (Barnes 1963: 348). I particularize the Classical period only because, in Duhamel's words, "the rhetoricians of the Classical Period [sic] ... established the art [of rhetoric] and the direction it was to take for a long time afterwards" (1949: 344). In the frame of

Classical civilization in Ancient history, I will intersperse references to the Classical stylistic period of Greek literature, and to the Western doctrinal schools of the Socratic period in Greek philosophy whenever such references will be favourable for my sketch.

On the one hand, chronology is dating. In the Christian chronology, the dating frontier fixed between B.C. ("Before Christ") era and A.D. ("anno Domini": in the Year of our Lord) era is marked by Christ's birth (or the Incarnation, or the Nativity). Such mid-point method in chronology was arbitrarily introduced by the 6th-century Scythian monk, Dionysius Exiguus (b. c.500; d. c.560 A.D.), but only made known far and wide in usage by the 7th-century Anglo-Saxon chronologist, the Venerable Bede (b. 673?; d. 735 A.D.) (Id., Ibid.). On the other hand, Glénisson (1983: 52) defines historical periodization as "delimitation and subdivision of a given historical process ... in terms of chronology." The Christian periodization of history, that is, the threefold division of history, was drawn in 1685 by the 17th-century AD Dutch Humanist historian, Christoph Keller (b. 1634; d. 1707), better known as Cellarius, a Christian teacher with the University of Halle, in Germany (Spitzlberger 1973: 280; Glénisson 1983: 45). The taxa of Cellarius' humanistically conventionalized group of historical periods are as follows: Ancient history, Medieval history, and Modern history (Barnes 1963: 16, 173, 330; Besselaar 1974: 90 - 91; Glénisson 1983: 46).

According to Cellarius (Barnes, Ibid.: 173), Ancient history spans from the Creation up to the last phase of the reign of Constantine the Great (b. A.D. 280?; d. A.D. 337). In my dissertation, however, Cellarius' descriptive label has to be shortened because of space limitations saved for a portion of generalizations related to classical ancient profiles of rhetoric only. More specifically, the time-honored label is here narrowly related to the time stretch that covers the Classical Greek civilization, that is, the one that covers the Classical period in Greek

literature: from B.C. 500 to B.C. 301, the ending part of pre-Socrafic period: from B.C. 500 to B.C. 450, and the Socratic period in Greek philosophy: from B.C. 450 to B.C. 301, the three of which following the end of the Archaic period revival in ancient Greece: from B.C. 750 to B.C. 500. Accordingly, Ancient history, limited as it was by Cellarius, here is narrowed down to two centuries only, namely, the 5th and 4th centuries before the mid-point in history.

THE SKETCH OF THE FOUR PROFILES OF CLASSICAL ANCIENT RHETORIC

I will sketch the following cluster of general manifestations via basic attitudinizing conventions that are "meaningful only within the context of the author's system taken as a whole" (Duhamel, op. cit.: 344). The conventions will define rhetoric differently. Before I sketch the defining manifestations of rhetoric, however, I shall say that Lucas et al. (1986: 399) class rhetoric as a "genre," and Raby et al. (op. cit.: 849) typify it as a "language and literary art form." Besides defining rhetoric as a genre, or an art form, likewise poetry, comedy, tragedy, oratory etc. in the taxa of the literary genre group, I realize that defining rhetoric further than that is a challenge facing he/she who lacks some knowledge at least of its defining profiles in Classical time. It is a challenge because rhetoric is a content word that has undergone shifts of results in centuries. Indeed, rhetoric effected renewed attacks and searching criticisms on it, which have generated its changing manifestations or profiles in ensuing centuries from the 5th B.C. onwards.

Within the narrow stretch of Ancient history for my work, the defining Classical profiles of rhetoric (here used hypernymically) may be traced in the following "ad hoc" literary and philosophical taxa: in the Classical stylistic period of Greek literature; and in the pre-Socratic, and Socratic, periods, of Greek philosophy as

well. The Classical stylistic period encompasses the ending part of the pre-Socratic period, and the Socratic period, of Greek philosophy. Then, Greeks portrayed rhetoric not less than in four profiles (here used hyponymically), namely, (1) Sophistical, (2) moral, (3) pedagogical, and (4) philosophical.

THE SOPHISTICAL PROFILE OF RHETORIC

The first defining profile of rhetoric in the Classical period of Greek literature encompassing the ending part of the pre-Socratic, and half the Socratic, periods of Greek philosophy, is the Sophistical profile, which was portrayed by the Sophists. The hyponymic term 'Sophistical profile', which I here adopt for characterizing the first Classical rhetorical profile, comes from Wilkins' use of the terms "Sophistical Rhetoric" (sic) and "sophistical rhetoric" (sic) (1962: 26, 28), and Plebe's use of the term 'Sophistical rhetoric' (1978: 27). Also, it is a phrase syntactically parallel to such syntactical forms used by Mora (1981) as "refutación sofísticas," "recursos sofísticos," etc.

Like rhetoric, Sophist is another content word whose intensional aspect of meaning has been difficult to state by reason of diverging connotational references to the word in treatises ensued from the Sophists' remaining reputation as well as from the Sophists' remaining fragments of works. The difficulty is well alleged by the Stranger from Elea whom Theodorus and Theaetetus had brought to one of the seven last dialogues of Plato entitled **Sophist** (cf. [218]), as in the following excerpt:

> I [the Eleatic Stranger] should like you [Theaetetus] to make out what he [the Sophist] is and bring him [the Sophist] to light in a discussion, for at present we are only agreed about the name [Sophist], but of the thing to which we both apply the name possibly you have one notion and I another.

Admittedly, the Sophists arose from at least two crises in Great Greece, namely, one philosophical and the other political. The two crises defined the term Sophist differently but complementarily. The political crisis, however, was most important on account of the fact that it prompted Sophists to produce a course of attitudinizing conventions or theories leading to the Sophistical profile of rhetoric.

The first philosophical crisis is that which happened to Great Greece at the end of the pre-Socratic period of Greek philosophy, in which cosmological speculations (derived from earlier cosmogonic ideas) had been performed by the lonely thinkers of the Ionian, Eleatic, Atomist, etc., schools. The Socratic period followed the pre-Socratic mistakes and few truths, and in turn, it concerned metaphysical problems. Sophists appeared at some point in the transition between the two periods of Greek philosophy. Then, the Sophists capitalized on the pre-Socratic mistakes and few truths to establish a moral crisis in philosophy, and to acquire "[p]ower and prestige" (Cockcroft et al. 1992: 5). They ridiculed and defied the pre-Socratic cosmologies. Noisily, and before long, they introduced to the public the Sophistical thinking on anthropological problems by debating, for instance, the fundamental antithesis between 'nature' and 'custom' (Franca 1940: 6 - 65). Consequently, the Sophistical arguments against moral preconceptions and for the freedom of the natural state tended to appeal to the youngsters as their first supporters. From the foregoing reference, the term Sophist primarily connoted "challengers to orthodoxy" (The New Encyclopaedia Britannica 1986: 17) on account of their readiness to deny "the existence of any external or objective standard of right" (Wilkins 1962: 30) and their prospective interest to change human behaviour (Kerferd 1986: 602 - 605).

Most importantly, the political crisis, as follows, is that which happened first to Sicily, soon to Athens, and later to the whole Great Greece, in the beginning of the Socratic period, in the later half of the 5th century B.C. Under the "tyrants" as

rulers, Greeks were deprived from their citizenship rights, and from their properties in dwelling and land. People were sent into exile. The tyranny of despotic rule set Greek life in a state of social chaos. At last, people managed to depose the ruling tyrants and, thus, Greeks witnessed the rise of democratic forms of governments (Wilkins, op cit.: 27). The Greek democratic society, although lasting short, began in certain of the city-states of ancient Greece. Greek democracy was, then, a legal body of ideas that were shaped by the egalitarian government of Syracuse. Under such democratic legal system, Syracusan and Athenian exiles whose homecoming was at last allowed by the new legislature, could rightfully enter into litigation for the return of their estates. "Derangement" (Id., ibid.) over civil rights and rival property claims required "claimants of property" (Id., ibid.) to go to court to plead their own cases. However, only skillfully persuasive speakers as pleaders or litigants could manage their claims to the public panel of officials as judges to try the merits of such controversies. Thus, the ability of self-expression in private lawcourts became a matter of importance in the middle of the 5th century before the incarnation (Id., ibid.; Barthes 1975: 151; Plebe, op. cit.: 1 - 3; Perelman 1986: 808 - 810).

Likewise in the moral crisis reported above, Sophists availed themselves of the political crisis existing in the founding of Greek democracy so as to pose theoretical and practical questions on the nature of language, and thus to prepare handbooks of 'conventions or theories on {speech-}making'. As its most literal, 'speech' denotes 'oral delivery', and 'oral delivery' denoted 'oratory'; 'the making' (of speech) denotes 'the composing' (of speech), and the 'composing of speech' denoted 'rhetoric'. Consequently, Sophists appealed to people in need of systematic instruction in rhetoric for oratory. From the foregoing reference, the term Sophists connoted, then, "rhetors," or "rhetoricians," or better, "teachers of rhetoric and oratory." So, the term rhetoric generally connoted the "formal" and "empiricist"

(Plebe, op. cit.: 23 - 24) art of composing oral and written speech, or the technique of orators (Kennedy 1969: 425).

In general, some of the attitudinizing conventions that conditioned the Sophistical profile of rhetoric, for instance, in Athens, were manifestations of the ancient Empiricism mainly. In its broad senses listed by Quinton (1986: 617 - 620), the ancient Empiricism postulated by the Sophists was based on the moral experience of men in different societies as the 'facts' from observation, or better, as "the proper objects of [the Sophists'] philosophical inquiry." The ancient Empiricism was present in their skepticism about the wrong and the right, about any preconceived notions and conventional claims determined by the moral code to men's conduct; in their "hard-headed refusal" to restraints on ambition; in their "blunt resistance to received opinion" bequeathed by tradition (id., ibid.).

I will arrange some of the Sophistical conventions under three basic definitions of Sophistic rhetoric. Sophists' stance on the nature of language postulated that rhetoric was, first, a body of theories and techniques.

By means of rhetorical theories and techniques speakers could deal with different kinds of prose, individual, circumstance, etc., skillfully. As skilled private teachers highly paid by the landed and landless men, laymen and aspiring speakers, statesmen and would-be politicians, intellectual newcomers, etc., the Empiricist Sophists professed to teach a curriculum focusing mainly on anthropological attitudes toward morality, besides rhetoric and oratory. Regarding rhetoric and oratory specifically, rhetoricians emphasized the practice of theories and techniques for the argumentative discourse in forensic and epideictic oratory or prose, the use of sonorous and solemn language, the creation of inductive belief or disbelief in public audience, the congeniality as standard, the formulation of untrue arguments from the appearance of experiences of facts, the skill learned from the

interpretation of the subsequent, effects, facts or particulars of a case, from the artful flattery, from actual rehearsals of verbal arguments, etc.

Further, the Empiricists postulated that rhetoric was the will to "power." "Power" referred to rhetorical power, or to the "word" as the men's greatest good, which could direct the speaker's discourse to rule over or counterfeit popular assemblies qualified to act in judicial matters, or better, to persuade hearers (i.e. legislators or judges) into believing, for instance, that the intrinsic wrongs of a controversy were the rights (falsely), and the rights were the wrongs (falsely). As for the power of the word, the Sophist Gorgias (5th c. B.C.) made the following hypothetical statement, first simplifying and subsequently generalizing, to Socrates, in the excerpt from Plato's **Gorgias** ([452]):

> [If] you [Socrates] have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker ... will be found to greater treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.

Moreover, the skeptical men postulated that rhetoric was the means to "virtue." "Virtue" connoted "qualities" by which shrewd Greeks with or without family backing could either achieve practical success in public life and debate in Greek council, assembly, and lawcourts, gain influence on people, and pursue selfish, personal ambitions based on the conceptual thinking that man was the measure of all things (as posited by the Classical rhetor Protagoras). In fact, Sophists' target was the suasive arguments grounded on the rhetorical qualities. Within the purview of Sophistical rhetoric, some of the rhetorical qualities to be hold by the wise speakers were posited by some of the Classical rhetors as follows: the methods of argumentation from 'arrangement' and 'probability' (i.e., deceptive or obscured demonstration for lack of 'documentary evidence') in forensic oratory, and the parts of a speech, posited by Tisias and Corax (5th c. B.C.); the emotional appeal in

ceremonial oratory via the artificial use of stylistic devices such as 'balanced' or symmetrical clauses, figures of speech, 'unfamiliar' words, clarity of diction, posited by Gorgias; highly rhythmical prose effects, the elaborately artificial diction, in language, posited by Thrasymachus; the tricks of expression posited by Polus; the shades of meaning, posited by Prodicus (Plebe, op. cit.: 1 - 19; Wilkins, op. cit.: 26 - 31), etc.

The Sophistical profile of rhetoric had been thus portrayed by the Empiricist Sophists, on which the Athenians Socrates (b. c. 469; d. 399 B.C.), and Plato (b. c. 427; d. 347 B.C.), to name but a few, led attacks in the Socratic period (450 - 300 B.C.), the second period of Greek philosophy. Socrates' and Plato's strictures passed on the Sophists may be said to have comprised the anti-Sophistical rhetoric whose profiles were the moral and the pedagogical respectively.

THE MORAL PROFILE OF RHETORIC

The second defining profile of rhetoric in the Classical period of Greek literature encompassing the pre-Socratic, and half the Socratic, periods of Greek philosophy, is the moral profile, that was portrayed orally by Socrates, but written by Plato. The hyponymic term 'moral profile' or 'moral rhetoric' here adopted is influenced by Mora's words regarding the "carácter moral" or the "cuestión moral" in Socrates' view of man's reality (op. cit.); by Taylor's statements vis-à-vis the moral commitment in Socrates who was "the founder of the doctrine of an absolute morality based on the conception of a felicity that is the good ... of man as man, as part of universal humanity" (1986: 488), and by Fritz's information regarding Socrates' moral adherence to "the principle never to do wrong nor to participate, even indirectly, in any wrongdoing" (1986: 747).

In general, some attitudinizing conventions that conditioned the moral profile of rhetoric were mainly manifestations of Platonic Socrates' faith in the Homeric Zeus. The evidence for such faith on the Orphic mysteries on the part of Socrates is abundant and plain in Socrates' utterances from Plato's **Gorgias**. Like other Platonic dialogues, **Gorgias** was written from notes found in some reminding pads of Plato's lessons taught without fees by Socrates.

In that dialogue, Socrates manifested himself against Sophistic Skepticism by clearly fostering in men love of truth and virtue of justice from faith. He did not only disclose his faith to the Sophists in such bits of speech as "I [Socrates] believe" (Plato, **Gorgias** [523]), or "I [Socrates] am persuaded of the truth of these things [consequences from Zeus' law respecting the judgment day]" (cf. ibid., [526]), etc., but also he quizzed Gorgias, Polus, Chaerephon, and Callicles, about the nature of Sophistic rhetoric. Throughout the dialogue, Socrates simulated ignorance to win arguments against the opponents' tricky dissent, and he resorted to maieutics to instruct the opponents about his moral theory. Despite unwilling to be "discourteous" (cf. ibid., [462]), at Callicles' house, Socrates flatly attacked the practical opportunists' rhetoric by defining it as "the habit of a bold and ready wit ... to manage mankind," the habit which he summed up under the word "flattery" and under the phrases "bad ignoble," "the ghost or counterfeit of a part [Greek democracy] of politics" (cf. ibid., [463]), and "an experience" (cf. ibid., [465]) mastered by Sophists in Greek philosophy, or better, "a mere empiric knack" (aiming at disguising "falsehood or ignorance as plausible truth") as the word 'experience' was also translated into English as reported by the Professor Emeritus of Greek, Armstrong (1986: 883), and Cockcroft et al. (op. cit.: 5).

I will arrange some of Socrates' conventions under one of the Socratic functions of moral rhetoric. Socrates' outward stance on the moral function of language postulated that moral rhetoric "should be used ... with a view to justice,"

the practice of which was both "the best way of life" and "every virtue in life and death" (cf. **Gorgias**, [527]). By Socrates' moral rhetoric speakers could "exhort all men" (cf. ibid., [527]), on the one hand, to know about "the Islands of the Blessed" on which men living "in justice and holiness" on earth, quite unlike Sophists, should be judged suitable (by Minos, Rhadamanthus, or Aeacus) to live after death "in perfect happiness out of evil," and on the other hand, to know about "the house of vengeance and punishment which is called Tartarus," to which men living "unjustly and impiously," quite like Sophists, should be judged to go (cf. ibid., [523]).

On the causative faith, Socrates grounded his moral arguments some of which were addressed mainly to those whom he ironically typified "the three wisest of the Greeks of our [Athenians'] day" (cf. ibid., [527]), the only exception being Chaerephon. Within the purview of moral rhetoric, some of the moral qualities to be hold as standards of truth or conduct by speakers were as follows: (1) "happiness" consisted in a person's being "gentle and good" in the matter of education and justice" (cf. ibid., [470]) because the "unjust or doer of unjust actions [should be as] miserable [as Sophists had been]" (cf. ibid., [473]); (2) rhetoric should be serviceable to the man as a means "to excuse his own injustice ... himself being the first to accuse himself and his own relations" (cf. ibid., [480]); (3) the moral imperative was "know thyself" (Franca, op. cit.: 38), etc.

The moral profile of rhetoric had been thus portrayed by Socrates but worded by Plato in the Socratic period of Greek philosophy. In some dialogues, Plato's strictures passed on the Sophists may have also comprised the anti-Sophistical rhetoric with the pedagogical profile which follows.

THE PEDAGOGICAL PROFILE OF RHETORIC

The third defining profile of rhetoric in the Classical period of Greek literature encompassing the pre-Socratic, and half the Socratic, periods of Greek philosophy, is the pedagogical profile, that was portrayed by Plato. The hyponymic term "pedagogical rhetoric" here adopted comes from Abbagnano's (1963) address to Plato's dialectic as the "pedagogical or educational rhetoric," which is my direct translation from Spanish into English of the descriptive label "R. pedagógica o educativa" (sic).

In general, some attitudinizing conventions that conditioned the pedagogical (or educational) profile of rhetoric mainly in Athens were manifestations of Plato's Rationalism (or "intellectualism" or "apriorism") as the "most fundamental antithesis" of the skeptical Sophists' ancient Empiricism. Traditional Rationalism searched for truth based on 'reason' (i.e., on 'cause', on 'a priori' belief, on the former grasped by the intellect), as opposed to 'particulars' (i.e., to 'effects', to 'a posteriori' experience of facts, to the latter). The a priori beliefs "arise ... from intellectual intuition, the direct apprehension of self-evident truth." Rationalism stressed "the claims of authority, intuition, imaginative reasoning as sources of reliable belief" as reported by Quinton (ibid.: 617). Rationalism is rooted in Plato's rhetoric referred to in **Phaedrus** as the "true ... art of speaking" ([274]) "for the purpose of teaching" ([277]).

Rationalism led Plato through Socrates' speech in **Phaedrus** to attack Sophists' inductive rhetoric by verbalizing Plato's position to Phaedrus, under a plane-tree, by the banks of the Ilissus. In his anti-Sophistical and deductive reasoning, Platonic Socrates stated that Sophistical rhetoricians were "ignorant of the truth" because they did not seek for reasons, they aimed at "appearances" of experience of facts, and they attained "an art of rhetoric which [was] ridiculous and [which was] not an art at all" (cf. [262]). To Plato, rhetorician was a devious teacher of rhetoric who by force of suasive argument could make "the same thing appear

to the same persons to be at one time just [true], at another time ... unjust [false]" (cf. ibid., [261]), or they could make "the little appear great and the great little," or else they could disguise "the new in old fashions and the old in new fashions" (cf. ibid., [267]). Sophistical rhetoricians were "Skillful speakers" of mercenary actions because they imparted "their skill to any who [was] willing to make kings of them [of Sophistical rhetors] and to bring gifts to them [to Sophistical rhetors]" (cf. ibid., [266]). Moreover, Plato remarked that the Sophistical rhetoricians had taught that:

> he who would be an orator has nothing to do with true justice, but only with that which is likely to be approved by the many who sit in judgment; nor with the truly good and honourable, but only with opinion about them,"

and that "from opinion [came] persuasion, and not from the truth" (cf. ibid., [260]). Sophistical rhetoricians were "inferior" (cf. ibid., [263]) proponents of "a mere routine and trick" (cf. ibid., [260]), "an imaginary art" (cf. ibid., [269]) whose nature they were "unable to define" (cf. ibid., [269]), and whose method proceeded "without analysis ... like the groping of a blind man" (cf. ibid., [270]). Most importantly, Plato typified Sophists' rhetoric as a "false art of speaking" as opposed to his "true ... art of speaking" (cf. ibid., [274]).

I will arrange some of Plato's conventions under his definition for pedagogical rhetoric. Plato's stance on the nature of language postulated that such rhetoric was:

> a universal art of enchanting the mind by arguments ... [to be] practised not only in courts and public assemblies, but in private houses also, having to do with all matters, great as well as small, good and bad alike, and ... in all equally right, and equally to be esteemed (cf. ibid., [261]).

By Plato's pedagogical rhetoric speakers could base their arguments in reason and proof so as not to fall into contradiction as did the Empiricists. Reason was "the chief source and test of knowledge," "a faculty that [could] lay hold of truths" as in Blanshard's report (1986: 649).

On the causative Rationalism, Plato grounded his pedagogical arguments, some of which were addressed to Phaedrus. Within the purview of Plato's rhetoric, some of the qualities to be hold as standards of truth and conduct by speakers, or writers, were as follows: (1) "to arrive at the truth" but to know that "mere knowledge of the truth [would] not give [men] the art of persuasion" ([260]) "for the purpose of teaching" ([277]); (2) to "understand the ... nature of everything" ([262]), or better, "to ... acquire a distinct notion of [truth, justice, good, reality, as well as the untruth, injustice, evil, and dream]" ([263, 277]); (3) to "recognize a rhetorical necessity in the succession of the several parts of ... [a] composition" ([264]) that "he [a man] is writing or speaking" ([277]); (4) to know that "every discourse ought to be a living creature, having a middle [body], beginning [head], and end [feet], adapted to one another and to the whole" ([264]); (5) to "define his [the speaker's] several notions" in order to make "meaning clear" ([265]) etc. "And those who ... [had] this art [the art of pedagogical rhetoric as specified above], I [Plato's Socrates] ...[had] ... been in the habit of calling ..." ([266]) "lovers of wisdom or philosophers" ([278]), who were able "to handle arguments according to rules of [Plato's true] art" ([277]).

The pedagogical profile of rhetoric had been thus portrayed by Plato (through Socrates' speech) which was supported by Aristotle in the Socratic period of Greek philosophy. In Aristotle's **Rhetoric**, his strictures passed also on the Sophists mainly, advanced his attitudinizing conventions of rhetoric with the philosophical profile that follows.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILE OF RHETORIC

The fourth defining profile of rhetoric in the Classical period of Greek literature encompassing the pre-Socratic, and half the Socratic, periods of Greek

philosophy, is the philosophical profile, that was portrayed by the Stagirite Aristotle (b. c. 384; d. 322 B.C.). The hyponymic term "philosophical rhetoric" or 'philosophical profile' here adopted is borrowed from Wilkins (op. cit.: 43) in the reference he makes to Aristotle's "philosophical treatment of Rhetoric," and from Atkins (1953: 766) in the reference he makes to the Aristotelian rhetoric.

In general, some attitudinizing conventions that conditioned the philosophical profile of rhetoric portrayed by Aristotle were mainly manifestations of Rationalism, likewise the conventions of the pedagogical profile of Platonic rhetoric. This is substantiated by Aristotle's claim in **Rhetoric** that "the use of rational speech is ... distinctive of a human being" (I. 1. 1355b [35]).

Aristotle's Rationalism led him to assess the prior treatises on the art of Sophistical rhetoric as of restricted scope. In Aristotle's **Rhetoric**, his reasoning is that "the framers of the ... treatises on rhetoric ... [had] constructed but a small portion of that art" (I. 1. 1354a [10]). By the phrase "a small portion" Aristotle referred to the "accessory" (id., ibid.) or "non-essentials" (id., ibid. [15]) inherent in the preceding rhetoric. The prior rhetors had theorized about "non-essentials" only, such as, "the contents of the 'introduction' or the 'narration' or any of the other divisions of a speech" (cf. ibid., I. 1. 1354b [15]); "the arousing of "prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions" in hearers; the structure of the personal appeals to judges (cf. ibid., I. 1. 1354a [15]), whom they had "to put ... into a given frame of mind" (cf. ibid., I. 1. 1354b [20]), etc. In Aristotle's reasoning, it was "not right 'to pervert' the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity" (emphasis added). Soon Aristotle justified his assertion on the following ground:

> [So] much influenced by feelings of friendship or hatred or self-interest ... [the judge and the members of the assembly] ... [lost] any clear vision of the truth and ... [had] their judgment obscured (cf. ibid., I.1.1354a [20 - 25] - 1354b [5 - 10]).

I will arrange some of Aristotle's conventions under the Aristotelian definitions and functions of philosophical rhetoric. Aristotle's outward stance on the nature of language postulated that philosophical rhetoric was that which had both demonstrative, and emotional, arguments. In other words, its function was not only "to succeed in persuading [emotionally]" (as had been usual with Sophists' rhetoric), but also "to discover the means of coming ... near ... the circumstances [i.e., causes, etc.] of each particular case [demonstratively]" (cf. ibid., I. 1. 1355b [5 -10]).

By using Aristotle's philosophical rhetoric a speaker could "make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief," and "his own character ... right" and "put his hearers ... into the right frame of mind" altogether (cf. ibid., II. 1. 1377b [20]).

Within the purview of philosophical rhetoric, some of the essentials or "systematic principles of Rhetoric [sic]" (id. ibid. I. 1. 1354b [20]; I. 1. 1355b [20]) to be hold as standards of truth or conduct by speakers, or writers, in the political, forensic, and ceremonial branches of oratory of display (Cf. ibid., I. 3. 1358b [5]), were as follows: (1) truth and justness should "prevail" over their opposites; (2) "exact knowledge," and "notions possessed by everybody," should be used as "modes of persuasion and argument" to effect conviction; (3) persuasion that "is clearly a sort of demonstration" (ibid. I. 1. 1355a [30]), should be employed "on opposite sides of a question" in order to disclose the "facts" from which "opposite conclusions" were to be drawn "impartially" (cf. ibid., I. 1. 1355a [20 - 35]); (4) arguments should depend upon the three means/modes of persuasion: demonstration of proofs and apparent proofs, the speaker's right character, and the hearers' right frame of mind (cf. ibid., I. 2. 1356a [1 - 20]); (5) credible speech should rely on inductions and deductions (cf. ibid., I. 2. 1356b [1 - 25]; (6) arguments should be connected with the several emotions (such as anger,

friendship, fear, shame, kindness, indignation, envy, and emulation) that were to be produced or dissipated in the hearers (cf. ibid., ll. 1 - 11. 1377b [10] - 1388b [25]); (7) arguments should be adapted to the youthful, prime, and elderly characters of the audiences affected by good birth, wealth, or power (cf. ibid., ll. 12. 1388b [30] - 1391b [5]), etc.

The philosophical rhetoric concludes the Socratic period of Greek philosophy, and the Classical period of Greek literature likewise. The philosophical profile of rhetoric portrayed by Aristotle completes my sketch of four rhetorical profiles by reference to which I will extrapolate implications of relationship between the term 'rhetorical' and the terms 'organization' and 'ineptness' in the British structural text analysis adopted in the present dissertation.

The following two hundred and thirty years forms another distinct period for rhetoric. In it, the Hellenistic stylistic period in Greek literature (from B.C. 323 to B.C. 30), and the first part of the post-Socratic philosophy (from B.C. 300 to B.C. 30) moulded rhetoric differently. Numerous collaborations on the rhetorical art spanned the whole period in the schools that had ensued from Plato's and Aristotle's prototypal frameworks: the Peripatetic school of Theophrastus (B.C. 371 - 287), the Epicurean school of Epicurus (B.C. 340 - 270), the Stoic school of Zeno (B.C. 340 -263) of Citium, the Eclectic school of Cicero (B.C. 106 - 43), to name but a few. According to conventional reckoning, Plebe (op. cit.: 55) states that the period saw the extensive development of details and requirements to be fulfilled in literary and oratorical practices, and Kennedy (op. cit.: 425) specifies that "the 3rd and 2nd centuries B.C. saw extensive development of the details of rhetoric, including the study of memorization and delivery." Further, Kennedy refers to 'the philosophical and rhetorical rivalries' bred by the conquered Greeks for the Romans' support, upon the establishment of Roman hegemony in the Middle Republic (from B.C. 264 to B.C. 133), Late Republic (from B.C. 133 to B.C. 31),

and soon after upon the foundation of the Early (from B.C. 31 to A.D. 193) and Later Roman Empire (from A.D. 193 to 476) over many formerly Greek provinces. So he does as in the following excerpt:

> In the 2nd century B.C. rivalry for the allegiance of Romans who began to take interest in Greek thought broke out between [Greek] teachers of philosophy and [Greek] teachers of rhetoric. Roman practicality decided for the rhetoricians, and rhetoric became the center of [Roman] secondary education. The ideal orator became the symbol of the [Roman] patriotic statesman, and the practice of declamation, or delivery of speeches in imaginary suits, became a popular social grace [in the Roman Empire]. (Id, ibid.: 425)

As such, rhetoric reached across the B.C. era toward the A.D. era, and thus through the Greco-Roman period of Greek literature (from B.C. 31 to A.D. 330), and the second part of the post-Socratic philosophy (from B.C. 31 to A.D. 325) that encompassed the ante-Nicene period of patristic philosophy (from A.D. 101 to 325). The exposition up to this point has paid heed to the rhetoric of the Classical period in the Ancient history that comes to an end in 330 A.D.

IMPLICATIONS INHERENT IN HOEY'S TERMS

From the foregoing scheme of traditional principles that come within the purview of the Sophistical, Socratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian rhetoric kept at a rather high level of generality, I am led to extrapolate some of the implications that lie within the relationship between the classical ancient denotation of the term 'rhetorical' and Hoey's modern connotation to the terms 'rhetorical organization' and 'rhetorical ineptness'. The traditional denotation will be made prior to Hoey's connotation, from both of which my inferences will follow, then.

The Sophists' inductive Empiricism, Socrates' reasoning on morals, Plato's deductive Rationalism, and Aristotle's inductions and deductions each contributed to the moulding of the Classical profile of rhetoric as the formal art of composing

oral and written discourse in Ancient history. The Classical profile of rhetoric was mirrored in a language fraught with artistic contrivance, or better, rhetorical qualities or stylistic devices. The devices were devised at least to perform some relatively particular tasks and have certain effects. More specifically, the Sophistical rhetorical qualities were devised to achieve *persuasion* to the fulfillment of material and social advantages congenial to the Sophists; the Socratic rhetorical qualities were devised to achieve *persuasion* to the discernment of goodness and badness in human behaviour; the Platonic rhetorical qualities were devised to achieve *persuasion* to teaching; the Aristotelian rhetorical qualities were devised to achieve *persuasion* to the production of a demonstrative argument.

The Sophistical, Socratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian, persuasion may be said to have reflected such different practices, functions, or results as the immoral, moral, pedagogical, and philosophical. Despite the different shifts of emphasis, persuasion was retained as a trait common to the classicists' use of language. They practiced the *rhetoric* denoting *the use of language for persuasion.* They used *to persuade* meaning either *to make the persuaded willing to ... at the persuader's personal advantage* (as in Sophistical rhetoric) or *to produce to the persuaded the persuader's cooperative venture* (as in Socratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian rhetoric). The Classical ancient denotational meaning of *rhetorical* seems to me to be, therefore, *of the use of language either for personal advantage or for cooperative venture.* Classical rhetoric enclosed within its configuration of theories such rhetorical ingredients as the 'essentials' and 'non-essentials' (in Aristotle's use of the terms) to be used for 'a rhetorical necessity' (in Plato's use of the term) in oral and written speech, all needed to effect persuasion.

And so likewise does the British structural text analysis in the science of discourse analysis. Text analysis is a fund of theories, one of the major thrust of which is developed by Hoey (op. cit.), for instance. By reference to Hoey text

analysis actualizes some possibilities of description of discourse. One of the possibilities is that which he terms 'rhetorical organization'. Hoey's term connotes the possibility of description of 'focused' relations and 'fulfilled' discourse acts, the lack of both of which produces 'rhetorical ineptness' in the form of 'mis-signalling' and 'under-signalling'. In other words, the connotational meaning of 'rhetorical' organization is that of an ordered whole in discourse realized by such rhetorical ingredients as signalling of, and fulfillment of, discourse act (Hoey, op. cit.: 21 - 30). Such devices in written discourse help to produce 'rhetorical aptness' with regards to the organization of discourse. Conversely, the absence of such devices in written discourse gives rise to 'rhetorical {in-}aptness'. Rhetorical ineptness is the resultant of mis-signalling as the encoder's failure to give proper care to the fulfillment of discourse acts in D cotexts or to the predictive cues in his discourse, thus, fragmentary and non coherent. It is also the resultant of under-signalling as the encoder's failure to give proper attention to the anaphoric and cataphoric signposting in his discourse, though coherent.

Given the denotational meaning of 'rhetorical' and the connotational meanings Hoey associates to the terms 'rhetorical organization' and 'rhetorical ineptness', I come upon the implications that underlie the relationship, which fall into the following basic gist.

The seemingly objective phrase 'rhetorical organization' broadly refers to the use of a kind of written language, that is, the rhetorical ingredients, whereby the modern encoder ventures cooperation with the modern decoder's comprehension of written discourse 'as means to an end': the encoder wants the decoder to move toward *modernization* that is basically conditioned by *secularization* (Germani [1969]: 15; 1973: 80, 93; 1986: 255). More specifically, rhetorical organization refers to the writer's arrangement of overt micro features on the textual surface of discourse, and fulfillment of acts of discourse, as ingredients that persuade

favorably the reader to move toward the secularized modernization of knowledge, science, technology, etc. (Id., 1973: 93). Put differently, the rhetorical ingredients clear the reader's pathway in the writer's discourse toward the amassing of scientific knowledge, its application to technology, and efficiency, which are supported by the reader's choice to change and to specialize institutions. Scientific knowledge is "the central dynamic component of modern society" or "its prime mover" because it represents "the principles of secularization applied virtually without limit" (Id., 1986: 258). Scientific knowledge maximizes the reader's choice to expand knowledge, the reader's change by applying knowledge, and the reader's specialization to increase efficiency together with "critical judgment" and "wisdom" (Nida 1993: 485; Germani [1969]: 15; 1973: 80-82, 91), in the modern society. Modern society is "fact-oriented" (Wallwork 1969: 7) because

> Technology and science may control the environment, but **they** too **rest upon language** and [upon] **the passing of information and commands**, whether the language takes the form of complex mathematical symbols, or abbreviated jargon, or highly complex sentences [in highly complex discourses]. (Emphasis added.) (Id., ibid.: 6 - 7.)

In fact, "in such a society language is of course very important" (Id., ibid.: 7). Accordingly, the writer's course of action to signal relations and fulfill discourse acts prevents rhetorical ineptness in modern scientific discourse. Conversely, to oversight focusing and fulfilling (V) - (D) (see next chapter) relations is to produce a discourse at the expense of the reader's comprehension of statements of knowledge "at a time when the results of present-day scholarship in linguistic [for instance] ... **need** to be as widely accessible as possible" (emphasis added) (Germani 1973: 477). In this case, the writer's discourse does not seem to persuade the reader into sharing modernization of knowledge to societal and personal transformations, "especially in the developing countries of the world" whose people "desperately **need** meaningful access to the kinds of information

that is indispensable if such societies are to 'catch up' in ... communication," for example (emphasis added) (id., ibid.), and "want to read a wide variety of materials ..., want to learn - through reading - about ... specialized areas of knowledge that may lie outside of their field of study" (Dubin and Olshtain 1980: 354).

Oversimplifying Germani's essay (1986: 255 - 260) and chapters ([1969]: 9 - 21, 149 - 151; 1973: 76 - 105), secularization underlies modernization, or better, secularization makes modernization feasible. Without secularization, modernization in science, technology, economy, politics, personality, social relations, institutions, etc., is impossible. Modernization is characterized by expanding knowledge, applying knowledge to technology, maximizing efficiency, fostering "critical judgment', and "wisdom" (Nida, op. cit.: 465) as well. Secularizing involves choosing (as social action), changing and specializing institutions. Modernization depends on secularization that legitimizes the modern expansion of knowledge through choice, the modern application of knowledge through change, and the modern maximization of efficiency through specialization. Modernization depends on the unification of recurrent struggles, transformations, or revolutions in order for the world to be a secularized context of civilization, or better, "a new world civilization" (Germani 1986: 255).

Looked at in this way, *written language* "acts as a powerful tool" (id., ibid.: 256), and *written discourse* is a "social action," a dialectical struggle between the language system and the social system (1) "to make texts do more fully what [writers] wish them to do," (2) to create "cooperation," "sharing of meaning," understanding and agreement," "contact with people of different symbolic communities," development of [the reader's] symbolic repertoire," etc.; (3) to produce "successful, forceful communication," "statements of knowledge," "features of social structure," etc. (Bazerman 1988: 18 - 24; 291 - 298), all toward "heterogenetic" (Germani [1969]: 149), "rational" (id., 1973: 80-81; 1986: 255 et

passim), societal transformation. Complementarily, in so far as writers make their "findings as widely acceptable as possible," they are "beneficiaries of a ['secular' or secularized] society" (Nida, op. cit.: 485; Germani 1973: 80), which is "rationally organized around impersonal and utilitarian values and patterns" (Germani 1986: 255). Written discourse is one "path" (id., ibid.) leading toward modernity. Written discourse affects the individual's attitude toward transformation. In written discourse, rhetorical ingredients may be said to be a kind of language that help to maximize such societal transformation because they rid the readers of obstructions, hindrances, difficulties, or the like, in the reading process toward comprehension of statements of knowledge. Accordingly, the lack of rhetorical ingredients effects rhetorical ineptness in discourse, which delays transformation onto secularization in modern society. To tackle rhetorical ineptness in written discourse, finally, writers shall "attend to the rhetorical process in [their] understanding and production of knowledge texts" (Bazerman, op. cit.: 24). Such then are the implications thus far.

CHAPTER III

BACKGROUND RATIONAL

This chapter specifies the 'theoretical framework' that I will use in the present qualitative research into the phenomenon of 'rhetorical ineptness' of texts written by linguists, from the perspective of 'coherence' and 'cohesion'. The theoretical framework subsumes two parts. The first and leading part of the framework, under which I will arrange the second part, concerns the 'rhetorical organization' of discourse, as posited by Hoey (op. cit.). The second concerns the categorized signals of prediction as expounded by Tadros (op. cit.). Here, I will conflate Tadros' part into Hoey's inasmuch as the signalling studied by Tadros *focuses* (or *forms* or *signals*) content relations in discourse and thus *organizes* discourse *rhetorically* as studied by Hoey. Hoey's rhetorical organization and Tadros' signalling of prediction coalesce to substantiate cohesion and coherence. Tadros' notions are the supportive theoretical part that embeds into the leading part posited by Hoey. The two form the ad hoc unifying theoretical framework in my research.

Here, cohesion and coherence do not express the extremism in the cause-effect relationship as, for example, treated by Carrell (1982). In other words, I neither see cohesion as the cause of coherence nor cohesion as the effect of coherence. The two are viewed as follows.

I advocate reading and writing as two acts of co-operation that maximize comprehension of scientific knowledge texts for societal secularization by

expanding knowledge, applying knowledge to technology, acquiring efficiency, critical judgment and wisdom. In the present fact-oriented society, the two acts must interact. Writer and reader engage and the process starts. They act co-operatively. The writer's co-operation is in his contract, "the finished product - the text itself" (Dubin and Olshtain, ibid.: 355). The reader's co-operation is in the intrinsic formal and content schemata activated by the input information of the written contract. The written contract is intermediate between the two mutually unknown individuals as Dubin and Olshtain explicitly state: "It is true, the writer and reader do not share the same physical space; indeed they may be very distant from each other in both time and space. Nevertheless a relationship still exists" (Id., ibid.: 354). As mutually unknown entrants, therefore, they ultimately depend on the contract for any starting interaction or 'relationship': the contract conditions the reader's decoding of the writer's coded scientific formulations. Interaction is the ultimate proof of a straightforward and untroubled negotiation between the parties. Prompt interaction is the ultimate proof of textual plausibility. Interaction, in turn, depends on the 'synergy' or 'synergism' of meaning (created by the contractual cohesion and recreated by the contractual coherence). The intensional meaning of synergism is the combining of such two elements as coherence and cohesion to create a whole greater than a mere sum of the parts: their common ends favoring secularization and societal transformations.

As such in this research, coherence is global meaning not inscribed in the finished product; the phenomenon of meaningful content relations reconstructed by the reader from both the data constructed by the writer and the bipartite schemata inherent in the reader. Cohesion is contractual prediction inscribed in contract; the cophenomenon of content coherence; explicit rhetorical information or conventions or contrivance or qualities or ingredients; stylistic micro features used to disambiguate scientific writing; the writer's predictive and predicted purpose

straightforwardly signalled, or declared, on the surface of text as contract; the rhetorical focusing, signalling, forming of the writer's commitments and eventual fulfillment; rhetorically organizational micro features that reveal the textual threads; overt signals of prediction that counteract failures in rhetorical relationships of English technical and scientific texts as finished products.

Coherence and cohesion are to be synergetic in scientific and technical discourse. As such, the *two* coalesce into common ends: to produce co-operative venture to smooth away failures in comprehension of input statements of written scientific knowledge that contributes significantly to modernity; to tailor time-sparing texts and interpretations. Cohesion and coherence are the provision against differing interpretations of scientific formulations; against the conditions in the receptive process, such as, hindrances, constraints, stops, hardship, difficulties, derailment, bumps, mismatch, obstructions, jolts, disruption, backtracking, and the like, arisen from rhetorical ineptness, mis-signalling (unfulfillment, conflicting cues, deferment, fragmentary discourse), under-signalling (lack of cues/signals, no clear pathway), non coherence, non cohesion, etc. Sinergetically, cohesion and coherence are against the barrier to scientific knowledge; they create such great whole as the access to secularization of scientific knowledge. One is not sufficient without the other for committed writers of scientific discourse.

Committed writers purpose to produce a scientific discourse to be unambiguously interpreted by a humanity of experts or non-experts in the particular subject field of linguistics, English native or non-native literate readers scientifically aligned to societal transformations. Committed writers do not play hide-and-seek with the reader, hiding coded messages in a maze. They do not challenge the reader's capacity and patience for the deciphering of, for implicit rhetorical information of, for arbitrary content structure of, or tricky scheme of, time-consuming knowledge texts. They do not refuse to commit themselves on the

issue. Their products are not devoid of resources that foster the synergism of meaning in text or discourse.

Here, I will use the two recurrent terms 'text' and 'discourse' as one. As such, they are conceptualized "as linearizations and groupings by conjunction and embedding of ... predictions in a text base" (Enkvist 1990: 24), "as a linguistic object" or "as a series of instructions that tell the reader how to utilize the knowledge he [or she] already has, and contingently modify this knowledge in the light of the literal content" (Sanford and Garrod, ibid.: 8), and "as an operational instance of language [that] implies ... a shared system of verbal symbols"(Gregory and Carroll, op. cit.: 75).

RHETORICAL ORGANIZATION OF DISCOURSE

Hoey's (ibid.: 179) theoretical formulations about the organization of discourse are structured around the notion that written discourse may be viewed from three major descriptive perspectives: first, the description of the total set of relation network of discourse; second, the description of the signalled relations in discourse; third, the description of the reader's interpretation of discourse. As it would take me too far here to try to summarize the kernel of the three perspectives, I will embark into summarizing roughly the second perspective only, whose kernel is within the scope of my descriptive research.

In the second perspective, the organization of written discourse is viewed as a *dialogue* that reflects the decoder's linear reading. Accordingly, discourse is "a dialogue in which the reader matches his or her expectations against the answers received" (Id., Ibid.: 177) from the non-linear discourse. The reader's expectations are, say, about discourse rhetorical patterns as micro patterns that are nurtured by coherent and cohesive relationship between the prospective and retrospective

content in discourse. In the receptive process of linear reading, the reader poses his/her *questions,* produces his/her *paraphrases,* and searches for signalling as rhetorical ingredients produced in the written medium of expression. Accordingly, questions, paraphrases and signalling are useful means whereby the reader may head safely and smoothly for content relations and interpretation. Hoey typifies the descriptive text analysis of the 'organization of signalling' in discourse (i.e., the organization of *focused* patterns, or *formed* relations) as the description of 'rhetorical organization' (id., ibid.).

The notions advanced by Hoey (ibid.) highlight that signalling is an important factor in the encoding and decoding of discourse because signalling disambiguates discourse. Signalling eases the reader's job of weaving relations together to reach a click of comprehension of discourse. Signalling happens on the micro level, in the rhetorical organization of discourse, and enables the encoder to succeed in communicating to the decoder all that his/her discourse may. Signalling is put in the surface of text to guide the reader explicitly and smoothly through the parts of a discourse. Signalling may enable the encoder to make gaps in the relationship between 'non-linear network' and 'dialogue' less difficult to the reader to bridge. Signalled relations maximize comprehension and interpretation in scientific writing. Hoey defines signalled relations as "relations given focus by the encoder and are therefore those most readily decoded by the reader/auditor" (id., ibid.: 178). If, however, the encoder fails to relate sentence(s) to sentence(s) in his/her discourse by means of regulative signalling, the encoder will be producing *fragments of a discourse* (id., ibid.: 177, 180) to be presented to the decoder. The encoder will consequently give birth to the phenomenon Hoey calls 'rhetorical ineptness' in discourse (id., ibid.: 179 - 183).

As for the attendant 'rhetorical ineptness', it stems at least from the two kinds of frustration for the reader which Hoey typifies as 'mis-signalling' and 'under-

signalling' in discourse, and which Phelps (in Bamberg, op. cit.: 420) name *undercue*{-ing} and *miscue*{-ing}. The two are textual circumstanced entanglements in discourse. The distinction between the two circumstances is essential to this study, which is as follows.

Mis-signalling is the outcome of the encoder's setting up to the reader of an expectation that he/she does not satisfy in the latter parts of his/her discourse. Here, "the writer ... [tells] the reader to expect a particular question to be answered and then ... [he or she delays] supplying information ... as an acceptable answer to that question" (Id., Ibid.: 183). The unfulfillment in D cotexts, or ever deferred fulfillment, of *mis-signalled* (or *mis-formed* or *mis-focused*) and misleading predictions causes problems of "unrealized expectations" to the reader (Id., Ibid.) in a discourse that is fragmentary and, thus, "not ... coherent" (Id., Ibid.: 180).

Under-signalling is the outcome of the encoder's failing to focus (or to form, or to signal) explicitly the relations in his/her discourse. Here, the writer fails either to supply sufficient information or to relate prospective and retrospective parts; readers find "no clear focus of attention," "clear pathway through the parts" (Id., Ibid.), or too few cues, in the writer's "coherent" discourse (op. cit.), though. The *under-signalled* (or *under-formed*, or *under-focused*, or under-cued) relations cause problems of rhetorical organization, possibly leading to divergent interpretations about the scientific formulations.

Differently from Hoey, Phelps generalizes about the "failures in coherence [which] occur either because writers undercue - provide too few cues for readers to let them perceive the relationships between parts of a text - or because they miscue - give conflicting or misleading cues." Accordingly, signals or *focuses* or *cues* "facilitate a reader's integration of details in a text into a coherent whole" (Id., Ibid.). In brief, I view rhetorical aptness in scientific, technical, and mainly unfamiliar material, as 'contingent' upon the two circumstances: mis-signalling (unfulfillment,

deferred fulfillment, unrealized expectations, conflicting cues, fragmentary discourse) and under-signalling (lack of rhetorical cues, too few cues, no overtly signalled relations). Both circumstances may endanger cohesion and coherence.

In the above leading part as posited by Hoey (ibid.), which I supplemented by quoting Phelps' formulations, the signalling (or *focusing* or *cueing* or *forming*) to which I have referred will be drawn from the theoretical part as posited by Tadros (ibid.). Put differently, the *pointers* (i.e., explicit signals, focuses, cues, forms) whereby I will investigate 'rhetorical ineptness' lie within the purview of Tadros' framework of prediction. Illustratively, to this framework belong such signalling of prediction as 'textual place reference items', 'linear and non-linear text words', 'reporting past-time adjuncts', 'recalled data', 'nominalizations', to name but a few. In short, the ad hoc signalling here assembled is from Tadros' theoretical part, which I will reconcile around Hoey's leading part: the general framework of two interrelating systems in this research. Thus, rhetorical organization is here performed by, and connected with, such micro devices as the categorized signals of prediction, as follows.

PREDICTION IN TEXT

Tadros' theoretical formulations about the organization of discourse are structured around the notion that prediction in text is a linguistic device that unambiguously discloses to readers a writer's foregoing commitment to provide specific textualizations in an ensuing part of his/her written text. According to Tadros, written text is the medium for, or the mediation of, 'negotiation' between the writer's construct of experiences and the reader's reconstruction of such experiences. In her view, written text is interactive (although non-reciprocal) and its interaction is maximized by six categories of prediction, namely: *Enumeration*,

Advance Labelling, *Reporting*, *Recapitulation*, *Hypotheticality*, and *Question*. Each category of prediction for interaction in written discourse has specific signals and criteria for identification of types. Here, I will summarize the signals and criteria in structural representations. Illustrations will be provided in square brackets, below.

The criteria enable the researcher (or the reader) to identify each category in a binary relation made up by the basic structural unit of discourse. The basic discourse unit to which Tadros refers is the *pair* made up of a *predicted* item embedded into a *predictive* item. The predictiVe item she calls *V* member. The predicteD item she calls *D* member. The V member comes first and advances a prediction that is fulfilled by the D member, that is, the textualization coming afterwards in text. Every pair of V and D members carries distinctive signals of prediction by means of which the writer enables readers to grasp, apprehend the writer's discourse act (commitment, promise, claim, prediction) in an unambiguously written text as Tadros then declares:

> A piece of text which does not have a signal of prediction cannot be said to **unambiguously** [emphasis added] commit the writer to a certain course of action and it is by virtue of the signal that the reader will be able to recognize the commitment. (Id., Ibid.: 6)

Furthermore, Tadros conclusively comments on the categorized signals of prediction as follows:

> Thus if there is a signal the reader can predict what the writer will do; if there is no signal the reader may anticipate [guess] what the writer will do, making use of his own common sense, knowledge of the world, etc. and relying upon tacit assumptions of human cooperation without which no interaction can proceed. (Ibid.)

Needless to say, 'anticipation' and 'tacit assumptions', when in a discourse that does not provide the decoder with any suitably 'signalled encoding scheme' of experiences, may lead the reader to become entangled in his/her decoding, specially in the case of long texts, as the ones analysed in this dissertation. This

assumption is consistent with Phelps' observation that "When such cues are missing [in discourse], readers *may* [emphasis added] be unable to make this integration" (Id., Ibid.). In other words, a discourse that fails to signal does not venture explicit help to free the reader from misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the content relations there imparted.

The signals and criteria that isolate the types of, and the notions of authorial 'involvement' plus 'realization' in, the V and D members of **Enumeration** (as the first category of prediction), are here summarized together in the following three structural representations: (1) A plural subject + a verb + a colon in V, + the cohesive realization as new information in D, for instance: [Clause relations may be divided into: logical sequence, and matching relations.] (2) A cataphoric textual place reference item + a plural noun + a colon in V, + the cohesive textual realization as new information in D, for instance: [Matching relations are as follows: contrast, and compatibility.] (3) An exact numeral or an inexact numeral + a sub-technical noun or a discourse self-reference noun in V, + the cohesive textual realization of new information in D, for instance: [Two tasks of discourse analysts are: to discover what favours the reader's interpretation, and to discover what ensures that interpretation occurs.] Hence for the V member the author use signals, such as: **colon, textual place reference items** (i.e., the following, as follows, etc.), **sub-technical nouns** (i.e., aspects, functions, etc.), **discourse self-reference nouns** (i.e., definitions, examples, etc.), **exact numerals** (i.e., two, three, etc.), **inexact numerals** (i.e., a number of, several, etc.), etc. The signals for the D member of Enumeration structure may be the features of textual layout, or devices of cohesion, such as: **italics, numbering, punctuation, sequencing signals, grammatical parallelism, lexical repetition, new information,** etc. (Id., Ibid.: 17-22).

The signals and criteria that isolate the types of, and the notions of authorial 'involvement' plus authorial 'realization' in, the V and D members of **Advance Labelling** (as the second category of prediction), are here summarized together in the following three structural representations: (1) The writer's prospective labelling of discourse act in V, + the realization by a linear text in D, for instance: [It will be helpful to distinguish between broad questions, narrow questions, high-level questions, and low-level questions. Broad questions allows for convenient generalization. Narrow questions reflect the relationship holding between the two parts of a particular discourse. High-level questions elicit a large portion of text. Low-level questions elicit a small portion of discourse.] (2) The writer's prospective labelling of discourse act + a non-linear text noun in V, + the realization of the non-linear text in D, for instance: [It will be helpful to distinguish between broad questions and narrow questions in the following table. The TABLE.] (3) The writer's prospective labelling of "two" discourse acts implied in 'Consider' + a non-linear text noun in V, + the realization of the non-linear text in Da + the realization of the attendant linear text in Db, for instance: [Consider the following TABLE. In the foregoing table, broad questions are ... whereas narrow questions are ...] Hence for the V member the author use signals, such as: **'Let us', 'Consider', verbs** (i.e., classify, discuss, examine, etc.), **verb phrases** (i.e., make clear, put forward, deal with, etc.), **non-linear text words** (i.e., Tables and Figures), etc. The D member of Advance Labelling structure may be: **linear text** (i.e., the writer's explanation toward interpretation, etc.), and **non-linear text** (Tables: index, output, payment, quotations, etc.; Figures: bill, curve, diagram, graphic, etc.) (Id., Ibid.: 24-28).

The signals and criteria that isolate the types of, and the notions of authorial 'detachment' plus authorial 'evaluation' in, the V and D members of **Reporting** (as the third category of prediction), are here summarized in the following structural representation: (1) A reporting and reported pair or a quoting and quoted pair or a

reporting past-time adjunct in V, + an evaluation: a rebuttal or a non-rebuttal in D, for instance: ["There is no reason why this should be so, since written texts have to be coherent as well as cohesive, and there is ample evidence that dialogic interactions conform to the rules of cohesion as well as being coherently negotiated," said James (1980: 103). However, we shall insist on the difference between 'texts analysis' and 'discourse analysis' on account of the fact that ...] Hence the signals for V member, such as: **reporting matrix clauses** (i.e., factive or non-factive reporting verb/verb phrase + 'that' complement or a nominal group complement + an appositional 'that' clause; factive or non-factive quoting verb/verb, + the quoted part), **factive reporting verbs** (i.e., verbs that prevent D rebuttal, e.g., prove, show, etc.), **non-factive reporting verbs** (i.e., verbs that predict D rebuttal, e.g., think, believe, etc.), **verb phrases** (i.e., look on/upon, point out, etc.), **reporting past-time adjuncts** (i.e., adjuncts that predict D rebuttal, e.g., formerly, at first, etc.), **'it was customary'**, **'it used to be'**, opening and closing **double** and **single quotation marks**, etc. The signals for the **D** member of Report structure may be: **the shift from V past tense to D present tense**, **conjuncts** (as the concessive contrastive 'however'), **an incompatible D proposition**, etc. (Id., ibid.: 28-35).

The signals and criteria that isolate the types of, and the notions of authorial 'involvement' plus new authorial 'information' in, the V and D members of **Recapitulation** (as the fourth category of prediction), are here summarized in the following four structural representations: (1) A writer's discourse act as past predicator in finite declarative clauses + a textual time relationship adverbial emphasizing recency and/or a place reference item in V, + new and contrastive data in D, for instance: [It has already been seen that 'network' and 'signalling' are two potential descriptions of any discourse. To these descriptions, however, another has to be added, namely, that of the reader's 'interpretation' of discourse.]

(2) A writer's discourse act as past participle predicator in non-finite declarative clauses + a textual time relationship adverbial and/or a place reference item in V, + new and contrastive data in D, for instance: As already noted, 'network' and 'signalling' are two potential descriptions of any discourse. To these descriptions, however, another has to be added, namely, that of the reader's 'interpretation' of discourse.]

(3) A writer's discourse act as past participle predicator in nominalizations + a textual time relationship adverbial and/or a place reference item in V, + new and contrastive data in D, for instance: [Reference has been made to 'network' and 'signalling' as two potential descriptions of any discourse. To these descriptions, however, another has to be added, namely, that of the reader's 'interpretation' of discourse.] (4) The paragraph-initiating conjunct of inferential nature 'Then' in V, + new and contrastive data in D, for instance: ['Network' and 'signalling' are then two potential descriptions of any discourse. To these descriptions, however, another has to be added, namely, that of the reader's 'interpretation' of discourse.] Hence the following signals in the V member: **recalled data**, **inflectional bound morphemes for** regular and irregular past and past participle **predicators** (i.e., {-ed}, {-en}, etc.) as the writer's discourse labelled act, verbs (e.g., discuss, examine, etc.), verb phrases (e.g., find out, point out, etc.), **finite declarative clauses** (e.g., 'It has been seen', etc.) , **non-finite declarative clauses** (e.g., 'As already noted', etc.) , **textual recency-emphasizing adverbial** (e.g., already, just, etc.), **place reference items** (e.g., above, in the preceding chapter, etc.), **nominalizations** (e.g., 'Rectification was defined', etc.), **the inferential conjunct 'Then'**, etc. The signals for the D member of Recapitulation structure may be: **new and contrastive data**, etc. (Id., ibid.: 35-42).

The signals and criteria that isolate the types of, and the notions of authorial 'detachment' plus authorial 'involvement' in, the V and D members of

Hypotheticality (as the fifth category of prediction), are here summarized in the following five structural representations: (1) The pragmatic introductory particle of the first person of imperative mood 'Let us' + a lexical verb + a nominalization in V, + a 'factual' generalization in D, for instance: [Let us consider the case of a rhetorically inept text that is long, complex, and monolithic. Conflicting interpretations may arise in readers.] (2) The pragmatic introductory particle of the third person of imperative mood 'Let' + a noun phrase + 'be' + a noun phrase in V, + a 'factual' generalization in D, for instance: [Let the textual problem be under-signalling. There is a lack of rhetorically organized predictions in text.] (3) A fictitious proper name in V, + a 'factual' generalization in D, for instance: ["When Robinson Crusoe found a quantity of gold coins in the wrecked ship he was doubtful whether they were worth the trouble of taking them ashore." Doubt implies reservations about persons, acts, etc.] (Id., Ibid.: 45). (4) The simple subordinator 'If' + a non-factual noun phrase + a past subjunctive verb in a verb phrase (in the subordinate conditional clause), + a noun phrase + a verb phrase: a past modal in a perfective or nonperfective construction (as the matrix clause) in V, + a 'factual' generalization in D, for instance: ["If the factors, land, labour and capital had to be combined in a fixed proportion in order to carry out any particular kind of production, there would be no problem of proportions to be solved ..."] (Ib., Ibid.: 45). (5) The simple subordinator 'If' (unparaphrasable by 'whenever') + a nonfactual noun phrase + a present indicative or subjunctive verb in a verb phrase (in the subordinate conditional clause), + a noun phrase + a verb phrase: a present or past modal in a perfective or nonperfective construction (as the matrix clause) in V, + a 'factual' generalization in D, for instance: ["If a man is confronted by a choice between living in a larger house and running a motor car, the real cost of running the motor car, if he chooses that alternative, would be the larger house he had to do without."] (Id., Ibid.: 45).

Hence the signals for the V member, such as: **specificity** (i.e., simplification), **nonfactual data** (i.e., noun phrases, world), **'Let us'**, **'Let'**, lexical **verbs** (e.g., assume, suppose, consider, etc.), **verb phrases** (e.g., there would be, would be, had to be combined, etc.), **nominalizations** (i.e., noun phrases, e.g., 'The actor's bad performance of the role', 'The role's bad performance by the actor', etc.), **nonfactual proper names** (Sherlok Holmes, Ebenezer Scrooge, etc.), **'If'**, present indicative verbs, past subjunctive verbs, subordinate **conditional clauses** with direct hypothetical (or closed or unreal or rejected or nonfactual or counterfactual or marked) condition, **matrix clauses**, **past modals in perfective or nonperfective constructions**, etc. The signals for the D member of Hypotheticality structure may be: **nonspecificity** (i.e., generalization from the specificity of the hypothetical statements), **factual data** (i.e., restatements of hypothetical statements), the reinforcing subtype of additive conjunct **'Again'**, the assertive and negative determinative and intensifier **'No'**, etc. (Id., Ibid.: 42-48).

The signals and criteria that isolate the types of, and the notions of authorial 'detachment' and authorial 'involvement' in, the V and D members of **Question** (as the sixth category of prediction), are here summarized in the following two structural representation: (1) A question not as heading in V, + the writer's 'straightaway' state of knowledge about the V question, in the D, for instance: ["Can this statement be reconciled with a theory of scarcity? Indeed, it can, since ..."] (Id., Ibid.: 50). (2) A question as heading in V, + an intervening discussion , + the writer's 'deferred' state of knowledge about the V question, in the D, for instance: ["What is 'Text Frame'?" Pedagogical implications have to be treated before the answer. The efficient teacher ... Text-decoding skills can be exercised through ... Text frame is a powerful pedagogical tool that enable readers not only to draw attention to the micro and macro structures of a text but also to provide a systematic way of approaching other aspects of teaching with text.] Hence for the

V member the author use signals, such as: an **interrogative sentence at section level**, **interrogation mark**, a **Socratic question**, etc. The D member of Question structure may be: **the writer's answer** to the V question (id., ibid.: 48-52).

The six categories of prediction may happen in *simple patterning* or *complex patterning* (id., ibid.: 53). Simple patterning is the occurrence of a predictive member and the appendant predicted member. Complex patterning is the occurrence of predictive and predicted members intermingled with one another as *discontinuity*, *embedding*, and *overlap* pair patterns of prediction (illustrated below in three *rhetorical structures* framed in accordance with the transcription conventions for this dissertation). The **discontinuity** pair pattern is "the physical occurrence in text of one pair or pairs within another pair" as in (V1), (V2) ~ (D2), (D1). The **embedding** pair pattern is the physical occurrence in text of "one pair acting as one member of another pair" as in (V1) ~ (D1) : (V2) ~ (D2). The **overlap** pair pattern is "a kind of discontinuity where the V member of one pair occurs physically between the V and D members of another pair" as in (V1), (V2), (D1), (D2) (id., ibid.: 53 - 54).

THE COALESCENCE OF HOEY'S AND TADROS' THEORIES

The coalescence of Hoey's and Tadros' foregoing theoretical considerations prompt me to conceive of one whole, and devise it to be the axis of the theoretical framework for the present research. I typify the axis *the rhetorically organized prediction*, which I conceptualize as *control centers* (De Beaugrande and Dressler, ibid.: 39), "points from which accessing and processing can be strategically done" in discourse, or as control *metatext*{-s} (Enkvist 1990: 24), language that describes the rhetorical composition of a written text (discourse, operational instance of language, linearizations, groupings, linguistic object, knowledge material), or as

textual *forestructures*, the textual threads anticipatively outlined by the writer to guide subsequently the interplay of written scientific formulations. The control metatext is a positive orthographic rhetorical prediction in knowledge text; a micro pattern of cohesive rhetorical organization of content coherence in scientific material. It is identified by the predictiVe and predicteD categorized signals (interaction mechanics, integration mechanics, rhetorical cues or clues, rhetorical ties, rhetorical micro-features, stylistic rhetorical devices, rhetorical conventions, rhetorical pointers, rhetorical ingredients) for rhetorical balance. Characteristically, the rhetorically organized prediction is *regulatory*, *global-local*, and *persuasive-cooperative* micro-patterns planned in the productive process of scientific material in favour of the ease with which the receptive processing is to be activated.

A micro-pattern is 'regulatory' because it controls and adjusts discourse for the textual plausibility of scientific formulations, in conformity to the requirements specified by the structural representations of Enumeration, Advance Labelling, Reporting, Recapitulation, Hypotheticality, and Question categories of prediction. The categorized requirements qualify a prediction as *standard* (superficially positive, plausible, explicit, signalled, direct, overt, formed, focused, cued, and the like) or *substandard* (nonstandard, unsaid, nonplausible, anomalous, implicit, indirect, covert, unsignalled, pseudo-forestructure, etc.). It clarifies the rhetorical encoding scheme of formulations. It favours content relations and synergetic meaning in the non-linear productive process and the chain-like, linear, receptive process. It paves the trail of encoding and decoding. It supports explicitly the (V) ~ (D) members of prediction-based pair patterns. It nurtures formulations, and helps to eliminate detrimental conditions in the receptive processing. Regulatory micro-patterns steer the language of written discourse, mainly the instructional language of technical and scientific description, away from the circumstanced rhetorical ineptness, and ease the reader's building of the overall coherence, and of the

diagrammatically represented information structure, of a contract (see Enkvist 1990: 13 - 21; 1987: 24 - 26).

A micro-pattern is 'global-local' because, as a signally intertwined (V) ~ (D) simple or complex rhetorically organized pair-pattern of prediction, the global (V) *cotext* introduces the general content of a text. Global prediction is a part-whole-relation-based prediction; it syncretizes different, local, predictive members of textual prediction; it reconciles into an introductory amalgamation all the differing local predictions, each of which to be developed in ensuing groupings. The global cotext reveals inclusiveness, and thus encompasses the local cotexts. The global forestructure exhibits explicitly the rhetorically organized scheme of predictions. Local prediction is a whole-part-relation-based prediction, a predictive member of textual prediction, a predictive member of the global amalgamation. The local cotext is the individual treatment of a prediction in a specific grouping. An illustration of global prediction is as follows: "In this chapter, we purpose to evaluate jargon after, first classing it, second illustrating it, third listing its five defining ingredients, fourth explaining its semantic traits, and finally reporting some recorded objections to its use" (Text D, Chapter IV, this dissertation). Each of the existing prediction included in the above global forestructure is a local prediction. Still, global and local (V) segments advance signally an authorial "definite commitment" to events in discourse and the (D) segment grants co-responsively the physical "occurrence" of the discourse events (Francis, op. cit.: 34). Global-local explicit members encapsulate cohesively and coherently the scope of the text.

A (V) ~ (D) micro-pattern is potentially 'persuasive' and 'co-operative' because it has the interactive nature of the agreement between the committed writer (addressor, encoder, text sender, author) and the specialist learner (reader, addressee, decoder, text receiver, comprehender) to negotiate the 'synergism' between content-coherence-cotext-cohesion and 'secularization' of knowledge

required by the present fact-oriented society. By considering the 'essentials' (as the suasive categorized stylistic micro features) to tailor 'rhetorically organized predictions' (as micro-patterns of written texts), committed writers try to help to persuade favorably readers to move toward transformations. The essentials help to nurture the course of reasoning to fit the reader's need for the secularized modernization of scientific knowledge. Persuasive micro-patterns venture the necessary co-operation through discourse as a means to definite ends.

The persuasive-cooperative, global-local and regulatory control metatexts are micropattern-based sources of printed help, and happen in simple pair patterning and/or in such complex patterning, which specifies/specify the physical place of pairs occurring in text. Complex patterning may be: discontinuity, embedding, overlap, and that which I call *amalgamation*. I conceptualize the 'amalgamation' complex patterning as the prospective cotext of prediction that explicitly: ( ), or implicitly: [ ], engulfs two or more (V) members at the same time, for instance, (V1-V2), etc., encoded in the same complex or compound orthographic sentence. An amalgamated predictive member is one double or threefold, etc. structure of prediction, whose (D1), (D2) cotexts are to be appendant at the writer's convenience. Failures in attention to simple or complex control metatexts evince the phenomenon of rhetorical ineptness, the causes of which are mis-signalling (or *miscueing*) and under-signalling (or *undercueing*).

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF TEXTS

In this chapter, I will analyze transcribed portions of five chapters selected as data for this research. In considering Hoey's words with regard to the fact that "close analysis is never easy reading" (op. cit.: 62), I shall recommend readers a careful reading of the five chapters provided in the Appendix, as absolutely necessary to any understanding of the questions I will raise.

Text A (Wallwork 1969: 1 - 13)

The actual matter under consideration in Wallwork's chapter is *the various uses of language*. Language is there outlined to be used for: *phatic communion*, *ceremonial purposes*, *action*, *records*, *orders*, *information*, *influence*, *self-expression*, and *thought*. Each use of language is examined individually. The examination as a whole is attempted to be a *perhaps possible* and *preliminary* definition of language.

At a first reading, text A struck me as mis-signalled and, therefore, rhetorically inept. Guided by surface cohesion, content coherence and my schematic knowledge, I anticipated that text A would admit of improvements. In this text, the first prediction is present in the overt signal *What is Language?* in the title, and in the Question category of prediction. The interrogative sentence in syntax, at section level, as heading in (V1), posed at the beginning of the thirteen-page chapter, commits the encoder to provide the reader with a relevant answer in the chapter. I

classified the overt signal *What is Language?* as in the predictive category of Question because it is an example of the 2nd structural representation of Question. Sampling the bottom-up information to confirm my top-down prediction about a printed answer to (V1) resulted in a not compatible and not interactive movement. Actually, the (V1) Question, which enticed me as a specialist learner into reading the chapter as raw content material needed for the teaching of linguistics, seemed to be unfulfilled. The unfulfilled predicted member of the predictive category of Question seemed to be the disruptive circumstance present in text A because the response the encoder supplies later, with long deferment, is not the specific linguistic event elicited by the predictive Question structure.

In order to clarify the rhetorically inept organization of the discourse as the disruptive circumstance in the condition experienced, I as a specialist learner revised the following transcribed portion of text by positing inferentially plain-sense, and follow-up, questions.

(V1): (V2-V3), (V4)

(V1) (1:1) - "What is Language?" (2:1) - At least one book has been entitled 'What is Language?' (...) (V2-V3) (3:1) But if 'What is Language?' is for the moment, difficult to answer, it is perhaps possible to begin by looking at the various uses people make of language. (...) (V2-V3) (4:2) - Let us examine some ways of using human language. [D2] [D3] (5:2) - Jones (...). (...) (6:12) - Language is used for: (...). [D1] (7:12) - But the question 'What is Language?' still remains unanswered. (8:12) - The answer will inevitably be complex, and if a listing of the uses of language helps to an understanding, it is still only a preliminary. (V4) (9:12) - In order to attempt an answer, it will be necessary to chop language up in rather arbitrary ways (...).

DOES THE WRITER PROMISE TO DO SOMETHING IN TEXT A? Yes, he does it by means of (V1) in 1) and 2), to begin. WHAT DOES THE WRITER PROMISE TO DO IN (V1)? To *answer* his posited Question *What is Language?* despite being *difficult to answer* it, as admitted in 3). DOES THE WRITER FULFIL HIS (V1) PROMISE? No. In fact, he acknowledges at the end of the thirteen-page chapter that *the* predictive *question 'What is Language? still remains unanswered*, in 7). WHAT DOES *STILL* IMPLY IN 7)? Inferentially, *still* in 7) (as a time-

relationship subjunct) seems to correspond in semantic force to the concessive relation between a 'past' *moment* with a 'present' or 'future' *moment* in 3). In the sentence *But the question 'What is Language?' still remains unanswered*, *still* can carry the implication that the answer to the Question structure 'is not fulfilled in the preceding section of the chapter' but ' is likely to be fulfilled in the foregoing section of the chapter'. In the former, the writer attempts the first answer to (V1); in the latter, the writer attempts the second answer to (V1).

THE FIRST ATTEMPT

WHAT IS THE FIRST ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE THE ANSWER PREDICTED BY (V1)? The tentative answer elicited by the amalgamated prediction following (V1). WHICH AMALGAMATED PREDICTION? The following (V2-V3) prediction in 3): *it is perhaps possible to begin* [to answer the (V1) Question] *by looking at the various uses people make of language*, which is recurrent in 4): *Let us examine some ways of using human language*. WHICH IS THE FIRST ANSWER ELICITED BY THE (V2-V3) AMALGAMATION? The [D2] *examina*{-tion} of [D3] *functions* of *language* in eleven pages of the chapter that are represented in the transcribed portion above from sentence 5) up to 6). IS THE FIRST ANSWER UNDER (V2-V3) COMPATIBLE AND INTERACTIVE WITH THE (V1) QUESTION? No, because the ensuing first answer tentatively provided under (V2-V3) to (V1) is later qualified by the author himself as *only a* [*possible*] *preliminary*. WHY IS THE TENTATIVE ANSWER TO (V1) A [POSSIBLE *PRELIMINARY*]? First, because the writer thinks that it is *perhaps possible to begin* to answer his posited (V1) Question by engaging in an Advance Labelling amalgamated with Enumeration structure as (V2-V3) to *look at the various uses people make of language* as in 3). Second, because the *examina*{-tion} of, and *the uses of language* under (V2-V3) are a first attempt that later is seen to demand a second attempt to the answer. The first answer is not made compatible and interactive with

the 'definition' elicited by the (V1) Question. Tentatively, though, my extrapolative textual inference creates the following definition elliptical from the formulations encoded in text A: [*human language* seems to be a tool by which people communicate various *functions*]. No predicted definition is explicitly put on the textual surface indeed.

THE SECOND ATTEMPT

WHAT IS THE SECOND ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE THE ANSWER PREDICTED BY (V1)? The attempt encoded in the ensuing (V4) Advance Labelling structure: *to chop language up in rather arbitrary ways* as in 9), which he does not fulfil at least in the chapter. WHY A SECOND ATTEMPT? Because the (V2-V3) amalgamation is considered *only a preliminary*. As such, the writer engages in (V4).

In text A, the (V1) title *What is Language?* is a rhetorical signalling that does not nurture or describe "the content of the chapter" as it implies by its semantic and pragmatic nature that it would (Turablan 1987: 10). The overt micro feature on the textual surface of discourse persuaded me unfavorably to read the thirteen-page text not to find the [D1] answer to the (V1) Question. The caption is a deceiving signalling because the content of the chapter only starts the encoder on the fulfilled (V2-V3), *the various uses* (...) *of language* in 3), and on the unfulfilled (V4), 'the cuts of language', not on the conceptual meaning of *Language* as promised in (V1).

The encoder of text A poses one interrogative sentence whereby he requests himself to one definite commitment, which he does not fulfil. He does not supply in an adjacent [D1] the bottom-up information elicited by the (V1) Question structure, and needed as well as expected by me as the specialist learner. The encoder is fully aware from the start to the end of the chapter that the predicted answer is *difficult* as shown in 3), and *complex* as shown in 8), to supply, and his promise is

hopeless *for the moment* in 3), that is, for the first chapter actually devoted to listing *various* language functions. The predictive (V1) Question structure *What is Language?* in 1), 2), 3) and 7), *remains unanswered* up to the end of the chapter, as openly acknowledged by the encoder in 7).

Accordingly, text A is rhetorically inept with regards 'mainly' to the unfulfilling predictive category of Question. The rhetorical ineptness is the resultant of mis-signalling on account of the fact that its encoder fails to give proper care to the cataphoric realization of a discourse act, that is, to define language rather than list language *functions* or *chop language up*. The language functions on which he lingers throughout the chapter could have been more effectively signalled in/by a chapter title like [What are the *ways of using human language*?] as in 4) or like [What are the functions of language?] so as to avoid the circumstance of mis-signalling at the beginning of the text and the consequent frustrated expectation in the reader. In this knowledge text, therefore, the writer does not attend to the rhetorical process of organizing text due to the fact that the (V1) member of prediction mainly, which is never fulfilled, mis-signals the contract.

Text B (Wallwork 1969: 2 - 12)

At a second reading of text A, now considered as text B, I ventured to qualify text B as both rhetorically organized and rhetorically inept. On the one hand, it is rhetorically organized in forming two explicitly signalled predictive members encoded in an amalgamated pair patterning of prediction: the (V2) Advance Labelling that amalgamated the (V1) Enumeration structure: *Let us examine some ways of using human language*. Notice that reference to V and D now is independent from the analysis carried out in the previous section. The (V1-V2) amalgamation definitely commits the encoder both to examining *ways* of using

human language, as (V2), and to enumerating *some* of the ways, as (V1). Seemingly, text B is rhetorically nurtured by the amalgamated prediction.

On the other hand, it is rhetorically inept in under-signalling the predicted member of (V1) Enumeration to be treated below. Accordingly, the encoder fulfills the (V2) ~ [D2] pair of prediction of Advance Labelling by truly examining the *ways* of using human language. As for the (V1) ~ [D1] pair of prediction of Enumeration, however, [D1] is fulfilled but not in a rhetorically organized D plan. In the [D1] member of Enumeration (inherent in the [D2] realization of the manifest V2 member of prediction of Advance Labelling), the encoder does not enumerate by means of explicit signalling the *ways* in the linear text. The encoder fails to form clearly the [D1] language functions on display in the [D2] cotext of *examin*ation. in other words, the encoder does not attend to the rhetorical focuses to organize unambiguously the implicitly predicted outline examined in the prospective cotext. The [D1] information sought by the (V1) member of Enumeration is rhetorically insufficient for the optimal (V1) realization. The [D1] information follows the amalgamation without clear focus of attention along the [D2] realization under the (V2) commitment of the contract, to the point of blurring to the comprehender the boundaries, or adjacent groupings, of formulations. The linear text that covers the [D1] language functions under [D2] examination lacks sequencing ties of cohesion. I placed the disruptive circumstance of text B, therefore, in the unfocused (or uncued or unformed or unsignalled), or better, under-signalled linearizations of the [D1] member of the Enumeration structure in the amalgamated prediction.

In order to organize rhetorically the literal content of the underlying predicted member of Enumeration in a text frame and to tackle the eventual derailment in reading, I revised analytically the following illustrative, transcribed portions of texts by posing plain-sense, and follow-up questions, and by resorting to lexical, evaluative and extrapolative inferences as follows.

(V1-V2)

(V1-V2) (1:2) - Let us examine some ways of using human language.

WHAT DOES THE WRITER PROMISE TO DO IN THE EXPLICIT V2 AND V1 MEMBERS OF THE AMALGAMATED PREDICTION? In (V2), to *examine* (...) *ways of using human language*, prior to whose fulfillment the writer is, in (V1), to enumerate *some ways*, on account of the fact that a [D1] 'examinee' has to be formed in advance of a [D2] 'examination'. Admittedly, the encoder predicts that he is to list *some* ways, truly listing them in the cataphoric linear text. By using *some* the encoder's responsibility to explicit signalling is intentionally or unintentionally reduced but is not dismissed. WHICH ARE THE SIGNALS? The double prediction is overtly signalled by the writer's prospective labelling of discourse act *Let us examine* in 1), by the inexact numeral *some* and the sub-technical plural noun of the Enumerabies class *ways*, together with the linear text the writer provided ahead as the new information to the context of text B.

[D1], [D2]

(*WAYS* AND *EXAMINATION*)

IS THERE A PERCEIVABLE ORDER INTO WHICH THE ENCODER SETS THE [D1] ENUMERATION AND THE [D2] EXAMINATION OF *WAYS*? There is a perceivable order but of the interfering circumstances inherent in [D1] and [D2] encoded portion of text. WHAT ARE THE INTERFERING CIRCUMSTANCES PERCEIVABLE IN THE [D1] AND [D2] MEMBERS? The nonplausible terminating lines between groupings of [D2] examination, and nonplausible list of [D1] *ways of using human language*. Under-signalling is inherent in [D1] and [D2]. HOW MANY *WAYS* DO I IDENTIFY FROM THE UNDER-SIGNALLED STRETCH? Inferentially, seven [D1] ways here identified as [D1i], [D1ii], [D1iii], [D1iv], [D1v], [D1vi], and [D1vii] to be illustrated and treated below.

[D1i], [D1ii]

(THE *'PHATIC' WAY* AND THE *' CEREMONIAL' WAY*)

[D1i] [D2i] (2:2) - Jones is exercising his dog in the park and meets Smith with his dog. (3:2) Jones says cheerfully, 'Morning, Peter. How's things?' (4:2) Smith grunts and says something that sounds like 'So-so'. (...) - (5.3) In its private form this 'phatic' communion, as Malinowski called this part of speech behaviour which is mainly polite talk, greetings and rather meaningless exchanges of words, is socially necessary, (...). (6:4) - Private 'phatic' communion then, serves primarily to establish our social relationships with each other.

[D1ii] [D2ii] (7:4) There is a (...) more public, use of language (...). (8:4) (...), whereby we seek to soften the desolation of life, or to assure future wellbeing, either in life or death. (9:4) (...), the 'ceremonial' communion may seek to establish a relationship between man and god, or between man and some abstract and formal ideal. (10:4) When such ritual and ceremonial use of language is (...). (11:5) - It is not, of course, true that in all ceremonial or ritual uses of language, choice of words is of such relatively minor importance; (...). (12:5) Sometimes words have the power of action themselves. (13:6) - In using language to give orders, to control other people and things, a precise and logical use is necessary.

DOES THE WRITER FORM THE [D1] *WAYS* TO BE EXAMINED IN [D2]? The first two *ways* or functions are formed in nonstandard rules that deprive the text of predicted rhetorical accuracy. HOW NONSTANDARD? By the use, for instance, of a pair of single quotation marks, or better, a single inverted comma at the beginning of, plus a single apostrophe at the end of, each of the first two ways, supposedly to distinguish the two in the two groupings of examination of functions. The two groupings are distinguished from the under-signalled rest of the [D1] and [D2] sections of text. WHICH ARE THE TWO FUNCTIONS FOCUSED BY NONSTANDARD RULES IN [D1] OF TEXT B? The [D1i] function: the *'phatic'* in 5) and 6), and the [D1ii] function: the *'ceremonial'* in 9). WHAT ORTHOGRAPHIC SENTENCE MARKS IMPLICITLY THE TERMINATING LINE BETWEEN THE [D1i], [D2i] GROUPING AND THE [D1ii], [D2ii] GROUPING OF LANGUAGE FUNCTIONS AND EXAMINATION? The comparative clause of nonequivalence *There is a* (...) *more public* use of language, in 7). HOW? By the use of the clause element *more public* in the matrix clause that specifies the implicit standard of comparison: *public*{-ness} in 7). WITH WHAT BASIS OF COMPARISON DOES THE CLAUSE ELEMENT 7) RELATE? With the *'phatic'* use of language given in the correlative subordinate clause 6), which is elliptical in 7). WHY ELLIPTICAL IN

7)? Because part of the correlative subordinate clause in 6) is an implied repetition of an explicit part given in the matrix clause 7). WHAT EXPLICIT PART? The *use of language*. WHAT IS THE FULL COMPARATIVE CLAUSE OF NONEQUIVALENCE IMPLIED IN THE CLAUSE ELEMENT AND THE BASIS OF COMPARISON GIVEN IN 6), 7) AND 9) TOGETHER? [*'Ceremonial'* , in 9), *use of language*, in 7), *is more public*, in 7), (...) than the *'phatic' use of language* (is), in 5) and 6)]. [The *phatic* way is *private*] as in 5) and 6).

[D1iii]

(THE *FACTUAL WAY*)

[D1iii] [D2iii] (14:6) - To some extent we control our present in the light of our past. (15:6) A primitive people preserves its history (...). (16:6) A more sophisticated society deposits its records in printed, written, taped or filmed form (...). (17:6) No language, no history. (18:6-7) Technology and science may control the environment, but they too rest upon language and the passing of information and commands (...). (19:7) - Such factual uses of language are essential (...).

WHAT ORTHOGRAPHIC SENTENCE MARKS IMPLICITLY THE TERMINATING LINE BETWEEN THE [D1ii], [D2ii] AND THE [D1iii], [D2iii] GROUPINGS OF EXAMINATION AND LANGUAGE FUNCTIONS? Sentence 14): *To some extent we control our present in the light of our past.* WHY? Because sentence 14) introduces abruptly a change of topics. WHAT NEW TOPICS? New underlying links made by language, for instance, between the human *present* and *past* in the transcribed 14), and between *technology* and *science* in 18): *Technology and science may control the environment, but they too rest upon language and the passing of information and commands.* WHAT [D1iii] LANGUAGE FUNCTION DOES THE NONSTANDARD FOCUS INTRODUCE? The *factual* in 19): *Such factual uses of language are essential.* The *factual* way embraces hypernymically the anaphoric hyponymic terms *'present'* , *'past'* , *technology* and *science.*

[D1iv]

(THE *EMOTIVE WAY*)

[D1iv] [D2iv] (20:7) But the mass of verbiage (...), the streams of fact (...). (21:7) (...) tend to bring the status of 'fact' into question. (...) (22:7) Again, the often emotive use of language used to report a 'fact' adds an extra quality (...) not distinguished from the fact itself. (23:7) The emotive use of language (...).

WHAT ORTHOGRAPHIC SENTENCE FOCUSES THE TERMINATING LINE BETWEEN THE [D1iii], [D2iii] AND THE [Div], [D2iv] SECTIONS OF EXAMINATION AND LANGUAGE USES? Sentence 20): *But the mass of verbiage* (...), *the streams of fact* (...). WHY? Because the introductory conjunction *But* in 20) expresses an upcoming contrast, thereby introducing the fourth function or *way*. [D1iv] is prefaced by the replacive subtype of contrastive conjunct *Again* in 22). WHAT IS THE FOURTH FUNCTION? The [D1iv] function is the *emotive*, in 22) recurring in 23).

[D1v], [D1vi], [D1vii]

(THE *SELF-EXPRESSION*-RELATED, *THOUGHT*-RELATED, AND *PERCEPTION*-RELATED, *WAYS*)

[D1v] [D2v] (24:7) - Is there anything common between a hearty 'Damnation!' and the strains of 'Marriage of Figaro' issuing from the bathroom? (...) (25:8) (...), for the use in these cases is largely one of self-expression (...). (26:8) This is self-expression (...). (27:8) - To the relief and pleasure of such (...) self-expression which we call literature, especially poetry (...).

[D1vi] [D2vi] (28:9) - (...), and when the relationship between language and thought is considered (...). (29:9) That there is a close relationship between thought and language is obvious (...). (30:10) For most people language and thought are mutually interdependent (...).

[D1vii] [D2vii] (31:10) - (...) No two languages are identical (...). (32:11) Just how different two languages may be (...). (...) (33:11) - Different people view the same objective facts in different ways, and express their perceptions in quite different language forms. (34:11) (...) reactions (...) will be expressed in different linguistic terms (...). (...) (35:11) (...) our view of the world is largely conditioned by our mother tongue (...). (36:11) (...) our views are coloured by the language readily at our disposal. (...) (37:11-12) (...) the more flexible and wide-ranging a person's language is, the richer is likely to be the quality of his life. (38:12) Conversely, the more restricted and limited his language, the more restricted and limited may be his life. (...)

WHAT ORTHOGRAPHIC SENTENCE SIGNALS THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE [D1iv], [D2iv] AND THE [D1v], [D2v] GROUPINGS OF LANGUAGE FUNCTIONS AND EXAMINATION? Sentence 24): *Is there anything common between a hearty 'Damnation!' and the strains of 'Marriage of Figaro'*

issuing from the bathroom? WHY? Because sentence 24) is a predictive interrogative sentence that declares a 'new' state of knowledge on the part of the writer who shares it with the reader straightaway, in the [D1v] fifth way. WHAT IS THE FIFTH WAY? The [D1v] is the *self-expression*, in 25), 26), and 27), in the above transcription. DOES THE WRITER'S CHOICE OF WORD IDENTIFYING THE [D1v] FUNCTION HELP THE READER MAKE A COHESIVE LINK WITH THE FOUR PRECEDING FUNCTIONS? Neither choice of words identifying the fifth, the sixth and the seventh functions showed in the three forthcoming parts of discourse helps the reader. WHY? Because neither *self-expression* as the [D1v] function in 25): (...), *for the use in these cases is largely one of self-expression* (...), nor *thought* as the [D1vi] function in 28): (...), *and when the relationship between language and thought is considered* (...), nor *perceptions* as the [D1vii] function in 33): *Different people view the same objective facts in different ways, and express their perceptions in quite different language forms*, endorses lexically the cohesive grammatical parallelism realized ineptly by the lexical set to which *'phatic'* (D1i), *'ceremonial'* (D1ii), *factual* (D1iii) and *emotive* (D1iv) ways (the last two without single quotation marks) belong. Furthermore, because the outline of seven functions above, which I infer from the under-signalled predicted stretch of text, does not match the writer's outline as recapitulated in the ensuing (V3) in 39), 40) and 41) below.

(V3)

(RECALLED INFORMATION STRUCTURE OF FUNCTIONS)

(V3) (39:12) - In this chapter I have tred [sic] to look at language as a whole by looking at some of the ways it [language] is used by people. (40:12) What has been said at some length can be said here in a much more precise form: (41:12) - Language is used for: (i) phatic communion (i.e. as a social regulator); (ii) for ceremonial purposes; (iii) as an instrument of action; (iv) to keep the records; (v) to convey orders and information; (vi) to influence people; (vii) to enable self-expression; (viii) to embody or enable thought. (...) (D3) (42:12) - (...) it will be necessary to chop language up (...).

From the circumstanced organization of the implicit D1 member of text B, HOW MANY WAYS OF USING HUMAN LANGUAGE DOES THE TEXT IMPART TO THE PRESENT READER? I infer extrapolatively and evaluatively that the text imparts the following 'seven' *ways of using human language*. I manage to link the 'seven' *ways* by syntactical parallelism in my information structure to be represented diagrammatically either in a text frame, pyramid diagram or mapping, as follows: (i) the *phatic* way; (ii) the *ceremonial* way as in *ritual* (whose 'choice of words is unimportant'), *action* and *order* (whose 'choice of words is important'); (iii) the *factual* way as in *history*, *technology* and *science*; (iv) the *emotive* way; (v) the [*self-expression*-related] way as in *literature* and *poetry*; (vi) the [*thought*-related] way; and (vii) the [*perception*-related] way. However, the present reader's efforts to construct meaning and to integrate the seven unfocused groupings of ways and examination into a coherent whole are doomed to frustration. WHY? Because of the resultant mismatch between the decoder's information structure, and the writer's recalled information provided in the immediate forthcoming (V3) pair pattern of Recapitulation structure evinced from 39) to 41) in the above transcription. WHICH RECALL SIGNALS INTRODUCE THE (V3) RECAPITULATION STRUCTURE? Broadly conceived, (V3): *In this chapter I have* [tried?] *to look at language as a whole by looking at some of the ways it is used by people*, in 39), endorsed by *What has been said at some length can be said here in a much more precise form:*, in 40), is the 'anchorage' introduced by the main recall signs: the place reference item *In this chapter* plus the verb phrase in finite declarative clause *I have tred* [sic] *to look at* that labels the encoder's (V3) action, and predicts (D3) 'new' information from 42) onward. WHAT DOES (V3) IMPART? Specifically, (V3) imparts the writer's recalled information structure (of the [D1] cotext) branched into 'eight' language functions, which does not match my

inferred text framing branched into seven language functions. The new condition is generated by the insufficient cohesive ties to signal information in the implicit D1 member. WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR THE MISMATCH BETWEEN THE IMPLICIT D1 MEMBER OF ENUMERATION AND THE EXPLICIT V3 MEMBER OF RECAPITULATION? Simplifying the state of affairs, I adduce not less than four reasons why the [D1] member of Enumeration and the (V3) member of Recapitulation seem to be mismatched as the following figure contrasting my list of language functions and the writer's shows. In the figure, my outline of a tentative nature comes first because it was developed prior to the finding of, and confrontation with, the writer's recalled outline, in the reading process.

THE PRESENT READER'S OUTLINE	THE WRITER'S OUTLINE
Some ways of using human language are:	*Language is used for:*
(i) the *phatic* way	*(i) phatic communion (i.e. as a social regulator);*
(ii) the *ceremonial* way as in *ritual* (whose choice of words is unimportant), *action* and *order* (whose choice of words is important)	*(ii) for ceremonial purposes;*
(iii) the *factual* way as in *history*, *technology* and *science*	*(iii) as an instrument of action;*
(iv) the *emotive* way	*(iv) to keep records;*
(v) the [*self-expression*-related] way as in *literature* and *poetry*	*(v) to convey orders and information;*
(vi) the [*thought*-related] way	*(vi) to influence people;*
(vii) the [*perception*-related] way	*(vii) to enable self-expression;*
	(viii) to embody or enable thought.

THE FIRST AND SECOND REASONS

WHAT IS THE FIRST REASON FOR THE MISMATCH BETWEEN THE READER'S AND THE WRITER'S OUTLINE OF *WAYS*? Only two of the *ways* appearing in the writer's (V3) recalled outline happen to coincide with the first two in my deduced outline, namely, the *'phatic'* and the *'ceremonial'* ways. WHAT IS THE SECOND REASON? Three *ways* appearing in the writer's outline happen to

have a syntactic form different from the form appearing in my outline. In mine the three are rearranged to be in grammatical parallelism with the two first *ways* (*phatic* and *ceremonial*) while in the writer's the three are given without parallelism, namely, *to influence people*, *to enable self-expression* and *to embody or enable thought*. Instead of *to influence people*, under (vi) in the illustrative 41), the writer might have used, for instance, *emotive* way to be in accordance with the hyponymic phrase *emotive use of language* appearing in 22), which encapsulates the fourth grouping ranging from 20) introduced by *But*, 22) introduced by *Again* up to 23). Instead of *to enable self-expression* under (vii) in the illustrative 41), the writer might have used to use, for instance, [*self-expression*-related] as I infer from the fifth grouping ranging from 24) introduced by an interrogative sentence up to 27). Instead of *to embody or enable thought* under (viii) in the illustrative 41), the writer might have opted for, let us say, [*thought*-related] as inferred from the sixth grouping ranging from 28) to 29).

THE THIRD REASON

WHAT IS THE THIRD REASON FOR THE MISMATCH BETWEEN THE OUTLINES? The *action* under (iii), the *records* under (iv), and the *orders and information* under (v), appearing in the writer's outline in 41), do not seem to me to be implied hyponymic *ways of using human language* but only some 'illustrations' of different *ways* as explained below.

Concerning *action* and *orders*, they seem to be misplaced words in the writer's outline. Inferentially, *action* and *orders* were to be considered examples of the hyponymic *ceremonial* way, under which the two misplaced items were to be suitably arranged. Deductively, the *ceremonial* way is shown to depend on the 'important' and 'unimportant' *choice of words*. On the one hand, some human ceremonies might be considered illustrations of 'unimportant' *choice of words*. On the other hand, some other human ceremonies might be considered illustrations of

'important' *choice of words* as the writer states explicitly in 11): *choice of words* is not unimportant in *all ceremonial* (...) *uses of language.* Deductively, there are ceremonies in which the *choice* is important. Accordingly, the nonspecific, indefinite predeterminer *all* occurring before the premodifier *ceremonial* of the plural count head noun *uses* of language in 11), prompts me to think of 'some' exceptionable ceremonies. As such, *action* is a citing of specific material to supplement, explain, or demonstrate part of the *ceremonial* function. Similarly to *action*, *orders* also require *a precise and logical use* of words as stated in 13): *In using language to give orders, to control other people and things, a precise and logical use is necessary.* The two, *action* and *orders*, were to be two examples of important *choice of words.*

Concerning *records* and *information*, they also seem to be misplaced words in the writer's outline. The two items were to be considered other examples of the hyponymic *factual* way, under which the two were to be adequately placed together with *history*, *technology* and *science.* The *records* as shown in 16), the *history* as shown in 15), the *Technology and science* in 18) are all inserted within the general *passing of information* as shown in 18), or better, "the passing of facts and information" (Id., ibid.: 7). Both the reinforcing additive conjunct *too* in 18), and the anaphoric pro-form, or pro-modifier, *Such* in the *Such factual uses* of language in 19), assure me of the above deductions. The predeterminer specifically, refers to its sentential antecedent within which the items *records*, *information*, *history*, *technology* and *science* are all inserted. The sequence of sentences in the anaphoric segment referred to by *Such* ranges from the orthographic sentence 14) (up to 19) transcribed under the *factual*-way section identified as [D1iii].

THE FOURTH REASON

WHAT IS THE FOURTH REASON FOR THE MISMATCH? The [*perception*-related] way is omitted in the writer's outline. The omission is objectionable

because the orthographic sentence 31): *No two languages are identical* (...), may be considered to mark implicitly the terminating line between the sixth and the seventh groupings of functions and examination. In fact, sentence 31) touches on the aspect of language with regards to cultural *perceptions* specifically, or better, to the bond between 'ethnicity' and language. By stating that *no two languages are identical*, in 31), the writer introduces some reflection on different *perceptions* codified differently by culturally different *people* conditioned by different *languages*. As such, *language* is used also for encoding culturally different *perceptions*, which I identify in my outline as the (D1vii) *way*.

THE UNORDERED AND RECALLED DATA

DO THE RHETORICALLY UNORDERED DATA IN [D1] AND RECALLED DATA IN [V3] CONFIRM MY GUESSES? Not surprisingly, the rhetorically unordered and recalled data in the text of 'stack-like structure' do not confirm most of my guesses; do not create co-operation, sharing of statements of knowledge as scientific findings, contact with the present specialist learner of a different symbolic community; do not maximize secularization of knowledge; do not facilitate the present reader's attempts to construct the diagrammatic information structure of the text within which I challenge my background and prior knowledge to integrate a coherent whole. IS THE [D1] COTEXT RHETORICALLY *PRECISE*? The organization of the [D1] cotext is positively 'not' *much* rhetorically *precise*, what is implied in 40): *What has been said at some length can be said here in a much more precise form:*. More properly, by admitting that *a much more precise form* has to be developed cataphorically as promised in the (V3) of Recapitulation structure, in 40), the writer acknowledges the quality of the sentential antecedent or anaphoric [D1] as having been said in [*a much* less *precise form*] at the point of having to *be said* again *much more precise*{-ly}.

The organization of [D1] cotext is rhetorically nonplausible and, thus, inept as a result of the pervasive phenomenon of under-signalling. The under-signalling in the progressive relation of language functions, like a chain, gave rise to the disruption of reading, to at least two disparate interpretations as those in the writer's and in the reader's resultant outlines. The perceived absence of regulative 'features of layout' in the underlying D1 member of Enumeration structure, such as, the exact enumerative conjuncts (e.g., first, at the outset, second or secondly, next, third or thirdly, or in the first place, in the second place, or first of all, second of all, or I, II, II, or A., B., C., or a., b. c., or i, ii, iii, etc.) plus grammatical parallelism and lexical repetition of *way* or function altogether (e.g., [A fourth way of using human language is the *self-expression*-related way]; [A fifth way of using human language is the *thought*-related way], and so on, obscures the predicted taxa of hyponyms embedded into the ad hoc superordinate situational and classificatory term of the predictive member *ways*. Coherence stemmed from my cognitive contributions and ability to rearrange the building of the ad hoc universe of discourse around the text.

C (Corder 1974: 19 - 27)

The subject-matter under consideration in Corder's chapter is on the significance of systematic errors to learners, teachers and researchers. Such significance is grounded on theoretical contributions from teaching methodology, linguistic and psychology.

Constrained to create global textual coherence in text C by the absence of a standard and regulative global prediction, I can say that the text struck me as rhetorically inept due to under-signalling and mis-signalling.

A number of successful local predictions in the text notwithstanding, for instance, *In the field of methodology there have been two schools of thought in*

respect of learners' errors, in 4), and *The opposition between systematic and non-systematic errors is important*, in 22), etc., a rhetorically organized pair pattern of prediction whereby I could identify regulative cues for constructing the global meaning of the text, and thus write a cohesive and coherent information structure, was difficult to locate. To process this nine-page text, I as a specialist learner had to backtrack once and again from the groupings of multifarious scientific formulations in search of global relations to organize rhetorically a text frame. Guesswork took place.

In the guesswork, questions and inferences were used, as follows. WHAT IS THE ENCODER'S EXPLICITLY GLOBAL AND STANDARD PREDICTION IN TEXT C? Properly, no explicitly global prediction is found. WHAT EXPLICIT AND STANDARD INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT THE GLOBAL DIRECTION OF TEXT C DOES THE WRITER PROVIDE THE PRESENT READER NOT TO GET LOST? Admittedly, no explicit and standard instructions about the global textual direction is found. DOES THE PRESENT READER MENAGE TO WRITE A COHESIVE AND COHERENT INFORMATION STRUCTURE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FIRST READINGS OF TEXT C? Not without time-consuming guesswork. WHY? Because of the non cohesive and not coherent rhetorical organization of the text. HOW SO? First, text C is non cohesive in that it requires: (i) a global prediction right at the beginning of discourse to uncover the global rhetorical scheme of (V) ~ (D) cotexts (or groupings), and (ii) some editing from 9) to 10):

> (8:21) - (...) the most widespread hypothesis about how language are learned, which I have called behaviourist, is assumed to apply in both circumstances. (9:21) These hypotheses (...). (10:21) If (...) these hypotheses (...) are being questioned (...), it would seem reasonable to see how far they might also apply to the learning of a second language.

In the stretch, the two pro-forms of text-dependence *these* and *they* seem to be particularly inept at establishing a coreferencial bond with the sentential antecedent supplied by the linguistic context of the singular count noun *hypothesis* (specifically

that of the *behaviorist* type), in 8). Secondly, text C does not guide the reader unambiguously, through the overall content relations (to be shown below) intended to create a meaningful unity of groupings of scientific formulations.

DOES THE WRITER ANNOUNCE IMPLICITLY A GLOBAL PREDICTION TO TAKE LOCAL COURSES OF ACTION IN TEXT C? Probably an implicit announcement of two commitments encoded in the rhetorically 'substandard' orthographic sentence 2): *It is of course true that the application of linguistic and psychological theory to the study of language learning added a new dimension to the discussion of errors* (...), and supported by *now* in 16): *We can now return to the consideration of errors made by learners*. The circumstanced sentence 2) together with the circumstanced *now* produce for the present reader two differing contingent interpretations about the global rhetorical scheme of text C.

THE ORTHOGRAPHIC SENTENCE 2) AND

THE CIRCUMSTANCED *NOW* IN 16)

(...) (2:19) It is of course true that the application of linguistic and psychological theory to the study of language learning added a new dimension to the discussion of errors; (...).

(...) (16:22) - We can now return to the consideration of errors made by learners.

ON WHAT ACCOUNT IS THE ORTHOGRAPHIC SENTENCE 2) SUBSTANDARD? Appropriately enough, sentence 2) is substandard on account of the fact that actual features present in it render it not to function as a standard prediction. So it seems to be because its rhetorical flaw is the lack of supportive minimum ingredients required to identify it unambiguously as in a structural representation of categorized prediction, and to accomplish specific predictive and predicted goals. Inferentially, however, sentence 2) is a 'potential predictive member' in text C. As such, I venture to consider it as either a pseudo global Reporting prediction or a pseudo global Advance Labelling amalgamated structure of prediction. The two predictive alternatives entail two different interpretations. WHAT PROMPTS THE PRESENT READER TO IDENTIFY 2) AS A

'POTENTIAL PREDICTIVE MEMBER' FOR TEXT C IN FACE OF CIRCUMSTANCED FEATURES IN THE STRUCTURE? Circumstanced features notwithstanding, the orthographic sentence 2) seems to encapsulate the incoming subject-matter covered in the linear text ranging from sentence 3) up to sentence 30) (to be transcribed below, in the first and second interpretation sections). The pseudo global metatext in 2) may be viewed, on the one hand, as predicting 'to discuss' *linguistic* and *psychological theory*, and, on the other hand, 'to specify' *a new dimension* (which applied theory *added*) *to the discussion of errors*. Both inferred discourse acts may be considered local predictions. Both seem to be the scope of text C. WHY DO I INFER 2) AS AN ADVANCE LABELLING STRUCTURE OF PREDICTION? An Advance Labelling prediction entails an act-involvement-based predictive cotext, and a realization-involvement-based predicted section. In my first textual interpretation (to be developed below), I view the implicit content relations in text C as organized around a pseudo amalgamated Advance Labelling prediction, [V1-V2], supported by the circumstanced *now* in 16) here considered as a discoursal-transitional conjunct. Such rhetorical microstructure is interpretative on account of the fact that sentence 2) is a substandard structure of prediction. Actual features, however, render it not to function as a prediction. WHICH ACTUAL FEATURES RENDER 2) TO BE A PSEUDO ADVANCE LABELLING AMALGAMATED STRUCTURE OF PREDICTION AND THUS NOT TO FUNCTION AS SUCH? One feature: the factive verb *added* prefacing a *new dimension to the discussion of errors*. In fact, the verb *added* seems to be far from being the writer's prospective labelling of discourse act because its subject is *the application of* (...) *theory*, in 2). The other feature: the lack of an explicit prospective labelling in 2) to be fulfilled by the writer. The unspecific item *dimension* in 2), however, calls for 'specification'. Inferentially,

[specifying *dimension*] may be taken to be one of the writer's prospective labelling of discourse act, following the act of [discussing *theory*].

WHY DO I INFER 2) AS A REPORTING STRUCTURE OF PREDICTION? A Reporting prediction entails a report-detachment-based cotext, and an evaluation-involvement-based predicted section. In my second textual interpretation (to be developed below), I view the implicit content relations in text C as organized around a pseudo Reporting prediction, [V1], supported by the circumstanced *now* in 16), here considered as a resultive conjunct. Such rhetorical microstructure is interpretative because sentence 2) is a substandard prediction. Actual features render it not to function as a prediction. WHICH ACTUAL FEATURES RENDER 2) TO BE A PSEUDO REPORTING STRUCTURE OF PREDICTION AND THUS NOT TO FUNCTION AS SUCH? The features are in the prefaced matrix clause *It is of course true that*, which evinces the writer's attitudinal evaluation of the pseudo-Reporting proposition. Admittedly, the clause does not set prediction and delay. By inserting *of course* as an attitudinal content disjunct in the matrix clause the writer expresses 'conviction' as a direct claim. By inserting *true* as an adjective occurring predictively in the clause the writer adds his comment and judgment on the 'truth value' of the declarative report clause, on the 'truthfulness' of 'the act of *add*{-ing}' (i.e., addition or contribution) performed by *the application of* theories. Sentence 2) fails to meet a minimum level of need in the matter-of-fact Reporting prediction, that is, the need of the writer's detachment. The undeferred evaluation invalidates the writer's tentative prediction.

WHY IS *NOW* IN 16) CIRCUMSTANCED? Because now is ambiguous. WHY IS *NOW* AMBIGUOUS? The absence of a standard, overt, rhetorically organized global prediction in C is detrimental to the identification of the exact 'import' of the item *now* appearing in 16), which supposedly signals the borderline between two groupings of information. Accordingly, the hidden 'import' of *now* is not

unambiguously identifiable in the writer's prediction in 16). Given the linguistic context in C, *now* elicits differing interpretations out of lexical, extrapolative and evaluative inferences as the following ones: *now* in C is likely to play either a discoursal-transitional conjunctive role (in supporting my contingent amalgamated Advance Labelling prediction) or a resultive conjunctive role (in supporting my contingent Reporting prediction).

FIRST INTERPRETATION: [V1-V2] ~ [D1], [D2]

(TWO INVOLVED ACTS AND TWO INVOLVED REALIZATIONS)

(1:19) - "The Significance of Learner's Errors". (...) [V1-V2] (2:19) It is of course true that the application of linguistic and psychological theory to the study of language learning added a new dimension to the discussion of errors; (...). [D1] (3:19) The major contribution of the linguist to language teaching was (...) contrastive study of the systems of the second language and the mother tongue of the learner; out of this would come an inventory of the areas of difficulty which (...). (...) (4:20) - In the field of methodology there have been two schools of thought in respect of learner's errors. (...). (5:20) - Both linguistics and psychology are in (...) 'flux and agitation' (...). (...) (6:20) One effect has been (...) the emphasis (...) from (...) *teaching* towards (...) *learning*. (...) (7:20) This has (...) led to (...) the question whether there are any parallels between (...) acquiring the mother tongue and the learning of a second language. (...) (8:21) - (...) the most widespread hypothesis about how language are learned, which I have called behaviourist, is assumed to apply in both circumstances. (9:21) These hypotheses (...). (10:21) If (...) these hypotheses (...) are being questioned (...), it would seem reasonable to see how far they might also apply to the learning of a second language. (11:21) - Within this new context the study of errors takes on a new importance and will I believe contribute to a verification or rejection of the new hypothesis. (12:21) - This hypothesis states that (...). (...) (13:21) - The application of this hypothesis to second language learning is not new and (...). (...) (14:22) - The principal feature that then differentiates the two operations is the presence or absence of motivation. (...) (15:22) - I propose therefore as a working hypothesis that (...).

(...) [D2] (16:22) - We can now return to the consideration of errors made by learners. (...) (17:23) - (...) the best evidence that a child possesses construction rules is the occurrence of *systematic errors* (...). (...) (18:23) (...) by reducing the language to a simpler system than it is (...). (19:23) - (...) it would be wise to introduce a qualification here about the control of input (which (...) we call the syllabus). (...) (20:23) (...) or more properly his intake. (...) (21:24) - (...) his *built-in syllabus* (...). (...) (22:24) - The opposition between systematic and non-systematic errors is important. (...) (23:25) The errors of performance will (...) be unsystematic and the errors of competence, systematic. (...) (24:25) (...) errors of performance as *mistakes*, reserving (...) *error* to refer to the systematic errors of the learner from which we are able to reconstruct (...) his *transitional competence*. (25:25) - Mistakes are of no significance to the process of language learning. (...) (26:25) - A learner's errors (...). (27:25) (...) are significant in three different ways. (28:25) First to the teacher (...). (29:25) Second, (...) to the researcher (...). (30:25) Thirdly (and in a sense this is their most important aspect) they are indispensable to the learner himself, because (...).

HOW ABOUT *NOW* AS A DISCOURSAL TRANSITIONAL CONJUNCTIVE ROLE IN THE FIRST INTERPRETATION? Lexically inferred as a discoursal

transitional conjunct, *now* seems to signal the 'shift' of the writer's 'attention' from a foregoing topic to a new, incoming one. As such, it guided the process of my first reading and of my first tentative interpretation for text framing. Admittedly, the discoursal transitional conjunct *now* well-established in mid-position of the factual clause 16) seems to signal the [D2] textualization (under the [V1-V2] prediction). The transitional conjunct can have the import of focusing the shift of attention from the [D1] member to the [D2] member as labelled in the transcription above. WHAT [V1-V2] COMMITMENTS DOES THE PRESENT READER CREATE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF *NOW* AS A TRANSITIONAL CONJUNCTIVE SIGNALLING DEVICE? In my inferentially amalgamated prediction, [V1] and [V2] are different amalgamated commitments implicitly encoded in the substandard 2). On the one hand, I tentatively inferred that the writer purposes, as [V2], [to specify] *a new dimension*, in 2), of the *significance* (i.e., underlying meaning and importance) *of systematic errors*, which he begins to satisfy only from page 22 on, that is, from 16) up to 30) in the transcription, only three and a half pages further down sentence 2). On the other hand, I inferentially notice that the writer purposes, as [V1], [to discuss or introduce or consider] some theoretical data in teaching methodology, linguistics and psychology, seemingly from 3) up to 15). Admittedly, in the [V1] ~ [D1] overlap the writer hangs illustratively on theoretical issues, multifarious linguistic formulations, as bases for the [V2] ~ [D2] overlap grouping of assertions. In fact, [V1] ~ [D1] prefaces [V2] ~ [D2].

DOES THE [D1] PART CAUSE DERAILMENT IN THE READING OF THE [D2] PART? Aside from the importance of every information lectured on in [D1], the writer's 'unformed' prediction, under which [D1] would subsume, intervenes to derail the reading process in the [D2] part which seems to be cut off, or hanging loosely, from the [D1] part. Both parts seem to structure the seemingly 'twofold unity' of text C. WHAT TWOFOLD RHETORICAL UNITY OF TEXT? The unity

made up of two commitments, namely, [To discuss or consider or introduce some theory] and [to specify a new dimension], implied in the contingently amalgamated structure of prediction, in 2). The first, for example, being seemingly the [V1] ~ [D1] prerequisite introductory grouping to the [V2] ~ [D2] forthcoming grouping. In the [D1] part, inferentially, the writer [discusses or introduces or considers] some theoretical *contribution*{-s} in 3), from *linguistics and psychology* in 2), 5), and *methodology* in 4), to language teaching and language learning, such as: the *contrastive study*, the *inventory of the areas of difficulty* in 3), the change of focus from *teaching* to *learning* in 6), the differences between *acquiring the mother tongue* and *learning* (...) *a second language* in 7), the *behaviourist hypothesis* in 8). In the [D2] part, apparently grown from the previous [D1] discussion, the writer specifies the significance of the learners' *systematic errors* to the *construction rules* in 17), *by reducing the language to a* (...) *system* in 18), in *his* [or her] *transitional competence* in 24), made up of *input* as *syllabus* in 19, or *intake* in 20), to the *built-in syllabus* in 21), to *teacher*{-s} in 28), *researcher*{-s} in 29), and to *learner*{-s} in 30) whose strategies are different. WHAT CONTINGENT AMALGAMATED STRUCTURE OF PREDICTION DOES THE READER IDENTIFY AS INHERENT IN THE SUBSTANDARD 2), CREATED FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF *NOW* AS A TRANSITIONAL CONJUNCTIVE DEVICE? At a guess and at my cost, the implicit amalgamated [V1-V2] Advance Labelling structure of prediction, which may be global to nurture the content scheme of text C, and to dispense with the guesswork. WHICH TWO AMALGAMATED LABELS OF PROSPECTIVE DISCOURSE ACT CAN DISPENSE WITH THE GUESSWORK? Any standard prospective discourse acts, which I safely expected the writer to provide at the outset to his own discourse, and by which I could recognize 'promptly' both the writer's local roles encoded in cataphoric/anaphoric cotexts of discourse and the global relations. WHICH EXPLICIT ACTS AS

SURFACE REGULATIVE SIGNALS OF PREDICTION ARE ENCODED IN THE PRESENT READER'S CONTINGENT AMALGAMATED ADVANCE LABELLING STRUCTURE? The signalled act [to consider theoretical data in ...] for the [V1] member, and the act [to specify the *importance* of *systematic errors* in ...] for the [V2] member. WHAT IS THE TENTATIVE AMALGAMATED ADVANCE LABELLING STRUCTURE ARISEN OUT OF THE SUBSTANDARD 2), SUPPORTED BY THE TRANSITIONAL *NOW* IN 16), IN WHICH THE PRESENT READER EXTRAPOLATIVELY IDENTIFY THE WRITER'S MISSING COMMITMENTS? At a guess and at my cost, [We will consider, first, some theoretical contributions in teaching methodology, linguistics and psychology, as bases for us to specify, secondly, the underlying *importance* of *systematic errors* in first and second language learning]. This is the first interpretation. I will next develop the second, and provide the illustrative text with ad hoc changes.

THE SECOND INTERPRETATION: [V1] ~ [D1]

(REPORTED PROPOSITIONS AND NON-REBUTTAL EVALUATION)

(1:19) - "The Significance of Learner's Errors". (...) [V1] (2:19) It is of course true that the application of linguistic and psychological theory to the study of language learning added a new dimension to the discussion of errors; (...). (3:19) The major contribution of the linguist to language teaching was (...) contrastive study of the systems of the second language and the mother tongue of the learner; out of this would come an inventory of the areas of difficulty which (...). (...) (4:20) - In the field of methodology there have been two schools of thought in respect of learner's errors. (...). (5:20) - Both linguistics and psychology are in (...) 'flux and agitation' (...). (...) (6:20) One effect has been (...) the emphasis (...) from (...) *teaching* towards (...) *learning*. (...) (7:20) This has (...) led to (...) the question whether there are any parallels between (...) acquiring the mother tongue and the learning of a second language. (...) (8:21) - (...) the most widespread hypothesis about how language are learned, which I have called behaviourist, is assumed to apply in both circumstances. (9:21) These hypotheses (...). (10:21) If (...) these hypotheses (...) are being questioned (...), it would seem reasonable to see how far they might also apply to the learning of a second language. (11:21) - Within this new context the study of errors takes on a new importance and will I believe contribute to a verification or rejection of the new hypothesis. (12:21) - This hypothesis states that (...). (...) (13:21) - The application of this hypothesis to second language learning is not new and (...). (...) (14:22) - The principal feature that then differentiates the two operations is the presence or absence of motivation. (...) (15:22) - I propose therefore as a working hypothesis that (...).

(...) [D1] (16:22) - We can now return to the consideration of errors made by learners. (...) (17:23) - (...) the best evidence that a child possesses construction rules is the occurrence of *systematic errors* (...). (...) (18:23) (...) by reducing the language to a simpler system than it is (...). (19:23) - (...) it would be wise to introduce a qualification here about the control of input

(which (...) we call the syllabus). (...) (20:23) (...) or more properly his intake. (...) (21:24) - (...) his *built-in syllabus* (...). (...) (22:24) - The opposition between systematic and non-systematic errors is important. (...) (23:25) The errors of performance will (...) be unsystematic and the errors of competence, systematic. (...) (24:25) (...) errors of performance as *mistakes*, reserving (...) *error* to refer to the systematic errors of the learner from which we are able to reconstruct (...) his *transitional competence*.

(25:25) - Mistakes are of no significance to the process of language learning. (...) (26:25) - A learner's errors (...). (27:25) (...) are significant in three different ways. (28:25) First to the teacher (...). (29:25) Second, (...) to the researcher (...). (30:25) Thirdly (and in a sense this is their most important aspect) they are indispensable to the learner himself, because (...).

HOW ABOUT *NOW* AS A RESULTIVE CONJUNCTIVE ROLE IN THE SECOND INTERPRETATION? In this lexical inference, the resultive *now* tends to cue a 'conclusion' in a result-based [D1] cotext of scientific formulations ranging from 16) up to 24) as a basis for further inference ranging from 25) to 30). As such, *now* taken as a resultive conjunct guided the process of my second reading and thus of my second tentative interpretation for text framing. Contingently, the regulative *now* in 16) can signal the [D1] evaluative member of the [V1] Reporting structure of prediction framed out of the substandard 2). The [V1] Reporting structure, which I venture to consider in the second interpretation, is likely to range from the 3) up to the 15) as labelled in the transcription. The [D1] member can be the textualization of the secularized *discussion of* systematic *errors* given further down as a positive evaluation. The positive evaluation is elicited by the affirmative factive verb *added* prefacing the unspecific complement *new dimension* in 2). The verb introduces the foregoing lengthy [V1] theoretical information. The writer traces the [D1] present evaluative formulations from the past [V1] report. More specifically, *now* can play the role of a resultive conjunct to connect the [D1] present considerations of *systematic errors* as a positive derivative to the foregoing section of [V1] methodological, linguistic and psychological *contributions*. WHAT IS THE SECOND TENTATIVE PARAPHRASE ARISEN OUT OF THE SUBSTANDARD 2), CREATED FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE RESULTIVE *NOW* IN 16) AS THE CONTINGENT STANDARD REPORTING

STRUCTURE? At a guess and at my cost, [Those who know methodological, linguistic and psychological theories assert that they account for the *significance* of the learner's *systematic errors* to *learners*, *teachers* and *researchers*.] The word *significance* is present in the title. The word *systematic* referring to *errors* is central to the textual theme of the text in accordance with sentence 25), which attests *unsystematic errors* to be *of no significance to the process of language learning*.

Text C was apparently built around the pseudo rhetorically organized prediction in 2), which produced under-signalling, and around the misleading *now* in 16), which evinced mis-signalling. Sentence 2) and *now* were here considered as cut-off interrelated circumstances. The eventual missing of a formed global forestructure did not facilitate the reader's prompt integration of formulations imparted in the text into a cohesive and coherent whole for text framing. The writer, in fact, does not attend to the rhetorical organization of the text by cueing ambiguously the reader in what the writer entertained to do in the first part, and in how many parts he means to organize his discourse. Thus conceived, I viewed sentence 2) as a potential prediction for the rhetorical plan of text C. The under-signalling and mis-signalling were detrimental to the reading process and text frame production.

D (Bolinger 1980: 125 - 137)

The subject-matter treated in Bolinger's chapter is the type of specific language required by choice of field typified as *jargon*. In the three groupings of formulations, attention is differently centered on many aspects of jargon. In the first grouping, attention is centered on classing jargon as a *sociolet*, and illustrating its *styles* in *science*, *linguistics*, *chemical company*, *educational establishment*, etc.; in the second, on listing *ingredients* that define it as *pseudo-scientific basic words* or *compounds* with *syntax*, and *semantic traits* as *elevated*, *ameliorative*, and

euphemistic; in the third, on reporting some of the *local* and *federal recorded objections* to its use. On the bases of the background information a positive and negative evaluation of jargon and jargoneers closes the chapter.

Confronted with circumstanced undercues and miscues in textual directions, I can say that parts of text D are rhetorically inept, and that the global rhetorical scheme of prediction is hidden. As such, the text does not signal unambiguously the writer's predictive and predicted commitments. Like the three previous texts, text D fails to venture cooperation with the present decoder's prompt comprehension of the linguistic events for text framing.

Aiming at interaction with text D, I tried to translate my expectations into the following questions about, and inferences from, the content relations, on the basis of the actual resources of the text partly devoid of standard rhetorical mechanics. DOES THE ADDRESSOR USE PREDICTIVE SIGNALS THAT EXPLICITLY CONFIRM HIS COMMITMENTS TO THE OCCURRENCE OF SUCCESSIVE LINGUISTIC EVENTS IN THE GROUPINGS OF TEXT D? Not for all of his seemingly seven commitments in the seemingly three groupings, unless otherwise intended. WHY NOT FOR ALL THE SEEMINGLY SEVEN COMMITMENTS IN THE SEEMINGLY THREE GROUPINGS? Because, among the following seven seeming commitments in the following three different groupings, mis-signalling and under-signalling as circumstances are detrimental to most of the commitments in the text, and thus to its rhetorical organization.

1st Grouping	[V1-V2] ~ (D1) ~ (D2)	[V1] [To class *jargon*]
		(D1) in 6): *SOCIOLET*
		[V2] [To illustrate *styles* of *jargon*]
		(D2i) in 9): *science*
		(D2ii) in 10): *sacred institution*
		(D2iii) in 11): *linguistics*
		(D2iv) in 12): *chemical company*
		(D2v) in 13): *radio talk show*
		(D2vi) in 14): *educational establishment*, etc.

2nd Grouping	[V3] ~ (D3), (D3iv) : [V4] ~ (D4)	[V3] from 15) - 17), 25): [To *define* jargon by means of five *ingredients* or *qualities* or *features*]
		(D3i) in 18): *first, pseudo-scientific basic words*
		(D3ii) in 19): *after, compounds*
		(D3iii) in 20): *Third, syntax of phrases*
		(D3iv) : [V4] in 25): *SEMANTIC*
		(D3v) in 30): non *impressiveness*
		(V4) in 25): [To explain the three semantic traits of jargon, namely, *elevated*, *ameliorative*, and *euphemistic*]
		(D4i) in 27): *The first*, [elevated]
		(D4ii) in 27): *the second*, [ameliorative]
		(D4iii)
3rd Grouping	(V5) ~ (D5) : (V6); (V7)	(V5) in 31): [Someone *recorded federal* and *local objections to jargon* and those *go back a long way*]
		(D5) (V6) in 40): [*Can any good* be said *of jargon*?]
		(D6i) in 41): Evaluation: agreement to use or disagreement to objections
		(D6ii) in 44): Evaluation: disagreement to use or agreement to objections
		(V7) in 40): *Having battered jargon for all these pages*

The first and second amalgamated commitments, in the first grouping, are rhetorically under-signalled. The third commitment, in the second grouping, is implicitly and explicitly signalled, and introduces mis-signalling under the implicit fourth commitment as an embedding patterning. The fifth commitment, in the third grouping, is explicitly signalled and supplemented by the sixth commitment, which is substandardly signalled and prefaced by a seventh commitment that is mis-signalled. The first grouping from the groupings and commitments referred to and illustrated above will be treated first, as follows.

THE FIRST GROUPING: [V1-V2] ~ (D1) ~ (D2)

(TO CLASS JARGON AND ILLUSTRATE AREAS, SOCIOLET CLASS, ILLUSTRATIVE AREAS)

[V1-V2] - (2:125) When the US Department of State appointed a Consumer Affairs Coordinator to look after the Department's interests in what has come to be called consumerism, it fell to (...) Lawrence Eagleburger, to draw up a description for the job. (...) (3:125) - Next to 'Why can't Johnny read (or write)?', the most-debated question of language today is 'Why can't officials use plain language?' (...) (4:125) - (...) Johnny's ineptitudes are transformed. (5:125-126) The more Johnnies there are (...), the more their altered language becomes a badge of their class. (D1i)

(6:126) Jargon takes on the function of a SOCIOLET. [sic] (...) (7:126) - (...) it is easy to find unofficial styles that share the sources of jargon as well as some of its purposes. (8:126) Take the language-for-sociability (...) called 'phatic communion'. (...) (D2i) (9:126) - For jargon, science is both source and motive. (...) (D2ii) (10:129) - Jargon spares no institution, not even the sacred ones (...). (D2iii) (11:129) - (...) linguistics (...). (D2iv) (12:129) (...) a chemical company (...). (D2v) (13:129) (...) a radio talk show (...). (D2vi) (...) (14:130) (...) jargon is firmly established on both sides of the Atlantic, with roots deep in the educational establishment (...).

HOW UNDER-SIGNALLED ARE THE FIRST AND THE SECOND COMMITMENTS? The addressor does not seem to advance any explicit local prediction to organize rhetorically the first grouping of formulations, or an explicit global prediction to encapsulate the six-and-a-half pages of groupings of multifarious formulations. Actually, the present addressee processed the introductory grouping insecurely, that is, without any rhetorical instruction either as to the pair pattern adopted to organize the first part, ranging from 2) up to 14) as in the transcription, or as to the relationship intended between a first part and incoming parts of the chapter. After backtracking over the linguistic object as a whole, I qualify the first grouping, the [V1-V2] commitments that I had to infer from (D1) and (D2), as under-signalled and not coherent. IS THE FIRST GROUPING SIGNALLED IN A NONSTANDARD WAY? Inferentially, yes. WHAT NONSTANDARD WAY? The upper-case lettered word *SOCIOLET*, in 6), used in the linguistic context (or content itself) covering jargon as a medium of status in many areas. WHAT [V1-V2] AMALGAMATED COMMITMENTS DOES THE PRESENT READER INFER FROM THE NONSTANDARD WAY? The rhetorical failure of the passage notwithstanding, I infer that the encoder purposes [to class and illustrate *jargon*], respectively. WHICH TENTATIVE PREDICTION DOES THE READER IDENTIFY AS SUITABLE TO THE INFERRED [V1-V2] TO ORGANIZE THE FIRST GROUPING OF TEXT D? At a guess, an amalgamated Advance Labelling structure of prediction. WHAT [V1] AND [V2] MEMBERS OF ADVANCE LABELLING STRUCTURE DOES MY COMMON SENSE LEAD ME TO ANTICIPATE IN FACE OF THE UNDER-SIGNALLED FIRST GROUPING? At a

guess, the [V1] member is [First and foremost, I will class *jargon*] amalgamated with the [V2] member [and illustrate *styles of jargon*]. WHAT ARE THE (D1) AND (D2) SUBSUMED INTO THE AMALGAMATED PREDICTIVE MEMBER? The (D1) member in the linear text classes *jargon* as *a SOCIOLET*, the (D1i) in 6), and the (D2) proceeds [to illustrate its *styles* in different areas, such as: one, *science* as the (D2i) in 9); two, a *sacred institution* as the (D2ii) in 10); three, *linguistics* as the (D2iii) in 11); four, *a chemical company* as the (D2iv) in 12); five, *a radio talk show* as the (D2v) in 13); six, an *educational establishment* as the (D2vi) in 14), etc.

WHICH SURFACE SIGNALS DOES THE PRESENT ADDRESSEE PUT IN THE AMALGAMATED ADVANCE LABELLING STRUCTURE OF PREDICTION TO VENTURE CO-OPERATION WITH COMPREHENSION IN THE [V1-V2] ~ (D1) ~ (D2) GROUPING? Appropriately, the two predictive discourse acts [class] and [illustrate], and the enumerative conjuncts as [one], [two], [three], etc., to nurture rhetorically the predicted linear text regarding jargon as a sociolet in many areas. WHICH ORTHOGRAPHIC SENTENCE SEEMS TO MARK EXPLICITLY THE TERMINATING LINE BETWEEN THE UNSIGNALLED FIRST GROUPING, AND THE IMPLICITLY AND EXPLICITLY SIGNALLED SECOND GROUPING, OF FORMULATIONS, IN TEXT D? Sentence 15): *jargon is complex and hard to define*. ON WHAT ACCOUNT DO I IDENTIFY 15) AS THE BOUNDARY LINE? The orthographic sentence 15) seems to me to encode an implicit predictive discourse act that subsumes an explicit predicted member, namely, [V3] ~ (D3), to be referred to below.

THE SECOND GROUPING: [V3] ~ (D3), (D3iv) : [V4] ~ (D4)

(TO DEFINE JARGON, DEFINING INGREDIENTS, TO EXPLAIN SEMANTIC TRAITS, EXPLANATION)

[V3] (...) (15:130) - (...) jargon is complex and hard to define. (16:130) Pure jargon would have to be a condensation of only those ingredients shared by no other style (...). (17:130) - But take certain qualities (...), and you get a (...) solid approximation of the undenatured [sic] thing: [sic]

(D3i) (18:130) - First, basic words - pseudo-scientific (...). (...) (D3ii) (19:130) - After basic words come the compounds. (...) (D3iii) (20:130) - Third, the syntax of phrases. (...) (21:131) - Verb phrases are like noun phrases except that the lightweight is an empty verb instead of an empty noun. (...) (22:131) - Many phrases are hard to classify (...). (...) (23:132) - As for the syntax of jargon, it predictably circumnavigates. (...) (24:132) (...) jargon discovers a dozen ways of beating around the bush - for whatever reason: self-importance, obfuscation, ineptitude. (...) (D3iv) [V4] (25:132) - The most consistent feature of jargon is SEMANTIC. [sic] (26:132) It is elevated, ameliorative, euphemistic (...). (...) (D4i) (27:132) The first purpose is served by avoiding the unpleasant, (D4ii) and the second by sounding weighty. (...) (28:133) - There is always some obstacle to penetrating the essential meaning of a piece of jargon. (...) (29:133) (...) the conjuring of something out of nothing can be done with (...) woolly abstractions (...). (D3v) (30:133) - It lacks the ingredient of impressiveness. (...)

WHICH PREDICTION IS IMPLICITLY SIGNALLED IN THE SECOND GROUPING OF PAIR PATTERN? An inferred, contingent commitment, the [V3] member, in 15). WHAT [V3] COMMITMENT DOES THE ADDRESSOR IMPLICITLY SIGNAL IN 15)? [*Defin*{-Ing} *jargon*] coming from *jargon is complex and hard to define* in 15). WHAT IS EXPLICITLY SIGNALLED IN THE PAIR PATTERN? The (D3) member, which is the definition of jargon. WHAT STRUCTURE OF PREDICTION DOES THE ADDRESSOR TRY TO CONSTRUCT FOR THE [V3] MEMBER IN THE SECOND GROUPING? An Advance Labelling structure of prediction. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICIT V3, AND THE EXPLICIT D3 MEMBERS INTENDED FOR THE SECOND GROUPING? Paraphrastically, the [V3] member is [Thirdly, I will *define jargon* by means *of* five *ingredients* (in 16) and 30)) or *qualities* (in 17)) or *feature*{-s} (in 25)), as follows:], and the (D3) member, in the linear text, comprises the five *ingredients*, or *qualities*, or *feature*{-s} defining jargon, namely, *first*, the *pseudo-scientific basic words* as the (D3i) in 18); *after*, the *compounds* as the (D3ii) in 19); [t]*hird*, the *syntax of phrases* as the (D3iii) in 20)); fourth, the *SEMANTIC* [sic] as the (D3iv) in 25), and after, the non *impressiveness* as the (D3v) in 30). HOW DOES THE [V3] ~ (D3) PAIR PATTERN INTRODUCE MIS-SIGNALLING IN THE EMBEDDING PATTERNING? Through one of its five (D3) members: the (D3iv). The (D3iv) acts as the predictive member of a new pair pattern, the Implicit V4 in 25), and the explicit D4 that in turn is mis-signalled. Put differently, the (D3) member

encompasses (D3iv), which is the fourth defining ingredient of jargon: SEMANTIC, 25). The (D3iv) ingredient, in turn, introduces the embedding pair pattern [V4] in 25) - 26): *The most consistent feature of jargon is SEMANTIC. It is elevated, amelioratíve, euphemistic*, and (D4) in 27), which only treats *elevated* and *amelioratíve*. Similarly to the structure of the [V3] and (D3) pair pattern, the [V4] ~ (D4) embedding pattern belongs implicitly to an Advance Labelling structure. In the [V4] member, the addressor supposedly purposes [to explain the three semantic traits of jargon, namely, *elevated*, *amelioratíve*, and *euphemistic*], in 26), as (D4i), (D4ii), and (D4iii), respectively. On examination, however, it becomes clear that from the three traits, which are *purpose*{-built} as in 27), only the first two are introduced prospectively by such sequencing signals as *The first* and *the second* in 27), and explained accordingly. As regarding the predictive third trait, the misleading *euphemistic*, cataphoric explanation does not seem to be provided in the grouping. As such, mis-signalling is a new circumstance present in text D. WHAT ORTHOGRAPHIC SENTENCE SEEMS TO MARK THE TERMINATING LINE BETWEEN THE SECOND [V3] ~ (D3), (D3iv) : [V4] ~ (D4) GROUPING AND THE THIRD FORTHCOMING GROUPING OF FORMULATIONS? Sentence 31), which is *recorded objections to* jargon *go back a long way*. WHY DO I IDENTIFY 31) AS THE BOUNDARY LINE? Sentence 31) introduces explicitly the prediction V5 for the third grouping as examined below.

THE THIRD GROUPING: (V5) ~ (D5) : (V6); (V7)

(V5) (31:133) - No one has compiled a history of jargon, but recorded objections to it go back a long way. (...) (32:134) - Reaction was inevitable, and it has taken two forms: an effort to reeducate, and an attack on deliberate unclarity. (33:134) Industry and government are concerned about (...). (...) (34:134) President Carter (...) that Federal regulations (...). (...) (35:134) - Some local governments too (...). (36:134) - Conspicuous by their absence among these experts are the professional linguists. (...) (37:135) - (...) a diplomat (...). (38:135) - Here, perhaps, jargon has its place (...). (...) (39:136) - (...) false notions of refinement (...).

(V7) (40:136) - Having battered jargon for all these pages, (D5) (V6) is there any good we can say of it? (...) (D6i) (41:136) Perhaps (...) it is part of the exuberance of language (...). (...) (42:136) Jargon is an ABUSE [sic] of terms whose main fault is that some of them tempt us to abuse them. (...) (43: 136) Old vices are accepted, new ones viewed with horror (...). (...) (D6ii)

(44:136) - (...) it would neither be good nor possible to ABOLISH [sic] the special ways of talking and writing that serve (...). (45:137) (...) as a barrier of social class. (...)

HOW EXPLICITLY IS THE THIRD GROUPING SIGNALLED? The (V5) member is framed in a way that explicitly signals the addressor's detachment from his text. I qualify the (V5) member as a Reporting structure. Ostensibly, the addressor purposes 'to report' propositions so as 'to evaluate' them cataphorically, in the (D5) member. WHAT IS THE (V5) AND THE (D5) MEMBERS IN THE ORGANIZED PAIR PATTERN OF REPORTING? Paraphrastically, the (V5) member is [Someone *recorded federal and local objections* to *jargon* and those *go back a long way*], in 31), 34) and 35). Inferentially, the (D5) member of evaluation turned into the substandard (V6) in 40) covers the prospective passage ranging from 40) on. WHICH ARE THE OVERT SIGNALS IN THE (V5) REPORTING STRUCTURE? The writer's detachment in attributing the factive act of *record{-ing} objections* to 'someone' (which I deduce from *no one* (...), *but* in the matrix clause), the phrasal verb *go back* embedded in the past time adjunct *a long way*, all in sentence 31), the non-rebuttal after the factive verb, and the encoder's prospective evaluation in the linear text, which includes his agreement with the reported illustrations. WHY DOES (D5) TURN INTO (V6) IN 40)? The (D5) evaluation is introduced in a new prediction. The new prediction is the substandard (V6) prefaced by the misleading (V7) commitment. In the (D6) cotext, the addressor evaluates the recorded objections to jargon from whose use he dissents.

WHAT STRUCTURE OF PREDICTION DOES THE PRESENT ADDRESSEE PURSUE IN (V6)? An explicit Question structure of prediction, in 40). WHICH IS THE QUESTION STRUCTURE 40) AS THE EXPLICIT V6 COMMITMENT? The (V6) commitment, which is marked by the one only interrogative sentence at section level, is: *is there any good we can say of it?* WHAT IS THE CIRCUMSTANCE THAT PROVES (V6) TO BE SUBSTANDARDLY SIGNALLED? The so-called 'editorial *we*'. HOW

SUBSTANDARDLY IS (V6) SIGNALLED IN THE QUESTION STRUCTURE? The addressor fails to detach himself from the situational context by inserting in the Question structure the inclusive first person plural *we*. The pronoun does not seem to be the so-called 'rhetorical we' (to imply collective sense) or the so-called 'condescending we' (not to claim authority in the situational context) but the so-called 'editorial *we*' (to avoid the egotistical 'I') (Quirk et al., op. cit.: 350). The addressor declares his involvement in the state of knowledge of the use of jargon. WHAT TENTATIVE QUESTION STRUCTURE DOES THE ADDRESSEE PRODUCE OUT OF THE SUBSTANDARD (V6)? Paraphrastically, [V6] is [*Can any good* be said *of* jargon?], whereby the writer both detaches from his serious discursive writing and predicts evaluation in the adjacent prospective member. WHAT IS THE (D6) MEMBER OF THE AMENDED V6 QUESTION STRUCTURE? The (V6) is the addressor's evaluative response, which is a mixture of agreement as the (D6I), ranging from 41) to 43), and disagreement as the (D6II), ranging from 44) to 45).

WHAT IS THE MIS-SIGNALLED (V7) PREFACING THE (V6) MEMBER IN THE THIRD GROUPING? *Having battered* as in the mis-signalled explicit prediction *Having battered jargon for all these pages*, encoded in the introductory part of 40). WHY IS THE (V7) MIS-SIGNALLED? Because the labelled act *Having battered*, which the addressor decides tardily to make clear, is not in agreement with the hidden rhetorical scheme of *all* of *these* foregoing eleven-and-a-half *pages* of the linguistic material. Appropriately, battering jargon implies evaluating *jargon* in violent contrast. However, the battering (or evaluating) of *jargon* is only 'one' of the seemingly six predictive commitments found in the cotexts of text D, namely, [to class jargon, to illustrate jargon, to define jargon, to explain its semantic traits, to report objections, and to evaluate it]; the battering (or evaluating) of jargon is to be derived from the cataphoric groupings of facts as the retrospective bases for the

prospective battering (or the evaluation); the battering is non predictive due to its arbitrary lateness or tardiness in the writing; the battering (or evaluating) alone does not confirm the present reader's expectations as to a global rhetorically organized prediction, and as such may effect differing interpretations; the battering (or evaluating) is a misleading label that does not hint inclusiveness, or better, it does not cover the previous acts altogether present in the rhetorical scheme of the text as implied. For all that, therefore, the commitment *Having battered* prefacing (V6) is mis-signalled, miscued, conflicting, misleading, that is, ineptly signalled. Admittedly, I dismiss *Having battered* as highly detrimental to the text, and to the reconstruction of the hidden rhetorical scheme of text D. It may be left out in the rhetorical scheme of text D without further damage. WHY HIDDEN? The scheme is hidden because it has to be forcefully inferred by the present addressee as shown in the first, second, and third groupings, sketched above. In opposition to the actual labelled act *Having battered* as the global rhetorically organized prediction of text D, the addressee infers from the implicit and explicit textual directions that text D has an underlying threefold rhetorically organized scheme of prediction encompassing six commitments. WHICH IS THE GLOBAL IMPLICIT RHETORICALLY ORGANIZED SCHEMA OF PREDICTION TO SUPPORT TEXT D? Inferentially, [In this chapter, we purpose to evaluate *jargon* (as the (V6)) after, first classing it (as the [V1]), second illustrating it (as the [V2]), third listing its five defining *ingredients* (as the [V3]), fourth explaining its three semantic traits (as the [V4]), and finally reporting some *recorded objections* to its use (as the (V5))]. The rhetorically organized scheme (as inferred above) is in a mismatch with the "message" and "metamessage" (Enkvist 1990: 15) in the substandard signalling as SOCIOLET, SEMANTIC, ABUSE, and ABOLISH, highlighted in the following illustrative transcription.

SOCIOLET, SEMANTIC, ABUSE, ABOLISH

(6:126) Jargon takes on the function of a SOCIOLET. (...) (18:130) - First, basic words - pseudo-scientific (...). (...) (23:132) - As for the syntax of jargon (...). (24:132) (...) jargon discovers a dozen ways of beating around the bush - for whatever reason: self-importance, obfuscation, ineptitude. (...) (25:132) - The most consistent feature of jargon is SEMANTIC. (...) (28:133) - There is always some obstacle to penetrating the essential meaning of a piece of jargon. (...) (29:133) (...) the conjuring of something out of nothing can be done with (...) woolly abstractions (...). (...) (31:133) - No one has compiled a history of jargon, but recorded objections to it go back a long way. (...) (39:136) - (...) false notions of refinement (...). (42:136) - Jargon is an ABUSE of terms whose main fault is that some of them tempt us to abuse them. (...) (44:136) - (...) it would neither be good nor possible to ABOLISH the special ways of talking and writing (...). (...) (45:137) - (...) as a barrier of social class.

ARE THE NONSTANDARD SIGNALS *SOCIOLET* IN 6), *SEMANTIC* IN 25), *ABUSE* IN 42), AND *ABOLISH* IN 44), RHETORICALLY REGULATIVE? Despite the semantic content and coherence inherent in the condensation of the four capitalized items, among which the addressor inexplicably overlooks *syntax* in 23), as in the present reader's created meaning: [Jargon is a *sociolet* whose *semantic*{-s} persuades people to *abuse* it rather than *abolish* it], they are unnecessary. Inferentially, the four items are unnecessarily 'capitalized', that is, unnecessarily put in capitals to persuade but sophistically. The four items are suasive but misleading. They do not lead the present reader into the rhetorical organization of text D. They do not support the implicit rhetorical organization, and do not nurture the reader to create the linguistic configuration, of text D. Seemingly, *SOCIOLET* appears in, and is meant to characterize, the first grouping of formulations; *SEMANTIC*, the second grouping; *ABUSE* and *ABOLISH* together, the third. No capitalized item is rhetorically meant to focus the *syntax* of jargon, otherwise misplaced. SOCIOLET, SEMANTIC, ABUSE and ABOLISH seem to me to be as unnecessary as the subtitle is incongruous and contradictory.

THE SUBTITLE

(1:125) - "Another Case in Point: The jargonauts and the not-so-golden fleece". (...) (6:126) - Jargon takes on the function of a SOCIOLET. (...) (18:130) - First, basic words - pseudo-scientific (...). (...) (23:132) - As for the syntax of jargon (...). (24:132) (...) jargon discovers a dozen ways of beating around the bush - for whatever reason: self-importance, obfuscation, ineptitude. (...) (25:132) - The most consistent feature of jargon is SEMANTIC. (...) (28:133) - There is always some obstacle to penetrating the essential meaning of a piece of jargon. (...) (29:133) (...) the conjuring of something out of nothing can be done with (...) woolly abstractions (...). (...) (31:133) - No one has compiled a history of jargon, but recorded objections to it go

> back a long way. (...) (39:136) - (...) false notions of refinement (...). (42:136) - Jargon is an ABUSE of terms whose main fault is that some of them tempt us to abuse them. (...) (44:136) - (...) it would neither be good nor possible to ABOLISH the special ways of talking and writing (...). (...) (45:137) - (...) as a barrier of social class.

HOW INCONGRUOUS AND CONTRADICTORY IS THE SUBTITLE AS ACTUALLY COINED? Excepting the title introduced by the general ordinal *Another case in point:*, signalling that the writer is going to cover in *Chapter 11* (as the general heading) the second topic from a list of three special topics in the book, the subtitle *the jargonauts and the not-so-golden fleece* is ostensibly as incongruous (not suitable) as contradictory (not compatible) in relation to the scope of the text. The actual subtitle seems incongruous with the breadth of concern held in text D against jargons. Seemingly, it was built on the basis of the following proportion: 'Jargonauts' is to 'Argonauts' equals 'not-so-golden fleece' is to 'Golden Fleece'. The subtitle signals the reader to process content coherence through the reader's memory schemata of, and metaphorical interpretations from, Greek mythology, and lexicology of English neologisms. Extrapolative inferences from the knowledge of the fictional old story of Jason's Argonautic expedition, and of the structure of English neologisms, establish coherence in the subtitle. Illustratively, indeed, the jargoneering compound *jargonauts* is coined by the 'blending' of the 'new initial part' in 'pragmatic position' {*jargon-*} with the 'end-part' of the 'thematic base' of 'linguistic form' {*-naut*} as from {*Argo-*}*nauts*. In consequence of the incongruity, the subtitle of the text is contradictory to what is happening around the text. One is not compatible with the other. In the formation of the subtitle there is, at least, one jargon, a *pseudo-scientific phrase*, in 18), *a barrier of social class*, in 45), which the writer intends to have *battered for all these pages*, throughout text D. Put differently, the subtitle predicts that the writer is going to argue, in the cataphorically adjacent part of the text, over *jargoneers* and over the pursuit of *jargon*, which is a *not-so-golden fleece*. Indeed, he argues over *jargon*, thereby dissenting from its *obfuscation* in 24), its *woolly abstractions* in 29), its *false notions of refinement* in

39), its use, to name but a few. The subtitle of text D, thus, contradictorily, is framed exactly on counterclaimed bases. CAN THE SUBTITLE IMPLY CONGRUENCE AND NONCONTRADICTION? Needless to say, no ostensible metalanguage is present in the text to justify the writer's elaboration of the jargoneering subtitle and thus eliminate ambiguity. Maybe the subtitle is 'an illustration of a jargonistic obstacle' used on purpose in the technical and scientific discourse, against which the writer argues by acknowledging that *There is always some obstacle to penetrating the essential meaning of a piece of jargon* in the technical and scientific discourse, in 28). Maybe the subtitle is a sort of "daring playfulness" (Quirk et al., op. cit.: 1985: 1583) in the technical and scientific discourse.

Tackling the data-driven problems, the adventitious circumstances that encouraged the rise of misunderstanding, differing interpretations, and disruption of reading in text D, was time-consuming. The linguistic configuration sought to back the pedagogical text frame was not created evenly because the text is devoid of the suggested rhetorically organized, global or local metatexts that facilitate the reader's integration of the multifarious scientific formulations of the groupings into a coherent whole. The under-signalling and mis-signalling actually substantiate rhetorical ineptness in text D.

E (Widdowson 1979: 7 - 17)

The difficulties attendant on text E seem to be mainly caused by under-signalled D members which are not unambiguously subsumed under overtly formed V members, and by mis-signalled V members. Coherence is not created unambiguously due to the absence of cohesive qualities in the predicted pair members and to the lack of compatibility with the present receiver's top-down predictions and the bottom-up information provided in the textual material. The

data-driven undercueing qualifies parts of the text as rhetorically inept, and conditions conflicting interpretations. Thus, at times, text E does not enhance comprehension: the present reader's assumed knowledge and interpretative skill do not disambiguate the under-signalled D members ambiguously subsumed under the first three rhetorical relationships performed by the first three overtly formed amalgamations, namely, (V1-V2): *I want to bring into focus a number of problems* (...) *with the teaching of English as a second language* (...), *in scientific and technical education*; (V3-V4): *to provide some of the means by which they may be solved*; (V5-V6): *Let us begin with some obvious and general observations*. In addition to under-signalling, miscueing may be found within the text. Two interpretations of the rhetorical organization of text E are a consequence of this situation.

THE FIRST INTERPRETATION

(V1-V2) (V3-V4) : [V9] ~ [D9], [V11] ~ [D11], [V12] ~ [D12]

(A NUMBER OF *PROBLEMS*, *SOME OF THE MEANS*, *USAGE-USE*, *LANGUE-PAROLE*, *COMPETENCE-PERFORMANCE*)

1st interpretation:	(V1-V2) : [V9] ~ [D9], [V11] ~ [D11], [V12] ~ [D12]	(V1) in 2): *problems*
		(V2) in 2): *a number of problems*
		[V9] in 14): *the usage* (*grammatical* function, *signification*) of language
		[V11] in 18): *langue*
		[V12] in 24): *notions of competence*
		(D12) in 25): *First of all*
		?
	(V3-V4) : [V9] ~ [D9], [V11] ~ [D11], [V12] ~ [D12]	(V3) in 2): *means*
		(V4) in 2): *some of the means*
		[V9] in 14): the *use* (*communicative* function, *value*) of language
		[V11] in 18): *parole*
		[V12] in 24): *performance*
		(D12) in 25): *First of all*

		?
	(V5-V6) : (V7) ~ (D7), [V8] ~ [D8], [V13] ~ [D13] : [V14] ~ [D14], [V16] ~ [D16]	(V5) in 5): *obvious and general observations*
		(V6) in 4): *some* obvious and general *observations*
		(V7) in 5): *First*, what do we do?
		(D7) in 6): *developing skills, correct sentences*
		[V8] in 10): *what* do we teach?
		[D8] in 11): *langue*
		[V13] in 26): *How* can we teach the *rules of use?*
		[D13] in 27): *rhetoric*
		[V14] in 29): two ways in the *rhetorical revival: speech act, speech function*
		[V16] in 31): *other* two *ways: conventions of use, context*
	(V15) ~ [D15]	(V15) in 29): *I should now like* (...) *to indicate* (...) *what relevance it might have for the preparation and presentation of teaching materials*
		(V15) in 35): *Let me now indicate what bearing I think this has on the teaching of English*
		[D15] in 36) - 38)
	(V10) ~ [D10]	(V10) in 16): *I shall return to this point later*
		[D10] ?

In the first interpretation represented in the above figure, text D was divided into four groupings of formulations. Seemingly, the first grouping lists and labels *a number of problems* (...) *with the teaching of English as second language* (...), *in scientific and technical education*; the second lists and labels *some of the means by which* [the problems] *may be solved*, and the third lists and deals with *some obvious and general observations*. The fourth grouping seems to be an evaluation.

In the next stretch of analysis, I will refer first to (V1-V2) and (V3-V4) pairs of prediction, which subsume [V9] ~ [D9], [V11] ~ [D11], [V12] ~ [D12]. The first members, (V1-V2), approach *a number o problems* with the teaching of English as a second language. The second members, (V3-V4), refer to *some of the means* to solve the problems listed in the chapter as in the following illustrative excerpt.

(V1-V2) (2:7) - (...) I want to bring into focus a number of problems (...) with the teaching of English as a second language (...), in scientific and technical education. (...)

(V3-V4) (3:7) (...) to provide some of the means by which they may be solved. (...)

(V9) (14:8) - There is an important distinction to be made, then, between the *usage* of language (...) and the *use* of language (...). (...) (D9) (15:9) - (...) attention (...) to the grammatical rather than the communicative properties of the language (...) and the focus is on signification rather than value.

(V10) (16:9) I shall return to this point later. (...) (17:9) - I have been using the terms *langue* and *parole*. (...)

(V11) (18:9) I want to question the validity of the distinction and its relevance to language teaching, and to suggest that the distinction (...) is misleading (...). (...) (D11) (19:9) - Lyons says (...). (...) (20:9) (...) by Hockett (...). (21:9) Householder provides (...). (22:10) The confusion (...). (...) (23:10) - (...) competence and performance.

(V12) (24:10) I want now to have a closer look at these notions (...). (D12) (25:11) - First of all, (...).

As a starting point, IN WHAT STRUCTURES OF PREDICTION DOES THE WRITER FRAME THE AMALGAMATED PREDICTIVE MEMBERS (V1-V2) AND (V3-V4)? Explicitly stated, two Advance Labelling structures (centered on *problems* and *means*) combined with an Enumeration structure (revealed by *a number of*, or *some of the*) altogether. WHICH SURFACE REGULATIVE SIGNALS OF PREDICTION DOES THE PRESENT RECEIVER IDENTIFY IN THE (V1-V2) AND (V3-V4) AS TWO PARTS OF ONE WHOLE? In the (V1) member of Advance Labelling: the prospective labelling of discourse act as the writer's explicit role, *want to bring into focus*, and the sub-technical plural noun in the Enumerables class, *problems*. In the (V2) member of Enumeration: [to list] *a number of* as an inexact numeral qualifying *problems*, which reduces the writer's responsibility but does not dispense him with providing prospective sequencing signals of Enumeration as new information to the context. In the (V3): *to provide means*. In the (V4): *some of the means*. WHAT DO THE (V1-V2) *PROBLEMS*, [V3-V4) *MEANS* SEEM TO SUBSUME? In the first interpretation, they together seemingly subsume [D9], [D11] and [D12] of predictive Advance Labelling structures. Inferentially, [D9], [D11] and [D12] cover three *problems* with ESL teaching in scientific and technical education, namely, *usage*, *langue*, and *competence*, and

three *means* to unravel the problems, namely, *use*, *parole*, and *performance*. Of the three, [D12] causes difficulties for me to construct a text frame because this member encompasses two and a half pages on the examination of the *notions* of *competence* and *performance*, a first notion only of which, however, is introduced by the sequencing conjunct *First of all*. Explicitly outlining the remaining *notions* is time-consuming indeed.

In the next stretch of analysis, I will refer to (V5-V6) pair of prediction, which subsumes (V7), [V8], and [V13], whose [D13] is realized by [V14] and [V16]. The (V5) and (V6) amalgamated members refer to *some obvious and general observations*.

(V5-V6) : (V7) ~ (D7), [V8] ~ [D8], [V13] ~ [D13] : [V14] ~ [D14], [V16] ~ [D16]

(*SOME OBSERVATIONS*, *WHAT WE* DO, *WHAT WE* TEACH, *HOW WE* TEACH *USE*, ONE WAY, *OTHER WAYS*);

(V5-V6) (4:7) - Let us begin with some obvious and general observations.

(V7) (5:7) First: what do we imagine we are doing when we are 'teaching a language'? (D7) (6:7) We speak of developing skills, of making habitual the ability to compose correct sentences. (7:7) At the same time (...). (8:7) We take pains to ensure that language is presented initially in situations (...). (9:7-8) (...) to make the language meaningful (...).

[V8] (10:8) What precisely are we teaching? [D8] (11:8) (...) we are teaching the language system: *langue*. (12:8) (...) realized in (...) *parole* in our initial presentation (...). (13:8) (...) to exemplify *langue*.

[V13] (26:13) - How do we set about teaching the rules of use? (...) [D13] (27:13) Traditionally, rhetoric (...) in much the same way as traditional grammar (...). (...) (28:13) (...) developments in linguistics (...) are moving towards a rhetorical revival.

[V14-V15] (29:13) I should now like to review one of these developments and to indicate (...) what relevance it might have for the preparation and presentation of teaching materials. [D14] (30:13) - From social anthropology (...) the speech function; and from linguistic philosophy (...) the speech act. (...)

[V16] (31:14) - What other ways are there of indicating what act a sentence counts (...)? [D16] (32:14) Certain linguistic features (...), (...) the context of utterance and the conventions of use (...). (...) (33:15) Just as one linguistic form may fulfil a variety of rhetorical functions, so one rhetorical function may be fulfilled by a variety of linguistic forms. (34:15-16) - There is, then, a good deal of progress being made in the description of rules of use and the characterization of different rhetorical acts.

IN WHAT STRUCTURE OF PREDICTION IS THE AMALGAMATION (V5-V6) FRAMED? In an Advance Labelling structure amalgamated with an Enumeration structure. WHICH SURFACE REGULATIVE SIGNALS OF PREDICTION DOES THE PRESENT RECEIVER IDENTIFY IN THE (V5-V6) STRUCTURE? The discourse act *Let us begin with some observations*, which the writer values as *obvious* and *general*, in the (V5) Advance Labelling structure. Also, [to list] implicit in *some* as an inexact numeral that qualifies the sub-technical noun of the Enumerables class: *observations*, in the (V6) Enumeration structure. WHICH ARE THE [D5], [D6] MEMBERS REALIZED BY THE ENSUING LINEAR TEXT? The [D5], [D6] members are the under-signalled body of *obvious* and *general observations*. WHAT DOES THE [D5], [D6] BODY OF *OBSERVATIONS* SUBSUME? I extrapolatively infer that it subsumes three embedding pair patterns of Question structure of prediction, namely, (V7) ~ (D7) prefaced by *First* under *observations*, questioning about *what* teachers do; [V8] ~ [D8] questioning about *what* to teach; and [V13] ~ [D13] questioning about *how* to teach the rules of use. The [D13] member is supplemented by not only [V14] ~ [D14] approaching one way to teach *the rules of use*: *rhetorical revival*, but also [V16] ~ [D16] providing *other ways*: *linguistic features*, *context*, etc. WHY IS THE BODY OF *OBSERVATIONS* EXTRAPOLATIVELY INFERRED? Because the body is in lack of explicit cohesive enumerative conjuncts to point straightforwardly to each of the contingent three *observations* (V7), [V8] and [V13] subsumed by the amalgamation (V5-V6), the only exception being the *First observation*, that is, (V7). WHAT PROMPTS THE PRESENT ADDRESSEE TO EVALUATE INFERENTIALLY THE SUBSTANDARD (V7), [V8], AND [V13] FORESTRUCTURES AS THREE D MEMBERS SUBSUMED UNDER, OR EMBEDDED IN, THE (V5-V6) MEMBER OF *SOME OBVIOUS AND GENERAL OBSERVATIONS*? So I evaluate 'inferentially' on account of the following three

circumstances. The first, the strong expectation set in my mind by the (V5-V6) member as to what *obvious* and *general observations* are to be treated prospectively, or specified by way of explicit signals. Under-signalled D *observations*, despite their being valued as *obvious* and *general*, are not found explicitly. Inferences counterbalance D under-signalling and, thus, minimize the frustrated expectation. The second, the overt grammatically describable link established by the enumerative conjunct *First:*, which prefaces *what do we imagine we are doing when we are 'teaching a language'?*, the first Question structure (V7) as a D of (V5-V6). The third, the propositional parallelism in which the three embedding Question structures of prediction, (V7): *what do we imagine we are doing when we are 'teaching a language'?*, [V8]: *What precisely are we teaching?*, [V13]: *How do we set about teaching the rules of use?*, in face of the three substandard metatexts, are seemingly arranged to join in the predicted cotext under (V5-V6). WHY ARE (V7), [V8] AND [V13] SUBSTANDARD OR FAULTY? Because of the writer's participant intervention as coded possibly in the inclusive rhetorical *we*, which is extraneous to the standard Question structure of prediction. Inferentially, the writer is a language teacher and, thus, part of the teaching group. The inclusive *we* is used in a collective sense of the 'group of teachers' of language, of which he is a member. The extraneous interference in (V7), [V8] and [V13] cause the three propositions not to predict that the writer will declare his deferred state of knowledge. It does not signal authorial detachment as required (Tadros, op. cit.: 48 - 52). The three substandard Question structures will be covered below, the first of which is (V7).

(V7) ~ (D7)

(*WHAT WE* DO, *CORRECT SENTENCES*)

(V7) (5:7) First: what do we imagine we are doing when we are 'teaching a language'? (D7) (6:7) We speak of developing skills, of making habitual the ability to compose correct sentences. (7:7)

> At the same time (...). (8:7) We take pains to ensure that language is presented initially in situations (...). (9:7-8) (...) to make the language meaningful (...).

WHY IS (V7) THE ONLY EXCEPTION? Because (V7) is the only *observation* in an embedding pair pattern of Question structure, explicitly introduced by a cohesive enumerative conjunct, namely, *First* in 5). WHICH IS (V7) AS THE *FIRST OBVIOUS* AND *GENERAL OBSERVATION* IN THE FIRST EMBEDDING PAIR PATTERN OF QUESTION STRUCTURE OF PREDICTION? The encoder's substandard prediction *what do we imagine we are doing when we are 'teaching a language'?* in 5). WHICH IS (D7) EMBEDDING IN (V7)? The writer's involvement in such statement of knowledge as *We speak of developing skills, of making habitual the ability to compose correct sentences*, in 6), and of *language* (...) *presented initially in situations*, in 8), *to make* it *meaningful*, in 9). [D7] is followed by [V8] and [V13] to be shown below.

[V8] ~ [D8], [V13] ~ [D13]

(*WHAT WE* TEACH, *LANGUE*, *HOW* TO TEACH *USE*, *WAYS*)

> [V8] (10:8) What precisely are we teaching? [D8] (11:8) (...) we are teaching the language system: *langue*. (12:8) (...) realized in (...) *parole* in our initial presentation (...). (13:8) (...) to exemplify *langue*.
>
> [V13] (26:13) - How do we set about teaching the rules of use? (...) [D13] (27:13) Traditionally, rhetoric (...) in much the same way as traditional grammar (...). (...) (28:13) (...) developments in linguistics (...) are moving towards a rhetorical revival.

WHICH ARE THE OTHER TWO CONTINGENT EMBEDDING PREDICTIVE MEMBERS OF QUESTION INTRODUCING THE REMAINING *OBSERVATIONS* SUBSUMED UNDER THE (V5-V6) AMALGAMATED PAIR? The faulty member [V8] is *What precisely are we teaching?* in 10), and the faulty member [V13] is *How do we set about teaching the rules of use?* in 26). WHAT IS THE EMBEDDING [D8] FOLLOWING STRAIGHTAWAY [V8] AS THE SECOND *OBVIOUS* AND *GENERAL OBSERVATION*? The statement that *we are teaching the language system: langue* (...) *realized in* (...) *parole in our initial presentation* (...) *to exemplify langue*, in 11), 12) and 13). HOW ABOUT THE EMBEDDING

[D13] UNDER THE [V13] MEMBER AS THE THIRD *OBVIOUS* AND *GENERAL OBSERVATION*? At a guess and at my cost, the embedding [D13] *observations* are provided in [D14]: one way to teach *rules of use*, namely, *rhetorical revival*, and in [D16]: other ways to teach rules of use, namely, linguistic features, context, etc. [D13] is developed as follows.

[D13] : [V14] ~ [D14], [V16] ~ [D16]

(*WAYS*, ONE WAY, *OTHER WAYS*)

[V13] (26:13) - How do we set about teaching the rules of use? (...) [D13] (27:13) Traditionally, rhetoric (...) in much the same way as traditional grammar (...). (...) (28:13) (...) developments in linguistics (...) are moving towards a rhetorical revival.

[V14] (29:13) I should now like to review one of these developments and [-V15] to indicate (...) what relevance it might have for the preparation and presentation of teaching materials. [D14] (30:13) - From social anthropology (...) the speech function; and from linguistic philosophy (...) the speech act. (...)

[V16] (31:14) - What other ways are there of indicating what act a sentence counts (...)? [D16] (32:14) Certain linguistic features (...), (...) the context of utterance and the conventions of use (...). (...) (33:15) Just as one linguistic form may fulfil a variety of rhetorical functions, so one rhetorical function may be fulfilled by a variety of linguistic forms. (34:15-16) - There is, then, a good deal of progress being made in the description of rules of use and the characterization of different rhetorical acts.

[V15] (35:16) - Let me now indicate what bearing I think this has on the teaching of English, and in particular on English for science and technology. (...) [D15] (36:16) Teaching rhetorical acts (...) involves the teaching of different linguistic elements and vocabulary items, which are taught meaningfully because they are given a definite communicative import. (...) 37:16) (...) basing the preparation of teaching materials (...) on the rhetorical units of communication (...). (...) (38:16) - Scientific discourse can be seen as a set of rhetorical acts (...), but the manner in which these acts are related (...) and (...) linguistically realized may be restricted by accepted convention.

WHICH ARE THE [V14] AND [V16] MEMBERS CONTINGENTLY SUBSUMED UNDER [V13]? The [V14] member in 29) is *I should now like to review one of these developments* explicitly amalgamated with the recursive [V15] in 29), which is *to indicate* (...) *what relevance it* [speech act or speech function] *might have for the preparation and presentation of teaching materials* (to be explained later). The [V16] member is *What other ways are there of indicating what act a sentence counts* (...)?, in 31). WHAT PROMPTS THE READER TO CONSIDER [V13] ~ [D13] LINKED BOTH TO [V14] ~ [D14] AND [V16] ~ [D16]? Inferentially, the cue *other ways* appearing in [V16] linked to *How* appearing in

[V13]. The linking seemingly cues the following prospective content predicted relations to the retrospective [V13] member, which looks for the *ways*, or the *How*, *the rules of use* are taught. First and foremost, [D13] offers one *way*: [the first], *rhetoric*. Next, [D14] offers 'possibly' two *ways* (in the *rhetorical revival*): [the second], *speech act*), or/and [the third], *speech function*, and both supplement [D16], which offers possibly *other* two *ways*: [the fourth], *conventions of use* (or seemingly *linguistic features*), and [the fifth], *context*. In brief, the discontinuity Question-structured [V16] ~ [D16]: *other ways*: *conventions of use*, *context*, seems to be a supplementary information to the overlap Advance-Labelling-structured [V14] ~ [D14]: two ways: *speech act*, *speech function*, and the two D members together seem to supplement the embedding Question-structured [V13] ~ [D13]: one way: *rhetoric*. WHICH ARE [D13], [D14] AND [D16] ALTOGETHER LINKED TO, AND SUBSUMED UNDER, [V13] AS THE THIRD *OBVIOUS* AND *GENERAL OBSERVATION*? Accordingly, [teachers can *set about teaching the rules of use* by means of *rhetoric*, of *speech functions* and/or *speech acts* (which the writer names *rhetorical function* and *rhetorical act*), of *context*, of *conventions of use* (or seemingly *linguistic features*)].

In this first interpretation of text E, I see that the foregoing data on *a number of problems*, *some means* to counteract them, and *general observations*, with regards to *The teaching of rhetoric to students of science and technology*, are followed by evaluative formulations encoded in (V15) ~ [D15] to be referred to below.

(V15) ~ [D15]

(RELEVANCE, EVALUATIVE FORMULATIONS)

[V14] (29:13) I should now like to review one of these developments and [-V15] to indicate (...) what relevance it might have for the preparation and presentation of teaching materials. [D14] (30:13) - From social anthropology (...) the speech function; and from linguistic philosophy (...) the speech act. (...)

(V15) (35:16) - Let me now indicate what bearing I think this has on the teaching of English, and in particular on English for science and technology. (...) [D15] (36:16) Teaching rhetorical acts (...) involves the teaching of different linguistic elements and vocabulary items, which are taught meaningfully because they are given a definite communicative import. (...) 37:16) (...) basing the preparation of teaching materials (...) on the rhetorical units of communication (...). (...) (38:16) - Scientific discourse can be seen as a set of rhetorical acts (...), but the manner in which these acts are related (...) and (...) linguistically realized may be restricted by accepted convention.

HOW ABOUT THE EVALUATIVE (V15) PREDICTION? (V15) is explicitly amalgamated with [V14], and both are an overlap. IN WHAT STRUCTURE OF PREDICTION IS THE OVERLAP (V15) MEMBER FRAMED BY THE WRITER? Advance Labelling. WHICH IS THE (V15) MEMBER OF THE OVERLAP ADVANCE LABELLING-STRUCTURED PATTERN? In fact, (V15) is a recurrent Advance Labelling structure because it is introduced, first, as *I should now like* (...) *to indicate* (...) *what relevance it might have for the preparation and presentation of teaching materials*, in 29), and secondly reframed as *Let me now indicate what bearing I think this has on the teaching of English* (...) in 35). WHICH SURFACE REGULATIVE SIGNALS OF PREDICTION DOES THE RECEIVER IDENTIFY IN THE RECURRENT (V15) ADVANCE LABELLING STRUCTURE? The writer's prospective roles in the verb phrases *should* (...) *like to indicate*, in 29), and *Let me* now *indicate*, in 35). Moreover, the nouns of (V15): *relevance* in 29), and *bearing*, in 35). Also, the authorial involvement coded twice in the pronouns *I* in 29), and *me* in 35). WHAT IS THE OVERLAP [D15] MEMBER? The grouping of evaluative formulations ranging from 36) to 38) in the above excerpt.

In closing the first interpretation, I have to refer to the (V10) prediction. In fact, (V10) is an illustration of mis-signalling in text E, as follows.

(V10) ~ [D10]

(TO *RETURN TO THIS POINT*, UNDER-SIGNALLING)

(V10) (16:9) I shall return to this point later.

HOW ABOUT THE (V10) PREDICTION? The explicit (V10) member is an overlap in the Advance Labelling structure of fulfilled prediction. It predicts that the writer will return to refer to the *usage* (grammar and *signification*) and the *use* (communication, *value*) of language. HOW ABOUT [D10]? [D10] is under-signalled: not arranged according to a rhetorically organized scheme. [D10] scatters and diffuses without rhetorical conventions to tailor the course of *this point* in 16) to fit the reader's need for plausibility.

THE SECOND INTERPRETATION

(V1-V2) (V5-V6) : (V7) ~ (D7), [V8] ~ [D8], [V9] ~ [D9], [V11] ~ [D11], [V12] ~ [D12];

(*PROBLEMS AS OBVIOUS AND GENERAL OBSERVATIONS, SKILLS/CORRECT SENTENCES, LANGUE, USAGE,* RECURRENTLY *LANGUE, COMPETENCE*)

In the second interpretation, text D was divided into three groupings of formulations. Seemingly, the first grouping lists and labels *a number of problems with*, or more specifically, *a number of* what I inferred from sentences 2) and 5) as being *problem*{-atic} *observations* regarding, *the teaching of English as a second language* (...), *in scientific and technical education*; the second grouping lists and deals with *some of the means by which* the *problems*, or *problem*{-atic} *observations*, were unravelled. The third grouping seems to be an evaluation. The second interpretation can be represented in the following figure as from the following quoted portions of text:

2st interpretation:	(V1-V2) (V5-V6) : (V7) ~ (D7), [V8] ~ [D8], [V9] ~ [D9], [V11] ~ [D11], [V12] ~ [D12]	(V1-V5) in 2), 5): *problems as obvious and general observations*
		(V2-V6) in 2), 5): *a number of problems or some obvious and general observations*
		(V7) in 5): *First, what* do we do?
		(D7) in 6): *developing skills, correct sentences*

		[V8] in 10): *what* do we teach?
		[D8] in 11): *langue*
		[D9] in 15): *the usage* (*grammatical* function, *signification*) of language
		[D11] in 19): *langue*
		[V12] in 24): *notions of competence*
		[D12] in 25): *First of all*
	(V3-V4) : [V9] ~ [D9], [V11] ~ [D11], [V12] ~ [D12], [V13] ~ [D13], [V14] - [D14], [V16] - [D16]	(V3) in 2): *means*
		(V4) in 2): *some of the means*
		[V9] in 14): the *use* (*communicative* function, *value*) of language
		[V11] in 18): *parole*
		[V12] in 24): *performance*
		(D12) in 25): *First of all*
		?
		[V13] in 26): *How* can we teach the *rules of use*?
		[D13] in 27): *rhetoric*
		[V14] in 29): two ways in the *rhetorical revival*
		[D14] in 30): *speech act, speech function*
		[V16] in 31): *other* two *ways*:
		[D16] in 32): *conventions of use, context*
	(V15) ~ [D15]	(V15) in 29): *I should now like* (...) *to indicate* (...) *what relevance it might have for the preparation and presentation of teaching materials*
		(V15) in 35): *Let me now indicate what bearing I think this has on the teaching of English*
		[D15] in 36) - 38)
	(V10) ~ [D10]	(V10) in 16): *I shall return to this point later*
		[D10] ?

(V1-V2) (2:7) - (...) I want to bring into focus a number of problems (...) with the teaching of English as a second language (...), in scientific and technical education. (...)

(V3-V4) (3:7) (...) to provide some of the means by which they may be solved. (...)

(V5-V6) (4:7) - Let us begin with some obvious and general observations.

(V7) (5:7) First: what do we imagine we are doing when we are 'teaching a language'? (D7) (6:7) We speak of developing skills, of making habitual the ability to compose correct sentences. (7:7) At the same time (...). (8:7) We take pains to ensure that language is presented initially in situations (...). (9:7-8) (...) to make the language meaningful (...).

[V8] (10:8) What precisely are we teaching? [D8] (11:8) (...) we are teaching the language system: *langue*. (12:8) (...) realized in (...) *parole* in our initial presentation (...). (13:8) (...) to exemplify *langue*.

[V9] (14:8) - There is an important distinction to be made, then, between the *usage* of language (...) and the *use* of language (...). (...) [D9] (15:9) - (...) attention (...) to the grammatical rather than the communicative properties of the language (...) and the focus is on signification rather than value.

(17:9) - I have been using the terms *langue* and *parole*. (...) [V11] (18:9) I want to question the validity of the distinction and its relevance to language teaching, and to suggest that the distinction (...) is misleading (...). (...) [D11] (19:9) - Lyons says (...). (...) (20:9) (...) by Hockett (...). (21:9) Householder provides (...). (22:10) The confusion (...). (...) (23:10) - (...) competence and performance.

[V12] (24:10) I want now to have a closer look at these notions (...). (D12) (25:11) - First of all, (...).

[V13] (26:13) - How do we set about teaching the rules of use? (...) [D13] (27:13) Traditionally, rhetoric (...) in much the same way as traditional grammar (...). (...) (28:13) (...) developments in linguistics (...) are moving towards a rhetorical revival.

To pursue this interpretation is to anticipate either that (V5-V6) is a mis-signalled and unfulfilled prediction, not belonging into the text, or that the (V1-V2) *problems* and the (V5-V6) *obvious* and *general observations* as [problematic *observations*] are matching items, probably sharing the same (V) member of the same prediction, being the latter a lexical repetition of the former and conversely. However, the unsignalled predicted *problems* or the unsignalled predicted [problematic *observations*] alike might be *general*, but might not be *obvious* in text E as far as the connotation of "readily perceived (...), immediately *apparent* [sic], unmistakably true" (The Cassell Thesaurus 1991) is concerned. The absence of the metalanguage in text E to specify clear-cut connotational relations between the lexical item *obvious*, which "is very general, with a wide range of uses" (ibid.), and the sub-technical nouns *observations*, or *problems*, causes (V5-V6) to be mis-signalled and misleading to the reader.

WHICH ARE THE (V1-V2) *PROBLEMS* AS (V5-V6) *OBVIOUS AND GENERAL OBSERVATIONS* IN THE SECOND INTERPRETATION? Inferentially, or implicitly, the *problems* are likely to be hidden in the embedding (D7): teachers speak of *developing skills*, *correct sentences*, and [D8]: teachers

teach *langue*, and in parts of the unsignalled discontinuities [D9]: teachers focus the *usage* of language, [D11]: teachers speak of *langue*, and [D12]: teachers highlight *competence*. ARE THERE MEANS TO UNRAVEL THE PROBLEMS? inferentially, yes, as follows.

(V3-V4) : [V9] ~ [D9], [V11] ~ [D11], [V12] ~ [D12], [V13] ~ [D13], [V14] ~ [D14], (*MEANS*, *USE*, *PAROLE*, *PERFORMANCE*, *RULES OF USE* THROUGH *RHETORIC*, *RHETORICAL ACTS-FUNCTIONS*, *CONVENTIONS OF USE-CONTEXT*)

At a second reading of text E illustrated under (V1-V2) (V3-V4) section above, WHICH ARE THE (V3-V4) *MEANS* POSSIBLE TO UNRAVEL THE *PROBLEMS* AS *OBSERVATIONS*? (V3-V4) *means* may be in parts of the unsignalled discontinuities [D9]: teachers were to focus the *use* of language, [D11]: teachers were to practice *parole*, and [D12]: teachers were to concentrate on *performance*, in the unsignalled discontinuity [D13]: teachers should teach the *rules of use* through *rhetoric*, that is supplemented by the unsignalled overlap [D14]: teachers were to teach the *rules of use* through *rhetorical acts* and *rhetorical functions*, and the unsignalled discontinuity [D16]: teachers were to teach the *rules of use* through *conventions of use*, *context*, etc., which effect under-signalling in the predicted members of text E. The relevance and evaluation regarding the data above seem to be encoded in (V15) ~ [D15].

(V15) ~ [D15]

(RELEVANCE, EVALUATIVE FORMULATIONS)

[V14-V15] (29:13) I should now like to review one of these developments and to indicate (...) what relevance it might have for the preparation and presentation of teaching materials. [D14] (30:13) - From social anthropology (...) the speech function; and from linguistic philosophy (...) the speech act. (...)

[V16] (31:14) - What other ways are there of indicating what act a sentence counts (...)? [D16] (32:14) Certain linguistic features (...), (...) the context of utterance and the conventions of use (...). (...) (33:15) Just as one linguistic form may fulfil a variety of rhetorical functions, so one rhetorical function may be fulfilled by a variety of linguistic forms. (34:15-16) - There is, then, a

good deal of progress being made in the description of rules of use and the characterization of different rhetorical acts.

[V15] (35:16) - Let me now indicate what bearing I think this has on the teaching of English, and in particular on English for science and technology. (...) [D15] (36:16) Teaching rhetorical acts (...) involves the teaching of different linguistic elements and vocabulary items, which are taught meaningfully because they are given a definite communicative import. (...) 37:16) (...) basing the preparation of teaching materials (...) on the rhetorical units of communication (...). (...) (38:16) - Scientific discourse can be seen as a set of rhetorical acts (...), but the manner in which these acts are related (...) and (...) linguistically realized may be restricted by accepted convention.

HOW ABOUT (V15) ~ [D15]? Similarly to (V15) ~ [D15] in the first interpretation, the (V15) ~ (D15) pair pattern in the second interpretation is an evaluative prediction. Similarly to (V10) ~ [D10] in the first interpretation, the (V10) ~ [D10] pair pattern of prediction in the second interpretation is under-signalled, as follows.

(V10) ~ [D10]

(TO *RETURN TO THIS POINT*, UNDER-SIGNALLING)

(V10) (16:9) I shall return to this point later. (...)

HOW ABOUT (V10) ~ [D10]? Similarly to (V10) ~ [D10] in the first interpretation, the (V10) ~ [D10] pair pattern in the second interpretation is a predictive member whose predicted cotext is under-signalled.

I tend to admit that I do not know definitely, explicitly, which and how many the *problems* with, and the *observations* on, ESL teaching in science and technology were in text E, as well as which and how many the workable *means* to unravel such problems were purported to be. Text E falls short of its predictions because it is short on rhetorical conventions to support explicitly the predicted members of prediction-based pair patterns. The rhetorical ineptness caused the reader to waver among *problems*, *means*, *observations* and organized pairs of (V) ~ (D) members. At the end of the reading process, the reader abounded in doubts ostensive in at least the two interpretations developed above. Accordingly, the foregoing rhetorical difficulty, or resultant confusion, hardly needs commenting upon further than the following point to be the last: text E was mainly an under-signalled and not

coherent tricky maze of implicit rhetorical information, or better, of concealed rhetorical relationships between under-signalled predicted members and signalled or mis-signalled predictive members of simple and complex pair patternings of prediction. Rhetorical ineptness in text E effected the above state-of-affairs.

F (Gregory and Carroll 1978: 75 - 85)

The matter under consideration in Gregory and Carroll's chapter to be analyzed is individual language *variation* at the cultural level. Language variation is explained to be an effect of language *selection* that is determined by, and reflects, individual *social factors*. The explanation for such formulations are given through the report of the *theory of social development*, and the *theory of code*. Conclusively, code is considered the *connective concept* between social system and language variation.

Text F seemed to me to be another representative of rhetorical information implicitly imparted in the scientific discourse of linguistics. A positive signalled orthographic prediction as a main micro pattern of cohesive rhetorical organization for content coherence is not graphically imparted. Instead, the writers provide predictions explicit but peripheral to a main rhetorical metatext of organized prediction unsignally fulfilled. They provide also a train of recurred objectives that seem to have supported past researches into the cultural and linguistic aspects of language *variation*. Still, they provide a mis-signalled prediction, and mis-signalled pro-form-antecedent relations. Inferentially, the circumstances minimize 'textual plausibility', are detrimental to the reader's prompt comprehension of global content relations, and do not promote the prompt production of a global cohesive/coherent text frame. However, the first structure of prediction, (V1) ~ (V2), is local and overt, as follows:

(V1) ~ (D1)

(1:75) "Code". (V1) (2:75) - We have emphasized in Chapter one the importance of looking at language as a social phenomenon (...). (...) (D1) (3:75) We can regard it as behaviour relating the participants (...) to their environment, to each other and to the medium of communication itself. (...) (4:75-76) Meaning (...) as part of a larger system of meaning to which members of the community have access. (5:76) This system of potential meaning is the culture itself. (...) (6:76) (...) these meanings will be encoded in grammatical and lexical options. (7:76) - Examination of individual utterances reveals extensive variation (...). (8:76) Language seems to be characterized by such variability (...).

WHICH ARE THE FIRST TWO OVERT STRUCTURES OF PREDICTION IN TEXT F? (V1) is a Recapitulation structure, and (V2) - below - a pseudo-Hypotheticality structure. WHERE DOES THE (V1) RECAPITULATION STRUCTURE OCCUR? Right at the beginning of the Chapter. IN WHICH ORTHOGRAPHIC SENTENCE DOES (V1) OCCUR? In 2). WHICH IS THE (V1) PREDICTION? The predictive 'abstract' and 'anchorage' *We have emphasized in Chapter one the importance of looking at language as a social phenomenon.* WHICH ARE THE EXPLICIT RECALL SIGNALS IN THE PREDICTIVE 2)? The writer's participant status in *We*, the place reference item *in Chapter one*, and the inflectional bound morpheme {-ed} for the regular past participle verb in the finite declarative clause *We have emphasized* (...). WHICH IS THE PREDICTED MEMBER OF THE (V1) ANCHORAGE? The (D1) member is the 'new information' added to the context of *language as a social phenomenon*, ranging from sentence 3) up to sentence 8). In the linguistic stretch, the non-floating new information are about *language* as *behaviour* in 3), *potential meaning* in 5), *culture* in 5), *options* in 6), and *variability* in the 8) as the terminating orthographic line.

(V2)

(...) (V2) (9:76) If it is true that language reflects society then it should be possible to determine the specific ways in which this reflection occurs by showing how individual social factors determine the selection of individual linguistic features.

IN WHICH ORTHOGRAPHIC SENTENCE DOES THE V2 PSEUDO-HYPOTHETICALITY STRUCTURE OCCUR? In 9). WHICH IS THE V2 PSEUDO-STRUCTURE? The dependent if-clause *If it is true that language reflects society*, and the adjoined free clause *it should be possible to determine*

the specific ways in which this reflection occurs (...), prefaced by the correlating inferential conjunctive *then*. WHY IS THE (V2) PREDICTION A PSEUDO-HYPOTHETICALITY STRUCTURE? Although sentence 9) has the simple conditional subordinator *If* unparaphrasable by 'whenever' and the tense requirements for the proposition, sentence 9) falls to fit in with the fifth structural representation of Hypotheticality. The circumstance is the two clausal extrapositions: as *it is ... that* (inserted in the conditional clause) and *it should be ... to* (fronting the matrix clause), and their two focal elements of information *true* and *possible*. As such, inferentially, sentence 9) is ineffective as a standard rhetorically organized prediction to encapsulate the forthcoming [D2] part, which is inept as I will show below. Sentence 9), thus, demands editing. WHAT EDITING? Actually, the *If* introduces a direct 'condition', whose consequence *to determine the specific ways in which this reflection occurs* has a straightforward relation to the condition *language reflects society*. Tentatively, the pseudo-hypothetical data in 9) were to be inscribed in the following positive Hypotheticality structure: [*If language tru*{-ly} *reflects society, the specific ways in which this reflection occurs should be* certainly *determin*{-ed}]. The (V2) simplification of the hypothetical structure paraphrastically brought about conformity to the fifth structural representation of Hypotheticality foresees a [D2] 'generalization of acts' in the factual world of *ways* that were to be clearly mapped and aptly signalled by means of sequencing adjuncts. The forthcoming [D2] part, however, seems to be inept. WHY IS THE FORTHCOMING [D2] PART, AFTER 9) ON, INEPT? Leaving the pseudo-Hypotheticality aside, the threads of the part ranging from 9) on, transcribed below, which is in difficulty for coherence, are devoid of a positive contractual prediction to encapsulate rhetorically the ensuing principles and viewpoints there covered. CAN I SEQUENCE THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN DIFFICULTY FOR COHERENCE

ATTENDANT ON [D2] PART FROM 9) ON? I can sequence three main mind-bending circumstances in [D2].

THE FIRST CIRCUMSTANCE IN [D2]

(...) (V2) (9:76) If it is true that language reflects society then it should be possible to determine the specific ways in which this reflection occurs by showing how individual social factors determine the selection of individual linguistic features. (...) [D2] (10:77) - (...) variation of language use must be related to something other than the linguistic system. (11:77) Variation must be linked to an independent theory of social development and change. (12:77) The concept 'social dialect' is a useful (...); however, to describe variability at the cultural level a different kind of abstraction is required. (13:77) - To do so we must think of culture and the social structural system as a system of meanings. (14:77) - The culture of a society incorporates all possible meaningful behaviour (...). (15:77) (...) the social structure, or the organization of roles and potential relationships among members of the society. (...) (16:77) - The context of culture is (...) actualized in a context of situation. (...) (17:78) Situation-type (...) implies context of culture (...). (18:78) - The social system is (...) a system of behavioural patterns which language interprets and realizes. (19:78) Meaning is (...) to be found at all levels of analysis. (20:78) - To determine how this occurs requires that we examine how language 'means', (...) the various meaningful functions that language performs. (...) (21:78) The ways in which the meaning potentials of the social system are actually organized into semantic categories have yet to be explained. (22:78) To do this we must step beyond the linguistic system (...) to try to relate the social system to the linguistic system. (23:78) In this manner we can determine how the meaning potential present in the social system determines the organization of meaning and therefore influences the selection of formal linguistic items. (24:78) We need an intermediary concept linking language to culture.

WHAT IS THE FIRST MIND-BENDING CIRCUMSTANCE? The first is the bunch of Advance Labelling predictions from 10) to 24) transcribed above. They are pseudo-predictions in the chapter since they are not coined to support the rhetorical structure neither of text F as a whole nor of a part of the text. They are misleading on account of the fact that they seem to be promises that frustrate the reader's expectations of fulfillment. The pseudo-predictions are not the writer's commitments to text F. Sentence 24): *We need an intermediary concept linking language to culture*, for instance, which seems to encode one commitment yet to be fulfilled by the writer has already been fulfilled by other researchers as the writer himself acknowledged tardily by *This intermediary concept has been provided* (...) *by the work of* (...) *Bernstein and his colleagues*, in 25).

THE SECOND CIRCUMSTANCE IN [D2]

WHAT IS THE SECOND CIRCUMSTANCE? The second circumstance is the correspondences of "propositional" and "contextual" meaning (Nuttall, op. cit.: 81) and "lexical content" (Quirk et al. 1985: 57) inscribed in the pseudo-predictions in the inordinately large segment from 9) to 24). A couple of illustrative correspondences are, for example, as follows: (a) *to determine the specific ways in which this reflection occurs* is the same as: (b) to show *how individual social factors determine the selection of individual linguistic features* in 9); (c) to relate *variation of language use to something other than the linguistic system* in 10) is the same as (d) to link *variation to an independent theory of social development and change* in 11); (e) *to try to relate the social system to the linguistic system* in 22) is the same as (f) to look for *an intermediary concept linking language to culture* in 24); (g) to *think of culture and the social structural system as a system of meanings* in 13) is the same as (h) to *determine how the meaning potential present in the social system* (...) *influences the selection of formal linguistic items* in 23), which in turn is the same as (i) to show *how individual social factors determine the selection of individual linguistic features* in 9), etc. Connotatively, *to determine the specific ways* in 9) and to show *how* in 9) and to *determine how* in 23) mean the same; the anaphoric reference-based *this reflection* in 9) and the relation between *individual social factors* and *the selection of individual linguistic features* in 9) mean the same; to relate *variation* (...) *to* in 10) and to link *variation to* in 11) mean the same; the assertive nonpersonal specific reference in positive context *something* in 10) is specified as *an independent theory of social development and change* in 11), what renders both prompt to mean the same; *to relate* in 22) and *linking* in 24) mean the same; *the social system* in 22) and *culture* in 24) are the same; *the linguistic system* in 22) and *language* in 24) mean the same; *the social structural system as a system of meanings* in 13) and *the meaning potential present in the social system* in 23) are alike; to *determine how*

meaning potentials present in the social system influences the selection of formal linguistic items in 23) and to show *how individual social factors determine the selection of individual linguistic features* in 9), wide apart, convey the same information.

THE THIRD CIRCUMSTANCE IN [D2]

> (...) (V2) (9:76) If it is true that language reflects society then it should be possible to determine the specific ways in which this reflection occurs by showing how individual social factors determine the selection of individual linguistic features. (...) [D2] (10:77) - (...) variation of language use must be related to something other than the linguistic system. (11:77) Variation must be linked to an independent theory of social development and change. (12:77) The concept 'social dialect' is a useful (...); however, to describe variability at the cultural level a different kind of abstraction is required. (13:77) - To do so we must think of culture and the social structural system as a system of meanings.
>
> (14:77) - The culture of a society incorporates all possible meaningful behaviour (...). (15:77) (...) the social structure, or the organization of roles and potential relationships among members of the society. (...) (16:77) - The context of culture is (...) actualized in a context of situation. (...) (17:78) Situation-type (...) implies context of culture (...). (18:78) - The social system is (...) a system of behavioural patterns which language interprets and realizes. (19:78) Meaning is (...) to be found at all levels of analysis. (20:78) - To determine how this occurs requires that we examine how language 'means', (...) the various meaningful functions that language performs.
>
> (...) (21:78) The ways in which the meaning potentials of the social system are actually organized into semantic categories have yet to be explained. (22:78) To do this we must step beyond the linguistic system (...) to try to relate the social system to the linguistic system. (23:78) In this manner we can determine how the meaning potential present in the social system determines the organization of meaning and therefore influences the selection of formal linguistic items. (24:78) We need an intermediary concept linking language to culture.

WHAT IS THE THIRD MIND-BENDING CIRCUMSTANCE? Excepting *To do this* in 22) on account of its clearly near sentential antecedent in 21), the third circumstance is the problematic linkage in pro-form and antecedent relations, performed by *To do so* in 13), and *this* in 20), which invite reanalyses. WHY *TO DO SO*? *To do so* is the complex pro-form used for substitution occurring in the non-finite form as the to-infinite construction in 13): *To do so we must think of culture and the social structural system as a system of meanings*. The nature of *To do so* is "problematic [to comprehension] in the sense that it is difficult to determine (partly because of variation between BrE and AmE) whether *do* is ... transitive and intransitive" and "uncertain ... both grammatically and semantically"

(Quirk et al., op. cit.: 874, 879). *To do so* has a confounding sentential antecedent in [D2], and it seems to range from 9) to 12) above. To avoid further confusion, I take the expression *To do so* to be a unique predication-substitute for the grouping. Seen as such, I take the subject ellipted from many of the pseudo-predictions to be the inclusive authorial [*We*] as used in 13), 20), 22), 23), 24). Also, I take the main verb *need* as used in 24) to follow the subject [*We*] and to preface the predication for which I venture to think that the time-consuming complex pro-form *To do so* substitutes. Thus, the unit *to do so*, which was to follow [*We need*] in my comprehension, substitutes for the larger anaphoric segment *to describe variability at the cultural level* in 12) or to link *variation to an independent theory of social development and change* in 11) or to relate *variation of language use to something* in 10) or to show *how individual social factors determine the selection of individual linguistic features* in 9) or *to determine the specific ways in which this reflection occurs* in 9). WHY *THIS*? *This* is the pro-form used for coreference in 20): *To determine how this occurs requires that we examine how language 'means',* (...) *the various meaningful functions that language performs*, has a confounding sentential antecedent. The 'near' demonstrative *this* has a cataphoric reference that does not seem to be encoded in the 'near' 19): *Meaning is* (...) *to be found at all levels of analysis*, because *all levels of analysis* seem to be outside the textual scope. Its reference is perhaps in the less near 18): *The social system is* (...) *a system of behavioural patterns which language interprets and realizes*, and more probably in the least near 14): *The culture of a society incorporates all possible meaningful behaviour* (...). Stated clearly here, I venture to suppose that *To determine how this occurs* in 20) means primarily [*To determine how The culture of a society incorporates all possible meaningful behaviour, the social structure, or the organization of roles and potential relationships among members of the society; To determine how The context of culture is* (...) *actualized in a*

context of situation, *The social system is* (...) *a system of behavioural patterns which language interprets and realizes*], as in 14) - 18).

The third overt structure of prediction, (V3) ~ [D3], following [D2], is treated and illustrated below:

(V3) ~ [D3]: (V4), (V5)

(V3) (25:78) - This intermediary concept has been provided, in part at least, by the work of (...) Bernstein and his colleagues (...). (...) (26:79) Different classes, he found, have different ways of using language (...). (27:79) Class structure created different linguistic codes. (28:79) - Bernstein found that language (...) was a principal factor in (...) the child's social identity. (...) (29:80) - (...) from a configuration of roles (...). (30:80) (...) created by the social system. (31:80) They reflect the culture (...). (32:80) (...) culture determines the role system (...). (...) (33:80) Bernstein has developed the concept of code to show how the social system determines and is reflected in linguistic differences. (34:80) - Code determines the meaning potential of the individual. (...) (35:81) - Bernstein postulates (...). (36:82) - The importance of the code theory in education lies in the fact that the school system requires the use of an elaborated code but not all students have access to it. (37:82) The importance of this theory to sociology lies in the fact that the differential access to the elaborated code does not occur randomly but rather is controlled by the class system. (...) (38:82) - In order to illustrate we shall use two passages (...) constructed by (...). (...) (39:83) (...) the following stories. (...) (40:83) - (...) code is not synonymous with social dialect. (...) (41:83) Code refers to (...). (...) (42:84) Social dialect, however, is (...). (...) (43:84-85) - Code determines (...).

(...) (V4) (44:85) The contextual determinants of text have been discussed in preceding chapters (in lexical, grammatical and phonological terms) as kinds of (...). (...) (V5) (45:85) Let us note here simply that these features (...) can also be linked to social structure and to the context of culture. (...) (D5) (46:85) The connective concept is code.

IN WHICH ORTHOGRAPHIC SENTENCE IS THE THIRD OVERT STRUCTURE OF PREDICTION ENCODED? In sentence 25). WHICH IS THE (V3) STRUCTURE OF PREDICTION? The propositional content of 25) from which the writer of text F detaches by signally attributing the *concept* to *Bernstein and his colleagues* prompts me to take it as the (V3) Reporting structure of prediction. WHICH IS THE REPORTING (V3) STRUCTURE OF PREDICTION IN 25)? *This intermediary concept* which *has been provided* (...) *by the work of* (...) *Bernstein and his colleagues*, and which extends in the report stretch from 25) up to 43). In the stretch, the writer reports *the code theory* according to which *code* is the *intermediary or connective concept* between the *social system* (*class structure*, *class system*, *different classes*, *social identity*) and the *variation* of

language (*linguistic differences, different ways of using language*). Accordingly, social system is reflected in language. WHICH IS THE [D3] MEMBER OF THE (V3) REPORTING STRUCTURE? Inferentially, the [D3] member is a 'positive evaluation' of code and social theories. The [D3] member is encoded in (V4) and (V5). The (V4) member is the embedding Recapitulation structure of prediction: *The contextual determinants of text have been discussed in preceding chapters (in lexical, grammatical and phonological terms)* (...), in 44), which *can also be linked to the social structure and to the context of culture* (V5) as imparted in an embedding Advance Labelling structure in 46).

TENTATIVE RHETORICAL MICROSTRUCTURE

(V1) in 1)	We have emphasized in Chapter one the importance of looking at language as a social phenomenon (...).
(V2) in 9)	If it is true that language reflects society then it should be possible to determine the specific ways in which this reflection occurs by showing how individual social factors determine the selection of individual linguistic features.
(V3) in 25)	This intermediary concept has been provided, in part at least, by the work of (...) Bernstein and his colleagues.
(V4) in 44)	The contextual determinants of text have been discussed in preceding chapters (in lexical, grammatical and phonological terms) as kinds of (...).
(V5) in 45)	Let us note here simply that these features (...) can also be linked to social structure and to the context of culture.

DO THE WRITER'S CLEARLY SIGNALLED COMMITMENTS (V1, V2, V3, V4, V5 COVERED ABOVE) HELP THE PRESENT READER BUILD COHERENCE FOR THE DIAGRAMMATICALLY REPRESENTED INFORMATION STRUCTURE OF TEXT F? Such clearly signalled commitments as to recapitulate on *language as a social phenomenon* (V1), to report *Bernstein and his colleagues' concept* of *code* (V3), to recapitulate shortly on the *lexical, grammatical and phonological features* (V4) *linked to social structure and to culture* (V5) by way of *code* do not concur to venture 'the necessary co-operation' on the building of the overall coherence, and on the diagrammatically represented information structure, of the text. WHICH NECESSARY CO-OPERATION? The tailoring of an explicit rhetorically organized prediction to signal the thread of

arguments, leading the reader to build the synergic meaning of the text unambiguously. WHICH MISSING RHETORICALLY ORGANIZED PREDICTIVE MEMBER DOES THE PRESENT READER VENTURE TO INFER FROM, AND IN FACE OF THE MINEFIELD OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN TEXT F, TO VENTURE THE NECESSARY CO-OPERATION? On recurrently careful inspection of the rhetorical information implicit in text F, I extrapolate that any of the following four tentative, positive, contractual predictions might encapsulate the cohesive and coherent scope of the text: [In the present chapter, we purpose to *explain* the individual *variability of language use* by way of the *theory of social development and change* and *the theory of code*], or [In this chapter, we purpose to *explain how individual social factors determine individual language selection* as a cause of *variation in language use* that *reflects the social system*, on the grounds of research into *social development* and *code*], or [Grounded on the results of researches into *cultural and linguistic systems*, we purpose to *explain variability of language use* among individuals of different social class], or [We want to give an account of the cultural *variation of language use* as a result of the *social system reflected in the language system* as shown by the *social* and *code* theories], etc. Accordingly, the D cotexts to be subsumed under each of the tentative predictive metatexts above were to be elaborated in an explicitly signalled way to the reader. WHY DO I TENTATIVELY PREDICT TO COVER ON *VARIATION* OF LANGUAGE USE RATHER THAN ON *CODE* AS IN THE TITLE? I am led to extrapolate that text F purposes to report that the *theory of social development* developed from 14) to 19), and the *theory of code* developed from 26) to 43), can explain *variation* of language use at the cultural level. Inferentially, *variation* is as an effect of the individual language *selection* determined by, and thus reflecting, individual *social factors*. My extrapolative inference arises from the reading of circumstanced segment from 9) to 25), which I take as a problem-solution macro

pattern. The segment is that made up of the bunch of misleading or pseudo-predictions already discussed. WHY DO I TAKE THE SEGMENT A PROBLEM-SOLUTION MACRO PATTERN? Because the 9) - 25) stretch seems to be an embedding pattern of problems and solutions: one problem requires one solution that, in turn, becomes a new problem requiring a new solution, which repeatedly becomes another problem eliciting another embedded solution, and so repeatedly once. The pattern seems to be nurtured by the four ingredients: *To do so* in 13), and *this* in 20), in 22), in 25). The four ingredients seem to be the boundaries (the interfaces or the control centers) between problems and solutions. Illustratively, *To do so* seems to preface the solution *we must think of culture* (through the theory of *social structural system* of *meanings*) to the foregoing problem of explaining language *variation* as an effect of language *selection* determined by *social factors* whose *reflection* is in *language*. Such a solution, *culture*, seems to turn into a new problem whose solution, introduced by the first *this*, is *the meaningful functions of language*, which turns to be a new problem whose solution, imparted by the second *this*, is the relation between *social system* and *the linguistic system*. Accordingly, the *social* and *linguistic* relation summons up as a new problem, the solution of which is the ensuing report of an *intermediary concept* of code as bordered by the third *this*, in 25). Admittedly, *linguistic variation*, and not *Code* as in the misleading title, is the inferential ad hoc theme targeted in the text and explained by way of the *code* and *social* theories. Thus, *linguistic variation* is a part of any of the four predictions that I tentatively suggest to encapsulate rhetorically the content relations of the chapter.

Text F purposes to fulfil a basic commitment that is not predicted to favour promptly the synergic cohesion and coherence. The unrevealed, unexpressed or undeveloped prediction as the important metatext to nurture the content groupings of discourse, the mis-signalling, and the recurrence, are the obtrusive causes of

ineptness in text F. The circumstanced under-signalling and mis-signalling entangle the present reader in the reading process fraught with inferences, tentativeness and arbitrariness.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

In light of Hoey's and Tadros' formulations on micro organizational features of written discourse, this microstructural descriptive text analysis has revealed that there are published texts written by linguists that may be characterized as rhetorically inept discourses because either they have a lack of rhetorical signals, overtly signalled content relations, or they have unfulfilled predictions, and misleading signals. The foregoing conclusion is supported by such 'condition' as the disruption in 'textual plausibility', as well as by such 'circumstance' as the under-signalled and/or mis-signalled rhetorically organized predictions pervading the evidentiary material.

The rhetorical ineptness in text A is the mis-signalling found in the unfulfilled predicted member of the predictive category of Question: the misleadingly signalled title *What is Language?* at section level, typographically detached, with heading status. The rhetorical ineptness in text A is found in the unfulfilling (D1) member of the mis-signalled predictive category of Question (V1), following the lengthy (V2-V3) discussion intervening. The condition is the frustrated expectation experienced by the reader as to the definition of language. The rhetorical ineptness in text B is the under-signalling found in the absence of enumerative conjuncts, grammatical parallelism and lexical repetition in the [D1] member: *ways of using language*, of the (V1) Enumeration amalgamated with the (V2) Advance Labelling:

some ways of using human language. The condition is the mismatch between the decoder's information structure and the writer's information scheme of *ways* provided tardily in the (V3) Recapitulation.

The rhetorical ineptness in texts C, D, E, and F is the bipartite circumstances: under-signalling and mis-signalling. In C, the under-signalling is in the absence of a formed global rhetorically organized forestructure to disambiguate the overall content relations seemingly controlled by the mis-signalling inherent in *now*. The condition is the two interpretations arisen in the reader to uncover the implicit rhetorical scheme of the text, namely: (I.) the pseudo-prediction in sentence 2) may be the [V1-V2] Advance Labelling structure: [to discuss *linguistic* and *psychological* theory and to specify *dimension*], or (II.) the pseudo-prediction in sentence two may be the [V1] Reporting structure: [to report theories, and to make evaluation]. In D, the under-signalling is in the absence of a global rhetorically organized prediction to pave the way toward global meaning; in the [V1-V2] Advance Labelling: [to class *jargon*, and illustrate *jargon*]; in the [V3] Advance Labelling: [to *define jargon*], the (D3iv) of which embedded the (V4) Advance Labelling: [to explain semantic]. The mis-signalling is in the (D4iii): *euphemistic*; in the substandard (V6) Question: *is there any good we can say of it?*, and in the misleading Recapitulation prediction (V7) prefacing (V6): *Having battered jargon for all these pages*. In E, under-signalling and mis-signalling are present in two contingent interpretations. Under-signalling is in [D] members of the Advance Labelling pairs (V1-V2) *problems*, (V3-V4) *means*, (V5-V6) *observations*, and (V10): *this point*. Mis-signalling may be either in the misleading Advance Labelling (V5-V6) observations, or in the misleading (V1-V2) problems. In F, the under-signalling is in the absence of a global rhetorically organized scheme to ease or smooth the textual threads. The mis-signalling is in the pseudo-Hypotheticality (V2): *If it is true that* (...) *it should be possible* (...), and in the misleading [D2]: the bunch of Advance Labelling pseudo-

predictions, the correspondences of propositional and contextual meaning and lexical content inscribed in the pseudo-predictions, and the problematic linkage in pro-form and antecedent relations.

The reader's background knowledge about rhetorical conventions was not sufficient to grasp unambiguously the uncued and/or miscued rhetorical relationships of (V) ~ (D) cotexts, in the six texts; rather, it was sufficient to qualify unambiguously the six texts as devoid of clearly signalled relations. In addition, it was sufficient to understand unambiguously that implicitly rather than *explicitly* stated rhetorical information in scientific discourse point to a proof either of the writer's *thoughtlessness* of the readers' needs without, of course, appearing to realize it before publication, or of the writers' *content-bound scientism* that causes them not so much to slight the rhetorical schema as to neglect it.

Either thoughtlessness or content-bound scientism notwithstanding, the writers do not attend to the Sophistical, Socratic, Platonic, Aristotelian, and Hoeyan rhetoric, which "Today (...) is enjoying a critical revival, ... and developing new variations in the media explosion of the late twentieth century" (Cockcroft et al. op. cit.: 5). I can say that the writers do not *persuade denotationally* and *connotationally*, do not make *the use of language for cooperative venture* with the modern decoder's comprehension of written texts as a means to the following end: secularized modernization. They do not venture to persuade because they neglect the use of rhetorical language for the personal advantage of having their published texts being valued as textually plausible, rhetorically organized, and actually co-operative with modernization. They do not give persuasive care to anaphoric and cataphoric signposting. They do not attend to the rhetorical process, the powerful tool of the written rhetorical kind of language (1) to venture co-operation with the specialist learner living in a developing country, in need of access to scientific information; (2) to persuade favorably the reader into sharing the secularized

modernization of the specialized area of linguistics advances indispensable to the specialist learner; (3) to rid the specialist learner of texts that may be qualified as rhetorically inept, which hinder persuasion, comprehension, societal transformations, efficiency, critical judgment and wisdom. Texts A and B, C, D, E, and F are not unambiguous beneficiaries of a secularized society because they neglect regulative, global-local, and persuasive-cooperative, *rhetorically organized binary microstructures* (rhetorical ingredients as language for an ordered whole) in written discourse.

The exemplificatory five chapters as projections of written language are potential for rhetorical aptness. They are potential benefits if restructured on the basis of cohesive cotexts, micro metatexts, textual forestructures, the (V) ~ (D) patterns of global and local rhetorically organized predictions. They are a secularization potential and potentially best texts.

This research testifies to the rhetorical language as regulatory behaviour that relates one reader to the operational instance of language. It testifies to the receptive process experienced by one reader. It offers the window through which the present specialist learner viewed the phenomenon of rhetorical ineptness pervading five chapters written in the content area of linguistics. This dissertation informs against the circumstanced ineptness arisen out of mis-signalling and under-signalling in such texts. Endeavours are urgent not to allow rhetorical ineptness to subsist in scientific discourse among the groupings of binary cotexts. Future text analysis researches into the global and local rhetorically organized predictions of texts to be submitted to many readers will be of paramount importance. Future cogent arguments in favour of the global and local rhetorical organization of discourse will certainly invite or induce writers in general to produce (1) focused content relations, (2) fulfilled discourse acts, (3) prompt co-operative venture with the audience in general, and (4) persuasion to maximize comprehension, critical

judgement, wisdom. The *rhetorically organized encoding scheme* in written texts helps to produce cohesive and coherent diagrammatically represented text frames as a pedagogical potential, to maximize the synergism between the top-down-predictions-bottom-up-input and the secularized modernization of knowledge, science and technology.

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S.v. "Sofisma";

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Rhetorical Microstructure of Text A

Circumstance:
Unfulfilled [D1] member of the mis-signalled predictive
Question (V1): "What is Language?"
Deferment in [D], conflicting rhetorical ingredient in (V):
mis-signalling

(V1)			*"What is Language?"*
	(V2-V3)		*(...) it is perhaps possible to begin by looking at the various uses people make of language.*
	[D2], [D3]		
[D1]			*But the question 'What is Language?' still remains unanswered.*
		(V4)	*In order to attempt an answer, it will be necessary to chop language up in rather arbitrary ways (...).*

LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTICS

AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE

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HEINEMANN EDUCATIONAL BOOKS
LONDON

Heinemann Educational Books Ltd
LONDON EDINBURGH MELBOURNE AUCKLAND TORONTO
HONG KONG SINGAPORE KUALA LUMPUR NEW DELHI
NAIROBI JOHANNESBURG LUSAKA IBADAN
KINGSTON

ISBN 0 435 10916 2

TEXT A

© J. F. Wallwork 1969
First published 1969
Reprinted 1970, 1971, 1972, 1974, 1976

Published by
Heinemann Educational Books Ltd
48 Charles Street, London W1X 8AH
Printed Offset Litho and bound in Great Britain by
Cox & Wyman Ltd, London, Fakenham and Reading

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1 TEXT A

(1:1) What is Language? (V1)

(2:1) At least one book has been entitled 'What is Language?' 'What is water?' asks a ten-year-old child. He is, rightly, not satisfied that it is 'what you drink'; nor is 'what we speak' an adequate answer to the first question. The child is no more conscious of learning to speak than he is of the great cycles of nature that eventually lead to the kitchen tap. He usually takes both for granted, language no doubt more than water. The complex explanations of what water is, its chemical constituents, how it arrives via the rain, lakes, rivers and waterpipes to the tap are ultimately much easier than the explaining of language; the fact of death without water is rapidly comprehensible to the child; the probably equally disastrous if less immediate consequences of life without language in a modern civilisation are less apparent even to the more sophisticated. But if 'What is Language?' is for the moment, difficult to answer, it is perhaps possible to begin by looking at the various

(3.1) uses people make of language. (V2-V3)

The currently fashionable way of describing any use of language is to say that is for 'communication'. As the Scottish correspondent of the *Times Educational Supplement* said recently, 'Reading, writing and spelling are unmentionables, but the arts of communication (being integrated), may be discussed with propriety.' 'Communication', however, is too vague to be of much use. Dogs communicate when they bark or wag their tails, so do chimpanzees when they use sound, or facial and bodily gesture; wolves in a pack, or bees in a hive, work with obvious co-ordination which must be derived from some form of communication; as Sapir pointed out, even the clouds in the sky can be said to communicate the imminence of rain; computers can certainly answer back. But the languages all these use for communication are, without exception, of a very

restricted kind, in spite of the apparent complexity of the computer, and are evidently different in ways other than degree of complexity from human language, so 'communication' must be more narrowly defined, and yet cover more, than these other restricted languages if it is to be applied to human language. Let us examine some ways of using human language.

Jones is exercising his dog in the park and meets Smith with his dog. Jones says cheerfully, ' 'Morning, Peter. How's things?' Smith grunts and says something that sounds like 'So-so'. Jones's dog growls and then bares his teeth. Smith's dog bristles and raises his tail. Jones's use of language has probably communicated (*a*) a desire to be friendly, and (*b*) his optimistic view of life at that moment. Smith's grunt, and words, communicate (*a*) his lack of interest in Jones's society, and (*b*) his less optimistic view of life. The dogs have communicated a warning and a defensive reaction. Had Jones said, 'Nice day today, isn't it?' he would have communicated pretty well the same thing as he did by 'How's things?' The exact words he uses are largely irrelevant to the situation, and a choice of any one of a fairly restricted set of phrases would have done equally well. Not so long ago much more formal emphasis was placed on teaching this sort of human communication; children stood up and said 'Good morning, Miss Smith,' as she entered the room; they were taught that the 'correct' response to 'How do you do?' was 'How do you do?'; and the person who interpreted the language literally and responded in the logical rather than the approved fashion, perhaps with 'Pretty lousy, thank you' immediately became a social outcast, not so much because of the lice, but because of the language. Loosening of convention in social life has meant that in many circles now the logical rather than the formal response is appropriate, but quite often in public life we still accept a response which is irrelevant to the actual language of the stimulus, or we use language with no apparent relevance to the actualities of the situation. To quote only two examples: in the Christian marriage service the Minister's demand 'Who giveth this Woman to be married to this Man?' is a rhetorical, formal demand bearing little relationship to legal or factual, or even spiritual life, but is nevertheless

to many people a valuable and revered use of language. A later part of the same ceremony where the man says '. . . with all my worldly goods I thee endow . . .' bears a meaning legally rather different and factually often very different from the literal meaning most users of the phrase would attribute to it. Parliamentary language may appear nonsensical, as when one member of Parliament who wishes to be offensive to another still feels constrained to say 'The Honourable Gentleman is a damned liar'.

In its private form this 'phatic' communion, as Malinowski called this part of speech behaviour which is mainly polite talk, greetings and rather meaningless exchanges of words, is socially necessary, but it is perhaps not so far removed from the communication of animals expressed in sounds such as barking, grunting, trumpeting, and so on, and in gestures such as baring the teeth, pawing the ground or wagging a tail. Phatic communion and animal language both serve to establish, consolidate and confirm social relationships. Human usage even here probably offers a wider range of differentiation than animal usage, reflecting the greater complexity of social ordering. Chimpanzee society, however, is thought to have fairly complex recognition signals, though unlikely perhaps to range the gamut of, for instance, 'Hullo!' (with varying intonations), 'Hiya!', ' 'Morning!', 'Wotcher!' (if this is really ever heard off-stage) 'Good morning, sir!' and the varying grunts which are all possible human greetings even in one human language.

But to return to Mr. Smith. If, later in his walk, he meets another, unknown man with a dog, and if this man bows and says 'Guten Tag, mein Herr', Smith is likely, apart from his surprise, to feel a little shocked and insecure. Who the devil was it—to speak to him in a language which, whatever it was, was certainly not English? And how much more the unease might have been if the man had looked Asiatic, or African, and the language had been obviously non-European. The stranger who says 'Good morning' is maybe eccentric, or even just extrovert; the stranger who says 'Guten Tag' deserves suspicion, at least in England. The use of a common language assures at least a degree of social cohesion; to speak the same language is,

for most people, to give a sense of security, and of belonging. Smith abroad accepts 'Guten Tag, mein Herr', but unless he is of the small number of either English cosmopolitans or Anglophobes, tends to find much relief in an unexpected English 'Good morning' in his hotel dining-room.

Even within 'English', the speaking of a common form of English often strengthens personal and social bonds. Two businessmen both using Yorkshire dialect may well get on better than two, one of whom uses Yorkshire and the other Irish dialect forms. The particularly English tendency to 'place' a person, to adopt a particular attitude to him, based on the form of the language he uses, will be discussed later.

Private 'phatic' communion then, serves primarily to establish our social relationships with each other. There is a similar, more public, use of language which results from an attempt to control our environment by the use of words. The incantations of a primitive tribe to induce rain, the prayers to the Christian God for help in suffering, the ritual of a funeral ceremony which includes phrases such as 'earth to earth, ashes to ashes, dust to dust,' together with the philosophical reflection 'Man that is born of a woman hath but a short time to live, and is full of misery', the strictly defined utterances and responses that have to be made on state and legal occasions, all these in their different ways illustrate uses of language whereby we seek to soften the desolation of life, or to assure future wellbeing, either in life or death. Whereas the personal, phatic, communion establishes a social relationship between individual people or groups of people, the 'ceremonial' communion may seek to establish a relationship between man and god, or between man and some abstract and formal ideal. When such ritual and ceremonial use of language is very long established, it is possible that the original meaning of the actual words used is lost, and for the participants in the ceremony the words cease to have much 'meaning' in the literal sense, and as with the examples we saw earlier, the 'meaning' of the language will then derive not from the words, but from the fact of saying them in a particular context, at a particular time, without respect to what the participants might understand by a literal meaning of the words.

Hence perhaps derived the reason for the continued use, until relatively recent times, of Latin in much of Roman Catholic church services; the fact that hardly anyone who used it understood it perhaps didn't matter, for communication was established without reference to literal meaning. And possibly those who opposed the change of Latin to the vernacular, feared that to change the language too abruptly would in fact disrupt rather than enable, communication.

It is not, of course, true that in all ceremonial or ritual uses of language, choice of words is of such relatively minor importance; it is possibly only true indeed in the case of ceremonies where the participants do not feel very deeply abont what they are doing, or are professing to be doing. Where personal human feeling is deeply involved, then the choice and use of words becomes of much more vital import, and in the past, wars were even waged over the exact interpretation of what a Church service might or might not say. Sometimes words have the power of action themselves. If during the baptism ceremony the child acquires the name 'Josiah Bloggs', this naming does something which has a pronounced and observable effect not only then, but for years afterwards. It is, moreover, an effect which might have been quite different if the clergyman had referred, not to 'Josiah Bloggs' but to 'William Henry' or 'John George'. In a Muslim country, the mere saying of 'I divorce you', in certain specified circumstances, itself constitutes an act, as in this country the words of a written will are themselves actions: 'I give and bequeath . . .' and the exact words used may have great and direct legal, social and emotional consequences. Only too familiar, again, is the dilemma good men have found themselves in when they have had to pronounce judgements or verdicts contrary to their own inclinations or beliefs, but dictated to them by the exact language of a law which they are bound to operate. The words of sueh laws can themselves constitute actions which cannot easily be escaped. Philosophers, and following them at a respectful and so far rather wary distance, linguists, have indeed begun to look at the distinction between such different uses of language as those where the act of speaking or writing has a certain force beyond

that of merely 'having a meaning', and those where there is no such force. In the first category might come such uses of language as exercising judgements, asserting an influence, making declarations of intention, or pronouncing verdicts of different kinds.

Apart from such relatively abstract classifications, however, it is obvious that in everyday life, there are many occasions when exactly what we say matters enormously, and has marked effects on the conduct of our lives. 'Eight pounds of potatoes, please,' fills our vegetable rack comfortably; 'Eighty pounds of potatoes, please,' would be a considerable embarrassment. A little 'y' sound makes the difference between good order and chaos in the kitchen. In using language to give orders, to control other people and things, a precise and logical use is necessary. No doubt there are some orders we can give without language at all—a look, a gesture, may sometimes be clear enough, but we will have some difficulty in getting our eight pounds of potatoes without language. The dog that jumps up, whines and barks alternately in his desire to be taken for a walk, has to repeat his gestures at considerable length to achieve the effect that Smith's wife achieves much more economically, and probably more effectively, by saying to her husband, 'Let's go for a walk' in a fairly firm tone of voice. Whereas phatic and ceremonial language may be meant to control the environment in a non-logical, incantatory way, our precise orders are meant to control it deliberately and consistently.

To some extent we control our present in the light of our past. A primitive people preserves its history, laws and traditions by oral accounts handed down from generation to generation. A more sophisticated society deposits its records in printed, written, taped or filmed form in acres of archives and libraries. Both are selective, the former perforce more than the latter. A sophisticated society will enshrine and petrify in written language what it considers worthy of record, a primitive society will keep alive, embellish and perhaps distort through the ages the source of its present state of being. No language, no history. Technology and science may control the environment, but they too rest upon language and the passing of information and commands, whether the language takes the form of complex mathematical symbols, or abbreviated jargon, or highly complex sentences.

Many people, if asked what they think language is used for, will give as their first answer, its use in the passing on of facts and information. The other uses of language tend to appear less significant, largely because modern society is so fact-orientated, and in such a society language is of course very important. Indeed, such use is virtually indispensable to comfortable living. Someone asks, 'What's the time?' and we answer 'It's nearly two o'clock', or someone yells down the stairs, 'Where are my clean socks?' and we answer 'In the top drawer'. Or we are confronted with a tin of syrup, firmly closed until we read 'To open this can, insert a penny under the rim of the lid'. Such factual uses of language are essential to the smooth running of daily life. But the mass of verbiage from all over the world in every issue of the day's papers, the streams of fact and alleged fact poured out over the air in radio and television programmes lead, guide, cajole, persuade, entreat or disgust us as well as inform us, according to the whims and intentions of thousands of unknown, and usually faceless, men and women. We may tend to regard these uses of language (news reporting, factual articles, etc.) as the 'passing on of information', but it can be argued that while conveying fact, they also tend to bring the status of 'fact' into question. By the inevitable selection of fact, the fact itself becomes both less and more than a fact. Again, the often emotive use of language used to report a 'fact' adds an extra quality only too often not distinguished from the fact itself. The emotive use of language, particularly in so far as it influences people in matters of what they beheve to be fact, is something to be considered fairly fully later in the book.

Is there anything in common between a hearty 'Damnation!' and the strains of 'Marriage of Figaro' issuing from the bathroom? The 'Damnation!' might have been something less socially acceptable, the 'Marriage of Figaro' might have been 'John Brown's Body . . .' and it would not have been of significance except in so far as the tastes and interests of the persons were possibly revealed. As with 'phatio' communion, there is a

relatively restricted range of appropriate swear words in any one language, but again as with phatic communion, selection from the range is largely immaterial, for the use of language in these cases is largely one of self-expression, independent of the actual sense or content of the words. With the singer, the words may exist only in tum-ti-tum fashion, or even if in more recognisable form, are likely to be irrelevant to the purposes to which the vocal organs are being put. In both cases some form of language is being utilised simply as a means of 'getting something off one's chest'—good or bad. This is self-expression in a primitive and unoriginal way, sometimes, as in the case of singing in the bath, coupled with sheer pleasure in the sound itself. A baby may babble, often with the more unconsciously determined aim of exercising the muscles required for speech, but perhaps also sometimes with sheer pleasure in the sound itself?

To the relief and pleasure of such primitive linguistic self-expression is ultimately related the self-expression which we call literature, especially poetry, though not all literature, or even all poetry can be included here. Such expressive literature is a deliberate attempt to give linguistic shape to humanity; to mould experience, emotional and social experience, into the shapes laid down by the linguistic community and, where necessary, to expand and enlarge the shapes in order to fit new or newly perceived experience. 'Damn' is immediately comprehensible because it is a simple linguistic expression of a pretty simple human reaction.

Glory be to God for dappled things—
For skies of couple-colour as a brinded cow;
For rose-moles all in stipple upon trout that swim;
Fresh-firecoal chestnut-falls; finches' wings;
Landscape plotted and pieced—fold, fallow and plough;
And all trades, their gear and tackle and trim.[1]

may be less immediately comprehensible, because the human reaction is now no longer simple and therefore not easily given conventional linguistic expression. It is probable that truly obscure literature remains obscure not because of the difficulties

1. Gerard Manley Hopkins, *Pied Beauty*.

of the language, but because what it attempts to convey is not a genuine experience or reaction but a forced or untrue one. The 'obscure' literature, which is a genuine expression of humanity, will eventually be understood even if the language has temporarily outstripped the conventional provisions and is not immediately accessible to its contemporaries. Language which fulfils a genuine need or expresses a genuine human reaction may be difficult to understand because of its linguistic novelty or because of the novelty of the concept or reaction behind it, or both, but will ultimately find an audience, if only a limited one, to whom it is not obscure.

I have mentioned, at least by implication here, the relationship between language and feeling or emotion, and have again by implication rather than by direct statement suggested that, so to speak, the emotion came first and the language had to follow after, at least for the poet, though the process may be reversed for the reader. It is however not quite clear whether this is the right order of things, and when the relationship between language and thought is considered it is even less clear what, if any, is the 'right order'. Does language follow thought? Can thought exist independent of language? There is no simple answer to these questions and there is not likely to be any. Psychologists have much work left to do on the thinking processes, and even they are unlikely to produce any simple or single answer, although work on the relationship between language and concept formation has been explored in some depth. There are many kinds of thinking—some of which seem inextricably tied up with language, others of which seem to be less dependent on it. It seems, for instance, probable that language plays a minimal part in the 'thinking' required of us by the roadside posters exhorting us to 'Think before you overtake', or with what we mean when we speak of a tennis player's 'thoughtful game'. That there is a close relationship between thought and language is obvious; the commonly heard 'I know what I mean, but I don't know how to explain . . .' suggests the possibility that in at least some cases thought can be, and often is, independent of ordered language. Research now in progress suggests strong links between a person's linguistic

resources and his flexibility towards new ideas, or his ability to progress educationally. For the moment it may perhaps be simply left by saying that for most people, it is difficult to 'think' in the sense of to deliberate, or reflect, beyond the bounds set by their linguistic competence, and that thinking beyond these bounds requires a deliberate effort of originality or an original insight open to few. Should there be an original act of thinking, or an original insight, it remains to find the language to fit it, and again, only a few may be able, in the first instance, to understand the language. For most people language and thought are mutually interdependent; we cannot think, except with confusion and difficulty, what our linguistic competence does not permit; we cannot utter what we cannot think.

To some extent, then, we are controlled in our thoughts and actions by the language we know. No two languages are identical, and it has been suggested, therefore, that people with different mother tongues will have different responses to things, based on their different languages. Just how different two languages may be is illustrated by the common difficulty of translation from one tongue to another. Where translation is of something which can be related to a visible stimulus, there is a fair chance of verifying that both versions relate to the same occurrence, though even here there may be initial room for doubt. Alone in a foreign country, an English speaker sees a snake glide by and a native says 'Nyoka!'. Should he assume the correct translation is 'Snake!' or 'Look! there's a snake!' or 'Danger!' or 'Be careful!'? By accumulation of experience, of course, he eventually reaches a reliable conclusion as to the 'correct' translation of 'nyoka', but when there is no such visible stimulus, uncertainty may remain.

That there is no one-to-one relationship between a fact and the language used to express it is perhaps illustrated by the following account. Two groups of patients suffering from the same illness were asked to locate the primary source of their illness and to say how much pain or other effects they suffered. One group was Italian, the other Irish.

'The groups described the effect of the same illness differently. Generally, the Irish described a specific dysfunction with limited

bodily effects, while the Italians spoke of a diffuse disability, listing more kinds of dysfunction. The Irish tended to deny that their ailments affected them temperamentally, while the Italians scored high on an irritability scale. Zola suggests that the Italian, by overstating and dramatising his illness, hopes to dissipate the problem; whereas the Irishman, seeing life as full of privations, understates problems, as a defence mechanism. The author concludes that ethnicity may, therefore, be an important variable in preliminary diagnoses, since it affects the patient's recognition and communication of symptoms, and symptom-based health campaigns cannot assume that symptoms are objective facts.'[1]

Different people view the same objective facts in different ways, and express their perceptions in quite different language forms. The dramatic and understated reactions referred to above will be expressed in different linguistic terms, and no doubt if taped extracts of the discussions with the doctors were available these would show examples of the reflection in language of these varying attitudes to life. It is possible also to wonder to what extent the availability to these particular people of specific forms of language would influence their descriptions of their own illnesses. How do you, without gesture or excessive long-windedness, describe a pain in the trachea if your language has no word for a trachea, or if you do not know the word? It has been suggested by some linguists that our view of the world is largely conditioned by our mother tongue, and although few linguists or psychologists now agree with the unmodified theory, it has had considerable influence on thinking about the relationship of language to the people who use it. Few would deny that to some extent our views are coloured by the language readily at our disposal. But much more important for most of us, is the reverse process; not the extent to which our native language governs our lives, but the extent to which we control that language; the ranges and varieties of structure and words that we use, the intricacy of the patterns we master and understand. Modern research is beginning to find evidence for what has often been intuitively recognised, namely that the

1. *New Scientist*, 2nd February, 1967.

more flexible and wide-ranging a person's language is, the richer is likely to be the quality of his life. Conversely, the more restricted and limited his language, the more restricted and limited may be his life. If this is true, there would seem to be ample justification for more and more research to be done into language, its functions and its mechanisms, and how we master and employ it.

Language is greater than the sum of its parts, and it would be wrong to discuss the parts and mechanisms of language without a wider view of its functions. In this chapter I have tred to look at language as a whole by looking at some of the ways it is used by people. What has been said at some length can be said here in a much more precise form:

(6:12) Language is used for:

(i) phatic communion (i.e. as a social regulator);
(ii) for ceremonial purposes;
(iii) as an instrument of action;
(iv) to keep the records;
(v) to convey orders and information;
(vi) to influence people;
(vii) to enable self-expression;
(viii) to embody or enable thought.

(7:12) But the question 'What is Language?' still remains unanswered. [D1]

(8:12) The answer will inevitably be complex, and if a listing of the uses of language helps to an understanding, it is still only a preliminary. In order to attempt an answer, it will be necessary to chop language up in rather arbitrary ways. (V4) Its complexities are such that it is virtually impossible to analyse it in any meaningful way without making these cuts. What sort of uses people put language to is a complex enough matter, how in fact language can be used to achieve these ends is more difficult to work out, and is a task for the specialist linguist, who also has to bear in mind the work of philosophers, psychologists and sociologists. The following chapters will attempt a preliminary look at some of the ways in which language achieves what people want of it. Language does so in no simple

way, but by means of an interrelating series of different systems —systems of sounds, systems of grammatical patterning, systems of word meanings, systems of reference to non-linguistic events, all in turn combined and closely enmeshed in larger systems. To see the workings with any clarity it is necessary to take each of these systems in turn and examine it individually before it is possible to see how it interrelates with the others. And even with some insight into the different systems, or 'levels' as they are sometimes called, it is still necessary to choose some relatively arbitrary way of describing the relationship of these systems to each other. But if language is dismembered in this way, it must be remembered that the dismemberment is purely for convenience, for the different levels of language we choose to distinguish are of no validity unless they are set in the general framework of all the interrelating systems. So an anatomist may describe a human arm, or leg, or even a living human heart, but he cannot say anything really meaningful about it except in relation to the living, whole, body.

Rhetorical Microstructure of Text B

Circumstance:
Unsignalled predicted [D1] member in the absence of enumerative conjuncts, grammatical parallelism and lexical repetition: under-signalling

(V1-V2)		***Let us examine some ways of using human language.***
[D1i], [D2i]		**the *'phatic' '* way**
[D1ii], [D2ii]		**the *'ceremonial '* way (*ritual, action, order*)**
[D1iii], [D2iii]		**the *factual* way (*history, technology, science*)**
[D1iv], [D2iv]		**the *emotive* way**
[D1v], [D2v]		**the *self-expression*-related way (*literature, poetry*)**
[D1vi], [D2vi]		**the *thought*-related way**
[D1vii], [D2vii]		**the *perception*-related way**
	(V3)	***In this chapter I have tred*** [sic] ***to look at language as a whole by looking at some of the uses it is used by people.*** ***Language is used for:*** ***(i) phatic communion (i.e. as a social regulatory);*** ***(ii) for ceremonial purposes;*** ***(iii) as an instrument of action;*** ***(iv) to keep records;*** ***(v) to convey orders and information;*** ***(vi) to influence people;*** ***(vii) to enable self-expression;*** ***(viii) to embody or enable thought.***
	[D3]	

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HEINEMANN EDUCATIONAL BOOKS
LONDON

Heinemann Educational Books Ltd
LONDON EDINBURGH MELBOURNE AUCKLAND TORONTO
HONG KONG SINGAPORE KUALA LUMPUR NEW DELHI
NAIROBI JOHANNESBURG LUSAKA IBADAN
KINGSTON

TEXT 13

ISBN 0 435 10916 2

© J. F. Wallwork 1969
First published 1969
Reprinted 1970, 1971, 1972, 1974, 1976

Published by
Heinemann Educational Books Ltd
48 Charles Street, London W1X 8AH
Printed Offset Litho and bound in Great Britain by
Cox & Wyman Ltd, London, Fakenham and Reading

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TEXT B

1 What is Language?

At least one book has been entitled 'What is Language?' 'What is water?' asks a ten-year-old child. He is, rightly, not satisfied that it is 'what you drink'; nor is 'what we speak' an adequate answer to the first question. The child is no more conscious of learning to speak than he is of the great cycles of nature that eventually lead to the kitchen tap. He usually takes both for granted, language no doubt more than water. The complex explanations of what water is, its chemical constituents, how it arrives via the rain, lakes, rivers and waterpipes to the tap are ultimately much easier than the explaining of language; the fact of death without water is rapidly comprehensible to the child; the probably equally disastrous if less immediate consequences of life without language in a modern civilisation are less apparent even to the more sophisticated. But if 'What is Language?' is for the moment, difficult to answer, it is perhaps possible to begin by looking at the various uses people make of language.

The currently fashionable way of describing any use of language is to say that is for 'communication'. As the Scottish correspondent of the *Times Educational Supplement* said recently, 'Reading, writing and spelling are unmentionables, but the arts of communication (being integrated), may be discussed with propriety.' 'Communication', however, is too vague to be of much use. Dogs communicate when they bark or wag their tails, so do chimpanzees when they use sound, or facial and bodily gesture; wolves in a pack, or bees in a hive, work with obvious co-ordination which must be derived from some form of communication; as Sapir pointed out, even the clouds in the sky can be said to communicate the imminence of rain; computers ean certainly answer back. But the languages all these use for communication are, without exception, of a very

restricted kind, in spite of the apparent complexity of the computer, and are evidently different in ways other than degree of complexity from human language, so 'communication' must be more narrowly defined, and yet cover more, than these other restricted languages if it is to be applied to human language.

(1:2) Let us examine some ways of using human language. (v1-v2)

Jones is exercising his dog in the park and meets Smith with [p1i][p2i]

(3:2) (2:2) his dog. Jones says cheerfully, ' 'Morning, Peter. How's things?'

(4:2) Smith grunts and says something that sounds like 'So-so'. Jones's dog growls and then bares his teeth. Smith's dog bristles and raises his tail. Jones's use of language has probably communicated (*a*) a desire to be friendly, and (*b*) his optimistic view of life at that moment. Smith's grunt, and words, communicate (*a*) his lack of interest in Jones's society, and (*b*) his less optimistic view of life. The dogs have communicated a warning and a defensive reaction. Had Jones said, 'Nice day today, isn't it?' he would have communicated pretty well the same thing as he did by 'How's things?' The exact words he uses are largely irrelevant to the situation, and a choice of any one of a fairly restricted set of phrases would have done equally well. Not so long ago much more formal emphasis was placed on teaching this sort of human communication; children stood up and said 'Good morning, Miss Smith,' as she entered the room; they were taught that the 'correct' response to 'How do you do?' was 'How do you do?'; and the person who interpreted the language literally and responded in the logical rather than the approved fashion, perhaps with 'Pretty lousy, thank you' immediately became a social outcast, not so much because of the lice, but because of the language. Loosening of convention in social life has meant that in many circles now the logical rather than the formal response is appropriate, but quite often in public life we still accept a response which is irrelevant to the actual language of the stimulus, or we use language with no apparent relevance to the actualities of the situation. To quote only two examples: in the Christian marriage service the Minister's demand 'Who giveth this Woman to be married to this Man?' is a rhetorical, formal demand bearing little relationship to legal or factual, or even spiritual life, but is nevertheless

to many people a valuable and revered use of language. A later part of the same ceremony where the man says '. . . with all my worldly goods I thee endow . . .' bears a meaning legally rather different and factually often very different from the literal meaning most users of the phrase would attribute to it. Parliamentary language may appear nonsensical, as when one member of Parliament who wishes to be offensive to another still feels constrained to say 'The Honourable Gentleman is a damned liar'.

In its private form this 'phatic' communion, as Malinowski called this part of speech behaviour which is mainly polite talk, greetings and rather meaningless exchanges of words, is socially

(5:3) necessary, but it is perhaps not so far removed from the communication of animals expressed in sounds such as barking, grunting, trumpeting, and so on, and in gestures such as baring the teeth, pawing the ground or wagging a tail. Phatic communion and animal language both serve to establish, consolidate and confirm social relationships. Human usage even here probably offers a wider range of differentiation than animal usage, reflecting the greater complexity of social ordering. Chimpanzee society, however, is thought to have fairly complex recognition signals, though unlikely perhaps to range the gamut of, for instance, 'Hullo!' (with varying intonations), 'Hiya!', ' 'Morning!', 'Wotcher!' (if this is really ever heard off-stage) 'Good morning, sir!' and the varying grunts which are all possible human greetings even in one human language.

But to return to Mr. Smith. If, later in his walk, he meets another, unknown man with a dog, and if this man bows and says 'Guten Tag, mein Herr', Smith is likely, apart from his surprise, to feel a little shocked and insecure. Who the devil was it—to speak to him in a language which, whatever it was, was certainly not English? And how much more the unease might have been if the man had looked Asiatic, or African, and the language had been obviously non-European. The stranger who says 'Good morning' is maybe eccentric, or even just extrovert; the stranger who says 'Guten Tag' deserves suspicion, at least in England. The use of a common language assures at least a degree of social cohesion; to speak the same language is,

for most people, to give a sense of security, and of belonging. Smith abroad accepts 'Guten Tag, mein Herr', but unless he is of the small number of either English cosmopolitans or Anglophobes, tends to find much relief in an unexpected English 'Good morning' in his hotel dining-room.

Even within 'English', the speaking of a common form of English often strengthens personal and social bonds. Two businessmen both using Yorkshire dialect may well get on better than two, one of whom uses Yorkshire and the other Irish dialect forms. The particularly English tendency to 'place' a person, to adopt a particular attitude to him, based on the form of the language he uses, will be discussed later.

Private 'phatic' communion then, serves primarily to establish our social relationships with each other. There is a similar, more public, use of language which results from an attempt to control our environment by the use of words. The incantations of a primitive tribe to induce rain, the prayers to the Christian God for help in suffering, the ritual of a funeral ceremony which includes phrases such as 'earth to earth, ashes to ashes, dust to dust,' together with the philosophical reflection 'Man that is born of a woman hath but a short time to live, and is full of misery', the strictly defined utterances and responses that have to be made on state and legal occasions, all these in their different ways illustrate uses of language whereby we seek to soften the desolation of life, or to assure future wellbeing, either in life or death. Whereas the personal, phatic, communion establishes a social relationship between individual people or groups of people, the 'ceremonial' communion may seek to establish a relationship between man and god, or between man and some abstract and formal ideal. When such ritual and ceremonial use of language is very long established, it is possible that the original meaning of the actual words used is lost, and for the participants in the ceremony the words cease to have much 'meaning' in the literal sense, and as with the examples we saw earlier, the 'meaning' of the language will then derive not from the words, but from the fact of saying them in a particular context, at a particular time, without respect to what the participants might understand by a literal meaning of the words.

(6:4) (7:4) (8:4) (9:4) (10:4)

[D1ii] [D2ii]

Hence perhaps derived the reason for the continued use, until relatively recent times, of Latin in much of Roman Cathofic church services; the fact that hardly anyone who used it understood it perhaps didn't matter, for communication was established without reference to literal meaning. And possibly those who opposed the change of Latin to the vernacular, feared that to change the language too abruptly would in fact disrupt rather than enable, communication.

It is not, of course, true that in all ceremonial or ritual uses of language, choice of words is of such relatively minor importance; it is possibly only true indeed in the case of ceremonies where the participants do not feel very deeply about what they are doing, or are professing to be doing. Where personal human feeling is deeply involved, then the choice and use of words becomes of much more vital import, and in the past, wars were even waged over the exact interpretation of what a Church service might or might not say. Sometimes words have the power of action themselves. If during the baptism ceremony the child acquires the name 'Josiah Bloggs', this naming does something which has a pronounced and observable effect not only then, but for years afterwards. It is, moreover, an effect which might have been quite different if the clergyman had referred, not to 'Josiah Bloggs' but to 'William Henry' or 'John George'. In a Muslim country, the mere saying of 'I divorce you', in certain specified circumstances, itself constitutes an act, as in this country the words of a written will are themselves actions: 'I give and bequeath . . .' and the exact words used may have great and direct legal, social and emotional consequences. Only too familiar, again, is the dilemma good men have found themselves in when they have had to pronounce judgements or verdicts contrary to their own inclinations or beliefs, but dictated to them by the exact language of a law which they are bound to operate. The words of such laws can themselves constitute actions which cannot easily be escaped. Philosophers, and following them at a respectful and so far rather wary distance, linguists, have indeed begun to look at the distinction between such different uses of language as those where the act of speaking or writing has a certain force beyond

(11:5) (12:5)

that of merely 'having a meaning', and those where there is no such force. In the first category might come such uses of language as exercising judgements, asserting an influence, making declarations of intention, or pronouncing verdicts of different kinds.

Apart from such relatively abstract classifications, however, it is obvious that in everyday life, there are many occasions when exactly what we say matters enormously, and has marked effects on the conduct of our lives. 'Eight pounds of potatoes, please,' fills our vegetable rack comfortably; 'Eighty pounds of potatoes, please,' would be a considerable embarrassment. A little 'y' sound makes the difference between good order and chaos in the kitchen. In using language to give orders, to control other people and things, a precise and logical use is (13:6) necessary. No doubt there are some orders we can give without language at all—a look, a gesture, may sometimes be clear enough, but we will have some difficulty in getting our eight pounds of potatoes without language. The dog that jumps up, whines and barks alternately in his desire to be taken for a walk, has to repeat his gestures at considerable length to achieve the effect that Smith's wife achieves much more economically, and probably more effectively, by saying to her husband, 'Let's go for a walk' in a fairly firm tone of voice. Whereas phatic and ceremonial language may be meant to control the environment in a non-logical, incantatory way, our precise orders are meant to control it deliberately and consistently.

To some extent we control our present in the light of our [D1iii][D2iii] (14:6) past. A primitive people preserves its history, laws and tradi- (15:6) tions by oral accounts handed down from generation to gener- (16:6) ation. A more sophisticated society deposits its records in printed, written, taped or filmed form in acres of archives and libraries. Both are selective, the former perforce more than the latter. A sophisticated society will enshrine and petrify in written language what it considers worthy of record, a primitive society will keep alive, embellish and perhaps distort through the ages the source of its present state of being. No language, (17:6) no history. Technology and science may control the environment, but they too rest upon language and the passing of information and commands, whether the language takes the form of complex mathematical symbols, or abbreviated jargon, or highly complex sentences.

Many people, if asked what they think language is used for, will give as their first answer, its use in the passing on of facts and information. The other uses of language tend to appear less significant, largely because modern society is so fact-orientated, and in such a society language is of course very important. Indeed, such use is virtually indispensable to comfortable living. Someone asks, 'What's the time?' and we answer 'It's nearly two o'clock', or someone yells down the stairs, 'Where are my clean socks?' and we answer 'In the top drawer'. Or we are confronted with a tin of syrup, firmly closed until we read 'To open this can, insert a penny under the rim of the (19:7) lid'. Such factual uses of language are essential to the smooth [D1iv][D2iv] running of daily life. But the mass of verbiage from all over the (20:7) world in every issue of the day's papers, the streams of fact and alleged fact poured out over the air in radio and television programmes lead, guide, cajole, persuade, entreat or disgust us as well as inform us, according to the whims and intentions of thousands of unknown, and usually faceless, men and women. We may tend to regard these uses of language (news reporting, factual articles, etc.) as the 'passing on of information', but it can be argued that while conveying fact, they also tend to (21:7) bring the status of 'fact' into question. By the inevitable selection of fact, the fact itself becomes both less and more than a fact. (22:7) Again, the often emotive use of language used to report a 'fact' adds an extra quality only too often not distinguished from the (23:7) fact itself. The emotive use of language, particularly in so far as it influences people in matters of what they believe to be fact, is something to be considered fairly fully later in the book.

Is there anything in common between a hearty 'Damnation!' and the strains of 'Marriage of Figaro' issuing from the bath- (24:7) room? The 'Damnation!' might have been something less [D1v][D2v] socially acceptable, the 'Marriage of Figaro' might have been 'John Brown's Body . . .' and it would not have been of significance except in so far as the tastes and interests of the persons were possibly revealed. As with 'phatic' communion, there is a

relatively restricted range of appropriate swear words in any one language, but again as with phatic communion, seleetion from the range is largely immaterial, for the use of language in
(26:8) these cases is largely one of self-expression, independent of the actual sense or content of the words. With the singer, the words may exist only in tum-ti-tum fashion, or even if in more recognisable form, are likely to be irrelevant to the purposes to which the vocal organs are being put. In both cases some form of language is being utilised simply as a means of 'getting something off one's chest'—good or bad. This is self-expression in a primitive and unoriginal way, sometimes, as in the case of singing in the bath, coupled with sheer pleasure in the sound itself. A baby may babble, often with the more unconsciously determined aim of exercising the muscles required for speech, but perhaps also sometimes with sheer pleasure in the sound itself?

To the relief and pleasure of such primitive linguistic self-
(27:8) expression is ultimately related the self-expression which we call literature, especially poetry, though not all literature, or even all poetry can be included here. Such expressive literature is a deliberate attempt to give linguistic shape to humanity; to mould experience, emotional and social experience, into the shapes laid down by the linguistic community and, where necessary, to expand and enlarge the shapes in order to fit new or newly perceived experience. 'Damn' is immediately comprehensible because it is a simple linguistic expression of a pretty simple human reaction.

Glory be to God for dappled things—
For skies of couple-colour as a brinded cow;
For rose-moles all in stipple upon trout that swim;
Fresh-firecoal chestnut-falls; finches' wings;
Landscape plotted and pieced—fold, fallow and plough;
And all trades, their gear and tackle and trim.[1]

may be less immediately comprehensible, because the human reaction is now no longer simple and therefore not easily given conventional linguistic expression. It is probable that truly obscure literature remains obscure not because of the difficulties

1. Gerard Manley Hopkins, *Pied Beauty*.

of the language, but because what it attempts to convey is not a genuine experience or reaction but a forced or untrue one. The 'obscure' literature, which is a genuine expression of humanity, will eventually be nnderstood even if the language has temporarily outstripped the conventional provisions and is not immediately accessible to its contemporaries. Language which fulfils a genuine need or expresses a genuine human reaction may be difficult to understand because of its linguistic novelty or because of the novelty of the concept or reaction behind it, or both, but will ultimately find an audienee, if only a limited one, to whom it is not obscure.

I have mentioned, at least by implication here, the relationship between language and feeling or emotion, and have again by implication rather than by direct statement suggested that, so to speak, the emotion came first and the language had to follow after, at least for the poet, though the process may be reversed for the reader. It is however not quite clear whether this is the right order of things, and when the relationship
(28:9) between language and thought is considered it is even less clear what, if any, is the 'right order'. Does language follow thought? Can thought exist independent of language? There is no simple answer to these questions and there is not likely to be any. Psychologists have much work left to do on the thinking processes, and even they are unlikely to produce any simple or single answer, althongh work on the relationship between language and concept formation has been explored in some depth. There are many kinds of thinking—some of which seem inextricably tied up with language, others of which seem to be less dependent on it. It seems, for instance, probable that language plays a minimal part in the 'thinking' required of us by the roadside posters exhorting us to 'Think before you overtake', or with what we mean when we speak of a tennis player's 'thoughtful game'. That there is a close relationship between
(29:9) thought and language is obvious; the commonly heard 'I know what I mean, but I don't know how to explain . . .' suggests the possibility that in at least some cases thought can be, and often is, independent of ordered language. Research now in progress suggests strong links between a person's linguistic

resources and his flexibility towards new ideas, or his ability to progress educationally. For the moment it may perhaps be simply left by saying that for most people, it is difficult to 'think' in the sense of to deliberate, or reflect, beyond the bounds set by their linguistic competence, and that thinking beyond these bounds requires a deliberate effort of originality or an original insight open to few. Should there be an original act of thinking, or an original insight, it remains to find the language to fit it, and again, only a few may be able, in the first instance, to understand the language. For most people language
(30:10) and thought are mutually interdependent; we cannot think, except with confusion and difficulty, what our linguistic competence does not permit; we cannot utter what we cannot think.

To some extent, then, we are controlled in our thoughts and actions by the language we know. No two languages are
(31:10) identical, and it has been suggested, therefore, that people with [D1vii] [D2vii] different mother tongues will have different responses to things, based on their different languages. Just how different two
(32:10) languages may be is illustrated by the common difficulty of translation from one tongue to another. Where translation is of something which can be related to a visible stimulus, there is a fair chance of verifying that both versions relate to the same occurrence, though even here there may be initial room for doubt. Alone in a foreign country, an English speaker sees a snake glide by and a native says 'Nyoka!'. Should he assume the correct translation is 'Snake!' or 'Look! there's a snake!' or 'Danger!' or 'Be careful!'? By accumulation of experience, of course, he eventually reaches a reliable conclusion as to the 'correct' translation of 'nyoka', but when there is no such visible stimulus, uncertainty may remain.

That there is no one-to-one relationship between a fact and the language used to express it is perhaps illustrated by the following account. Two groups of patients suffering from the same illness were asked to locate the primary source of their illness and to say how much pain or other effects they suffered. One group was Italian, the other Irish.

'The groups described the effect of the same illness differently. Generally, the Irish described a specific dysfunction with limited

bodily effects, while the Italians spoke of a diffuse disability, listing more kinds of dysfunction. The Irish tended to deny that their ailments affected them temperamentally, while the Italians scored high on an irritability scale. Zola suggests that the Italian, by overstating and dramatising his illness, hopes to dissipate the problem; whereas the Irishman, seeing life as full of privations, understates problems, as a defence mechanism. The author concludes that ethnicity may, therefore, be an important variable in preliminary diagnoses, since it affects the patient's recognition and communication of symptoms, and symptom-based health campaigns cannot assume that symptoms are objective facts.'[1]

Different people view the same objective facts in different
(33:11) ways, and express their perceptions in quite different language forms. The dramatic and understated reactions referred to
(34:11) above will be expressed in different linguistic terms, and no doubt if taped extracts of the discussions with the doctors were available these would show examples of the reflection in language of these varying attitudes to life. It is possible also to wonder to what extent the availability to these particular people of specific forms of language would influence their descriptions of their own illnesses. How do you, without gesture or excessive long-windedness, describe a pain in the trachea if your language has no word for a trachea, or if you do not know the word? It has been suggested by some linguists that our view
(35:11) of the world is largely conditioned by our mother tongue, and although few linguists or psychologists now agree with the unmodified theory, it has had considerable influence on thinking about the relationship of language to the people who use it. Few would deny that to some extent our views are coloured by
(36:11) the language readily at our disposal. But much more important for most of us, is the reverse process; not the extent to which our native language governs our lives, but the extent to which we control that language; the ranges and varieties of structure and words that we use, the intricacy of the patterns we master and understand. Modern research is beginning to find evidence for
(37:11) what has often been intuitively recognised, namely that the

1. *New Scientist*, 2nd February, 1967.

more flexible and wide-ranging a person's language is, the
(38:12) richer is likely to be the quality of his life. Conversely, the more restricted and limited his language, the more restricted and limited may be his life. If this is true, there would seem to be ample justification for more and more research to be done into language, its functions and its mechanisms, and how we master and employ it.

Language is greater than the sum of its parts, and it would be wrong to discuss the parts and mechanisms of language without a wider view of its functions. In this chapter I have tred to look at language as a whole by looking at some
(39:12) of the ways it is used by people. What has been said at some (V3)
(40:12) length can be said here in a much more precise form:
(41:12) Language is used for:

(i) phatic communion (i.e. as a social regulator);
(ii) for ceremonial purposes;
(iii) as an instrument of action;
(iv) to keep the records;
(v) to convey orders and information;
(vi) to influence people;
(vii) to enable self-expression;
(viii) to embody or enable thought.

But the question 'What is Language?' still remains unanswered.

The answer will inevitably be complex, and if a listing of the uses of language helps to an understanding, it is still only a preliminary. In order to attempt an answer, it will be necessary
(42:12) to chop language up in rather arbitrary ways. Its complexities (D3) are such that it is virtually impossible to analyse it in any meaningful way without making these cuts. What sort of uses people put language to is a complex enough matter, how in fact language can be used to achieve these ends is more difficult to work out, and is a task for the specialist linguist, who also has to bear in mind the work of philosophers, psychologists and sociologists. The following chapters will attempt a preliminary look at some of the ways in which language achieves what people want of it. Language does so in no simple

way, but by means of an interrelating series of different systems —systems of sounds, systems of grammatical patterning, systems of word meanings, systems of reference to non-linguistic events, all in turn combined and closely enmeshed in larger systems. To see the workings with any clarity it is necessary to take eaeh of these systems in turn and examine it individually before it is possible to see how it interrelates with the others. And even with some insight into the different systems, or 'levels' as they are sometimes called, it is still necessary to choose some relatively arbitrary way of describing the relationship of these systems to each other. But if language is dismembered in this way, it must be remembered that the dismemberment is purely for convenience, for the different levels of language we choose to distinguish are of no validity unless they are set in the general framework of all the interrelating systems. So an anatomist may describe a human arm, or leg, or even a living human heart, but he cannot say anything really meaningful about it except in relation to the living, whole, body.

Rhetorical Microstructure of Text C

1st interpretation

Circumstance:
No explicit, standard, global prediction
Unsignalled, global Advance Labelling prediction as amalgamation: under-signalling
The misleading, ambiguous *now* in a discoursal-transitional conjunctive role: mis-signalling

[V1-V2]	***It is of course true that the application of linguistics and psychological theory to the study of language learning added a new dimension to the discussion of errors.***
[D1]	*(...) linguistic and psychological theory (...).*
	The major contribution of (...)
[D2]	***We can now return to the consideration of errors made by learners.***

Error Analysis

Perspectives on Second Language Acquisition

Edited by
JACK C. RICHARDS

LONGMAN

TEXT C

Acknowledgements

1:

We are grateful to the following for permission to reproduce copyright material:

The publishers of *English Language Teaching* and *Language Learning* for two of the author's own papers, *International Review of Applied Linguistics in Language Teaching* for 'The Significance of Learners' Errors' by S. P. Corder from *IRAL*, Vol. V/4 1967, 'Idiosyncratic Dialects and Error Analysis' by S. P. Corder from *IRAL*, Vol. IX/2, May 1971, 'Approximative Systems of Foreign Language Learners' by W. Nemser, from *IRAL*, Vol. IX/2, May 1971, 'Language Acquisition in A Second Language Environment' by R. Ravem from *IRAL*, Vol. VI/2, 1968, and 'Interlanguage' by L. Selinker from *IRAL*, Vol. X/3, 1972.

EDITOR'S NOTE

I am especially grateful to Roar Ravem for contributing a previously unpublished paper, and to those colleagues who agreed to write papers for this volume – Heidi Dulay and Marina Burt, Gloria Sampson and M. P. Jain.

J.R.

Longman
1724-1974

Longman Group Limited, London

Associated companies, branches and representatives throughout the world

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First published 1974
Third impression †1977

ISBN 0 582 55044 0

Filmset by Keyspools Ltd, Golborne, Lancs.

Printed in Singapore by
Singapore Offset Printing (Pte) Ltd.

2 TEXT C

(1:19) 1:

The Significance of Learners' Errors

S P CORDER

Reprinted from IRAL, Vol. V/4, 1967, published by Julius Groos Verlag, Heidelberg.

When one studies the standard works on the teaching of modern languages it comes as a surprise to find how cursorily the authors deal with the question of learners' errors and their correction. It almost seems as if they are dismissed as a matter of no particular importance, as possible annoying, distracting, but inevitable by-products of the process of learning a language about which the teacher should make as little fuss as possible. It is of course true that the application of linguistic and psychological theory to the study of language learning added a new dimension to the discussion of
(2:19) errors; people now believed they had a principled means for accounting for these errors, namely that they were the result of interference in the learning of a second language from the habits of the first language. The major contribution of the linguist to language teaching was seen as an intensive contrastive study of the systems of the second language and the mother tongue of the learner; out of this
(3:19) would come an inventory of the areas of difficulty which the learner would encounter and the value of this inventory would be to direct the teacher's attention to these areas so that he might devote special care and emphasis in his teaching to the overcoming, or even avoiding, of these predicted difficulties. Teachers have not always been very impressed by this contribution from the linguist for the reason that their practical experience has usually already shown them where these difficulties lie and they have not felt that the contribution of the linguist has provided them with any significantly new information. They noted for example that many of the errors with which they were familiar were not predicted by the linguist anyway. The teacher has been on the whole, therefore, more concerned with *how* to deal with these areas of difficulty than with the simple identifica-

[V1 - V2] [D1]

tion of them, and here has reasonably felt that the linguist has had little to say to him.

In the field of methodology there have been two schools of thought (4:20) in respect of learners' errors. Firstly the school which maintains that if we were to achieve a perfect teaching method the errors would never be committed in the first place, and therefore the occurrence of errors is merely a sign of the present inadequacy of our teaching techniques. The philosophy of the second school is that we live in an imperfect world and consequently errors will always occur in spite of our best efforts. Our ingenuity should be concentrated on techniques for dealing with errors after they have occurred.

Both these points of view are compatible with the same theoretical standpoint about language and language learning, psychologically behaviourist and linguistically taxonomic. Their application to language teaching is known as the audiolingual or fundamental skills method.

Both linguistics and psychology are in (5:20) a state at the present time of what Chomsky has called 'flux and agitation' (Chomsky, 1966). What seemed to be well established doctrine a few years ago is now the subject of extensive debate. The consequence of this for language teaching is likely to be far reaching and we are perhaps only now beginning to feel its effects. One effect has been perhaps to shift the emphasis away from a preoccupation with *teaching* towards a study (6:20) of *learning*. In the first instance this has shown itself as a renewed attack upon the problem of the acquisition of the mother tongue. This has inevitably led to a consideration of the question whether there are any parallels between the processes of acquiring the mother (7:20) tongue and the learning of a second language. The usefulness of the distinction between acquisition and learning has been emphasised by Lambert (1966) and the possibility that the latter may benefit from a study of the former has been suggested by Carroll (1966).

The differences between the two are obvious but not for that reason easy to explain: that the learning of the mother tongue is inevitable, whereas, alas, we all know that there is no such inevitability about the learning of a second language; that the learning of the mother tongue is part of the whole maturational process of the child, whilst learning a second language normally begins only after the maturational process is largely complete; that the infant starts with no overt language behaviour, while in the case of the second language learner such behaviour, of course, exists; that the motivation (if we can properly use the term in the context) for learning a

first language is quite different from that for learning a second language.

On examination it becomes clear that these obvious differences imply nothing about the *processes* that take place in the learning of first and second language. Indeed the most widespread hypothesis about how languages are learned, which I have called behaviourist, (9:21) (8:21) is assumed to apply in both circumstances. These hypotheses are well enough known not to require detailing here, and so are the objections to them. If then these hypotheses about language learning are being questioned and new hypotheses being set up to account for the process of child language acquisition, it would seem reasonable to see how far they might also apply to the learning of a second (9:21) language.

Within this new context the study of errors takes on a new importance and will I believe contribute to a verification or rejection of the (11:21) new hypothesis.

(12:21) This hypothesis states that a human infant is born with an innate predisposition to acquire language; that he must be exposed to language for the acquisition process to start; that he possesses an internal mechanism of unknown nature which enables him from the limited data available to him to construct a grammar of a particular language. How he does this is largely unknown and is the field of intensive study at the present time by linguists and psychologists. Miller (1964) has pointed out that if we wished to create an automaton to replicate a child's performance, the order in which it tested various aspects of the grammar could only be decided after careful analysis of the successive stages of language acquisition by human children. The first steps therefore in such a study are seen to be a longitudinal description of a child's language throughout the course of its development. From such a description it is eventually hoped to develop a picture of the procedures adopted by the child to acquire language (McNeill, 1966).

The application of this hypothesis to second language learning is (13:21) not new and is essentially that proposed fifty years ago by H. E. Palmer (1922). Palmer maintained that we were all endowed by nature with the capacity for assimilating language and that this capacity remained available to us in a latent state after the acquisition of a primary language. The adult was seen as capable as the child of acquiring a foreign language. Recent work (Lenneberg, 1967) suggests that the child who fails for any reason i.e. deafness, to acquire a primary language before the age of 12 thereafter rapidly

loses the capacity to acquire language behaviour at all. This finding does not of course carry with it the implication that the language learning capacity of those who have successfully learned a primary language also atrophies in the same way. It still remains to be shown that the process of learning a second language is of a fundamentally different nature from the process of primary acquisition.

If we postulate the same mechanism, then we may also postulate that the procedures or strategies adopted by the learner of the second language are fundamentally the same. The principal feature that then differentiates the two operations is the presence or absence of
(14:22) motivation. If the acquisition of the first language is a fulfilment of the predisposition to develop language behaviour, then the learning of the second language involves the replacement of the predisposition of the infant by some other force. What this consists of is in the context of this paper irrelevant.

Let us say therefore that, *given motivation*, it is inevitable that a human being will learn a second language if he is exposed to the language data. Study of language aptitude does in some measure support such a view since motivation and intelligence appear to be the two principal factors which correlate significantly with achievement in a second language.

(15:22) I propose therefore as a working hypothesis that some at least of the *strategies* adopted by the learner of a second language are substantially the same as those by which a first language is acquired. Such a proposal does not imply that the course or *sequence* of learning is the same in both cases.

(16:22) We can now return to the consideration of errors made by learners. [D2] When a two-year-old child produces an utterance such as 'This mummy chair' we do not normally call this deviant, ill-formed, faulty, incorrect or whatever. We do not regard it as an error in any sense at all, but rather as a normal childlike communication which provides evidence of the state of his linguistic development at that moment. Our response to that behaviour has certain of the characteristics of what would be called 'correction' in a classroom situation. Adults have a very strong tendency to repeat and expand the child's utterance in an adult version; something like 'Yes, dear, that's Mummy's chair'.

No one expects a child learning his mother-tongue to produce from the earliest stages only forms which in adult terms are correct or non-deviant. We interpret his 'incorrect' utterances as being evidence that he is in the process of acquiring language and indeed,

for those who attempt to describe his knowledge of the language at any point in its development, it is the 'errors' which provide the important evidence. As Brown and Frazer (1964) point out the best evidence that a child possesses construction rules is the occurrence
(17:23) of systematic errors, since, when the child speaks correctly, it is quite possible that he is only repeating something that he has heard. Since we do not know what the total input has been we cannot rule out this possibility. It is by reducing the language to a simpler system
(18:23) than it is that the child reveals his tendency to induce rules.

In the case of the second language learner it might be supposed that we *do* have some knowledge of what the input has been, since this is largely within the control of the teacher. Nevertheless it would be wise to introduce a qualification here about the control of input
(19:23) (which is of course what we call the syllabus). The simple fact of presenting a certain linguistic form to a learner in the classroom does not necessarily qualify it for the status of input, for the reason that input is 'what goes in' not what is *available* for going in, and we may reasonably suppose that it is the learner who controls this input,
(20:23) or more properly his intake. This may well be determined by the characteristics of his language acquisition mechanism and not by those of the syllabus. After all, in the mother-tongue learning situation the data available as input is relatively vast, but it is the child who selects what shall be the input.

Ferguson (1966) has recently made the point that our syllabuses have been based at best upon impressionistic judgements and vaguely conceived theoretical principles where they have had any considered foundations at all. The suggestion that we should take more account of the learner's needs in planning our syllabuses is not new, but has not apparently led to any investigations, perhaps because of the methodological difficulties of determining what the learner's needs might actually be. Carroll (1955) made such a proposal when he suggested it might be worth creating a problem-solving situation for the learner in which he must find, by enquiring either of the teacher or a dictionary appropriate verbal responses for solving the problem. He pointed out that such a hypothesis contained certain features of what was believed to occur in the process of language acquisition by the child.

A similar proposal actually leading to an experiment was made by Mager but not in connection with language teaching (Mager, 1961); it is nevertheless worth quoting his own words:

> Whatever sequencing criterion is used it is one which the user calls a 'logical' sequence. But although there are several schemes by which sequencing can be accomplished and, although it is generally agreed that an effective sequence is one which is meaningful to the learner, the information sequence to be assimilated by the learner is traditionally dictated entirely by the instructor. We generally fail to consult the learner in the matter except to ask him to maximize the effectiveness of whatever sequence we have already decided upon.

He points out as the conclusions he draws from his small scale experiment that the next step would be to determine whether the learner-generated sequence, or, as we might call it, his *built-in syllabus*, is in some way more efficient than the instructor-generated sequence. It seems entirely plausible that it would be so. The problem is to determine whether there exists such a built-in syllabus and to describe it. It is in such an investigation that the study of learners' errors would assume the role it already plays in the study of child language acquisition, since, as has been pointed out, the key concept in both cases is that the learner is using a definite system of language at every point in his development, although it is not the adult system in the one case, nor that of the second language in the other. The learner's errors are evidence of this system and are themselves systematic.

The use of the term systematic in this context implies, of course, that there may be errors which are random, or, more properly, the systematic nature of which cannot be readily discerned. The opposition between systematic and non-systematic errors is important. We are all aware that in normal adult speech in our native language we are continually committing errors of one sort or another. These, as we have been so often reminded recently, are due to memory lapses, physical states, such as tiredness and psychological conditions such as strong emotion. These are adventitious artefacts of linguistic performance and do not reflect a defect in our knowledge of our own language. We are normally immediately aware of them when they occur and can correct them with more or less complete assurance. It would be quite unreasonable to expect the learner of a second language not to exhibit such slips of the tongue (or pen), since he is subject to similar external and internal conditions when performing in his first or second language. We must therefore make a distinction between those errors which are the product of such chance circumstances and those which reveal his underlying knowledge of the language to date, or, as we may call it his *transitional competence*. The errors of performance will characteristically be unsystematic and the errors of competence, systematic. As Miller (1966) puts it, 'It would be meaningless to state rules for making mistakes'. It will be useful therefore hereafter to refer to errors of performance as *mistakes*, reserving the term *error* to refer to the systematic errors of the learner from which we are able to reconstruct his knowledge of the language to date, i.e. his *transitional competence*.

Mistakes are of no significance to the process of language learning. However the problem of determining what is a learner's mistake and what a learner's error is one of some difficulty and involves a much more sophisticated study and analysis of errors than is usually accorded them.

A learner's errors, then, provide evidence of the system of the language that he is using (i.e. has learned) at a particular point in the course (and it must be repeated that he is using some system, although it is not yet the right system). They are significant in three different ways. First to the teacher, in that they tell him, if he undertakes a systematic analysis, how far towards the goal the learner has progressed and, consequently, what remains for him to learn. Second, they provide to the researcher evidence of how language is learned or acquired, what strategies or procedures the learner is employing in his discovery of the language. Thirdly (and in a sense this is their most important aspect) they are indispensable to the learner himself, because we can regard the making of errors as a device the learner uses in order to learn. It is a way the learner has of testing his hypotheses about the nature of the language he is learning. The making of errors then is a strategy employed both by children acquiring their mother tongue and by those learning a second language.

Although the following dialogue was recorded during the study of child language acquisition, it bears unmistakable similarities to dialogues which are a daily experience in the second language teaching classroom:

> Mother: Did Billy have his egg cut up for him at breakfast?
> Child: Yes, I showeds him.
> Mother: You what?
> Child: I showed him.
> Mother: You showed him?

Child: I seed him.
Mother: Ah, you saw him.
Child: Yes, I saw him.

Here the child, within a short exchange, appears to have tested three hypotheses: one relating to the concord of subject and verb in a past tense, another about the meaning of *show* and *see* and a third about the form of the irregular past tense of *see*. It only remains to be pointed out that if the child had answered *I saw him* immediately, we would have no means of knowing whether he had merely repeated a model sentence or had already learned the three rules just mentioned. Only a longitudinal study of the child's development could answer such a question. It is also interesting to observe the techniques used by the mother to 'correct' the child. Only in the case of one error did she provide the correct form herself: *You saw him.* In both the other cases, it was sufficient for her to query the child's utterance in such a form as: *you what?* or *You showed him?* Simple provision of the correct form may not always be the only, or indeed the most effective, form of correction since it bars the way to the learner testing alternative hypotheses. Making a learner try to discover the right form could often be more instructive to both learner and teacher. This is the import of Carroll's proposal already referred to.

We may note here that the utterance of a correct form cannot be taken as proof that the learner has learned the systems which would generate that form in a native speaker, since he may be merely repeating a heard utterance, in which case we should class such behaviour, not as language, but in Spolsky's term (Spolsky, 1966) 'language-like behaviour'. Nor must we overlook the fact that an utterance which is superficially non-deviant is not evidence of a mastery of the language systems which would generate it in a native speaker since such an utterance must be semantically related to the situational context. The learner who produced 'I want to know the English' might have been uttering an unexceptionable sentiment, but it is more likely that he was expressing the wish to know the English language. Only the situational context could show whether his utterance was an error or not.

Although it has been suggested that the strategies of learning a first and second language may be the same, it is nevertheless necessary at this point to posit a distinction between the two. Whilst one may suppose that the first language learner has an unlimited number

of hypotheses about the nature of the language he is learning which must be tested (although strong reasons have been put forward for doubting this) we may certainly take it that the task of the second language learner is a simpler one: that the only hypotheses he needs to test are: 'Are the systems of the new language the same or different from those of the language I know?' 'And if different, what is their nature?' Evidence for this is that a large number, but by no means all, of his errors, are related to the systems of his mother tongue. These are ascribed to interference from the habits of the mother tongue, as it is sometimes expressed. In the light of the new hypotheses they are best not regarded as the persistence of old habits, but rather as signs that the learner is investigating the systems of the new language. Saporta (1966) makes this point clear, 'The internal structure of the (language acquisition) device, i.e. the learner, has gone relatively unexplored except to point out that one of its components is the grammar of the learner's native language. It has generally been assumed that the effect of this component has been inhibitory rather than facilitative'. It will be evident that the position taken here is that the learner's possession of his native language is facilitative and that errors are not to be regarded as signs of inhibition, but simply as evidence of his strategies of learning.

We have been reminded recently of Von Humboldt's statement that we cannot really teach language, we can only create conditions in which it will develop spontaneously in the mind in its own way. We shall never improve our ability to create such favourable conditions until we learn more about the way a learner learns and what his built-in syllabus is. When we do know this (and the learner's errors will, if systematically studied, tell us something about this) we may begin to be more critical of our cherished notions. We may be able to allow the learner's innate strategies to dictate our practice and determine our syllabus; we may learn to adapt ourselves to *his* needs rather than impose upon him *our* preconceptions of *how* he ought to learn, *what* he ought to learn and *when* he ought to learn it.

Rhetorical Microstructure of Text C

2nd interpretation

Circumstance:
No explicit, standard, global prediction
Unsignalled, global Reporting prediction: under-signalling
The misleading, ambiguous *now* in a resultive conjunctive role: mis-signalling.

[V1]	***It is of course true that the application of linguistic and psychological theory to the study of language learning added a new dimension to the discussion of errors.***
[D1]	***We can now return to the consideration of errors made by learners.***

Error Analysis

Perspectives on Second Language Acquisition

Edited by
JACK C. RICHARDS

LONGMAN

TEXT C

Acknowledgements

2:

We are grateful to the following for permission to reproduce copyright material:

The publishers of *English Language Teaching* and *Language Learning* for two of the author's own papers, *International Review of Applied Linguistics in Language Teaching* for 'The Significance of Learners' Errors' by S. P. Corder from *IRAL*, Vol. V/4 1967, 'Idiosyncratic Dialects and Error Analysis' by S. P. Corder from *IRAL*, Vol. IX/2, May 1971, 'Approximative Systems of Foreign Language Learners' by W. Nemser, from *IRAL*, Vol. IX/2, May 1971, 'Language Acquisition in A Second Language Environment' by R. Ravem from *IRAL*, Vol. VI/2, 1968, and 'Interlanguage' by L. Selinker from *IRAL*, Vol. X/3, 1972.

EDITOR'S NOTE

I am especially grateful to Roar Ravem for oontributing a previously unpublished paper, and to those colleagues who agreed to write papers for this volume – Heidi Dulay and Marina Burt, Gloria Sampson and M. P. Jain.

J.R.

Longman
1724-1974

Longman Group Limited, London

Associated companies, branches and representatives throughout the world

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First published 1974
Third impression †1977

ISBN 0 582 55044 0

Filmset by Keyspools Ltd, Golborne, Lancs.

Printed in Singapore by
Singapore Offset Printing (Pte) Ltd.

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The Significance of Learners' Errors

S P CORDER

Reprinted from IRAL, Vol. V/4, 1967, published by Julius Groos Verlag, Heidelberg.

When one studies the standard works on the teaching of modern languages it comes as a surprise to find how cursorily the authors deal with the question of learners' errors and their correction. It almost seems as if they are dismissed as a matter of no particular importance, as possible annoying, distracting, but inevitable by-products of the process of learning a language about which the teacher should make as little fuss as possible. It is of course true that the application of linguistic and psychological theory to the study of language learning added a new dimension to the discussion of errors; people now believed they had a principled means for accounting for these errors, namely that they were the result of interference in the learning of a second language from the habits of the first language. The major contribution of the linguist to language teaching was seen as an intensive contrastive study of the systems of the second language and the mother tongue of the learner; out of this would come an inventory of the areas of difficulty which the learner would encounter and the value of this inventory would be to direct the teacher's attention to these areas so that he might devote special care and emphasis in his teaching to the overcoming, or even avoiding, of these predicted difficulties. Teachers have not always been very impressed by this contribution from the linguist for the reason that their practical experience has usually already shown them where these difficulties lie and they have not felt that the contribution of the linguist has provided them with any significantly new information. They noted for example that many of the errors with which they were familiar were not predicted by the linguist anyway. The teacher has been on the whole, therefore, more concerned with *how* to deal with these areas of difficulty than with the simple identifica-

tion of them, and here has reasonably felt that the linguist has had little to say to him.

In the field of methodology there have been two schools of thought (4:20) in respect of learners' errors. Firstly the school which maintains that if we were to achieve a perfect teaching method the errors would never be committed in the first place, and therefore the occurrence of errors is merely a sign of the present inadequacy of our teaching techniques. The philosophy of the second school is that we live in an imperfect world and consequently errors will always occur in spite of our best efforts. Our ingenuity should be concentrated on techniques for dealing with errors after they have occurred.

Both these points of view are compatible with the same theoretical standpoint about language and language learning, psychologically behaviourist and linguistically taxonomic. Their application to language teaching is known as the audiolingual or fundamental skills method.

Both linguistics and psychology are in a state at the present time (5:20) of what Chomsky has called 'flux and agitation' (Chomsky, 1966). What seemed to be well established doctrine a few years ago is now the subject of extensive debate. The consequence of this for language teaching is likely to be far reaching and we are perhaps only now beginning to feel its effects. One effect has been perhaps to shift the emphasis away from a preoccupation with *teaching* towards a study (6:20) of *learning*. In the first instance this has shown itself as a renewed attack upon the problem of the acquisition of the mother tongue. This has inevitably led to a consideration of the question whether there are any parallels between the processes of acquiring the mother (7:20) tongue and the learning of a second language. The usefulness of the distinction between acquisition and learning has been emphasised by Lambert (1966) and the possibility that the latter may benefit from a study of the former has been suggested by Carroll (1966).

The differences between the two are obvious but not for that reason easy to explain: that the learning of the mother tongue is inevitable, whereas, alas, we all know that there is no such inevitability about the learning of a second language; that the learning of the mother tongue is part of the whole maturational process of the child, whilst learning a second language normally begins only after the maturational process is largely complete; that the infant starts with no overt language behaviour, while in the case of the second language learner such behaviour, of course, exists; that the motivation (if we can properly use the term in the context) for learning a

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first language is quite different from that for learning a second language.

On examination it becomes clear that these obvious differences imply nothing about the *processes* that take place in the learning of first and second language. Indeed the most widespread hypothesis about how languages are learned, which I have called behaviourist, (9:21) (8:21) is assumed to apply in both circumstances. These hypotheses are well enough known not to require detailing here, and so are the objections to them. If then these hypotheses about language learning are being questioned and new hypotheses being set up to account for the process of child language acquisition, it would seem reasonable to see how far they might also apply to the learning of a second (10:21) language.

Within this new context the study of errors takes on a new importance and will I believe contribute to a verification or rejection of the (11:21) new hypothesis.

(12:21) This hypothesis states that a human infant is born with an innate predisposition to acquire language; that he must be exposed to language for the acquisition process to start; that he possesses an internal mechanism of unknown nature which enables him from the limited data available to him to construct a grammar of a particular language. How he does this is largely unknown and is the field of intensive study at the present time by linguists and psychologists. Miller (1964) has pointed out that if we wished to create an automaton to replicate a child's performance, the order in which it tested various aspects of the grammar could only be decided after careful analysis of the successive stages of language acquisition by human children. The first steps therefore in such a study are seen to be a longitudinal description of a child's language throughout the course of its development. From such a description it is eventually hoped to develop a picture of the procedures adopted by the child to acquire language (McNeill, 1966).

The application of this hypothesis to second language learning is (13:21) not new and is essentially that proposed fifty years ago by H. E. Palmer (1922). Palmer maintained that we were all endowed by nature with the capacity for assimilating language and that this capacity remained available to us in a latent state after the acquisition of a primary language. The adult was seen as capable as the child of acquiring a foreign language. Recent work (Lenneberg, 1967) suggests that the child who fails for any reason i.e. deafness, to acquire a primary language before the age of 12 thereafter rapidly

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> Mother: You showed him?

Child: I seed him.
Mother: Ah, you saw him.
Child: Yes, I saw him.

Here the child, within a short exchange, appears to have tested three hypotheses: one relating to the concord of subject and verb in a past tense, another about the meaning of *show* and *see* and a third about the form of the irregular past tense of *see*. It only remains to be pointed out that if the child had answered *I saw him* immediately, we would have no means of knowing whether he had merely repeated a model sentence or had already learned the three rules just mentioned. Only a longitudinal study of the child's development could answer such a question. It is also interesting to observe the techniques used by the mother to 'correct' the child. Only in the case of one error did she provide the correct form herself: *You saw him.* In both the other cases, it was sufficient for her to query the child's utterance in such a form as: *you what?* or *You showed him?* Simple provision of the correct form may not always be the only, or indeed the most effective, form of correction since it bars the way to the learner testing alternative hypotheses. Making a learner try to discover the right form could often be more instructive to both learner and teacher. This is the import of Carroll's proposal already referred to.

We may note here that the utterance of a correct form cannot be taken as proof that the learner has learned the systems which would generate that form in a native speaker, since he may be merely repeating a heard utterance, in which case we should class such behaviour, not as language, but in Spolsky's term (Spolsky, 1966) 'language-like behaviour'. Nor must we overlook the fact that an utterance which is superficially non-deviant is not evidence of a mastery of the language systems which would generate it in a native speaker since such an utterance must be semantically related to the situational context. The learner who produced 'I want to know the English' might have been uttering an unexceptionable sentiment, but it is more likely that he was expressing the wish to know the English language. Only the situational context could show whether his utterance was an error or not.

Although it has been suggested that the strategies of learning a first and second language may be the same, it is nevertheless necessary at this point to posit a distinction between the two. Whilst one may suppose that the first language learner has an unlimited number

of hypotheses about the nature of the language he is learning which must be tested (although strong reasons have been put forward for doubting this) we may certainly take it that the task of the second language learner is a simpler one: that the only hypotheses he needs to test are: 'Are the systems of the new language the same or different from those of the language I know?' 'And if different, what is their nature?' Evidence for this is that a large number, but by no means all, of his errors, are related to the systems of his mother tongue. These are ascribed to interference from the habits of the mother tongue, as it is sometimes expressed. In the light of the new hypotheses they are best not regarded as the persistence of old habits, but rather as signs that the learner is investigating the systems of the new language. Saporta (1966) makes this point clear, 'The internal structure of the (language acquisition) device, i.e. the learner, has gone relatively unexplored except to point out that one of its components is the grammar of the learner's native language. It has generally been assumed that the effect of this component has been inhibitory rather than facilitative'. It will be evident that the position taken here is that the learner's possession of his native language is facilitative and that errors are not to be regarded as signs of inhibition, but simply as evidence of his strategies of learning.

We have been reminded recently of Von Humboldt's statement that we cannot really teach language, we can only create conditions in which it will develop spontaneously in the mind in its own way. We shall never improve our ability to create such favourable conditions until we learn more about the way a learner learns and what his built-in syllabus is. When we do know this (and the learner's errors will, if systematically studied, tell us something about this) we may begin to be more critical of our cherished notions. We may be able to allow the learner's innate strategies to dictate our practice and determine our syllabus; we may learn to adapt ourselves to *his* needs rather than impose upon him *our* preconceptions of *how* he ought to learn, *what* he ought to learn and *when* he ought to learn it.

Rhetorical Microstructure of Text D

Circumstance:
Uncued, explicit, standard, global, rhetorically organized prediction; uncued, local, rhetorically organized predictions: under-signalling
Miscued (D4iii), (V6) Question, (V7) Recapitulation: mis-signalling

[V1-V2]						[First and foremost, I will class jargon, and second illustrate styles of jargon.]
(D1)						*SOCIOLET*
(D2i)						[one] *science*
(D2ii)						[two] *sacred institution*
(D2iii)						[three] *linguistics*
(D2iv)						[four] *chemical company*
(D2v)						[five] *a radio talk show*
(D2vi)						[six] *educational establishment*, etc.
	[V3]					*Jargon is complex and hard to define.* [Thirdly, I will define jargon by means of five ingredients/qualities/features, as follows:]
	(D3i)					*first, pseudo-scientific basic words*
	(D3ii)					*after, compounds*
	(D3iii)					*Third, syntax of phrases*
	(D3iv)	[V4]				[fourth] *SEMANTIC* [To explain the three semantic traits of jargon: elevated, ameliorative, and euphemistic.]
	(D3v)					[after] *non impressiveness*
		(D4i)				*The first, elevated*
		(D4ii)				*the second, ameliorative*
		[D4iii]				?
			(V5)			*No one has compiled a history of jargon but recorded objections to it go back a long way.* [Someone recorded *federal* and *local objections to jargon* and *those go back a long way.*]
					(V7)	*Having battered jargon for all these pages,*
			(D5)	(V6)		*(...) is there any good we can say of it?*
				(D6i)		*ABUSE*
				(D6ii)		*ABOLISH*

TEXT D

Language – The Loaded Weapon

The use and abuse of language today

Dwight Bolinger

Longman
London and New York

To the memory of beloved Ruth

Longman Group UK Limited

Longman House
Burnt Mill, Harlow,
Essex, CM 20 2JE, England
and Associated Companies throughout the world.

Published in the United States of America
by Longman Inc., New York

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First Published 1980
Fifth impression 1986
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Bolinger, Dwight
Language, the loaded weapon
1. Sociolinguistics
I. Title
301.2'1 P40 80-40301

ISBN 0-582-29107-0
ISBN 0-582-29108-9 Pbk

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(1:125) Another case in point: the jargonauts and the not-so-golden fleece

TEXT D

When the US Department of State appointed a Consumer Affairs Coordinator to look after the Department's interests in what has come (2:125) to be called consumerism, it fell to the Deputy Secretary for Management, Lawrence Eagleburger, to draw up a description for the job. Here, in part, is what he wrote: [V1 - V2]

> The purpose of the Department's plan is two-fold, to confirm and reinforce the Department's sensitivity to consumer rights and interests as they impact upon the Department and to take those steps necessary and feasible to promote and channel these rights and interests with respect to the maintenance and expansion of an international dialogue and awareness.

The Coordinator's duties were to 'review existing mechanisms of consumer input, thruput and output, and seek ways of improving these linkages via the consumer communication channel'.[1] For this achievement in prose, Mr Eagleburger was presented with the annual Doublespeak Award from the National Council of Teachers of English, through its Committee on Public Doublespeak.

That there should be such a committee – formed in 1971 – is one of many signs of growing irritation and alarm at the spread of obscure language. Next to 'Why can't Johnny read (or write)?', the most-debated (3:125) question of language today is 'Why can't officials use plain language?' Not that officials are the only offenders, but their pronouncements affect the general public and the general public feels it has a RIGHT to understand what is going on.

Jargon – gobbledegook – doubletalk – doublespeak. Johnny's encounters with English are part of the problem. Writing is sueh an alien activity that he overreaches himself. Stepping into a written paragraph for him is like stepping into a Paris salon – to play safe he dons the most formal style he can lay hands on, and since he has little acquaintance with formal styles, he combines purple tails with a frilled shirt and forgets that he is still wearing his work trousers. As more and more Johnnies spread by capillary action through the professions, the level of prose sinks with a dead weight.

(5:125-126) (4:125) By sheer numbers, Johnny's ineptitudes are transformed. The more

Johnnies there are in contact with one another and performing the same activities, the more their altered language becomes a badge of their class. (6:126) Jargon takes on the functions of a SOCIOLECT. The same can be said of (D1;) jargon as of another sociolect, the slang of marijuana-users: that it becomes 'one of the most important active media for transmitting certain kinds of social awareness through the culture'[2] – a Solidarity of Bureaucrats, whose bureaucratese is their password. Like other forms of secret language – the slang of the 'now' generation, the argot of pickpockets, the Latinisms of medicine – it identifies its users to one another and shields them from intrusion. Combating it calls for something more than instruction in English. The anti-jargoneer encounters the same obstacles as the campaigner against environmental pollution: success is not a question of eliminating a few supposed errors but of changing a way of life.

Except that all play their part in group reinforcement, there would seem to be little in common between jargon and other secret languages. Yet there are so many of them that it is easy to find unofficial styles that (7:126) share the sources of jargon as well as some of its purposes. Take the language-for-sociability that the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (8:126) called 'phatic communion'. Its main purpose is not to exchange information but to warm the conversants to each other and keep the talk going. Ostensibly conversation has to be about something, so phatic talk – when it gets beyond the standard greetings and leavetakings – makes a stab at being informative; but content is outweighed by sound and stroking. In California, phatic communion luxuriates in a rank growth of 'psychobabble', as R. D. Rosen calls it (see his book listed on page 203). The topics follow the latest psychic fad, disdaining precision, affecting modish variation of the same trite ideas, a music to accompany the clink of cocktail glasses:

> At a dinner party, a new acquaintance tells me about her intimate life. Although she is still 'processing' her ex-husband . . . , she just spent a weekend with another man from whom she gets 'a lot of ego reinforcement. My therapist keeps telling me to go where the energies are,' she says, 'so that's what I'm doing, because that's what went wrong last time. I didn't just kick back and go with the energies.'[3]

The mark of pseudoscience is on this passage, and reading another, from McFadden's book *The Serial*, one understands why. It lists the character Rita's curriculum of psycho-courses; Rita had 'been through'

> Gurdjieff, Silva Mind Control, actualism, analytical tracking, parapsychology, Human Life Styling, postural integration, the Fischer-Hoffman Process, hatha and raja yoga, integral massage, orgonomy, palmistry,

and she was commuting twice a week for 'polarity balancing manipulation'.[4]

(9:126) For jargon, science is both source and motive. The social sciences (D2;)

imitate the hard sciences, the pseudo-sciences imitate the social sciences, and the mod speaker takes his cues from all three. Why does an ordinarily plain-spoken person advise keeping detergent away from indoor plants because *it causes an adverse reaction* instead of *it is bad for them*? The metaphors of scientism tempt us with a sham authority; they keep the ordinary from sounding commonplace. English is particularly susceptible because of its openness to borrowings from everywhere, and scientists are notorious for their snatches of Latin and Greek, and for applying rules of affixation that result in verbal monstrosities. Their nomenclatures are intended to be internally consistent – *deoxyribonuclease* is made to have each of its elements, *de* + *oxy* + *rib* + *nucle* + *ase*, relate the compound to some trait in the whole family of organic compounds. But this goes counter to the essential contrastiveness of words; in natural language it is more practical to keep things apart than to show their interrelationships, and when such terms are taken into everyday speech they trade the reality of scientific precision for its pretense. The charlatan passes for a scientist by sounding like one, and writing and conversation swell with the concepts, metaphors, and polysyllables of our white-coated oracles. In some professions – notably those dealing with public safety, such as fire and police – the affectation becomes comical: *At least seventy-five people evacuated safely from the premises*, goes a radio report,[5] to let us know they all got away.

The full riches of jargon are best savored in the softest of the soft sciences, sociology and its branches. An anonymous wag a few years ago circulated a 'Folklore Article Reconstitution Kit' consisting of four sections which, when compiled phrase by phrase in 1–2–3–4 order, would yield sentences suitable for a folklore article. Readers can try their hand:

Section 1

1 Obviously,
2 On the other hand,
3 From the intercultural standpoint,
4 Similarly,
5 As Lévi-Strauss contends,
6 In this regard,
7 Based on my own field-work in Guatemala,
8 For example,
9 Thus, within given parameters,
10 In respect to essential departmental goals,

Section 2

1 a large proportion of intercultural communicative coordination
2 a constant flow of field-collected input ordinates
3 the characterization of critically co-optive criteria
4 initiation of basic charismatic subculture development
5 our fully integrated field program
6 any exponential Folklife coefficient

7 further and associated contradictory elements
8 the incorporation of agonistic cultural constraints
9 my proposed independent structuralistic concept
10 a primary interrelationship between systems and/or subsystems logistics

Section 3

1 must utilize and be functionally interwoven with
2 maximizes the probability of project success while minimizing cross-cultural shock elements in
3 adds explicit performance contours to
4 necessitates that coagulative measures be applied to
5 requires considerable further performance analysis and computer studies to arrive at
6 is holistically compounded, in the context of
7 presents a valuable challenge showing the necessity for
8 recognizes the importance of other disciplines, while taking into account
9 effects a significant implementation of
10 adds overwhelming Folkloristic significance to

Section 4

1 Propp's basic formulation
2 the anticipated epistemological repercussions
3 improved subcultural compatibility-testing
4 all deeper structuralistic conceptualization
5 any communicatively-programmed computer techniques
6 the profound meaning of *The Raw and the Cooked*
7 our hedonic Folklife perspectives over a given time-period
8 any normative concept of the linguistic/holistic continuum
9 the total configurational rationale
10 Krappe's Last Tape.

Not to be outdone, the Open University's magazine *Sesame* published the following reduced-complexity homeomorphic covarying exercise in sociological conceptualization:

The Instant Sociological Jargon Matrix

0 relative	0 charismatic	0 model
1 peripheral	1 hierarchical	1 regression
2 traditional	2 bureaucratic	2 alienation
3 internalized	3 conceptual	3 paradigm
4 functional	4 homeostatic	4 reification
5 normative	5 pre-industrial	5 hypothesis
6 symbolic	6 deviant	6 commitment
7 multi-variate	7 anomic	7 expectations
8 reciprocal	8 empirical	8 syndrome
9 affective	9 psychometric	9 deprivation[6]

(10:129) Jargon spares no institution, not even the sacred ones, where, we are told, the minister of the Gospel (D2ii)

> lives in a *pastorium*, *interacts* with and gets *input and feedback* from his *prayer-cell circle of the Committed* in a *Christian Life Center*, *raps* with *teens* in special *after-glow* services, *opts for alternatives* to *implement*, *restructure*, *finalize*, and *firm up* a *meaningful Operation Involvement Outreach Explosion* to *bridge the Generation Credibility Gap* of the *unchurched* through a *Koinonia*, *Agape Multimedia Thrust*.'

The organ supplies strains of rock music in the background.

Most jargon is not quite so condensed – it takes rhapsodic compilations like these to make good reading. The anti-jargoneer is not above exaggerating a bit to make his point. Here is a 'translation' of the beginning of the Twenty-third Psalm from the Gospel according to Alan Simpson, former President of Vassar College:

> The Lord is my external-internal integrative mechanism.
> I shall not be deprived of gratifications for my viscerogenic hungers or my need-dispositions.
> He motivates me to orient myself towards a non-social object with affective significance.
> He positions me in a non-decisional situation.
> He maximizes my adjustment.[8]

(11:129) But the real thing is almost a match for the caricature. Here is a true-to-life sentence from an article on linguistics: (D2iii)

> In traditional linguistics it has been assumed that the analysis of sentences can be performed upon examples isolated from the process of interaction within which they naturally emerge.

Deflated, this means 'Traditional linguists thought that sentences could be analyzed out of context'. Appropriately, the next sentence from the same passage reads *Indeed this has been stated as an explicit tenant by Chomsky*.[9] Malapropisms – like *tenant* for *tenet*, where the writer could just as well have said *principle* – are a regular adornment of jargon. The writer or speaker strains for the more erudite and exotic synonym, but has no sure idea of what he is looking for. An official of a chemical (12:129) company boasts that *During our 33-year history, only one employee died of chemical exposure and his death was largely due to panic on his behalf* – (D2iv) jargon in the phrase *chemical exposure* as well as in the malapropism (13:129) *behalf* for *part*.[10] A caller on a radio talk show says *It becomes inherent on us* – stumbling on the way from the simple *It is our duty* to the elegant *It is incumbent on us*.[11] (D2v) Another true-to-life passage:

> Over the past ten years the school has evolved a child-centred individual-learning situation with a degree of integrated day organisation and close co-operation between each year's mixed-ability classes. Basic-work morning programmes are carefully structured but allow for integration ....[12]

The spelling tells us that jargon is firmly established on both sides of the (14:130) Atlantic, with roots deep in the educational establishment – as yet another true-to-life passage extravagantly proves: (D2vi)

> Our school's Cross-Graded, Multi-Ethnic, Individualized Learning Program is designed to enhance the concept of an Open-Ended Learning Program with emphasis on a continuum of multi-ethnic academically enriched learning, using the identified intellectually gifted child as the agent or director of his own learning. Major emphasis is on a cross-graded, multi-ethnic learning with the main objective being to learn respect for the uniqueness of a person.

This was in a letter received by a Houston, Texas father inviting him to a meeting about a new high school program.[13]

(15:130) Like any other style, jargon is complex and hard to define. Pure [V3]
(16:130) jargon would have to be a condensation of only those ingredients shared by no other style, and obviously such an extreme would be annihilated by its own density, a sort of verbal black hole. But take certain qualities and pack them close together, and you get a pretty solid approximation
(17:130) of the undenatured thing:
(18:130) First, basic words – pseudo-scientific, much of it layered with Greek (D3i) and Latin prefixes and suffixes, most of it a substitution of the unusual for the usual. Not that unusualness is bad if the ideas are unusual: the rarity of the words hardly counts against a sentence like *The piebald mare trampled the yarrow underfoot.*[14] But *The identical theory offers a basis for development of X* is authentic jargon: for *identical*, read *same*; for *offers a basis*, read *from*; for *development*, read *develop* – which translates to *From the same theory we develop X*. Jargon even invades the prepositions: *before* becomes *prior to*, *after* becomes *following* or *subsequent to*, *from* in a causative sense becomes *due to* (*She broke down due to overwork*), *in* becomes *as far as* (*It is striking as far as appearance*). The unusual soon becomes usual – statistically – as the jargon word catches on and becomes a vogue word. *Government programs impact on people's needs. Things are prioritized and reprioritized. Bureaucrats coordinate, facilitate and disseminate, especially on the interface.*[15] The lexicon of jargon quickly degenerates into a catalog of clichés.

(19:130) After basic words come the compounds. Here thrive the hyphen- (D3ii)
ations that make it appear as if every passing encounter between two ideas deserved a permanent record in the dictionary. On a Greyhound bus appears the sign *This coach is restroom equipped for your convenience – to have a restroom* becomes a new verb, *to restroom-equip*. The city jail in Madison, Wisconsin is called a *total-incarceration facility*. *Correctional facility* has become a kind of standard euphemism for *jail* or *prison*.

(20:130) Third, the syntax of phrases. Richard Nixon's lieutenant Gordon (D3iii)
Liddy, outlining *Operation Diamond*, aimed at preventing demonstrations at political conventions, explained a bit of strategy:

> We will have a second operational arm that could be of even greater preventive use. These teams are experienced in surgical relocation activities. In a word, General, they can kidnap a hostile leader with maximum secrecy and minimal use of force.[16]

The simple noun *kidnapping* grows to a noun modified by a noun modified by an adjective. A radio station announces a new venture in religion: *Program emphasis will be on Christian living:*[17] we have a new technical entity, *program emphasis*, to replace the humdrum activity of emphasizing something in a program. An ad for a magazine inquires, *How can you tell if you are heart-attack prone?*[18] Piling up plethoric adjectives gives a similar effect: *ambient noncombatant personnel* for *refugees*[19] and *waterborne logistic craft* for *sampans*,[20] both from the rich harvest of jargon from Vietnam. A common practice in these phrases is to attach heavyweight modifiers to lightweight nouns. The noun *facility* covers virtually anything intended for general use and having an established location, from an insane asylum to a lavatory: *sanitary facility*, *health facility* (hospital), *parking facility* (public garage), *recycling facility* (junkyard), besides Madison's *incarceration facility*. A traffic-spotter helicopter, reporting light rain, observes *a lot of windshield wiper activity*. We hear *firefighting operation* for *firefighting*, *supervisory personnel* for *supervisors*, *age level* for *age*. Among the most frequent empty nouns are *phase*, *process*, *condition*, *nature*, *phenomenon*. In advertising the favorite is *system*: a motel calls its beds *sleep systems*, and a water bed is a *flotation system*; a vacuum cleaner is a *sanitation system*. But the general favorite for a number of years has been *situation* – empty enough to cover any situation. When the telephone lines were jammed during a heavy storm in the winter of 1977–78, a patron called the company to complain, and the operator explained, *Yes, we know, everyone's having the same trouble – we're in a slow-talk situation.*[21] A radio report says that *the weather does not permit a helicopter to maintain a landing situation.*[22] Two people in a fight are in a *conflict situation*. The result of no rain for six months is a *drought situation*. The nice thing about *situation* is that you can add it to any self-sufficient action noun: *crime situation*, *inflation situation*, *strike situation*, *attack situation*, *retreat situation*.

(21:131) Verb phrases are like noun phrases except that the lightweight is an empty verb instead of an empty noun. A passage quoted earlier had *perform an analysis* in place of *analyze*. *To be in receipt of* substitutes for simple *receive*, *to have need of* for simple *need*. In some cases there is a true contrast; for instance, *They had an argument* pictures the argument as finished, *They argued* suggests that there is more to the story. But this does not explain why the San Francisco police chief who wanted to get rid of prostitutes referred to *having an absence* of them.[23]

(22:131) Many phrases are hard to classify, but all are the same in substituting the roundabout for the direct: *other considerations to the contrary notwithstanding* for *in spite of other considerations*, *over and above* for

more than or *beyond*, *from this it follows that* for *so* or *therefore*, *it is a function of* for *it depends on*. In the larger unit of the sentence the combined resources are infinite: in the Nixon era, *The input process is going on* stood for *The president is listening*.

(23:132) As for the syntax of jargon, it predictably circumnavigates. There are passives in abundance (*it is thought that* for *I think that*), double negatives (*a not unintentional remark* for *an insult*), inversions and extractions (*It is security that people want* or *What people want is security* for *People want security*), repetitions of words that could be dropped or replaced with pronouns (*They accepted the document and said document was affirmed*), continual admonitions to the hearer or reader that the speaker or writer means what he is saying (*it should be understood that, it is noteworthy that, it is necessary to be aware of the fact that, bear in mind that, it cannot be stressed too strongly that*), transitions pointing to what is obvious on inspection (*to begin, we next turn to, in conclusion*), phrases with which the author pats himself on the back (*interestingly enough, the important fact is, we have made it clear that*). And so on. For every way of driving straight to a goal, jargon discovers a dozen ways of beating around the bush – for whatever reason: self-importance, obfuscation,
(24:132) ineptitude. Expanded constructions have their place, but not whole colonies of them.

(25:132) The most consistent feature of jargon is SEMANTIC. It is elevated, (D3iv) [V4]
(26:132) ameliorative, euphemistic in the most general sense. It tries to improve appearances, both in what the message is about and in the message itself. The listener is reassured that reality is at worst not threatening and at best attractive, and that the message and its giver have authority. The
(27:132) first purpose is served by avoiding the unpleasant, and the second by (D4i) (D4ii) sounding weighty. The ideal piece of jargon does both at once. There are not supposed to be secrets from the American people – so *secret* is removed from the secret file and replaced with *classified*, which makes things seem less conspiratorial and at the same time creates visions of busy, efficient people classifying documents in a scientific way. The Department of Physical Education of the California State University at San Jose covers its sweat and dons academic respectability as the *Department of Human Performance* (*physical education* was already the jargon of another era, when *physical exercise* was seeking status in institutions of higher *education*). The *Bay Area* (San Francisco) *Air Pollution Control District* went itself one better in 1978 as the *Bay Area Air Quality Management District*.[24] For many years now we have dialed *Directory Assistance* when all we want is *Information*. Vietnam was a verbal as well as a military minefield, a place where

> troops were advisors, where men were not murdered but wasted, and where the CIA shunned assassination in favor of termination with prejudice .... 'You always write it's bombing, bombing, bombing,' Col David H. E. Opfer, air attaché at the US Embassy in Pnompenh, complained to reporters. 'It's not bombing. It's air support.'[25]

Business uses glossy jargon for advertising, but evasive jargon for self-protection. When the Ford Motor Company recalled their Torinos and Rancheros,

> They sent out a letter: '... Continued driving with a failed bearing could result in disengagement of the axle shaft and adversely affect vehicle control.'[26]

Adversely affect vehicle control is a pseudo-scientist lecturing a moronic public, and *continued driving* puts the responsibility on YOU. George Herman, on the Washington staff of CBS News, tells of a business executive who erected a verbal screen at a Senate hearing by promising the optimum maximization of the potentialities or the maximum optimization of the potentialities, he wasn't sure which.

> I tried to figure out what it meant either way. Optimum maximization, I figure, is the best possible way of making something big, whereas maximum optimization is the biggest possible way of making something the best. Neither way does it make much sense. I listened some more and eventually I realized that it wasn't supposed to make much sense – it was part of a new language of anti-semantics, a strange hybrid tongue designed to keep your meaning so unclear that if anyone tries to quarrel with you, you can hastily beat a retreat by saying that that wasn't what you meant at all.[27]

Herman errs only in thinking the language to be new. It is more rampant now, but it is as old as speech, renewing only its manifestations.

(28:133) There is always some obstacle to penetrating the essential meaning of a piece of jargon. As with the last example, likely as not when we have got to the center of it we find the room empty. This happens most often in advertising, as in the pure illogic of *Not everybody likes Kava but Kava likes everybody*, or *People eat more MacDonalds than anybody*. Or the nonsense may be added on. Intonation can be used for this: an advertisement for Chevette cars went *A choice of TWO engines instead of no choice at ALL!*[28] The least possible choice is a choice from two, but least is made to sound like most. As these examples show, the conjuring of something out of nothing can be done with plain words as well as with
(29:133) woolly abstractions; the gobbledegook is in the logic rather than in the terms. Whether this should be called jargon is a matter of definition. It (D3v)
(30:133) lacks the ingredient of impressiveness. The brand of soup that carries on its label the wording *Full strength*; *no water needs to be added* is merely aiming to deceive, with its substitution of *full strength* for *already diluted*.

Who the first jargoneer was, nobody knows. He – or as likely she – probably antedated articulate speech, and substituted fancy gestures for plain ones. No one has compiled a history of jargon, but recorded
(31:133) objections to it go back a long way. Over two hundred years ago the (V9) Secretary to the Commissioners of Excise admonished an official of the town of Pontefract to stop his 'schoolboy way of writing', with 'affected

17

phrases and incongruous words, such as *illegal procedure*, *harmony*, etc.'[29] A century ago, the Director of the US Geological Survey, Dr George Otis Smith,

> chided a colleague for writing 'The argillaceous character of the formation is very prominent in some localities, although it is usually subsidiary to the arenaceous phase.' What he meant was: 'At some places the formation included considerable clay, but generally it is made up chiefly of sand.'[30]

Jargon at its worst is partly a product of unfinished education, and if we have more of it today, one reason is that we have more half-educated people in a position to afflict the public with their words – and, as often as not, a wish to hide something.

Reaction was inevitable, and it has taken two forms: an effort to (32:134) reeducate, and an attack on deliberate unclarity. Industry and (33:134) government are concerned about the bad impression their employees make on the public and the trouble they have understanding one another. President Carter made it official by demanding that Federal (34:134) regulations be written in plain English, and a number of agencies looked for ways to reform themselves or called in outside help. The Federal Trade Commision hired Rudolph Flesch, author of *Why Johnny Can't Read*, as consultant, the Department of Housing and Urban Development began taking advice from the former head of the English Department at Goucher College, Ruth Limmer, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare launched an 'Operation Common Sense' directed by a lawyer and writer, Inez Smith Reid, in a five-year plan to reedit six thousand pages of regulations. Its office of Civil Rights employed a former reporter and editor, Norma Mohr, to help 'push back the tide of turgid prose'. Here is an sample of an old regulation on hearing aids, and its new rendition by Flesch:

> No seller shall represent that it or any of its employees, agents, sales persons and/or representatives is a physician or an audiologist, unless such is the fact.
>
> Don't say or hint that you or anyone in your firm is a doctor of medicine or an audiologist if it isn't so.[31]

(35:134) Some local governments too began taking stock of their language. The Planning Division of San Mateo County, California, hired a specialist in plain writing whose blue pencil 'regularly changes *utilize* to *use*, *inaugurate* to *start*, and *at this point in time* to *now*'.[32] In Milwaukee a consulting firm was set up by a journalism graduate, Caroline Poh, to serve business clients in rewriting such products as advertisements, articles for trade magazines, and executives' speeches.[33]

Conspicuous by their absence among these experts are the (36:134) professional linguists. It cannot be just because linguists are among the worst offenders themselves – as claimed by David Ferris of Exeter University, who devised a scale to measure jargon and put theoretical

linguists at the top.[34] It is partly because linguists have not come forward with advice, and partly because shamanism is still the rule in treating the ills of language – glottotherapy, if you please.

When jargon is deliberate, education in direct, unambiguous speech (37:135) and writing is of little use. If the deliberate jargoneer is a diplomat, he needs his indirections for the sparring matches he has to play with others (38:135) of his kind. Here, perhaps, jargon has its place, in encounters where suspicion is high and talk has to be kept going without presuming on a frankness that might cause offense. But deliberate jargoneering 'to advance the career of the speaker (or the issue, cause or product he is agent for) by a kind of verbal sleight of hand', as L. E. Sissman describes it,[35] calls for countermeasures. There is one response that offers at least psychological relief: a public that feels put upon but helpless to do anything about it strikes back with gallows humor. Professor Don Nilsen of Arizona State University collects anti-jargon graffiti:

> When in doubt, do as the President does – take a guess.
>
> Studies at the University of Michigan have proved that the average blond has an IQ equalling that of a medium-sized radish.
>
> There is a relationship between stable government and horse sense.
>
> Bureaucrats never change the course of the ship of state; they simply adjust the compass.[36]

But sarcasm is too often an admission of defeat, and besides, not every public servant deserves to be publicly ridiculed. The logical target of the anti-jargoneer is specific jargon and its motives. Frankness and honesty are more apt to come in our one-way language-consuming world when we demand them frankly and honestly. And if the deliberate jargoneer cannot be educated, his victims can, to recognize what is being done to them. When Edwin Newman says of jargon that 'it serves as a fence that keeps others outside and respectful, or leads them to ignore what is going on because it is too much trouble to find out',[37] he exposes the attitude that makes this kind of deception possible. We are surrounded by the products of scientific magicians whose methods and formulas we do not understand and are afraid to question lest we expose our ignorance. Confident that if the scientific is accepted as unintelligible the unintelligible will be accepted as scientific, the pseudo-scientists parade their pseudo-formulas, persuading us to buy their products on the basis of misleading claims, or to accept a course of action that we would never endorse if it were clearly labeled. Jargoneering deception depends on ignorance; seen through, it collapses. We are the students in a class where the professor talks over our heads. We have paid our fees, and have a right to stop his lecture every time he gets ahead of us.

But to catch jargon aimed at us we must understand our own all too easy retreat into it. Words pass for solutions because we permit language to become automatic. This too we inherit from science – applied science, that is, which is forever on the lookout for tricks that will save people from having to do for themselves – in transportation, food preparation,

computing, pest control, child rearing – even to brushing teeth and opening a tin can. We have convenience foods and we want a convenience language, one with a formula for every emergency. For all things there have to be specialists, and specialists are those who have mastered the incantations of their science. If formulas have that power, how is the ordinary word to stand up against them?

The answer is to renew our own faith in ordinary language as the most powerful instrument we have. It produced all those special languages in the first place and can recall them when they prove defective. Formulas are good for putting ideas into a small space and testing them for consistency, but the formula that defies translation into intelligible prose is probably a fraud. The test of survival is to face the world of problems unarmed except with a functioning brain and the birthright of a common language. It is the unrestricted code, the organizer of our universe, not to be shamed by false notions of refinement nor cowed by the condescensions of those for whom promises are commitments and driving the Blacks out of the slums is urban renewal in the inner city.

Having battered jargon for all these pages, is there any good we can say of it? Perhaps that along with slang it is part of the exuberance of language always striving to keep one jump ahead of reality. If the expressions are there, even though vague and often deceptive at first, some of them may serve as half-finished material for ideas that are steadily refined. As we saw in an earlier chapter, things are not only assigned their words, but words reach out to things. The process of adjustment is never-ending – and what other word can we use here than *process*? In its day, *complex* was a jargoneering loan from psychology. *To contact* was jargon fifty years ago, but now we find it a useful abstraction a level higher than *to call*, *write*, or *see*, all unnecessarily specific; and it is certainly less clumsy than *get in touch with*. Today's *lifestyle* instead of *way of living* dramatizes what a whole generation insists on as its right, a new conceptual entity. Though terribly overused, *viable* in its proper sphere has no substitute. Jargon is an ABUSE of terms whose main fault is that some of them tempt us to abuse them. Otherwise they have a certain right to protest their innocence, for their other faults are no worse than those of hundreds of terms that pass our lips daily, unnoticed because we are used to them. A new word, or an old one that rockets to popularity, like *meaningful*, flags us down because we expected something else. With our attention riveted on it, there is no way for it to hide the semantic vagueness that afflicts all abstractions. Yet *meaningful* comes as a potentially useful antonym of a term that no one would think of as jargon. When Britt Ekland declares, *My love affairs have always been meaningful*,[38] she is saying that they were not *frivolous*. *Serious* will not quite serve. Old vices are accepted, new ones viewed with horror – the familiar jargon is the alcohol of our verbal drug culture, the unfamiliar jargon is its marijuana.

For all that one would like to throttle them, it would neither be good

nor possible to ABOLISH the special ways of talking and writing that serve little purpose except to set groups apart from one another. But it is essential to learn when not to be fooled by them. It makes no sense for a society to spend millions on bilingual programs to break down the barriers between languages, and do nothing about the rank growth of sociolects that raise new ones. Or do nothing about the oppressive side of the standard itself, which in some of its forms – and to some degree in the scheme as a whole – is designed as a barrier of social class. The standard, too, is a sociolect.

Rhetorical Microstructure of Text E

1st interpretation

Circumstance:
Uncued D members under the Advance Labelling (V1-V2), (V3-V4), (V5-V6), and (V10): under-signalling

(V1-V2)					*I want to bring into focus a number of problems (...) with the teaching of English as a second language (...),in scientific and technical education.*
[V9] ~ [D9]					*the usage (grammatical* function, *signification)* of language
[V11] ~ [D11]					*langue*
[V12] ~ [D12]					*notions of competence (...) First of all*
					?
	(V3-V4)				*(...) to provide some of the means by which they may be solved.*
	[V9] ~ [D9]				*the use (communicative* function, value) of language
	[V11] ~ [D11]				*parole*
	[V12] ~ [D12]				*notions of (...) performance (...) First of all*
					?
		(V5-V6)			*Let us begin with some obvious and general observations.*
		(V7) ~ (D7)			*First, what do we imagine we are doing when we are 'teaching a language'?* *(...) developing skills* *(...) correct sentences*
		[V8] ~ [D8]			*? What (...) are we teaching?* *(...) language system* *(...) langue*
		[V13] ~ [D13]			*? How do we set about teaching the rules of use?* *(...) rhetoric*
		[V14] ~ [D14]			two ways in the rhetorical revival: *speech act, speech function*
		[V16] ~ [D16]			other two ways: *conventions of use, context*

			(V15)		*I should now like (...) to indicate (...) what relevance it might have for the preparation and presentation of teaching materials.* *Let me now indicate what bearing I think this has on the teaching of English.*
			[D15]		
				(V10)	*I shall return to this point later.*
				[D10]	?

2nd interpretation

(V1-V2-V5-V6)				*[I want to bring into focus a number of problems* (...) as *obvious and general observations* (...) *with the teaching of English as a second language* (...), *in scientific and technical education.]*
(V7) ~ (D7)				*First, what do we imagine we are doing when we are 'teaching a language'?* (...) *developing skills* (...) *correct sentences*
(V8) ~ (D8)				? What (...) are we teaching? (...) *language system*
[V9] ~ [D9]				the *usage* (*grammatical* function, *significance*) of language
[V11] ~ [D11]				the *validity of the* misleading *distinction* between *langue* and *parole*
[V12] ~ [D12]				*a closer look at the notions of competence and performance* *First of all,*
	(V3-V4)			(...) *to provide some of the means by which they may be solved.*
	[V9] ~ [D9]			the *use* (*communicative* function, *value*) of language
	[V11] ~ [D11]			*parole*
	[V12] ~ [D12]			*performance*
	[V13] ~ [D13]			*How can we set about teaching the rules of use?* (...) *rhetoric*
	[V14] ~ [D14]			two ways in the rhetorical revival: (...) *speech act* (...) *speech function*
	[V16] ~ [D16]			*other* two *ways:* (...) *conventions of use* (...) *context*
		(V15)		*I should now like* (...) *to indicate* (...) *what relevance it might have for the preparation and presentation of teaching materials.* *Let me now indicate what bearing I think this has on the teaching of English.*
		(D15)		
			(V10)	*I shall return to this point later*
			[D10]	?

Explorations in Applied Linguistics

H. G. Widdowson

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.

T. S. Eliot *Little Gidding*



Oxford University Press
1979

TEXT E

Tipo de Aquisição Doação
Adquirido de Conselho Britânico
Data Aquisição 7.5.91
Preço
Registro 91.527
Data Registro 7-5-91

1º / 2º

Oxford University Press
Walton Street, Oxford OX2 6DP

Oxford London Glasgow
New York Toronto Melbourne
Wellington Cape Town
Nairobi Dar es Salaam
Kuala Lumpur Singapore Jakarta
Hong Kong Tokyo Delhi Bombay
Calcutta Madras Karachi

ISBN 0 19 437080 1

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Set in Monotype Imprint

Printed and bound in Great Britain
by Morrison & Gibb Ltd
London and Edinburgh

To S. Pit Corder

T: / 2:

1 The teaching of rhetoric to students of science and technology

(1:7)

TEXT E

In this paper I want to bring into focus a number of problems associated with the teaching of English as a second language, and by implication any other second language, in scientific and technical education. (V1-V2)
(2:7)
I make no pretence at being able to supply solutions. I do not myself believe that it is the business of applied linguistics to supply solutions to pedagogic problems, but only to provide some of the means by which they may be solved. (V3-V4)
(3:7)
It seems to me that the aim of applied linguistics is to clarify the principles by which the language teacher operates, or by which he might consider operating, if he is not alienated by arrogance.

The clarification which applied linguistics provides comes about as a result of relating the language teacher's beliefs about and attitudes to language and language learning, as they are revealed by his pedagogic practices, to the linguist's and psycholinguist's discoveries about language and language learning by means of theoretical and experimental investigation. It is particularly appropriate that applied linguistics should be concerned with English for science and technology because it happens to bring into prominence, as 'general' English teaching does not, a question which is one of the principal issues in linguistics at the present time: that is to say, the nature of language as communication. It is fairly rare that a shift in orientation in language teaching and a shift in orientation in linguistics should involve a coincidence of interest, but this, I believe, is now happening.

(4:7) Let us begin with some obvious and general observations. First: (V5-V6)
(5:7) what do we imagine we are doing when we are 'teaching a language'? (V7)
We speak of developing skills, of making habitual the ability to compose
(6:7) correct sentences. We stress that the primary need is to inculcate in our (D7)
learners a knowledge of the language system, and we devise drills and
(7:7) exercises to bring this about. At the same time, we do not wish to make our learners into automatons, mechanically repeating sentence patterns and so we insist that pattern practice and the manipulation of the language structures which are taught must be meaningful. We take
(8:7) pains to ensure that language is presented initially in situations which give meaning and point to the language which is being acquired. The
(9:7-8) general pattern is: situational presentation to make the language

meaningful followed by exercises in repetition to make it habitual. What precisely are we teaching? We are, of course, teaching something quite abstract: we are teaching the language system: *langue*. This is not to say that we neglect *parole*. You cannot teach *langue* directly since it has to be realized in some way or another, so we use *parole* in our initial presentation and we use it in our exercises. But it is an odd kind of *parole* when you think about it: it is pressed into service to exemplify *langue*. This, of course, never happens outside a language teaching classroom. Normally *parole* only occurs as a result of some kind of social interaction: it does not just exemplify the operation of linguistic rules.

There is an important distinction to be made, then, between the *usage* of language to exemplify linguistic categories and the *use* of language in the business of social communication. When we make use of expressions like 'This is a red pencil' or 'This is a leg' or 'He is running to the door' this is language *usage* not language *use*: it exemplifies but does not communicate.

I think it is true to say that the manipulation of language in the classroom for what is known as situational demonstration or contextualization is meant to indicate what I will call the *signification* of linguistic elements. Thus expressions like 'This is my hand', 'That is his foot', and so on, are meaningful as sentences because they indicate the signification of grammatical items like the possessive pronoun, and lexical items like 'hand', 'foot', and so on. Sentences like these are exemplificatory expressions and are meaningful as projections, as it were, of the language system or code. They are, of course, quite meaningless as utterances. It is difficult to see how they could possibly represent any message in any normal communication situation. They are meaningful as 'text-sentences' (to use a term of John Lyons') but meaningless as utterances because they have no *value* as communication.

It seems to me that it is important to stress this distinction. Language can be manipulated in the classroom in the form of text-sentences which exemplify the language system and thus indicate the *signification* of linguistic items. This is not the same as language *use*—the use of sentences in the performance of utterances which give these linguistic elements communicative *value*. In the classroom, expressions like 'This is a red pencil' are sentences; expressions like 'Come here', 'Sit down' are utterances because they have a communicative import in the classroom situation, which provides a natural social context for their occurrence.

Attempts are very often made to bestow communicative value on the language items which are introduced into the classroom, by the use of dialogue, for example. But it is done in a somewhat *ad hoc* and incidental way, and what I have in mind is something more systematic.

Even where there is an attempt to give communicative point to the language being learnt, it is generally left for the learner himself to work out the value. His attention is drawn to the grammatical rather than the communicative properties of the language being presented to him, and the focus is on signification rather than value. I shall return to this point later. For the moment I want to stress that the primary aim of the language teacher is at present directed at developing in his learners a knowledge of the language system, *langue*, using as much *parole* as is necessary to exemplify and establish it in the learner's mind.

I have been using the terms *langue* and *parole*. I think this distinction of de Saussure has provided theoretical sanction for the language teacher's notion as to what is involved in teaching a language. I want to question the validity of the distinction and its relevance to language teaching, and to suggest that the distinction, as de Saussure draws it, is misleading; and that in consequence the language teacher has been misled.

To begin with, though the distinction seems clear enough, when one traces it back to its source in the *Cours de Linguistique Générale* one finds it difficult to pin it down in any very precise way. Lyons says that it is intended to remove an ambiguity in the word 'language' which can refer both to potential capacity and to the realization of this potential in actual speech (Lyons 1968), and, of course, we can see what, in general, de Saussure is getting at. But although he suceeeds in removing this particular ambiguity, a necessary consequence is that he introduces other ambiguities. These have recently attracted the attention of linguists; largely, I believe, because their critical faculties have been stimulated by the similar but less equivocal distinction between competence and performance introduced by Chomsky. The precision of Chomsky's formulations have the happy effect of forcing his critics to be precise as well. The ambiguities of the *langue/parole* distinction are pointed out by Hockett:

> Wittingly or unwittingly, Saussure had packed two intersecting contrasts into his single pair of terms: some of the time *langue* means 'habit' while *parole* means 'behaviour', but at other times *langue* means 'social norm' while *parole* means 'individual custom'.
> *Hockett 1968: 15.*

Householder provides his own gloss on these remarks:

> Hockett remarks quite correctly, as others have too, on the Saussurean confusion of two possible contrasts in the *langue/parole* distinction. He puts it a little differently than I would: contrast (a) makes *langue* mean 'habit' and *parole* 'behaviour', (b) makes *langue* equivalent to 'social norm' and *parole* to 'individual custom'. I would

> tend to say rather that (a) equates *langue* with 'grammar' (i.e. 'competence grammar') or 'system' or 'structure' while *parole* is 'utterance' or 'performance', while (b) says *langue* is the 'common grammatical core' of a social group, while *parole* is the 'idiolect' or 'individual grammar'. Thus what is *langue* under (a) may be *parole* under (b). Of course there may be social groups of many sizes, so that in the (b) sense *parole* is the *langue* of a social group of one (if the limiting case is allowed).
> *Householder 1970.*

(22:10) The confusion which is revealed by Householder's remarks hardly needs commenting upon. From the social point of view, the distinction between *langue* and *parole*, which on the face of it seems so clear, disappears altogether. Both Hockett and Householder invoke the idea of social norms and such an invocation is fatal to the neat distinction which de Saussure is making. Once one places language in its social context, it becomes apparent that the notion of a common homogeneous system is a figment of the imagination. The paradox in the *Cours de Linguistique Générale* is that *langue* is represented as a social fact which is in some way independent of social use. As Labov points out:

> . . . the social aspect of language is studied by observing any one individual, but the individual aspect only by observing language in its social context.
> *Labov 1970.*

Once one becomes aware of the manner in which language functions in society as a means of interaction and communication, it becomes apparent that a description of language in terms of some homogeneous common system is a misrepresentation. One must accept that the linguist idealizes his data in order to do any linguistics at all, and there is nothing objectionable about this as a heuristic procedure. It could be argued that at the historical moment at which de Saussure was presenting his views the essential problem was to establish some methodological principles upon which linguistics could proceed as an autonomous discipline. This problem he succeeded in solving and linguistics has been able to develop as a result. But the linguist's area of concern as defined by de Saussure does not necessarily coincide with the areas of concern of other people involved in the study of language. The idealization represented by the *langue/parole* distinction happens to leave out of account those very aspects of language with which the language teacher must primarily be concerned.

Householder, as we have seen, glosses the *langue/parole* distinction by reference to the notions of competence and performance. I want now to have a closer look at these notions because it seems to me that (23:10) (24:10) (V12)

they are responsible for the change in the orientation of linguistics which is now taking place.

(25:11) First of all, it is clear that the competence/performance distinction is not just *langue/parole* writ large: if it were, there would presumably be no point in coining the new terms. *Langue* is represented as a concrete social fact whereas competence is represented as an abstract idealization: the perfect knowledge of the ideal speaker-listener in a homogeneous speech community. A linguistic description as an account of competence is therefore represented as a well-defined system of rules. The difficulty with an idealization upon which such a description depends is that it cuts the description off from empirical validation. Chomsky and his associates postulate the grammatical rules which constitute the system of the language by reference to their own intuitions. As for doubtful cases, they are prepared, they say, to let the grammar itself decide. As Labov has pointed out, however, it turns out that there are more doubtful cases than Chomsky imagined. This is because there is no such thing as a representative set of intuitions. (D12)

Once again, then, we run into difficulties as soon as we look at language from the social point of view. The concept of competence is meant to remove all the complications which are associated with social considerations but the result is that it also removes the possibility of what Firth called 'renewal of connection' with language in actual use. The system of the language as formalized in a generative grammar is thus cut off from the facts of use, and anomalies arise as a result: the ill-defined phenomena of human language, for instance, are represented as a well-defined system of generative rules.

The more explicit definition of competence, compared to the ambiguous definition of *langue* makes apparent the limitations of a linguistic description which depends on the abstraction of some elemental system isolated from, and unaffected by, language in use as a social phenomenon. This is not at all to belittle the achievements of generative grammar over the past two decades, but only to suggest that the depth of insight into linguistic form has been achieved by a narrowing of focus which has excluded many features of language which must somehow be accounted for in a total description. The problem is that many of these features are those with which the language teacher is principally concerned, and this is why generative grammar, as Chomsky himself points out, has such small relevance to language teaching. What exactly is excluded is indicated by Katz and Postal:

> We exclude aspects of sentence use and comprehension that are not explicable through the postulation of a generative mechanism as the reconstruction of the speaker's ability to produce and understand sentences. In other words, we exclude conceptual features such as the

> physical and sociological setting of utterances, attitudes, and beliefs of the speaker and hearer, perceptual and memory limitations, noise level of the settings, *etc.* (my emphasis).
> *Katz and Postal 1964: 4*

All of these features are bundled together under *performance*. The very heterogeneity of such a collection suggests that in fact this is a covering term for everything which cannot be conveniently accounted for in the proposed model of description. Performance is, in effect, a residual category containing everything which is not accounted for under competence. The suggestion is that it subsumes everything about language which is imperfect or irregular, all systematic features being accounted for within competence, which is the repository, as it were, of the speaker's knowledge of his language. But it is clear that some of the features listed under performance are also systematic and form a part of the speaker's knowledge of his language (in any normal sense of knowledge), and should also therefore be considered as part of his competence. It is part of the speaker's competence to be able to use sentences to form continuous discourse, as Halliday points out; it is part of his competence that he should know how to use sentences to perform what Searle calls speech acts, Lyons calls semiotic acts, and I call rhetorical acts. In brief, knowledge of a language does not mean only a knowledge of the rules which will generate an infinite number of sentences, but a knowledge of the rules which regulate the use of sentences for making appropriate utterances. An utterance is not just the physical manifestation of an abstract rule of grammar: it is also an act of communication. To know a language means to know how to compose correct sentences *and* how to use sentences to make appropriate utterances.

It seems to me that a revolution is taking place in linguistics against a conceptual order which derives from de Saussure, and which, indeed, served as the very foundation of modern linguistics. There is an increasing recognition of the need to pay as much attention to rules of use, the speaker's communicative competence, as to rules of grammar, his grammatical competence, and that an adequate linguistic description must account for both. Here is where the interests of linguistics and language teaching converge. So long as our concern is with the teaching of 'general' English without any immediate purpose, without knowing in any very definite way what kind of communicative requirements are to be made of it, then the need to teach language as communication is not particularly evident. Once we are confronted with the problem of teaching English for a specific purpose then we are immediately up against the problem of communication. Teaching English as a medium for science and technology must involve us in the teaching of how

scientists and technologists use the system of the language to communicate, and not just what linguistic elements are most commonly used. A common assumption seems to be that if you teach the system, use will take care of itself: that once you teach, say, how to compose a declarative sentence then the learner will automatically be able to understand and make statements of different kinds, will be able to define, illustrate, classify, qualify, describe, report—will, in short be able to perform rhetorical acts and recognize the rhetorical acts of others without much difficulty. In my view, the communicative competence which this presupposes does not come of itself, especially not to those learners outside the European cultural tradition. Rules of use have to be taught with as much care as rules of grammar.

I am suggesting, then, that what I see as a revolution in linguistic thinking should be matched by a revolution in language teaching methodology in order to cope with the kind of challenge which English for science and technology represents. In both cases there is a need to shift our attention away from an almost exclusive concentration on grammatical competence and to give equal attention to communicative competence. Knowledge of a language involves both, and whether we are concerned with the description or the teaching of language, we must concern ourselves with both.

(26:13) How do we set about teaching the rules of use? Rules of use are [V13]
rhetorical rules: communicative competence is the language user's
knowledge of rhetoric. Traditionally, rhetoric has been represented as a
set of prescriptive rules related to impressionistic norms, in much the
(27:13) same way as traditional grammar was represented. Rhetoric is concerned [D13]
with appropriacy and grammar with correctness, and the reason why
the latter has achieved academic respectability whereas the former has
not is probably only a matter of historical accident, and probably has
something to do with the relatively recent development of the social
sciences. There seems to be no reason why rhetoric as the description
of communicative competence should not achieve similar standards of
precision as grammar has in the description of grammatical competence.
Whether the two can be incorporated into the same model of linguistic
description is a matter for speculation, but it seems clear that develop-
ments in linguistics at the present time are moving towards a rhetorical
(28:13) revival. I should now like to review one of these developments and to
(29:13) indicate in a rather programmatic way what relevance it might have for [V14-V15]
the preparation and presentation of teaching materials.

The impetus behind the movement towards rhetoric has come from
(30:13) two main sources: social anthropology on the one hand and linguistic [D14]
philosophy on the other. From social anthropology has come the notion
of the speech function; and from linguistic philosophy has come the
notion of the speech act.

We owe the notion of the speech act to the Oxford philosopher J. L. Austin, though I suppose it can be regarded as a development of the whole 'meaning is use' movement in philosophy. Briefly, Austin pointed out (Austin 1962) that when we issue an utterance we perform some kind of act over and above the composing of a linguistic form. Thus when I utter the expression 'I'll come tomorrow' I am committing myself to a promise or an undertaking of some kind, and if I utter the expression 'Come here' I am performing the act of command. Promises, orders, and so on are what Austin called 'illocutionary acts'. One can discover what kind of illocutionary act is being performed by making the act explicit by what he called a performative verb. Thus 'I'll come tomorrow' can be established as a promise or undertaking because one can use the performative verb *promise* and make the utterance explicit: 'I promise I will come tomorrow' or 'I undertake to come tomorrow'. Similarly one can provide a performative verb to make an order explicit: 'I order you to come here'. And so with other performative verbs.

Certain linguists, among them Thorne, Ross, and Lakoff, have made use of this insight and have postulated a deep structure in which the performative verb figures in a superordinate sentence which dominates the rest of the deep structure configuration. Thus we get deep structures roughly paraphrasable as 'I promise you I come tomorrow', 'I order you you come here', and so on. There are two difficulties about this procedure. Firstly, one has to accept that a sentence like 'I order you to come here' and 'Come here' have the same illocutionary potential, that is to say are used to perform the same act of ordering. But it seems obvious that the circumstances in which one would utter one of these are different from those in which one would utter the other. The second difficulty is related to this. In many, perhaps most cases, one cannot tell what act is being performed in the uttering of a certain sentence unless one is provided with a context. To take a simple example: 'I'll come tomorrow' may be a promise or a threat or a confirmation. 'You sound just like your mother' may be an insult or a compliment or neither.

This kind of difficulty points to the principal problem we are faced with in the study of speech acts. What other ways are there of indicating
(31:14) what act a sentence counts as apart from the use of the explicit performative verb? Certain linguistic features serve as signals, but they are not
(32:14) to be trusted: the context of utterance and the conventions of use associated with particular types of discourse very often override the linguistic indicators. One might imagine, for example, that the imperative mood is an unequivocal indicator of the act of commanding. But consider these instances of the imperative: 'Bake the pie in a slow oven', 'Come for dinner tomorrow', 'Forgive us our trespasses', 'Take

[V16] [D16]

up his offer'. An instruction, an invitation, advice, and prayer are all different acts, yet the imperative serves them all; and need serve none of them: 'You must bake the pie in a slow oven', 'I should take up his offer', 'Why don't you come to dinner tomorrow?', 'We pray for forgiveness of our trespasses'. But one might suppose, nevertheless, that though there are several different kinds of act that can be performed by the imperative, when an order is to be given it is always the imperative which is used. But this, of course, is not the case either. Just as one linguistic form may fulfil a variety of rhetorical functions, so one
(33:15) rhetorical function may be fulfilled by a variety of linguistic forms. But the forms which can serve this function are dictated by the conditions which must be met if an order or a command is adequately performed. Here we can turn to the work of Labov for illustration (Labov 1969a).

Labov points out that the conditions which must be met in making a command are as follows: when A commands B, B believes that A believes that at a time T:

1 X should be done.
2 B has an obligation to do X.
3 B has the ability to do X.
4 A has the right to ask B to do X.

Labov takes the situation of a teacher asking a pupil to do a piece of work again because it is unsatisfactory. The teacher—A—may frame his order in any of the following ways corresponding to each of the conditions:

1 This should be done again.
2 You'll have to do this again.
3 You can do better than this.
4 It's my job to get you to do better than this.

Or, making use of what Labov calls 'modes of mitigation and politeness', the command can be couched in interrogative terms:

1 Shouldn't this be done again?
2 Don't you have to do neater work?
3 Don't you think you can do better?
4 Can I ask you to do this again?

Labov also shows how the response to the command can fix upon one of the conditions, and can also be mitigated by the interrogative form.

From a different point of view, Searle (1969) also has established conditions on the performing of speech acts like promising, thanking, congratulating, requesting, warning, and so on. There is, then, a good

deal of progress being made in the description of rules of use and the characterization of different rhetorical acts.

Let me now indicate what bearing I think this has on the teaching of English, and in particular on English for science and technology. What people like Austin, Searle, Labov, and others are now trying to pin down in terms of rules and conditions is precisely what language learners need to know if they are to cope with English as communication. I see no reason why the limitation stage of the language teaching process should not be a selection of rhetorical acts rather than of linguistic elements and vocabulary items. There seems no reason at all why we should not, for example, say 'For this course we will select undertakings, promises, warnings, definitions, classifications', and so on rather than 'For this course we will teach the simple present tense, present continuous, count and mass nouns', and so on. In fact, on the face of it, there would seem to be a very good reason for focusing on the former. Teaching rhetorical acts like promises and orders necessarily involves the teaching of different linguistic elements and vocabulary items, which are taught meaningfully because they are given a definite communicative import. You do not necessarily teach rhetorical acts when teaching linguistic elements and vocabulary items, as we all know, and what communicative competence the learners do acquire tends to be picked up incidentally. Once we accept the teaching of communicative competence as our prime objective, and once we can see—as I believe we now can see—how communicative competence can be described, then the logic of basing the preparation of teaching materials —limitation *and* grading—on the rhetorical units of communication rather than the linguistic units of the language system seems inescapable.

This approach seems to me to be of especial relevance in the preparation of English for science and technology teaching materials. I mentioned earlier that the conventions of use associated with particular types of discourse very often override linguistic indicators of rhetorical acts. Scientific discourse can be seen as a set of rhetorical acts like giving instructions, defining, classifying, exemplifying, and so on, but the manner in which these acts are related one with the other and the manner in which they are linguistically realized may be restricted by accepted convention. There are many ways of linking different acts to compose larger communicative units like, for example, a report or an exposition or a legal brief, and there are, as we have seen, several ways of performing the same basic act. My guess is that the best way—perhaps the only way—of characterizing different language registers is to discover what rhetorical acts are commonly performed in them, how they combine to form composite communication units, and what linguistic devices are used to indicate them.

Labov has said:

> It is difficult to avoid the common-sense conclusion that the object of linguistics must ultimately be the instrument of communication used by the speech community; and if we are not talking about *that* language, there is something trivial in our proceeding.
> *Labov 1970: 33*

I think it is possible that in language teaching we have not given language as an instrument of communication sufficient systematic attention. We have perhaps been too concerned with language system, taking our cue from the linguists, and in consequence there has often been something trivial in *our* proceedings. Now that we are turning our attention to the teaching of English for special purposes, and in particular to English for science and technology, we must take some principled approach to the teaching of rules of use, and restore rhetoric, in a new and more precise form, to its rightful place in the teaching of language.

Notes

A shortened and slightly revised version of a paper read at a BAAL seminar in Birmingham, March 1971, and published in Perren 1971.

Rhetorical Microstructure of Text F

Circumstance:
Unrevealed, unexpressed and undeveloped global metatext: under-signalling
Misleading propositional, contextual and lexical correspondences of pseudo-predictions in [D2]: mis-signalling

(V1)				*We have emphasized in Chapter one the importance of looking at language as a social phenomenon* (...).
(D1)				language as *behaviour, potential meaning, culture, options,* and *variability.*
	(V2)			*If it is true that language reflects society,* (...) *it should be possible to determine the specific ways in which this reflection occurs* (...)
	(D2)			*to determine the specific ways in which this reflection occurs*
				to show how individual social factors determine the selection of linguistic features
				to relate *variation of language use to something other than the linguistic system*
				to link *variation to an independent theory of social development and change*
				to try to relate the social system to the linguistic system
				to look for *an intermediary concept linking language to culture*
				to think of culture and the social structural system as a system of meanings
				to *determine how the meaning potential present in the social system* (...) *influences the selection of formal linguistic items*
				to show *how individual social factors determine the selection of individual linguistic features*
				to determine the specify ways
				to show *how*
				to *determine how*
				etc.

		(V3)		This intermediary concept has been provided, in part at least, by the work of (...) Bernstein and his colleagues.
		[D3]	(V4)	The contextual determinants of text have been discussed in preceding chapters (in lexical, grammatical and phonological terms)
			(V5)	(...) can also be linked to social structure and to the context of culture.

TEXT F

Language and Situation

Language varieties and their social contexts

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Language and Society

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First published in 1978 by
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd
39 Store Street, London WC1E 7DD
Broadway House, Newtown Road, Henley-on-Thames.
Oxon RG9 1EN and
9 Park Street, Boston, Mass. 02108, USA

Set in 10 on 11 point Times New Roman and
Printed in Great Britain by
Western Printing Services Ltd

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Gregory, Michael
Language and situation. – (Language and society).
1. Sociolinguistics
I. Title II. Carroll, Susanne W. Series
301.2'1 P40 77–30482

ISBN 0 7100 8773 X Pbk

TEXT F

Chapter seven

Code

(1:75) Concepts of 'time' and 'matter' are not given in substantially the same form by experience to all men but depend upon the nature of the language or languages through the use of which they have been developed. They do not depend so much upon ANY ONE SYSTEM (e.g., tense, or nouns) within the grammar as upon the ways of analyzing and reporting experience which have become fixed in the language as integrated 'fashions of speaking' and which cut across the typical grammatical classifications, so that such a 'fashion' may include lexical, morphological, syntactic and otherwise systematically diverse means coordinated in a certain frame of consistency.
Benjamin Lee Whorf, *Language, Thought and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf*

(2:75) We have emphasized in Chapter one the importance of looking at language as a social phenomenon, as a type of meaningful (V1) interaction among individuals in a social context. Language is therefore considered to be more than lexical, grammatical or phonological systems and structures. We can regard it as (D1) behaviour relating the participants in a speech event to their environment, to each other and to the medium of communi-
(3:75) cation itself. Text as an operational instance of language implies, therefore, a common social and cultural 'meaning' system in addition to a shared system of verbal symbols. This is not simply another way of saying that words have meanings and are composed of sounds—'phonemes', or letters – 'graphemes'. Words change their meanings according to context. Word-meaning is neither fixed nor stable. Word-meaning can be considered to be meaning-in-use, the 'living' word as it appears in situation. Meaning realized in recurrent

and typical situations can itself be seen as part of a larger system of meaning to which members of the community have access. This system of potential meaning is the culture itself. When we say that language is choice we suggest that language-in-use implies the selection of all possible meanings inherent in this extensive meaning system called culture. Only certain ranges of meaning will be relevant to a given situation and these meanings will be encoded in grammatical and lexical options.

Examination of individual utterances reveals extensive variation, even in utterances produced by the same speaker. Language seems to be characterized by such variability, yet participants in a speech event have little difficulty in decoding messages in spite of changes in the environment or in the content of the message. It would appear that not every change is pertinent to the interpretation of the speech event. The 'infinite variability' of language does not pose insurmountable difficulties to communication because we find similarities between utterances, and between speech events, which enable us to decode the message. As Halliday (1975b) suggests, variables can themselves be meaningful since social values tend to be associated with them: 'sexy' women in television advertisements often have husky voices in imitation of Mae West, comedians and comediennes successfully portray children by giggling, squealing, stuttering, etc. The successful interpretation of the message depends upon the association of given social values with the particular formal or phonic features used.

Whorf suggested as early as 1936 ('A Linguistic Consideration of Thinking in Primitive Communities', in Whorf, 1956) that linguistics is concerned primarily with meaning, meaning being given an enlarged sense. The particular problem posed for sociolinguistics as an independent study is the examination and correlation of linguistic and sociological phenomena. If it is true that language reflects society then it should be possible to determine the specific ways in which this reflection occurs by showing how individual social factors determine the selection of individual linguistic features. Seeking such relationships involves more than identifying social correlates with formal

and phonological variation, as we have done so far in discussing dialect.

Hasan (1973) has suggested that the descriptive techniques of dialectology, although offering interesting insights into the ways in which varieties differ from one another, do not explain the sociological basis of differences in language use. Both Hasan (1973) and Halliday (1975a, 1975b) have suggested that variation of language use must be related to something other than the linguistic system. Variation must be linked to an independent theory of social development and change. The concept 'social dialect' is a useful descriptive category to cover differences of formal and linguistic features; however, to describe variability at the cultural level a different kind of abstraction is required.

To do so we must think of culture and the social structural system as a system of meanings. The culture of a society incorporates all possible meaningful behaviour (linguistic and otherwise) possible within that society, the beliefs and attitudes associated with it, including the arts and sciences as we usually think of them. Culture therefore subsumes the social structure, or the organization of roles and potential relationships among members of the society. It subsumes shared values of the society (including the value systems of sub-groups). Culture includes systems of knowledge about the environment, about the past, about objects, things, ideas, etc. The social system is a social semiotic (Halliday, 1975b); a system of symbolic action, of organized meaning potential.

Behaviour, therefore, can be meaningful. Language is only one type of meaningful behaviour. Gesture, facial expression, smoke signals, are other types of non-linguistic, meaningful behaviour (writing systems like Braille or a system like semaphore are all based on language and therefore constitute manifestations of linguistic behaviour). At the cultural level of analysis these systems are all possible options which can be made within the 'context of culture' (Malinowski, 1923) of a given society. The context of culture is in turn actualized in a context of situation. Both an Italian and an American when stuck in traffic have the option of shouting and swearing or of

honking their car horns. It may be more usual, however, for Italians to honk their automobile horns than it would be for North Americans. We see in this context of situation a typical, recurrent environment in which language events may take place, depending always on the larger context of culture.

(17:78) Situation-type therefore implies context of culture since the former is only one semiotic structure in the entire range of possible semiotic structures inherent in the culture.

The social system is therefore regarded as a system of

(18:78) behavioural patterns which language interprets and realizes. Meaning is not, contrary to the popular expression, merely a question of semantics; rather, there is meaning to be found at

(19:78) all levels of analysis. To determine how this occurs requires that we examine how language 'means', that is to say the various

(20:78) meaningful functions that language performs. Describing what language does has enabled Halliday (based on earlier work done by the Prague Circle), for example, to develop a model of semantic macro-functions: the ideational (experiential and logical), the inter-personal and the textual. In other words, language has a 'referential' function, it names and describes things in the environment; language has a social function, establishing roles and relationships; language has its own way of doing things and relating to the rest of our behaviour (cf. Chapters three and eight).

These macro-functions belong to the linguistic system. They are linguistic variants of 'can mean'. The ways in which the meaning potentials of the social system are actually organized

(21:78) into semantic categories have yet to be explained. To do this we must step beyond the linguistic system and its levels of phonology, lexis and grammar, and semantics, to try to relate

(22-78) the social system to the linguistic system. In this manner we can determine how the meaning potential present in the social system determines the organization of meaning and therefore

(23-78) influences the selection of formal linguistic items. We need an

(24-78) intermediary concept linking language to culture.

This intermediary concept has been provided, in part at least, by the work of the sociologist Basil Bernstein and his

(25-78) colleagues at the University of London Institute of Education. (V3)

Bernstein, interested in language as a part of the socialization process, has investigated the relationship of language to educability and social class in England. He wanted to develop a theory capable of explaining how 'linguistic failure' is linked to 'educational failure' and how failure in the school system reflects the English social structure. The problem of low success rates among working-class children is not unique, of course, to England. The problem has also been studied in the USA but more specifically as it relates to black children in urban ghettos. The English and American studies are not therefore based on identical experiences. They do, however, both concentrate on structural problems. The language of the working-class child was often considered to be deficient; some suggested that these children had no language at all. Others considered their language to be structurally 'just different', the school system favouring the dialect of the middle class. Bernstein has examined the problem from the point of view of use. Different

(26:79) classes, he found, have different ways of using language, different 'strategies' for meaning, different 'fashions' of speaking.

(27:79) Class structure created different linguistic codes.

(28:79) Bernstein found that language, used in certain key socializing contexts, was a principal factor in the acquisition of the child's social identity. The child learns who he is, in terms of the social structure, through language—that language which surrounds him in his daily activities, that language which is directed to him personally, particularly as it is used to control his behaviour. The child learns how to relate to others, i.e. children learn how to address their elders, strangers, each other, in control situations; for example, 'You mustn't interrupt Aunt Edith when she's talking' or perhaps, 'Don't talk back to your mother.'

An individual can and does possess numerous distinct roles in a lifetime. Even in the course of a single day he will act first in one capacity and then in another. Some of these roles are long term, features of permanent (or reasonably so) relationships. A given individual can be husband or wife, mother or father (depending on the 'reasonably permanent status' of sex roles), lawyer, citizen, etc. These roles may change at some

time, hence the 'reasonably' (couples divorce, workers lose or change their occupations and so on). However, while the possibility exists that these long-term roles may change with time, an obvious contrast can be made between them and more immediate roles which reflect the context of situation. A lawyer, normally functioning in his long-term occupational role in court, might be required to assume others in specific instances, e.g. 'accused' or 'witness to an accident'.

(29:80) The social identity of the individual will result from a configuration of roles he possesses or can possess. Both long-term
(30:80) and situational roles are created by the social system. They
(31:80) reflect the culture—the role of 'prime minister' can only exist in a system possessing a parliamentary form of government; the role of 'potential purchaser of meat in a butcher's shop' depends upon the existence of certain eating habits (one would not expect such a role in a vegetarian society), and on a particular type of economic organization (in a society of farmers who slaughter and butcher their own meat and poultry this role might not be filled). Because the culture determines the
(32:80) role system, it determines the nature of interaction between different members of the system. Culture is therefore reflected in variations of verbal interaction which depend on role relationships. Bernstein has developed the concept of code to show how the social system determines and is reflected in
(33:80) linguistic differences.
(34:80) Code determines the meaning potential of the individual. It is, as we have suggested, a strategy or plan of linguistic use. The social system determines the entire range of meanings available to the community. Code can be seen to embody a range of meanings access to which is determined by the place the individual occupies in the social structure. Code controls the verbal repertoire of the individual, his capacity to encode meaning lexically and grammatically. Code therefore determines which options will be selected as appropriate to the given situation.

We return again to the idea of language behaviour. Certain types of behaviour only will be appropriate to a given situation. This is not simply a question of social etiquette.

Communication depends upon participants being able to interpret and anticipate behaviour in situation. Unkind words said with a smile or a wink may not be taken seriously. If they are, we say that a misunderstanding has occurred, communication has broken down. Frequently, though, appropriateness to situation can be seen as a question of etiquette if we regard the latter as simply conventions of personal interaction. Etiquette constitutes rules of social behaviour. Code enters the picture in determining how situation is interpreted, how meaning is organized.

(35:81) Bernstein postulates two types of code which reflect two different principles of semantic organization. Each code orientates the user to a specific type of meaning which is itself a function of the type of relationship that the user enters into. Code is therefore the product of individual experience. At the same time code directs further experience in that it determines the interpretation of meaning in speech events. The codes, elaborated and restricted, are acquired through exposure to different speech models. They embody two types of meaning. The concept of code has therefore two facets—the semiotic and the linguistic. Both the speech models and the semiotic functions are referred to as universalistic or particularistic.

Universalistic meaning is meaning made verbally explicit. The addresser does not assume that the addressee shares the meaning. It tends therefore to be individuated and personal. The particularistic meaning, on the other hand, is verbally implicit. The addresser does assume that the meaning is shared. It tends therefore to be 'public' meaning.

The universalistic speech model is one available to all members of the speech community. The particularistic speech model, however, has a limited distribution; it is available only to certain groups in the social structure. The restricted code tends to employ a universal speech model coupled with particularistic meaning. This code orientates the user to express linguistically ascribed position, inclusive and binding social relationships. As Bernstein says (1971) it emphasizes the 'We' over the 'I', that is to say it is used to express commonality and public values. The elaborated code tends to employ a

universalistic meaning and a particularistic speech model. The elaborated code orientates the user to achieved status; it places the 'I' above the 'We'. It is used to express individuality, to maintain social distance and to express personal values.

The importance of the code theory in education lies in the fact that the school system requires the use of an elaborated
(36:82) code but not all students have access to it. The importance of this theory to sociology lies in the fact that the differential access to the elaborated code does not occur randomly but
(37:82) rather is controlled by the class system. Lower-working-class urban children in England, Bernstein suggests, tend to have only a restricted code. Middle-class children possess both a restricted and an elaborated code. The two groups enter into different types of relationships and learn to express meaning in different ways through language. They do not use language for the same functions, some of which, it seems, are necessary for the school situation. When the lower-working-class child is expected implicitly to exploit language for functions he normally does not express verbally, a discontinuity is created between his home and his school environment. He has learned to verbalize a certain range of meanings in his home and when he enters the school another range of meanings is required. There is, then, a very subtle but none the less very real sense in which what is taught is personally irrelevant for this child. The school system does not talk to him about what he knows. Middle-class children possessing both codes, experience no such discontinuity. They can use language for those functions required by the school.

In order to illustrate we shall use two passages representative
(38:82) of the two codes constructed by Peter Hawkins of the University of London Institute of Education Sociological Research Unit (Bernstein, 1971, p. 178). Hawkins analysed the speech of two groups of five-year-old children. Both working-class and middle-class children were confronted with a series of four pictures: showing some boys playing football; the football breaking the window of a house; a woman looking out of the broken window and a man making a threatening gesture; the children moving away. The informants were asked to describe

the story in the picture. Based on his results Hawkins produced
(39:83) the following stories:

Middle-class example:
Three boys are playing football and one boy kicks the ball and it goes through the window the ball breaks the window and the boys are looking at it and a man comes out and shouts at them because they've broken the window so they run away and then that lady looks out of her window and she tells the boys off.

Working-class example:
They're playing football and he kicks it and it goes through there and it breaks the window and they're looking at it and he comes out and shouts at them because they've broken it so they run away and then she looks out and she tells them off.

To a person familiar with the test situation the stories may appear to be fundamentally the same. The differences, however, are both striking and important. The middle-class example makes the elements of the story—objects, participants, actions, etc.—verbally explicit. The story is, in fact, independent of the test situation. One does not need to be in the situation to understand the story. The working-class example, however, is situation-bound because of the consistent use of pronominalization. However, the capacity spontaneously to render meaning explicit in language is necessary for success in most contemporary school systems.

It should be apparent from these examples, however, that
(40:83) code is not synonymous with social dialect. The grammatical differences in these examples are slight (we cannot, of course, comment on the possible phonological variations of the
(41:83) children's stories as if they were spoken). Code refers to principles of semantic organization. These principles are reflected in lexical and grammatical selections, it is true, but the formal features used are important indirectly and only as they reflect semantic differences. In fact the formal features used by both classes may be the same or similar. Bernstein has stressed that

the restricted code is possessed by both groups. Ostensibly then both groups could say the same thing in similar situations calling for the use of restricted code. Social dialect, however,
(42:84) is a contextual category referring to text and to formal variation. It implies semantic organization but emphasis is on text associated with socio-situational variables. Its use as a descriptive category is that it permits the isolation and description of specific kinds of formal variation. The variations produced by code differences reflect not features of the user but rather features of the user's use of language in situation. Code influences register (see Chapter six) not dialect.

The educational problems of England, as they are posed by Bernstein (and his views are disputed), can therefore be seen to be somewhat different from those of the USA. The work done on Black English by linguists like William Labov and Raven McDavid Jr is dialectal studies dealing with features of American Negro speech: for example, the loss of certain phonological contrasts /θ/ becoming more like /f/, /ð/ becoming more like /v/; simplification of final consonantal clusters, e.g. loss of final /t/ or /d/ in words like 'fast', 'send', etc.; use of the copula 'be', e.g. 'he be' (+adjective). When American writers speak of 'code-switching' they are not referring to code as it has been used here. Code-switching refers to dialect-switching. This is not to say that some of the educational problems of American ghetto children may not be related to code in Bernstein's sense. The studies done on Black English have concentrated on structure and have not dealt with the distribution and use of restricted code (see, for example, Bereiter and Engelmann, 1966). Certain linguists have specifically tried to refute the work of the 'verbal-deprivation' sociologists who suggest that Black English does not permit certain types of conceptualization and abstraction, i.e. that it is more a code in Bernstein's sense. Labov particularly has studied non-standard Negro speech from this perspective (see Labov et al., 1965, 1968; Labov, 1966, 1970, 1972a).

(43:84) Code determines the verbal repertoire or the range of 'styles' an individual can possess, since it determines the range of meanings which that person can express through linguistic

means. It constitutes a 'frame of speaking', a 'strategy of use', and therefore determines how an individual will interpret situation. It also controls the ways in which a user will actualize the meaning potential of the social system in register which results from a configuration of situational features. Code determines the ways in which specific formal features relate (through the contextual features of field, mode and tenor) to situation. The contextual determinants of text have been discussed in preceding chapters (in lexical, grammatical and
(44:85) phonological terms) as kinds of language use and as components of the speech situation (see Chapter one and Chapters three to five). They will be discussed in the final chapter as part of a conceptual framework for representing, in contextual terms this time, the semiotic environment of the text. Let us note here simply that these features, which can be directly related to the linguistic levels, can also be linked to social
(45:85) structure and to the context of culture. A direct connection can be made between the linguistic 'can mean' and the social
(46:85) 'can mean'. The connective concept is code.