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AN INTERACTIONAL SOCIOLINGUISTIC STUDY OF

FICTIONAL CHARACTERS' CONVERSATIONAL EXCHANGES

por

CLAUDIA MESQUITA

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CLÁUDIA MESQUITA (Autoria)
C.I.C. - 411.653.145-68
Rua Cel.Rondaldo de Barros,776/484 C
Carvoeira
Florianópolis / SC, CEP. 88040-600

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em 6 de Janeiro de 2000, que vai por mim assinado.

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
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
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
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To Liliane Mesquita de Andrade, my beloved only daughter, as the greatest lesson I can ever hope her to learn from life:

"Above all, to thine ownself be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man."

(William Shakespeare, *Hamlet*)

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A podium activity: factual history or fictional story?...

"There are always people around us. Interacting with them is an open possibility resulting from our being in a certain place at a certain time, that is, living through the events which constitute our social circumstances.

"Pursuing a Master's is one of these events. It is also a learning event. I am convinced that no learning takes place without some sort of interaction: be it face-to-face or 'face-to-piece-of-paper.'

"In the first type of interaction, that is face-to-face interaction, people once more play a significant role. I believe that everyone who crosses our path has something to contribute to our learning process.

"So, I would like to start by acknowledging the contribution of those anonymous and faceless people behind institutional identities.

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"In doing so, they have helped me accomplish both the construction of this thesis and that of a new path into my human condition. I feel I will never be able to find the right words to thank them the way I would like to. Yet, I will keep on trying.

"Although meeting these people along the way might be regarded as the 'natural' result of a 'fortuitous' coincidence, I am even less sure that this applies to the order in which those meetings occurred. So, I chose this order to cite their names: Pedro de Moraes Garcez, Silvio Cesar De Bettio, Carolina Sampaio Barreto, and Miguel Obrer.

"Finally, I would like to str—"

"Hey, Claudia!" a member of the audience says loudly.

"What?!" Claudia asks in astonishment, shaking her head to both sides in search of him.

"That's all?" he says. "Nothing more?" he goes on incredulously. "What about who they are? I mean, remember Shakespeare: 'What's in a name?' And—"

"Oh, yes, I see . . ." Claudia interrupts him. "It seems I left their credentials out . . ." she adds thoughtfully.

"Sure. That's it." he replies in triumph.

"Well, then . . ." Claudia says with a mischievous smile and, looking straight into his eyes, she adds: "If you really want to know who the individual behind each name is, all you have to do is to reach for her/him and propose to endeavor in a joint project. After s/he accepts your proposal, then you may be able to find out what is so extraordinary about *doing 'being ordinary.'*" Then, Claudia turns and addresses the audience again: "I shall resume this by asking you to forgive me for any noticeable omissions. Thank you."

Florianópolis, September 17, 1999.

ABSTRACT

AN INTERACTIONAL SOCIOLINGUISTIC STUDY OF

FICTIONAL CHARACTERS' CONVERSATIONAL EXCHANGES

CLAUDIA MESQUITA

UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE SANTA CATARINA
1999

Supervising Professor: Pedro de Moraes Garcez

Storytelling is essential to human communication. Among the strategies used by storytellers to develop their narratives so as to promote and sustain audience involvement, the animation of the story characters' voices figures prominently. Such animation constitutes an interactional phenomenon called "represented interaction," in the form of "represented conversational exchanges." In this study, represented interaction is characterized so as to include all verbal and non-verbal actions performed by fictional characters ("reported discourse"), as well as the socio-situational features relevant for the production and understanding of such actions ("reporting discourse"). Starting from the assumption that represented interaction shares some organizational structures with naturally occurring talk-in-interaction, the pivotal question in the present study was the extent to which the former can be regarded as "ordinary." In order to answer that question, segments of represented interaction were first excerpted from short stories and novels and were, later, submitted to examination within an interactional sociolinguistic perspective that privileges participants' (characters') standpoints. The present analysis shows that a number of mechanisms employed by real conversationalists to the production and sense-making of interaction may also be used in the representation of characters' interaction, which suggests that authors rely on their and the readers' authority as members of a particular conversational community as the basis for represented interaction. The work also suggests that the representation of interaction is constrained by the activity in which it is embedded, by author's selection criteria, and by external factors such as linguistic norms and literary canon. Finally, it is suggested that such forces have a decisive influence on certain features of represented interaction, namely the turn-taking system projected into it and the neat arrangement of characters' utterances.

N° de páginas: 144
N° de palavras: 44.215

RESUMO

AN INTERACTIONAL SOCIOLINGUISTIC STUDY OF

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CLAUDIA MESQUITA

UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE SANTA CATARINA
1999

Orientador: Pedro de Moraes Garcez

Contar estórias é uma prática essencial à comunicação humana. Dentre as estratégias empregadas para contar-se uma estória e, assim, promover e garantir o envolvimento da audiência, a animação de vozes dos personagens tem papel de destaque. Tal animação constitui-se em um fenômeno interacional denominado "interação representada". Entende-se por interação representada aquela que inclui todas as ações verbais e não-verbais realizadas pelos personagens ficcionais ("o discurso relatado"), bem como todos os traços da situação social relevantes para a produção e para a compreensão daquelas ações ("o discurso que relata"). A partir do pressuposto de que a interação representada compartilha algumas das estruturas da organização da interação face a face real, a principal questão que se apresentou para este estudo diz respeito a quão "comum" aquela interação se afigura em relação à outra. A fim de responder tal questão, foram inicialmente extraídos de contos e romances segmentos de interação representada que, posteriormente, foram submetidos a exame pautado numa perspectiva sociolingüística interacional, que privilegia os pontos de vista dos próprios participantes (personagens). Conclui-se o estudo observando-se que muitos dos mecanismos empregados pelos interagentes reais na produção e na compreensão de sua interação também podem figurar na representação da interação dos personagens; o que, por sua vez, sugere que os autores de ficção fundamentam-se em sua própria autoridade, e na dos leitores, enquanto membros de uma dada comunidade conversacional como a base para a interação representada. O estudo sugere, outrossim, que a representação da interação se dá conforme: a atividade interacional na qual se insere, os critérios de seletividade do autor, e fatores externos tais como a normatização lingüística e o cânone literário. Por fim, o estudo indica que tais forças exercem influência decisiva sobre certos traços da interação representada, a saber, o sistema de tomada de turnos nela projetado e a forma superorganizada que tomam as falas dos personagens.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The language phenomenon traditionally conceived of and referred to as "reported speech" has been the focus of continuous attention from investigators working in a number of diverse fields such as linguistics, literary criticism, philosophy, pragmatics, discourse analysis, among others.

Sometimes both extreme aspects of the phenomenon, namely direct and indirect reported speech, have been examined. Along this trend, emphasis has been placed in describing either the semantic and syntactic distinctions between one form and the other, or the pragmatic and literary functions of each type of reported discourse.

Such preoccupations have busied researchers for so long due to the fact that recounting or reporting events lies at the very core of human social experience. Human beings can only go through their experiences again and share these experiences with one another by means of reviving them via their linguistic expression. The following excerpt, reproduced from a radio interview with pop singer Amy Grant published in *Speak Up* magazine (April 1998) can illustrate this:

> **Interviewer**: The title of the project 'Behind the Eyes' is actually a phrase from one of the songs on the album and when I asked Amy about that song "Turn This World Around" **she had quite a story to tell** [emphasis added]:
>
> **Amy Grant**: "Well, the music was written by Keith Thomas. And he actually had that line for the chorus—Turn This World Around. And my dear friend Beverly Darnall and I fleshed out the rest of the song. **I had a couple of experiences, one in particular that I'll recount** [emphasis added]. I had a day down in Santa Monica

and I went walking through a park, and while I was sitting on this bench a bagman came up. And **he asked me if I would watch his things while he went to a public restroom** [emphasis added]. And I said: '*All right! I'll be happy to.*' When he got back he said: '*Do you mind if I sit here for a while?*' And I said: '*No, that's fine. Do you mind if I keep doing what I came here to do. I'm just reading a book and listening to some music.*' He said: '*No, go ahead.*' And then... we visited, we talked we wound up telling each other about our lives. We talked for about two and half hours, and we walked down the side walk together, leaving. And I said: '*I'm telling you, I'm a little nervous walking back to my hotel cause I've trusted you. Don't let me down, Johnny!*' And he said: '*I won't let you down, Amy.*' And he never... He saw what hotel I went to, he never came knocking on my door, he never came and looked for me. (...) All of that obviously eventually became a lyric in the song '*Behind the Eyes.*' (p. 19)

Another fact this short piece serves to highlight is how recountings/retellings/reportings of experiences are intimately related to storytelling. Also, it shows how such storytelling activity is closely connected to the direct or indirect incorporation of voices other than the speaker's, or "reported speech." Last, in this brief excerpt, we can also see how the recounter assigns direct reported speech (henceforth DRS) a more significant function in the storytelling than she assigns to indirect reported speech. This might perhaps explain why researchers have frequently paid special attention to the study of DRS, especially in narrative.

While some researchers have investigated DRS in narrative, particularly in written fictional storytelling, from literary or discourse analytical standpoints, this thesis resumes the discussion about DRS in written fictional narratives in the light of interactional sociolinguistics.

The question which motivates the present study concerns the extent to which represented interaction can be regarded as similar to real face-to-face interaction in terms of the mechanisms which are operative in their organization. I believe that interactional sociolinguistic concepts and methodology constitute the appropriate framework to investigate such matters.

My initial assumption is that the structures which organize written storytelling activity happen to be very similar to the ones that organize oral storytelling. Only the former differ from the latter in that those structures have undergone the necessary adjustments to fit the written medium.

One such structure is the resource of assigning voice to characters in stories, or "reported speech." In fact, reported speech plays a prominent role in storytelling in the sense that it is a strategy largely and frequently employed by storytellers as a means to make their narratives more trustworthy as well as more vivid, thus heightening audience's involvement. The degree of audience involvement varies along a continuum which is parallel to the degree of directness employed in reporting. Consequently, the greatest degree of involvement can be achieved with the use of the most direct form of reporting, DRS.

I see DRS as one of the integral elements of the object of my concern in the present study. So I start up by focussing on three works which have dealt with the use of DRS in storytelling both in ordinary conversational storytelling and in written narrative.

In chapter two, I provide a detailed discussion of these studies in order to uncover how the phenomenon has been viewed and, consequently, how it has been analytically treated. The discussion of each of these works offers some useful insights which help me better characterize the object of my concern in this thesis, namely represented conversational exchanges, or, simply, represented interaction. In other words, my own

view of the phenomenon is constructed little by little as I foreground the relevant issues raised by those studies. At the same time, this discussion provides me with the opportunity to introduce and discuss some fundamental interactional sociolinguistic concepts which support the analytical perspective adopted here.

Chapter three is partly dedicated to the second element which integrates represented interaction: context. The crucial role it plays in interaction has been paid little attention to, if any at all, in the works examined. Contrary to these approaches, my claim is that, if one is to account for the whole dynamics and complexity of the phenomenon, context should be assigned the core position it deserves (Goodwin & Duranti, 1992).

Understood in a broad sense, context encompasses a set of phenomena ranging from the more immediate sequential location of the reported utterances (DRS) in relation to one another to the relationship of those utterances with the narrative discourse itself. The nature and scope of this relationship turns out to be a major factor in drawing the very limits of the conversational exchanges (interaction) within the story.

Still in chapter three, once the interactional nature of the phenomenon is established, I proceed by presenting some of the implications of such a view on the present analytical work. I then discuss the limits and difficulties posed by the phenomenon under study both to the selection and preparation of the material and to the process of analysis.

Chapter four is devoted to data analysis. It starts with turn-by-turn analyses of longer extracts and later concentrates on the analysis of specific instances of certain types of activities such as correction, and so on.

Finally, in chapter five, I resume the results of the analysis and conclude by considering the direction these findings point to.

CHAPTER 2

"DIRECT REPORTED SPEECH," "CONSTRUCTED DIALOGUE," AND

"REPRESENTED INTERACTION:"

CONSIDERATIONS ON THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL

FRAMEWORKS

2.1 Different perspectives on direct reported speech (DRS)

In this chapter, I bring into current discussion some works in the fields of

conversation analysis (CA) and discourse analysis (DA) which have dealt with DRS:

Holt (1996), Tannen (1989), and Caldas-Coulthard (1984, 1988, 1992, 1994).

Holt (1996) looks into the matter from a conversation analytical perspective,

which means that, in examining DRS, she uses naturally occurring conversation as data

and bases her assertions on what participants themselves demonstrably show orientation

to. I believe that this is the appropriate starting point to investigate language in use

(Clark, 1996; Duranti, 1998; Levinson, 1983; Pomerantz, 1990; Schenkein, 1978).

As for the two other authors, although they work in the field broadly known as

discourse analysis (DA), their individual views are based on distinct theoretical

perspectives and methodological frameworks. Tannen draws on the seminal works of

interactional sociolinguistics—especially those by Gumperz and Goffman—and on the

works of scholars such as Bakhtin and Voloshinov, for whom communicative action is

regarded as a discursive practice. Caldas-Coulthard draws mostly on the Birmingham

model of DA, which is grounded on a linguistic pragmatic tradition.

This theoretical and methodological difference leads their conclusions to

contrasting results. Tannen, on the one hand, argues in favor of the similarities between

DRS, or rather, "constructed dialogue," in both conversational storytelling and its written literary counterpart. Caldas-Coulthard, on the other hand, makes a distinction between "reported speech" (factual reports) and "represented speech" (fictional exchanges), even though, she claims, they have a common characteristic. In spite of being grounded on "the knowledge of structural properties of real talk" (1988, p. 89), Caldas-Coulthard posits that both reported speech and represented speech are actually "reduced" and "simplified" versions of talk in terms of the "overall organizational features" and "structural properties" (p. 90) they exhibit.

Despite these contrasting viewpoints and findings, these studies still offer some enlightening contribution to my own view of the phenomenon, in particular because they highlight the significant role played by DRS among available storytelling strategies. I shall be discussing Tannen's and Caldas-Coulthard's contribution, as well as that of Holt's, in detail in the next sections.

2.1.1 A conversation analytical view on DRS in conversation

In her article *Reporting on talk: The use of direct reported speech in conversation*, Elizabeth Holt carries out a systematic analysis of the use of DRS in informal telephone conversation in order to characterize the essential design features of DRS and show what interactional jobs DRS commonly performs in conversation.

Although she adopts a conversation analytical methodology, Holt also draws on the works of researchers grounded in linguistic and pragmatic traditions to support her own claims. She draws particularly on those studies which establish the semantic and syntactic distinctions between indirect, quasi-direct, and direct quotation, as well as on those which discuss the functions these devices perform in discourse. [1]

Holt's findings regarding the design features of DRS include three elements which characterize its production. The first element is "retention of 'original's' deixis" (p. 222), that is, personal, spatial and temporal deictics and verb tenses alike. In the following illustration provided by Holt, the short arrows indicate the lines in which these types of deictic elements occur:

[Holt:SO88(II)1:3:15]

	1	Hal:	=An' this <u>A</u>merican came tak' to me geh- ↑<u>e</u>lderly
→	2		man 'ee wa(h)s ⌐'n' 'ee said (0.2) 'ee said yo<u>u</u> know=
	3	Lesley:	└M<u>m</u>: h<u>m</u>?
→	4 →	Hal:	='ee said you've ↓got somethink here. 'Ee said you
→	5 →		c'n ↑F<u>EE</u>L ↓it. .hh H̄e seh <u>I</u>'ve been to England
	6 →		sev'ral times 'n I <u>feel</u> the .hhh yo<u>u</u> know (0.4)
	7		<u>some</u>think s-s:tro↓:n⌐ g.( )=
	8	Lesley:	└ih Y<u>e</u>:s.
	9 →	Hal	=( ). that ⌐<u>you</u>'re goin' t'be here in ↑hh<u>undre</u>ds=
	10	Lesley:	└he- Y<u>e</u>h
→	11	Hal:	= of years'↓time. ⌐ 'ee said.
	12	Lesley:	└e<u>Y</u>e:s that's ri:gh⌐t.
	13	Hal:	└But wh<u>a</u>t
	14		Tickled m<u>e</u> see Lesley <u>a</u>fter ee'd b<u>ee</u>n round the
	15		Cathedral'n the Pal<u>a</u>ce he <u>came</u> back outta the ga:te,
→	16		(0:3) 'n 'ee said <u>goo</u>dbye he s<u>ai</u>d. an' I sh'
	17 →		<u>come</u> back in- (.) in a h<u>undred</u> years 'n see it
	18 →		again, .h an' y<u>ou</u> <u>make</u> sure you're still st(h)ood
	19 →		o(h)on t<u>his</u> ↓ga(h)ate (Holt, 1996, pp. 222-223)

The second design feature of DRS is "retention of the 'original's' prosody" (p. 223), that is, when a current speaker's change in prosody marks a shift from unreported speech to DRS. [2] In the example below, the up and down arrows (*l.* 6, 7, 9, and 10) have been used to indicate such changes in prosody:

[Holt:October 1988:1:8:10]

→ 1   Lesley: An'↑ then she rang me up 'n said that (.) Joyce

2   Suggested that I (⌐   ¬ hel) ↑huh ⌐ hah huuh

3   Joyce: L Ahhh:::: ⌐   L Ohhh:::::::

→ 4   Lesley: hu-uh .hhhhh ↑So I said um .khhh W'I'm sorr ⌐y I'm =

5   Joyce: L(·)

→ 6 → Lesley: =teaching she said .hh ↑↑Oh: (.) ↑oh my dear. well how

7 →   lovely that you're involved in ↑↑tea↓ching. A⌐n' ↓I: =

8   Joyce: L Ohh:.

9   Lesley: =thought. .hhh ↑Well al↑right then p'haps I'd like to

10   Lesley: suggest you ↑↑f'the nex'supply pe(h)ers(h)on (Holt, 1996, p. 223)

The third element which characterizes DRS, or rather reported speech, is the use of "DRS indicators" by current speaker (p. 224). By "DRS indicators," Holt means structures formed with a pronoun followed by a speech verb such as "He said" (the long arrows to the left in the above examples point to the lines where such structures occurred). Holt argues that the use of "DRS indicators" (p. 224)/"prefatory forms" (p. 225) is a feature which falls outside the boundaries of the quotation and which can occur with any form of reported speech. Unlike this feature, both retention of deixis and of prosody establish a clear distinction between DRS and other types of utterances, especially indirectly reported ones (pp. 223-224), precisely because they are, in fact, constitutive elements of quoted discourse, or DRS.

Holt asserts that the fact that current speaker keeps the "deictic center in the previous interaction" (p. 234) allows for her/him to depict the reported context itself, or a whole sequence of events which may include utterances and thoughts as it were. Additionally, "changes in prosody can also be used to mark a shift from unreported speech to DRS" (p. 223), that is, a shift from current speaker's own voice to a voice

other than his. Both features can be used, Holt posits, to dramatize events in a story. Furthermore, it is this very possibility of dramatizing the events which "serves to make the story more effective" (p. 235), in that it allows for greater involvement of the story recipient.

As for the interactional jobs performed by DRS, Holt found that it is generally used as "an effective and economical way of providing evidence" (p. 225). By "effective," Holt means that DRS allows its recipient to have "direct" access to what is being portrayed, which gives "an air of objectivity to the account" (p. 230). Also, DRS is seen as "economical" because "it can be used to convey various types of information at once" (p. 240). The use of DRS can give insight to the reported speaker's, or speakers', stance; it may be used to indicate that current speaker has resorted to a discursive practice that differs from the major conversational activity in which it is embedded; and it can even have "the pragmatic function of making a link between what is being discussed and a new topic" (p. 241).

If Holt's findings may, at first, appear too obvious, in the sense that they seem to provide no novelty to the subject, this is not at all the case. Indeed, her findings raise a number of questions which have a strong bearing on the present study.

First of all, she demonstrates that not only can current speaker report utterances proffered on previous occasions (by himself, or by other speakers as well), but current speaker can also report thoughts and non-linguistic actions as well, thus making it possible for current speaker to portray "a series of actions with their accompanying thoughts or utterances" (p. 234). In Holt's corpus, a current speaker reports a sequence of events and thoughts as a means of describing a step-by-step process of deliberation leading her up to a certain action, namely that of making a telephone call to her recipient:

[NB:II:4:10]

1   Nancy: Ah huh? .t.hhhhhh OH I WZ JIST OU'WOH:SHING windo:ws:

2   ih- a:nd uh my mother ca:lled so I ca:me in ah thought

3 →   w'l wahl I'm in here'n I looked the clo:ck' uz 'leven

4 →   thirty in I thaw wul: (.) ther .hhh.hh ↓ther uhm (.)

5 →   surely th*er Up yih kn*ow I knew it⌐ wz kahn ⌐'v

6   Emma: ⌊ Y e s . ⌋

7   Nancy: a: ⌐ s l e e ⌐ p in d*a::y but I did'st g*et home

8   Emma: ⌊A wee-⌋

9   Nancy: til (.) .hhhh two las'night I met a very:,h

10   very n:ice ↓g*u:y. (Holt, 1996, p. 234)

By resorting to DRS (*l*. 3-5), therefore, current speaker can portray her deliberations and reactions in the form and order in which she claims they occurred in the original context. This, according to Holt, enables current speaker to "dramatize the events and the utterances that accompanied them" (pp. 235-236), thus allowing current recipient the opportunity to perceive how considerate the caller (current speaker) was in not calling the recipient until she was likely to be up.

In short, Holt's finding serves to highlight the fact that what we ordinarily refer to as DRS may sometimes include much more than just words uttered on a previous occasion. It may also include the telling of other aspects/elements of the situation which form with the utterances spoken, then, an integral whole on its own—from current speaker's point of view, of course. This is not trivial at all, for it suggests that current speaker's point of view or stance can also be subtly embedded in DRS. If this is so, current speaker could actually be providing the recipients with the touchstone against which what they hear should be judged. To put it in another way, current speaker can implicitly be signaling to the recipients that he believes in the state of affairs being

invoked by DRS and is leaving it up to the recipients to decide whether or not to agree with this point of view.

A second matter that deserves further commentary concerns the significance of prosodic features in the production of DRS. As Holt pointed out, current speaker can choose to try to imitate how the reported speaker produced the utterance in its original context by means of changes in prosody from preceding talk such as "shifts in intonation during the reported speech and reported thought" (p. 223). In so doing, Holt argues, current speaker avoids the use of speech/glossing verbs to account for pitch, loudness, and volume as well as for emotive aspects of voice. Most importantly to the present discussion, however, Holt suggests that this strategy is not available in written discourse:

> Reported speech is generally preceded by a pronoun, such as *I/he/she/they*, plus a speech verb which is usually "said" but can be "says," "goes," "thought," etc. "Said" is by far the most common, and one reason for this is that prosody then can be used to indicate the way in which the utterance was spoken, **thus making unnecessary the kind of introductions that are common in novels, such as "he whispered" or "she moaned"** [emphasis added]. (p. 224)

It follows then that, in written discourse, retention of the reported speaker's prosody is not quite possible, so, in animating the words of the portrayed characters, writers have but few alternatives left. They can either resort to glossing any prosodic feature of the quotation which they perceive as relevant or try and represent some features graphically.

My own data show instances where prosody is represented by means of speech verbs other than "say" such as "exclaimed" (conversational exchange 2, *l.* 23, p. 140), "exploded" (conversational exchange 6, *l.* 13, p. 142), "yelled" (conversational exchange 6, *l.* 33, p. 143), and "stammered" (conversational exchange 7, *l.* 21, p. 144). Also, in my data there are instances of "say" or other speech verb accompanied by certain descriptive adverbials such as "said vaguely" (conversational exchange 4, *l.* 10,

p. 141), "said bitterly" (conversational exchange 4, *l.* 20, p. 141), "said evenly" (conversational exchange 6, *l.* 9, p. 142), "asked rather timidly" (conversational exchange 4, *l.* 8, p. 141), "cried impatiently" (conversational exchange 5, *l.* 7-8, p. 142), "asked me, his voice rising" (conversational exchange 6, *l.* 27, p. 143). In addition, prosody also appears graphically represented in my data as in conversational exchange 4, lines 4, 12, 14 (p. 141) and 25 (p. 142), and in conversational exchange 5, line 9 (p. 142), where italics was employed.

In any case, in being a design feature of DRS, prosody (and situational aspects such as deixis as well) cannot be eliminated, for DRS is employed to allow the reader "a kind of access" (Holt, 1996, p. 230) to the scene depicted. In other words, what I am claiming is that, if the scene/character portrayed in written storytelling is to retain any ordinariness, one should actually expect prosody to be represented either in the narrative discourse or within the quotation, or even in both, since prosody is ultimately a major signaling mechanism for producing "contextualization cues" (Gumperz, 1982) to guide the reader in the interpretation of what s/he reads (I discuss this in detail in chapter 3).

Finally, if the use of DRS in conversation allows for the recipient to take up a more active participation stance, since he is being offered an opportunity to judge things for himself, the same happens in written narratives. That is to say that writers resort to DRS to involve the reader in the scene being depicted. The reader, then, can make his own inferences about what is going on, instead of having to be told in so many words. Thus, Holt's claim that DRS is usually employed in conversation to provide evidence turns out to be of utmost importance for my own view of the phenomenon. Neither DRS, nor any other form of quoted speech, as it were, constitutes an instance of an autonomous type of discourse: it always occurs within some major interactional activity.

Therefore, the interpersonal component implicit in this discursive practice should be attended to by analysts.

Nevertheless, it is not infrequent for analysts to overlook, or even completely neglect this (see sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3). It seems to me that, in her analysis, Holt herself has been caught in the pitfall, namely that of paying too much attention to the textual component of DRS (discourse itself) to the detriment of the interpersonal aspect embedded in this strategy.

Before she proceeds with the analysis of her own data, Holt brings in the findings of researchers who approached reported speech (in all of its forms: direct, indirect and quasi-direct) from either a linguistic or a pragmatic perspective. In the quotes of those who subscribe to these traditions, DRS is said to provide evidence because, in giving access to the event from the reported speaker's point of view, it is "more authentic" in that it "implies greater fidelity to the source" (Li, 1986, p. 41, cited in Holt, 1996, p. 226), or because DRS is a kind of "demonstration" in the sense that it "depicts its referents" (Clark & Gerrig, 1990, p. 764, cited in Holt, 1996, p. 226).

Similarly, Holt reports that the work of Philips (1986, cited in Holt, 1996, p. 226), who dealt with reported speech in a courtroom trial, points to the fact that lawyers assume DRS to be "more accurate," and thus, "more reliable" (Holt, 1996, p. 226). Furthermore, her own finding in relation to the function performed by DRS is that it is used "to provide evidence of a previous comment or interaction" (p. 226) "by depicting the reported utterance" (p. 226).

These results seem to foreground researchers' concern with asserting the strict relationship between providing evidence and being "accurate"/"faithful"/"objective," traditional labels often attached to DRS and used to explicate the distinction between this and other forms of quoted speech. Holt acknowledges the fact that this has been a

frequent preoccupation, but she does not explicitly take any definitive position in relation to it; she only goes as far as to suggest the existence of a paradox regarding DRS:

> There is something of a paradox here, because, although DRS is structured as though it were the repetition of an utterance or utterances made on a previous occasion, analysis shows that this is unlikely to be the case. Clark and Gerrig (1990) argued convincingly against the assumption that DRS embodies the accurate quotation of former locutions. (p. 226)

Holt adds that Mayes (1990, cited in Holt, 1996, p. 226) has also challenged the assumption that DRS is "accurate/"faithful"/"objective" by showing that, in her own data, authenticity is doubtful in 50% of the cases. Moreover, Holt asserts, psychologists have demonstrated that "verbatim recall is not often possible" (p. 226).

It seems to me that Holt herself may be influenced by the received linguistic view whose main concern is the textual component of DRS. In discussing the design features which characterize it, Holt asserts that features such as retention of deixis and prosody serve to distinguish DRS from, for instance, indirect reported speech. Yet, Holt does not provide one single counterexample to illustrate what characterizes indirect reported speech, or any problematic case, as it were. Indeed, she uses Coulmas's words (Coulmas, 1986, cited in Holt, 1996) to introduce the section in which she discusses the design features of DRS:

> As Coulmas (1986) pointed out, what distinguishes DRS from indirect speech and from other kinds of utterances is that "it evokes the original speech situation and conveys, or claims to convey, the exact words of the original speaker in direct discourse" (p. 2). Thus, among the distinguishing features of DRS, pronouns, spatial and temporal references, and verb tenses are all appropriate to the reported speaker/context rather than the current one. (p. 222)

Starting from this assumption then, Holt goes on to analyze her own data in order to argue her case, a recurrent strategy in the whole article. Therefore, I sense that, despite her alleged CA stance, she misses an interactional fact that I perceive as crucial, the sort

of interpersonal relationship DRS can establish between speaker/writer and his recipient.

It strikes me that neither Holt nor any of her sources could work out a solution for the paradox she has referred to, namely that DRS can be effectively employed to provide evidence even though it is acknowledged that its alleged "accuracy"/ "fidelity"/"objectivity" is, at least, doubtful, if at all possible. I believe this remains unsolved because, as I have suggested before, the interpersonal (interactional) component has been overlooked while too much emphasis has been put on the linguistic expression. Therefore, I propose to shift the focus of the issue by asking **what is the interactional reason/explanation for the fact that the recipient can perceive the use of DRS as conveying an "accurate"/"faithful"/"objective" state of affairs?** For, as the preceding discussion suggests, there is evidence that this happens to be the effect the use of DRS has on the recipient (see also Tannen's, 1989, discussion on reported criticism).

In order to answer the above question, the notions "accurate," "faithful," and "objective," deserve some consideration. Such notions seem to characterize a cognitive or philosophical concern rather than a strictly communicative one. The way I see it, if any message is structured in such a way so as to be demonstrably accepted by its recipient as plausible/believable, then that is all there is to it. It is not up for the analyst to question the "accuracy"/"fidelity"/"objectivity" of the message (regardless of its having the form of DRS or not) since it is clear that, in the situation in which it has been produced, its recipient showed no such concern. The following is a very practical illustration of what I mean, and one in which DRS has been employed.

I have been recurrently quoting what other researchers said before. If I have been convincing enough, you may well believe my (and their) words. From an interactional

sociolinguistic standpoint, there is not much more to it: I wanted you to believe me, and you did; so the matter is settled. But if, on the other hand, you call what others and I have said into question, you may then be making an issue of the "accuracy"/"fidelity"/"objectivity" of my present claims. As a result, that would turn into a legitimate interactional sociolinguistic concern: for us to deal with and solve, and for any outside analyst to examine as well.

Whether you believe me (or my sources) or not, two interactional facts still hold. First of all, that I am claiming there is evidence for why I believe things are as I say, and want you to believe, they are (Holt, 1996; Pomerantz, 1984b). Secondly, that I am doing so by directly quoting the words of those who I see as reliable authoritative sources (Pomerantz, 1984b). In this case, I am actually trying to mitigate my "accountability by presenting sources or bases for believing particular states of affairs, without accountably asserting" them (Pomerantz, 1984b, p. 609). That is to say that it is my communicative intent that you should accept what I am saying as plausible without you holding me accountable for proffering the accounting assertion(s).

This is so because people are ordinarily and constantly concerned with being accountable for their actions, regardless the specific activity they may be engaged in at any given moment. So, it applies to the sort of communicative activity we are currently engaged in, namely that of writing/reading a thesis. It also applies to storytelling, when the teller might be concerned with the plausibility of his story. Similarly, it is the story recipient's business to attend to the story being told as believable, in the sense that it conforms to the expectations triggered off by the teller's claim. The following considerations can help to clarify this point.

Sacks (1972, 1992) distinguishes between what he calls a "potentially correct description" from an "actually correct description" (1992, p. 254). The former means

any description which does not violate/subvert a social norm of proper behavior, whereas the latter has the additional component of being a description used "on some occasion where it's talking about something it characterizes" (p. 255). In other words, what marks the boundary between one description and the other is the claim its speaker/producer is making on the specific occasion when the description is employed:

> The power of good lies is that they could be good descriptions, and what would differentiate the phenomenon 'lies' from 'a story' would be that one who tells a story makes no claim at all that he's talking about some actual occurrence. A liar is presumably engaged in passing off his potentially correct description as actually correct. (Sacks, 1992, p. 255)

This serves to foreground the importance of the sort of claim being made by the producer of the discourse, and which its recipient is expected to be able to grasp. The question it raises then is how does the producer manage to communicate this claim to the recipient without having to overtly express it—as it appears to be the case when the speaker/writer employs DRS?

In order to answer this question, it is necessary to bring into the current discussion the notions of "footing" (Goffman, 1981) and "frame" (Bateson, 1972), which are complementary concepts accounting for phenomena operative in interaction. These concepts work together in determining what Goffman refers to as the "production format" (p. 145) and the "participation framework" of talk-in-interaction (p.137). In other words, footing and frame are organizational features of interaction which serve the production and the processing of all communicative events.

For Goffman (1981), footing is the alignment participants take up to themselves and to others in any given situation. Footing is, then, "expressed in the way [participants] manage the production or reception of an utterance" (p. 128). Moreover, changes in footing may occur at each and every moment of an on-going conversation. Due to this, participants are constantly monitoring each other's moves in search of any

signal that can indicate that even the slightest change in footing is likely so that they can be prepared to adjust to an eventual new footing. To put it differently, one participant usually signals, by means of altering the production format of his actions, that he is about to change his alignment and that the other party is being invited to change his own. Upon taking a new alignment himself, the other party may then be recognizing and ratifying the establishment of a new participation framework.

As for "frame," Bateson (1972) defines it as, primarily, a psychological concept and, secondly, as an interactional phenomenon which establishes a metacommunicative message that interactants attend to during the course of the on-going interaction in order to make sense of it. Frame is, then, a set of elements (linguistic or not) which explicitly or implicitly delimit a class of meaningful actions/messages, thus, signaling how these actions/messages should be interpreted.

Footings and frames are interrelated in that changes in footing can be used as indicative that a new frame is about to be introduced in the on-going interaction. The change in footing thus functions as a preparatory move to the intended change in frame. It follows, therefore, that when current speaker uses what Holt (1996) has called "prefatory forms" (p. 225), he is actually signaling that he is changing his present alignment and that, from this point on (and during a period of time), he will be incorporating the utterances/actions of other(s) into his own discourse. Consequently, this is how the recipient should take what will be said and align accordingly. Furthermore, whether the process of incorporation will be a direct or indirect one is immaterial, at this specific interactional locus.

Nevertheless, in choosing to report what was said directly or indirectly, current speaker is establishing a new frame. One that adds a new dimension to the interaction by setting a metacommunicative message which indicates current speaker's attitude

toward and degree of detachment/affiliation to what will be reported and invites the recipient to actively evaluate it.

Thus, in shaping DRS so as to retain both original deixis and prosody, current speaker is simultaneously constructing an implicit metacommunicative message by which he claims that all information offered inside the limits of that frame should be regarded by the recipient as trustworthy, or, in Sacks' (1992) terms, a "potentially correct description." In other words, the features which Holt (1996) asserts are used in the construction of DRS also concur to the building of a frame to provide the recipient with a metamessage on how to interpret what is being reported. Although Holt does not put it this way, she was able to perceive that DRS may actually have multiple functions: "Indeed it seems that DRS can be a highly economical device in that the entire quotation may have multiple functions" (p. 240). She identifies one of these functions as a means that current speaker has to signal to the recipient that what he is presently hearing should be taken as the reported speaker's words rather than the current speaker's (p. 238).

What I am arguing for is that this interpretive instruction is always implicit in DRS. Or, rather, this metacommunicative message is, in fact, a constitutive element of DRS. Additionally, the frame which is linguistically signaled by DRS has the power of activating a "knowledge schema" (Tannen, 1993) which sets up participants' expectations in relation to people, objects, events, and scenes. In the specific case of the use of DRS in conversation, and as I believe, in written narratives, this schema informs current recipient that the messages now being conveyed should be regarded as plausible/believable. Furthermore, the way I see it, that is the very reason why DRS can demonstrably be employed to provide evidence, even of things and events that were not really expressed in utterances (e.g., thought), or did not actually take place, or even did

not actually take place as current speaker says they did, but which **could have been said or could have happened** as current speaker claims they did.

2.1.2 A discourse analytical view on DRS in conversational narrative

In *Talking voices: Repetition, dialogue and imagery in conversational discourse*, Deborah Tannen (1989) deals with the analysis of the "animation of speech framed as voice other than the speaker's" (p. 1), especially in oral narratives. Her main objective is to substantiate two assertions. The first is that, in incorporating another's voice into his own speech, current speaker "bears full responsibility and credit" (p. 4) for the "creation" of a speech which Tannen designates "constructed dialogue"—thus rejecting the traditional term "reported speech" (p. 4), for, she argues, it may never have been actually produced by any speaker previously. Secondly, Tannen claims that "speakers use constructed dialogue to create scenes peopled by characters in relation to each other, scenes which hearers and readers recreate upon hearing/reading, resulting in both understanding and involvement" (p. 4). Moreover, it is Tannen's underlying assumption that "conversational discourse provides the source for [understanding and involvement] strategies which are taken up by other, including literary, genres, both spoken and written" (p. 2). Consequently, an "understanding of the language of everyday conversation is needed as a basis" for language and literary scholarship (p. 1).

I align with much of what Tannen argues for, but I do not fully agree with some of the arguments she presents, nor do I believe the terminology she uses is the most appropriate. I provide the following discussion of her claims and some terminological items in order to emphasize the interactional aspect of the phenomenon in question.

The very first paragraph in the introduction of Tannen's book corroborates two of my initial assumptions, namely that written narratives have a lot in common with their

oral/conversational counterparts, and that DRS, or "constructed dialogue," is employed

by storytellers as a means of promoting and sustaining audience involvement:

> The central idea of this book is that ordinary conversation is made up of linguistic strategies that have been thought quintessentially literary. These strategies, which are shaped and elaborated in literary discourse, are pervasive, spontaneous, and functional in ordinary conversation. I call them "involvement strategies" because, I argue, they reflect and simultaneously create interpersonal involvement. (p. 1)

In fact, the whole book is devoted to re-stating the assertion made elsewhere

(Tannen, 1982, 1986, cited in Tannen, 1989) that the strategies which occur in literary

discourse are similar to those normally used in ordinary conversation (see section 2.1.1).

Tannen reinforces this claim by means of the detailed discussion of three "involvement

strategies," among which "constructed dialogue" figures prominently.

To understand both Tannen's point of view as well as my own, it is necessary to

comprehend how each of us regard those similarities. It is also important to understand

the sense in which the phrases "involvement strategies" and "constructed dialogue" are

being used by Tannen. In addition, I propose to expand Tannen's "involvement

strategy" by incorporating two crucial interactional notions, namely "ordinariness" and

"frames."

Saying that "ordinary conversation is made up of linguistic strategies that have

been thought quintessentially literary" serves well to illustrate the amazing paradox

associated to language and its use. Western history, society, and especially literary

scholarship, have contributed to assigning written language a misleading higher

hierarchical status over that of spoken language. Yet, not only does spoken language

precede any written code but it is the very source of the latter. That is to say, written

code has been created so as to "mirror" the oral use of language—at least initially. It

follows that, a number of structural patterns, mechanisms and strategies used in

composing a written text might have been first "borrowed" from oral practice and, later, adapted to suit the requirements of the written medium.

Written discourse, on its turn, has been regulated by social agents such as prescriptive grammar, stylistics, rhetoric, and ultimately canon. All of which exert a powerful normative control over written discourse. However, none of them exert as great a power as to override the organizational similarity between written and oral discourse, or rather between written and oral interaction (Clark, 1996). Moreover, this is so because oral use of language is an orderly phenomenon, one which is regulated by an even more powerful—however unrecorded or unnoticed—force, "the technology of conversation" (see discussion below). All this is applicable to language use in general as well as to particular instances of language use such as storytelling.

Tannen reports on a previous study (Tannen,1986, cited in Tannen, 1989) in which she compared spoken and written narrative and concluded that "ordinary conversation and literary discourse have more in common than has been commonly thought" (p. 15), especially in regard to the strategies employed.

In fact, storytelling is "at the heart of everyday life" (Rosen, nd, cited in Tannen, 1989, p. 103). This is exactly what Sacks (1984) claims to be the essence of the job of "doing 'being ordinary':"

> The cast of mind of doing "being ordinary" is essentially that your business in life is only to see and report the usual aspects of any possible usual scene. That is to say, what you *look* for is to see how any scene you are in can be made an ordinary scene. (p. 416)

What Sacks is arguing for, in other words, is that whatever people experience in the conduct of their mundane daily lives necessarily entails the possibility that they tell about these experiences on a later occasion. Or, as he puts it, "people monitor the scenes they are in for their storyable characteristics" (Sacks, 1984, p. 417).

Sacks goes on to assert that there is "some immensely powerful kind of mechanism operating in handling your perceptions and thoughts" (p. 418). Such sophisticated mechanism regulates both the living through those experiences and the telling about them. Sacks (1984) calls this mechanism "the technology of conversation" (p. 413), which he defines as the "techniques"/"procedures"/"methods" that "generate the orderly features" (p. 413) to be found in conversation.

The point Sacks is making here is that being an ordinary person in the world implies using language. Moreover, in so doing, the person is not merely uttering words but, most significantly, the person is performing actions; actions which both construct the social world and are, simultaneously, regulated by this very same socially constructed reality. Storytelling plays a significant role in making sense of this reality, or, in Tannen's (1989) words, "storytelling is a means by which humans organize the world and feel connected to each other" (p. 103).

What allows for this feeling of connectedness is precisely what Sacks (1984) refers to as "an attitude of working at being usual" (p. 429). An attitude that is eventually determined and recognized as such by the culture of the specific group to which the individuals belong.

As a result, storytelling can only be regarded as "spontaneous" (Tannen, 1989, p. 1) in that it lies at the very core of human experience. Yet, in being finely attuned to whatever makes up for "ordinariness"/"usualness," storytelling is handled by that "powerful mechanism" which operates in any conversational activity. Furthermore, since it is a particular sort of conversational activity, there are some specific mechanisms which are operative in storytelling. [3]

From what I have been arguing so far, I hope to have made it clear that the use of DRS/"constructed dialogue" is a mechanism available to the teller as a means of

organizing and presenting the narrative. One mechanism which does allow for the recipient to take a more active role in the storytelling activity. Thus, a mechanism which can be viewed as an "involvement strategy."

Tannen explains that the sense in which she is employing "involvement" encompasses both Chafe's (1985, cited in Tannen, 1989, p. 11), which emphasizes the psychological component of the concept, and Gumperz's (1982), which highlights the essentially interactional aspect of it. Her own sense of the term can be summed up as "an internal, even emotional connection individuals feel which binds them to other people as well as to places, things, activities, ideas, memories, and words" (p. 12). Additionally, this psychological link, she adds, does not pre-exist the individual's living through experiences, but is achieved through interaction, or, as Tannen puts it, it is "an achievement in conversational interaction" (p. 12).

It follows that, in order to achieve involvement, participants necessarily have to share enough "linguistic and socio-cultural knowledge" (Gumperz, 1982, p. 3) to be able to make inferences which allow them "to derive **frames** [emphasis added] in terms of which they can interpret what is going on" (p. 2). In other words, it is the very possibility of grasping the metamessages implied by those frames that allows parties to be able to act appropriately during the interaction and, thus, to experience the feeling of "connectedness (to other participants, to the language, to the world)" (Tannen, 1989, p. 13).

Tannen—following Becker (1982, cited in Tannen, 1989, p. 13)—claims that understanding and connectedness are a matter of "an aesthetic response" (p. 13), which she equates to the "ability to perceive coherence [in discourse]" (p. 13). Such a claim should be viewed with caution, for the notion of "an aesthetic response" may appear to foreground undesired connotations such as "ecstasy," or "envelopment," long associated

to one's experiencing "Beauty." Therefore, the connection with one's perception of coherence in discourse may seem fuzzy. Indeed, perceiving coherence is not merely a matter of a purely emotional experience, it also involves cognitive processes. As a matter of fact, what is at stake here is not just parties' ability "to perceive" coherence, but their ability to jointly construct it (Clark, 1996; Jacoby & Ochs, 1995). In addition, it should be noted that what participants co-construct is coherence in interaction, not in discourse alone.

Thus, I believe that, although entailing a certain degree of emotional response, understanding and connectedness are primarily a matter of one being able to recognize and produce interactional frames, as well as the metamessages they communicate. Bateson (1972) argues that abnormalities in the individual's handling of frames are typical of certain forms of psychopathology such as schizophrenia: "The absence of metacommunicative framing (...) is characteristic of the waking communications of the schizophrenic" (p. 190).[4] Frames, then, in being related to cognitive processes, can activate background, familiar schemas which account for success in communication (Tannen & Wallat, [1987] 1993). However, it is hard to demonstrate participants' sense of satisfaction when they manage to produce coherence during an on-going interaction.

Differently from smooth interaction, when problems of communication arise, that is, when participants sense that their own schemas/frames do not match (or only partially match) those of the other party, failure can be easily demonstrated. Frustration, or at least uneasiness, can result from this perception, as well as from the knowledge that repairing problems is interactionally costly. So, when trouble occurs, it can either require that participants do extra work or it can lead parties to inferring about the other's unwillingness to cooperate, in which case, involvement is compromised. As a consequence, miscommunication, or even communication failure, is likely to occur.[5]

To put it differently, if participants to talk-in-interaction are actively and successfully sustaining interactional involvement, then everything runs smoothly. Otherwise, parties will signal non-involvement, even if temporary, by means of demonstrably orienting to the problem(s) perceived.

To sum up, the foregoing discussion provides the necessary link between the interactional and the psychological components which Tannen rightly suggests to interplay in establishing and sustaining audience involvement in storytelling activity. Thus, participants' feeling of understanding and connectedness—or simply involvement—presupposes their ability to recognize and handle interactional frames appropriately. This, in turn, depends on participants being able to co-construct ordinariness.

Now, as for the second element of the phrase "involvement strategy," Tannen reasons that, although the term "strategy" is usually associated to her unintended meaning of "conscious planning" or even "plotting" (p. 15), she decided to adopt it because this term has been largely employed in linguistic research. In this tradition, "strategy" is generally used to convey the idea of a "systematic way of using language" (p. 15). I have also been, and will continue, using the term in this latter sense.

I shall now turn to the discussion of the phrase "constructed dialogue." Tannen (1989) proposes "constructed dialogue" as a more appropriate term than the traditional and "misleading" phrase "reported speech." However, I believe that, the phrase "constructed dialogue" may be just as misleading as the traditional one. Most significantly, the way Tannen uses it seems to be fraught with a certain degree of inconsistency.

Tannen argues, first of all, that "reported speech" encompasses both what is "commonly understood to apply when another's utterance is framed as **dialogue**

[emphasis added] in other's voice"—"direct quotation"—and what is "commonly understood to apply when another's speech is paraphrased in the current speaker's voice"—"indirect quotation"—(p. 98). She adds that this distinction is valid only in the abstract, for when it comes to "actual discourse, many equivocal cases arise" (p. 98). Therefore, Tannen's "constructed dialogue" is intended to refer to any form of "reported speech."

This idea is reinforced by the notion that any utterance is ultimately the "absorption and transformation of another" (Kristeva, 1986, cited in Tannen, 1989, p. 99), a notion originally conceived by Voloshinov ([1929]1986, cited in Tannen, 1989, p. 99)/Bakhtin ([1952]1986, cited in Tannen, 1989, p. 99) and which Tannen fully incorporates into her own sense of "dialogue:"

> For Voloshinov/Bakhtin, dialogue is crucial: not dialogue *per se*, that is the exchange of turns that is of central concern to conversation analysts, but the polyphonic nature of all utterance, of every word. (p. 99)

Additionally, Tannen draws attention to the fact that "the reported speech" (p. 101) is dynamically interrelated to both the reported context—in which it was originally produced—and the reporting context—in which it is presently being reproduced. Due to this change in context, Tannen argues, "the reported speech" is "inevitably" (p. 101) transformed: "I am claiming that the term 'reported speech' is grossly misleading in suggesting that one can speak another's words and have them remain primarily the other's words" (p. 101). For her, then, current speaker appropriates the words by another when he repeats them; consequently, those words cease "to be those of the speaker to whom they are attributed" (p. 101). Due to this, she posits, those words should rather be regarded as current speaker's creation.

Finally, Tannen claims that "much of what appears in discourse as **dialogue** [emphasis added], or 'reported speech', was never uttered by anyone else in any form"

(p. 101). For this reason, she claims, "uttering **dialogue** [emphasis added] in conversation is much a creative act as is the creation of **dialogue** [emphasis added] in fiction and drama" (p. 101). In order to illustrate this, she provides a number of instances in which "a speaker represents an utterance as the words of another, [and] what results is by no means describable as 'reported speech.' Rather it is constructed dialogue" (p. 109).

The examples provided by Tannen include:

1) "**dialogue**" [emphasis added] representing what was not said, that is, what one felt like saying but which was withheld instead. In the following example, the speaker is telling about how she felt embarrassed when her father berated her in front of others for not having done what he had told her to:

(1)   You can't say, "Well Daddy I didn't HEAR you." (p. 111),[6]

2) "**dialogue**" [emphasis added] as instantiation, or dialogue constructed so as to illustrate an utterance type which is recurrent—similar, for instance, to an adage or saying. In this example, the man is telling about how his mother set his father up as one to be feared:

(3)   whenever something happened,

→   then "Oh wait until your father comes." (p. 112);

3) summarizing "**dialogue**" [emphasis added], in which the gist rather than the actual words of what was said is represented. Now, current speaker is talking about one occasion when she was at a Philippine restaurant with some other people and one of them criticized their being there:

(5)   and this man is essentially saying

→   "We shouldn't be here

→   because Imelda Marcos owns this restaurant." (p. 113);

4) choral **"dialogue"** [emphasis added], when one single utterance is attributed to more than one speaker. Here, some Americans have been waiting in line at the Athens airport for some hours when a Greek woman tried to break into the line. The Americans started to object, but in learning that she had small children with her:

(6)   And then all Americans said

→   "Oh in that case, go ahead." (p. 113);

5) **"dialogue"** [emphasis added] as inner speech, that is, current speaker's thought. The speaker was riding in a car of the New York subway, and a strange man entered the car:

(8)   started mumbling about . . . perverts,

→   . . . and I thought "Oh God,

→   if I am going to get

→   someone's slightly psychotic attitude on perverts

→   I really don't feel like riding this train." (p. 114)

6) **"dialogue"** [emphasis added] as someone else's inner speech. Here, a woman tells about a girl who was riding a bicycle with a basketball stuffed under her skirt, giving her the appearance of being pregnant. The girl fell off the bicycle and was almost hit by a bus:

(11)   And the bus driver was like "Oh my Go::d!" (p. 115)

There are many other examples, which include recipient's own contribution to the storytelling, indirect discourse fading into direct discourse, an utterance attributed to a nonhuman speaker, and an utterance in which the speaker uses vague deixis. The examples I quoted above, though, suffice as a starting point for my own discussion of the terms "dialogue" and "constructed."

First of all, and most noticeably, although "dialogue" is initially intended to refer to any form of reported speech (see p. 26), all the preceding examples are actually instances of "direct quoting." In fact, there is not a single example of indirect quoting among the twenty-one examples Tannen provides; and there are only two instances in which direct quoting and indirect quoting are mixed up. Therefore, "dialogue" seems to be standing rather for "direct quote" than for "reported speech."

Secondly, in spite of being intended to emphasize the polyphonic nature of discourse (see p. 27), "dialogue" is used, by and large, in the sense of turns at talk (see, for instance, the highlighted occurrences of "dialogue," pages 26 through 29); or, rather, **a turn** at talk, as in the preceding examples. In only two occasions out of the twenty-one examples were utterances paired up in dialogue-like form.

In short, it seems that Tannen's focus of attention is, in fact, on instances in which single utterances appear in direct discourse. This does not account for the distinction between direct and indirect reported speech, which Holt suggests rightly to be operative in conversation (see discussion on section 2.1.1). Nor does it take into account the potential of dialogue—turns at talk—as an interactional achievement, which I perceive as crucial to storytelling.

As for Tannen's argument that direct reported speech cannot be viewed as the objective rendering of one's actual words due to the polyphonic nature of discourse and to the fact that it may often be the representation of inner speech or of what was not said, this is subject to questioning.

One possible objection to it was raised by Holt (1996), who demonstrated that DRS/"dialogue" can be used to report thoughts as well as other non-linguistic actions (see section 2.1.1). Additionally, the utterances supposedly being reported could well be used as situational equivalents of one's gestures or actions, as in example 6 on page 29:

dialogue as inner speech. According to Goffman ([1964] 1972), utterances produced in the course of a social encounter do "a further job" (p. 65) than that of being mere linguistic expression, and it is this job that matters most. As a result: "Many of the properties of talk will have to be seen as alternatives to, or functional equivalents of, extra-linguistic acts" (p. 65).

A second objection derives from Holt's discussion about the alleged "accuracy"/ "fidelity"/"objectivity" of DRS. She cited sources who claimed that DRS may, in fact, sometimes be accurate and at some other times not. Now, even if we only consider Tannen's argument that reporting another's words is not possible due to the polyphonic nature of all utterances, this objection still holds. Therefore, I would not go as far as to assert that every "dialogue" that appears in current speaker's speech ought to be regarded as the product of his creative mind. Such a position completely eliminates the possibility of verbatim recalls.[7] In addition, such a position seems as extreme as that expressed by the traditional linguistic view, according to which DRS is repetition of one's actual words. I believe there is a compromise solution, grounded in strictly interactional reasons; which leads me to the third possible objection to Tannen's argument.

As I have argued in section 2.1.1, from a communicative perspective, what really matters is current speaker's claim regarding what he is quoting, as well as the recipient's reaction to it—whether it is accepted as a "potentially correct description" or not (see pp. 16-17). Thus, in the examples Tannen supplied, current speaker's "reporting," not one's actual words, but his own interpretation of the (linguistic and non-linguistic) actions performed in the situation being depicted, should not be viewed as interactionally deviant or exceptional. Rather, it should be viewed as the rule.[8] First of all, because participants are demonstrably orienting their actions to the construction

of such a "joint pretense" (Clark, 1996, p. 360), that is, a joint activity in which parties coordinate their actions to produce and ratify a projected, make-believe reality (Clark, 1996, chapter 3). Secondly, because what allows for the possibility of such a joint pretense is the laminative nature of the phenomenon itself (see further discussion at the end of this section and in the next).

Furthermore, *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* provides five definitions for the entry "to construct." Two of which seem to fit Tannen's idea of "creation" of dialogue. The first one is: "to form, make, or create by combining parts or elements" as in "*constructing a new freeway/a dormitory*;" the second reads: "to fabricate out of heterogeneous or discordant elements" as in "*constructed international language*" (p. 489). "Out of heterogeneous elements" is precisely the underlying semantic feature in the word "constructed" which renders it inadequate to describe the phenomenon in question.

Consider, for example, the construction of a building. One takes a number of diverse materials such as bricks, cement, iron, wood, glass, and so on, and puts them all together in such a way that what results—the building—by no means resembles, or could be described in terms of, its original components. Similarly, if we think of "dialogue" as being the result of a construction, what we may be implicitly admitting is that it does not resemble whatever components it is made of.

My claim, then, goes in another direction. If a speaker is now producing "dialogue," he does not start from any other possible thing but "dialogue:" as a competent member of a particular group, current speaker draws on his own knowledge of what "dialogue" is and ends up with nothing else but "dialogue." In other words, the speaker "looks for" what is **ordinarily** perceived as "dialogue" and does his best to produce something that can **ordinarily** be accepted as "dialogue." This is clearly an

illustration of what Sacks (1984) refers to as taking "an attitude of working at being usual" (p. 429) (see the discussion about "doing 'being ordinary' " on pp. 22-23; see also the discussion on "potentially correct description" on pp. 16-17).

Having this in mind, I believe that what current speaker is actually doing when he animates another's voice is to "re-present" dialogue: present dialogue again. In this sense—and especially in this sense—, dialogue in conversational narrative and dialogue in written narrative can, and should, be equated. I am suggesting that "represented dialogue" seems, at least provisionally, a more appropriate term for the phenomenon in question than does "constructed dialogue" (this issue is advanced in chapter 3).

Nevertheless, Tannen's argument that dialogue in conversation ought to be viewed as a construction/creation results from her intention "to question the conventional American literal conception of 'reported speech'" (p. 101), according to which "the literal truth of the report is not questioned" (p. 105).

As I have discussed earlier, Holt (1996) demonstrates that DRS, or rather "represented dialogue," is actually used by conversationalists to provide evidence. It so happens, I have argued, because the introduction of represented dialogue both signals a change in footing and concurs to establishing a frame which instructs recipients on how to interpret what is going on within it. Tannen's "constructed dialogue" does not fully consider the significance of both "footing" and "frame." Nor does it take into account the fact that communication operates simultaneously at several "levels of abstraction" (Bateson, 1972, p. 177-178), of which the primary level is the literal one. The level in which what matters is that which is "materialized" in linguistic form. Yet the level from which all other possible levels derive.

In discussing the notion of footing, Goffman (1981) argues that most utterances are structured in such a way so as to allow for speaker's "unrestricted displacement in

time and place" (p. 148) and unrestricted projection of oneself as well as other's self. This means that the speaker can actually project figures/characters who belong "to the world that is spoken about, not the world in which speaking occurs" (p. 147). Goffman calls this "embedding" and asserts that "multiple embedding" (p. 150) is also possible— and this phenomenon he terms "lamination" (p. 154).

Lamination, then, accounts for the possibility of transplantation of "the participation arrangement that is natural in one social situation into an interactional environment in which it isn't" (p. 153). As a result, not only does lamination allow for the embedding of utterances but, most significantly, for the embedding of interaction and interaction arrangements as well.

Moreover, if lamination is operative in any form of ordinary conversation, it is even more so in storytelling—which happens to be a particular instance of conversational activity:

> Storytelling, of course, requires the teller to embed in his own utterances the utterances and actions of the story's characters. And a full-scale story requires that the speaker remove himself for the telling's duration from the alignment he would maintain in ordinary conversational give and take, and for this period of narration maintain another footing, that of a narrator. (Goffman, 1981, p. 152)

Therefore, the recognition of this laminative property of storytelling constitutes the appropriate theoretical and methodological basis for the investigation of "represented dialogue" both in conversational and in written narrative.

2.1.3 A discourse analytical view on represented dialogue in written narrative

Unlike Tannen (1989), whose main concern is dialogue in oral narratives, Caldas-Coulthard (1984, 1988, 1992, 1994) focuses on the examination of written factual and fictional dialogue, or rather "exchanges" (1988, p. 89) or "interactions" (1992, p.70). She sets out to demonstrate that both represented and reported speech, in spite of being

grounded on "the knowledge of the structural properties of real talk" (1988, p. 89), are actually "reduced and simplified versions of talk in terms of the overall organisational features" and "the structural properties" (1988, p. 90; 1992, p. 70; 1994, p. 297) they exhibit. She also argues that fictional writers and factual reporters alike—the latter even more—rely on "the reader's ability *to reconstruct* what is not present in the discourse" (1998, p. 106; 1992, p. 71) or "in the interaction" itself (1988, p. 116). [9]

Caldas-Coulthard recognizes that teller and recipient are actively engaged in an interactional/communicative activity both in oral and written storytelling. But she makes a distinction between them in that, in the first sort of interaction, teller and listener are co-present and their interaction happens in "real time" (p. 37), while writer and reader are separate from one another spatially and temporally. In spite of that, written narratives are, she argues, recipient-designed in the sense that they "are organised to take account of a possible reader" (p. 38).

As a consequence of her seeing written narrative—or rather, any written text—"as a cultural interactive product directed to a specific reader" (p. 40), the text will inevitably carry "social and ideological meanings" (p. 40). This notion pervades her analysis of "the role of speech representation in written narratives" (p. 40).

Another aspect which Caldas-Coulthard introduces in her preliminary discussion of speech representation is the fact that narratives "can be layered and other interactive relations can occur" (p. 41), especially those interactions that "happen intratextually between narrators and characters" (p. 41). Layering accounts for several possible levels of interaction, starting from the one which "happens in the real world of authors and readers" (p. 42), ending at "the last layer of interaction" (p. 44) where character's speech is represented, and including intermediate levels such as the level at which the narrator takes up the position of teller, and so on.

The notion of layering Caldas-Coulthard employs was developed by literary scholars whose main concern is to describe literary narrative, particularly in relation to issues of diagesis (Chatman, 1978; Leech & Short, 1981, cited in Caldas-Coulthard, 1988, p.42). This concept of layering turns out to be similar to Goffman's (1981) notion of "lamination." However, lamination is more comprehensive in that it applies to communication/interaction in general, not just to particular types of activities such as literary storytelling (see discussion in section 2.1.2).

Caldas-Coulthard argues that the incorporation of the voices of others into one's own discourse is a means by which "recounters" (p. 61) detach themselves from what is being recounted. She adopts the term suggested by Fairclough (1988), namely "representation of speech," to refer to the incorporation of speech both in factual and in fictional narratives, because, in either case, "there is always a decision [of the recounter] to interpret and represent" speech (Fairclough , 1988, p. 1, cited in Caldas-Coulthard, 1988, p. 62).

As I have discussed in the previous section, I believe that "represented" speech is a more appropriate term than "reported"/"constructed" speech. I also believe—and in this I align with Caldas-Coulthard—that tellers decide if and how they will present the voices of others to their recipients. However, tellers act selectively both in regard to how voices are presented and to "whatever is to be animated."

Furthermore, Caldas-Coulthard claims that any author "is a social agent" (p. 62), who occupies "a specific place in a social structure" (p. 62). Due to that, texts will necessarily reflect the values of the specific social group which their authors participate in. Consequently, when authors represent or create characters' conversation, they do so "according to their motives and ideological constraints" (p. 62). In other words, authors'

decisions concerning what to say and how to say something cannot be viewed as neutral.

As a result, she claims, represented interaction "differs in significant ways from real interaction" (p. 62), even though writers "represent what they think conversationalists say when engaged in conversation" (p. 62). What Caldas-Coulthard is suggesting, then, is that writers' "assumptions about real interaction" (p. 62) do not correspond to what real interaction is. These assumptions can either lead to exaggeration or simplification of features of real interaction—or, as the findings of her studies indicate, just simplification/reduction.

In order to demonstrate that represented interaction is, in fact, reduced and simplified in comparison to real interaction, Caldas-Coulthard focuses on, on the one hand, aspects of overall organization in conversation and, on the other hand, on the structural properties of conversation. She asserts that she draws on both the works of "ethnomethodologists (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson)" (p. 64) to account for overall organization, and on "the Birmingham model of Discourse Analysis" (p. 91)— especially as proposed by authors such as Sinclair and Coulthard (1972, cited in Caldas-Coulthard, 1988, p. 91), Coulthard (1977, 1985, cited in Caldas-Coulthard, 1988, p. 91), and Coulthard and Brazil (1979, cited in Caldas-Coulthard, 1988, p. 91)—to explicate the structural properties of conversation.

In her discussion of "overall organisation of conversation" (p. 63), Caldas-Coulthard takes into consideration only two of the features which ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts have demonstrated to be operative in terms of sequential organization, namely conversation openings, pre-closings and closings, and the turn-taking system.

Following Schegloff and Sacks (1973), Caldas-Coulthard points out that openings, pre-closings and closings "are formalized, recognized and accomplished by participants in the interaction" (p. 65). Among possible opening sequences, she pays special attention to the exchange of greetings; requests for information, actions and services, and apologies—typically occurring between strangers—; a summons-answer sequence such as that which happens in telephone conversations; and phatic communion exchanges like talking about the weather. She claims that:

> In general (...) phatic exchanges are simplified, if not totally excluded from fictional dialogue.
> Interestingly, like phatic communion, opening and closing sequences are rarely present in fictive interaction. If openings do appear, narrators tend to report them in the cotext in which the report is inserted, rather than in the dialogue itself as "quote". (pp. 75-76)

In fact, she included only a few examples of interaction where openings—which play "such an important role in real talk" (p. 77)—appear. For, when they do appear, she claims, "their presence is super-significant because they do not simply mark beginnings of interactions but something else which the reader has to derive from" (p. 77).

Caldas-Coulthard quotes a passage from Anthony Burgess' *The Malayan Trilogy*, in which two characters (Crabbe and Fenella) are at Talbot's, waiting for him, when he arrives and says:

> "Don't tell me, don't tell me", said Talbot. "It's Bishop. We're back together again. God, it's been a long time. Mrs Bishop, how are you? Young and beautiful as ever, despite the heavy weight of the years. And the other boys, how are they, Bishop?" (p. 78)

In discussing this example, she concludes that:

> The significance of the greeting and the reason for its appearance at all is that Mr Talbot does not recognize Crabble and Fenella and talks to them as if they were Mr and Mrs Bishop. **The greeting is an economical way of showing this.** [emphasis added] (p. 78)

The foregoing example and the conclusion which follows it are revealing. It is stated that the use of interaction is "economical" in terms of narrative development. And

this is so exactly because interaction can be viewed as "supermeaningful" (p. 75). But the sense in which I can perceive represented interaction as "supermeaningful" differs from that which seems to be the sense in which Caldas-Coulthard means it. From her standpoint, "supermeaningful" is clearly related to the author's "intentions" and "ideology," which is ultimately what makes her/him manipulate characters' interaction. While one cannot deny that authors choose to employ certain devices which can better convey the meaning of the story—a meaning which is certainly related to the fact that **this** specific author is telling **this** story, and not any other one—, represented interaction turns out to be a "supermeaningful" device because readers are allowed to poke into the intratextual reality and, say, "see" characters' stances and actions, and so they can draw their own conclusions about what is being seen (see section 2.1.1).

My present claim is that interaction as a whole, or any interactional sequence such as openings, is not "supermeaningful" just because it happens to appear in a piece of literary work fraught with its author's ideological orientation; it is "supermeaningful" because communication (interaction/conversation) is multilayered (see discussion in section 2.1.2). This is why utterances acquire, or rather can be assigned, multiple-level meanings: literal and non-literal; serious and nonserious (Clark, 1996); linguistic, metalinguistic and metacommunicative (Bateson, 1972). Consequently, in the case of the example quoted, in the primary literal level/layer, the character (Mr. Talbot) is "only" greeting the others. Whereas, in a non-literal level, the man is telling his visitors about his bad memory. Indeed, this can only be inferred from the greeting because Crabbe and Fenella know—as Mr. Talbot, who is supposedly acquainted with them should know—they are not Mr. and Mrs. Bishop.

I am bringing in once again the notion of "lamination" (Goffman, 1981)/"layering" (Clark, 1996), which Caldas-Coulthard herself alludes to as

characteristic of narratives. What I am claiming, then, is that, at the level of author/narrator-reader interaction, it is true that the author/narrator is "guiding" the reader into seeing things as the author himself perceives them. Represented interaction can help the author accomplish this in an economical way because the author need not "narrate" what readers can unmistakably infer—or, in Caldas-Coulthard's words, "reconstruct" (p. 106)—for themselves (see section 2.1.1).

There is yet one aspect of the analysis of the intratextual reality level which is crucial for my own argumentation, and which deserves proper attention. In the case of the example quoted previously, there is no doubt that what we have is a representation of an opening sequence performed by the characters—or at least by Mr. Talbot, since only his utterance has been provided. An opening sequence which can effectively communicate both that Mr. Talbot is greeting his visitors and that he is having problems in recognizing people. These messages are conveyed to the reader by the actions of the character (DRS), and not by the author's/narrator's words (reporting discourse).

One crucial question that arises from this fact is: If one were to go through such a situation in real life, would he not infer that the man is having a hard time retrieving items from his memory? Of course the same inference could be drawn from such a situation. Because ordinary people in the world regard being mistaken for somebody else as socially inappropriate. As a result, people could either take offense, and react accordingly, or show tolerance/compassion for the person's getting confused. The latter seems to be the alternative explored by the author in question. Therefore, instead of appearing "simplified," the use of that specific opening section looks quite complex. Such opening appears as complex as it can be in real life. This cannot be downplayed by the fact that the author had such or such intention and/or ideology, that is, by the fact that authors act selectively as to what to include in/exclude from the narrative.

The same can be applied to pre-closing and closing sequences, if one's concern is to find out whether or not represented interaction is similar to real interaction and, above all, to what extent it happens. When represented interaction is focused on, the relevant question is: "Could people ordinarily act and interpret one another's actions in the same way, by using the same interactional techniques/mechanisms?"

Furthermore, it seems that the role sequences such as openings, pre-closings and closings play in real interaction is being overestimated. These sequences, however elaborate in structure and however expected their occurrence may be, are usually designed to perform the tasks suggested by the literal reference of the terms. Once these tasks are accomplished in interaction, the function of those sequences has been fulfilled. Yet, as I have suggested above, opening, pre-closing and closing sequences can simultaneously perform other tasks (in represented interaction as) in ordinary conversation besides that which they normally do. Such is the case of the example quoted before.

Furthermore, as I have suggested before, authors are free to act selectively as to what they decide to include in their stories. So, they may, in fact, choose to present their recipients with an instance of **a conversation**, that is, something characterizable in terms of overall features of organization such as opening, pre-closing and closing sections and, above all, the larger section in which the topic(s) is (are) developed (Levinson, 1983). Alternatively, though, authors may just present a section or subsection (one stage) of some supposedly major conversational activity. My data suggest that the latter seems to be a very frequent option indeed (see section 3.2.2).

What I mean is that authors do not often represent those kinds of sequences because their primary function is only quite too obvious. So, having narrators describe them seems to be more economical. Nevertheless, authors may choose to represent

sequences like those when they want to convey the idea that characters are doing something else besides greeting one another, for instance—which, I repeat, may also happen in real, naturally occurring interaction.

Regarding the turn-taking system, Caldas-Coulthard points out that "writers of fictional and factual speech reports are certainly aware of turn-taking mechanisms" (p. 80), but they only follow "the most basic rules in any conversation" (p. 80). According to her, this alone indicates that turn-taking is also simplified in fiction. She puts it as follows:

> The author is in absolute control of turn-taking mechanisms so turn-taking is not locally organised, but author organised. Therefore, turn order, turn size, length of conversation, what parties say, distribution of turns, how talk shifts and the ways transfers are coordinated, are all going to be pre-determined by the writer, and not locally managed as in real interaction. The simplification of the turn-taking system reduces conversational organisation since the struggle for the floor and control over turns, for example, tend not to be reported. (pp. 80-81)

In addition, she draws attention to the fact that overlaps and gaps cannot usually be found in represented interaction. Only silence seems to be attended to by writers in order to signal "conflict or a momentary breakdown in the communication" (p. 82).

Finally, another argument she raises to support her claim that represented interactions "are tidied-up versions of talk" (p. 82) is that "text is linear [so] it virtually forces tidiness on written conversation" (pp. 82-83). She is referring specifically to the fact that turns "generally terminate at utterance points, and have the characteristic of being organised in an orderly way. In real conversation, by contrast, a speaker can interrupt the current speaker in the middle of a turn" (p. 82).

As for turn-taking, although I acknowledge that authors do control aspects of the turn-taking system such as length of conversation, distribution and contents of turns, turn order, and turn size, this argument does not seem sufficient grounds to concluding that "represented interaction" is reduced/simplified. From the interactional

sociolinguistic perspective I subscribe to, it seems there are some important facts missing in this discussion.

First of all, the turn-taking system described by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson ([1974] 1978) is not the only basic mechanism operative in sequential organization of face-to-face interaction. In fact, conversation analysts have demonstrated that it works in tandem with other mechanisms which have not been included in Caldas-Coulthard's discussion of "the properties of real talk" (1988, p. 89). The mechanisms I am referring to are: adjacency pairs (Schegloff, 1972; Schegloff and Sacks, 1973), the notion of conditional relevance (Schegloff, 1972), the notion of preference organization (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984, part II), and topic progression (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984, part III).

Secondly, the object being focussed on here is by no means face-to-face, naturally occurring conversation. Rather, it is viewed as a particular instance of language use which derives from that "basic setting of language use" (Clark, 1996, p. 8). Moreover, it is an instance of language use which occurs within another, namely storytelling.

As I have discussed in section 2.1.2, lamination/layering plays a crucial role in structuring storytelling activity, or, in Clark's (1996) words, "layering is a feature of all types of stories" (p. 360) (see also section 3.2). It follows therefore that one cannot look at characters' conversational exchanges without taking lamination/layering into account. This also applies, of course, to the specific issue of turn-taking. If characters appear to be managing the turns they take at speaking, one could not possibly expect that this is going on in another world but the fictional reality, or the projected layer. Indeed, the fact that characters' interaction is embedded into the teller's/narrator's words suggests that there may be certain constraints imposed on its design features, one of which is the turn-taking system. What I am suggesting, then, is that the kind of turn-taking system

which is operative in "represented interaction" might perhaps differ from the turn-taking system as described by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson ([1974] 1978), that is "in its simplest systematic form" (p. 8). As is the case in other non-basic forms of language use (e. g. classroom or courtroom talk) which constitute speech exchange systems that are modified versions of ordinary conversation, the sociological bedrock.

In describing the turn-taking system operative in the basic setting of face-to-face conversation, Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson ([1974]) 1978) also provided for the possibility of such a turn-taking system suffering adaptations according to the particular sort of activity which the analyst is currently looking at:

> An investigator interested in some sort of activity that is organized by a turn-taking will want to determine whether, how, and how much the sort of activity investigated is adapted to, or constrained by, the particular form of turn-taking operating in it. (p. 8)

In fact, previous research has already demonstrated that this "basic" turn-taking system does suffer adaptation according to: 1) whether the conversation can be characterized as institutional talk, where turns are usually pre-allocated; 2) the type of activity presently at hand, such as the extended turns which occur in storytelling (Goodwin, 1984); and 3) the socio-cultural environment in which conversation is carried out (Shultz, Florio & Erickson, 1982).

Considering that there is a particular form of turn-taking system operating in storytelling and given that storytelling itself presupposes lamination/layering as one of its design features, one might reason that characters' conversational exchanges might be further constrained by virtue of their "projected" status. Indeed, it seems that characters' turn-taking might be especially designed in accordance with the projected nature of their interaction. What I am now suggesting, then, is that there might be a specific form of turn-taking system operating in the projected reality. Moreover, this "projected turn-taking system" seems to be, as Caldas-Coulthard points out, systematically author-

organized. Yet, it also appears that the "projected turn-taking system" is organized by authors in such a way that it can simulate characters' local management of their turns at speaking. If so, "the projected turn-taking" may still bear enough similarities with that "basic" turn-taking system operating in real, face-to-face conversation, as in all forms of language use (Clark, 1996). My own data points in this direction, as the analysis of characters' interaction in chapter 4 demonstrates.

As for the occurrence of overlaps, interruptions, and gaps—lapses or attributable silences (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, [1974] 1978)—, they may not be always represented, but (as I have noted in relation to openings, pre-closings and closings) they certainly occur whenever they are relevant to the story in question. For example, in Poe's *The cask of Amontillado* (see Appendix) there are two instances of interruption by the character Fortunato, who is demonstrably competing for the floor.

My data also show instances where silence occurs. Sometimes attributable silence——when one of the participants simply does not produce something which he was expected to contribute as a reply to the other party's prior turn (as in Austen's *Pride and prejudice*, in section 4.1.5). At other times, silence is being employed as a "conflict-management strategy" (Tannen, 1990)—as in F. O'Connor's *A good man is hard to find*, in section 4.1.3. Therefore, this evidence reinforces what I have claimed before regarding authors being free to decide what to include in/exclude from their stories.

Last, as for Caldas-Coulthard argument that "written text forces tidiness" (p. 82) to represented interaction, this cannot be denied. Yet, this is also true in relation to any written text, because the written code is highly conventionalized—even normatized. No oral text can be transposed to the written medium and remain what it was when originally spoken. Indeed, conversation analysts and interactional sociolinguists have reported on the difficulties which transcriptions of naturally occurring conversation

impose on the analytical work. For, in being written versions of spoken language, transcriptions also need to be adapted according to certain conventions, which means that there are decisions to be made (Ochs, 1979; Psathas, 1995). What I am claiming, in short, is that it is the differences between the two modalities—oral and written—which impose such limitations to the representation of interaction in general, and of fictional interaction, in particular. So, adaptation to the requirements of the written modality is not only desired/able, but it is taken for granted as part of the organization of non-basic, written uses of language (see discussion in section 2.1.1, pp. 11-12).

Most of my counter-argumentation in relation to what Caldas-Coulthard considers as "overall organization features" (p. 63) also applies to her view of "the structural properties" of real talk. If she drew on conversation analytical notions to discuss some organizations which are operative in conversation, her notion of structural properties of conversation derives from a strictly linguistic pragmatic tradition, namely the Birmingham model of Discourse Analysis, with insights from Longacre's (1983, cited in Caldas-Coulthard, 1988, p. 100) model of "repartee." She points out the similarities between the two models which justify her basing her discussion on, alternatively, one or another:

> The Birmingham theory of the exchange structure and Longacre's theory of repartee share striking similarities. Although the S/C [Sinclair & Coulthard] model is concerned with **the interactive structures which characterize formal teaching in oral and authentic contexts** [emphasis added], and Longacre's is concerned with **written dialogues** [emphasis added], both theories interpret utterances according to structural expectations. Longacre's notional structure corresponds to moves and acts, and his surface structure corresponds to the exchange structure. (p. 100)

Neither model, though, can be said to account for the structural organization of ordinary conversation, since the objects of their individual concerns are not conversation. Moreover, both models seem to link the utterances which are produced to

speech act/interactional move types (for a detailed discussion about some of the misconceptions of such theorization, see Levinson, 1983, Chapter 6).

The Birmingham school model, for instance, asserts that the categories which make up classroom discourse are, from the lowest to the highest: "acts, moves, exchanges, transactions and lessons/interactions" (Caldas-Coulthard, 1988, p. 93). According to this model, each higher category is made up by a number of the next lower category items. For example, transactions—which are regarded as "the largest unit of discourse (p. 93)—are made up of exchanges. These include "boundary exchanges" (p. 93), which are preliminary and terminal exchanges; "bound by frames and focus", "medial exchanges" (p. 93) and "free exchanges," which are those that are not "bound by **frames** or **focus**" (p. 93). Frame moves being elements "marked" by items such as 'right', 'well', 'ok', or 'now' and focus moves corresponding to metastatements about the discourse—it seems that what they call "focus moves" might perhaps correspond to Bateson's (1972) notion of "frame" (see section 2.1.1).

In this model, exchanges are the minimal units of interaction. In addition, in being obligatory units, medial and free exchanges are the ones which are described in terms of three classes of moves: Initiation, Response, and Follow up, of which only Initiation is obligatory. These three moves can be realized by certain speech acts. Initiation, for example, includes acts such as directive, informative, starter and elicit. Responses can be realized as reply, react, or comment; and Follow up includes acceptance, evaluation or comment (Caldas-Coulthard, 1988, pp. 93-94).

Caldas-Coulthard claims that, in spite of being devised to account for exchange structure in classroom interaction, this model can also be applied to naturally occurring interactions, which may have the Initiation-Response-Follow-up structure (p. 95).

As for Longacre's model, Caldas-Coulthard points out that his "description of composed dialogues is in many ways similar to the one devised for spoken dialogue" (p. 101). This, she claims, is enough to show that "writers definitely base their composition on real interaction" (p. 101) but "they seem to reduce the structural properties of the oral interaction" (p. 101).

To state it briefly, Caldas-Coulthard's main point is that "fictional interaction, at exchange level, is characterized by chains of two moves (initiations and responses) and three part exchanges are rarely found" (1994, p. 297).

First, I do not see why fictional interaction seems reduced if, according to the models mentioned earlier, only initiation is obligatory. Second, it may be true that in real classroom interaction, which is an instance of institutional talk, a three-move sequence can be frequently found. But in naturally occurring ordinary conversation, such structure is not frequently observable—although it can occur on occasions when conversationalists are taking up a teacher-student alignment, that is, when one is claiming superior knowledge status, leaving the other in the position of a learner, or less knowledgeable person.

Thirdly, the works of ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts have already demonstrated that "conversation has in fact an elaborate and detailed architecture" (Levinson, 1983, p. 295). This architecture corresponds to Sacks' (1984) "technology of conversation" (p. 413), that is, the set of techniques and mechanisms that emerge during the course of conversational activity and that parties employ to produce and make sense of that activity. These techniques/mechanisms include a number of complex conversational organizations which structure and manage the interaction: "the systematic properties of the sequential organization of talk, and the ways in which utterances are designed to manage such sequences" (Levinson, 1983, p. 287).

To conclude, while discussing Tannen's view of the phenomenon in question, I argued that, although she uses interactional sociolinguistic concepts, her methodological standpoint allows her to draw much from a more traditional, language-centered discourse analytical perspective. As a result, it seems that she adopts the position of an outside analyst, which happens to be a position similar to the one adopted by Caldas-Coulthard. I believe, however, that the phenomenon currently at hand can be better described if approached from an emic perspective—the perspective of participants themselves (Pomerantz, 1990)—, which I shall discuss in the next chapter. But, before turning to this discussion, I provide one last observation about the phenomenon itself.

As I have argued before (pp. 32-33), "represented dialogue" seemed at that moment a better characterization of the phenomenon than "DRS" or even "constructed dialogue." Nevertheless, during this last section, I have gradually incorporated Caldas-Coulthard's "represented interaction" into my own discourse. I have done so because, as I stated all through this chapter, the phenomenon we are dealing with is, in essence, interactional. Here is where the boundary between "dialogue" and "interaction" lies. In order to cross this boundary, a crucial element should be taken into account: context. Therefore, I start chapter 3 by discussing the role played by context in the characterization of the object of this study: "represented interaction."

CHAPTER 3

AN INTERACTIONAL SOCIOLINGUISTIC APPROACH TO REPRESENTED CONVERSATIONAL EXCHANGES

3.1 From dialogue to interaction

Following the line of discussion in chapter 2, I am now in a position to summarize my own perspective on the phenomenon under study. This will, then, allow me to foreground the reasons why I claim that an interactional sociolinguistic approach is the appropriate methodological standpoint to the investigation of such a phenomenon.

As I have suggested in section 2.1.2, I align with Tannen (1989) when she points out that the traditional label "reported speech" is misleading, because it does not take into account the polyphonic nature of language—a view which seems to be subscribed to by Caldas-Coulthard as well. I also align with Tannen in relation to the fact that the animation of the voices of others operates in written narrative similarly to the way it does in spoken storytelling. The differences between one and the other seem to be mainly related to the possibilities and constraints of each modality. In addition, and most significantly, following Tannen, I believe that the representation of fictional characters' voices seem to have a lot in common with ordinary face-to-face interaction.

My reason to believe this lies in the assumption that storytellers design the animation of characters' voices according to their notion of "ordinariness." A notion which is based on the teller's own social experience, or in Sacks' (1984) words, on their ability to "do 'being ordinary'" themselves. In Gumperz's (1982) terms, "doing 'being ordinary'" may be said to correspond to participants sharing "the linguistic and socio-cultural knowledge" (p. 3) necessary if communication between them is to succeed.

Thus, in designing characters' speech in such a way that it can be perceived as ordinary, the teller is neither merely "reporting" speech, nor "constructing" it, but he is actually representing speech (see section 2.1.2).

I have also argued that "dialogue" seemed, at least provisionally, a more adequate term to the animation of characters' voices than "speech." But my notion of "dialogue" differs from that which is implicit in Tannen's use of the term. First of all, in the sense in which she employs it, "dialogue" should encompass both direct and indirect quotation (and any other possible form within this continuum).

Unlike Tannen, I do believe that the traditional distinction between direct and indirect quote is actually operative in storytelling. In this, I align with Holt (1996), who suggests that the interactional task which one form accomplishes in narrative is different from that task performed by the other form. The choice between one and the other signals that the teller is proposing to take up different footings (see section 2.1.1). Nevertheless, "dialogue" can better express the idea of turns at talk, whereas "speech" or "quote" may only refer to a single turn or utterance.

Caldas-Coulthard (1988, 1992, 1994), however, suggests an alternative possibility to dialogue: "interaction." For her, interaction seems to replace the notion of DRS. Yet, the sense in which she employs "interaction" is close to the notion of "dialogue" as referring to turns, or a turn, at talk (see discussion in section 2.1.2).

There is one aspect of the animation of characters' voices, though, which has not been given proper attention by these researchers, namely context. I consider this aspect as crucial to the understanding of "represented interaction" both from the narrative recipient's standpoint and, above all, from an analytical perspective that privileges interactional participants' sense-making perspectives (Pomerantz, 1990).

Among the sources examined, Holt (1996) is the only one who admits that DRS allows current speaker to introduce contextual elements such as the reporting of a sequence of events and thoughts into his narrative. She also points out that current speaker tends to keep both deictic references and prosodic features as they appeared in the original (reported) context. Actually, she regards retention of deixis and prosody as the design features which characterize the production of DRS and distinguish it from, for example, indirect reported speech. Nevertheless, she does not systematically incorporate the notion of context into her discussion or analysis.

Although Tannen acknowledges that there is a dynamic interrelationship between what is being "reported" and the reported context as well as the reporting context, she deals with this interrelationship in terms of the general assumption of teller's presumed neutrality, as opposed to the dialogic nature of language use. In the examples provided by her, however, it is clear that context has to be attended to if one is to make sense of the utterances being presented.

For instance, the single utterance "Oh in that case, go ahead" (see example 4 on p. 29), attributed by the teller of the anecdote to some American people, can only be interpreted as ordinary if one knows that: (1) **those Americans were in a Greek airport** and (2) **a Greek woman tried to break into the line in which** (3) **those Americans have been waiting for some hours,** a quite annoying fact for anybody. So, it might well be the case that the Americans (4) **started to object** because they might have thought the woman was being given special attention due to the fact that she was Greek. For, as soon as (5) **they were told the woman had children with her,** they all could realize that the sort of treatment dispensed to the woman was the usual procedure in this circumstance and not, as the Americans seem to have thought, an exceptional one.

Without knowing facts 1 to 5 above, one cannot understand how such an utterance could possibly have been produced by more than one person and, ultimately, one cannot make sense of the utterance at all. Facts 1 to 5 are, thus, crucial both to the teller's representing an utterance which could have been simultaneously produced by each and every American in the scene and to the recipient's interpreting the utterance in the intended way. Actually, facts 1 to 5 turn out to be features of the context in which the teller claims the utterance has been produced.

In her discussion of overall organization and exchange structure, Caldas-Coulthard makes several references to the fact that what is not straightforwardly available in the characters' utterances tends to be indirectly reported, or otherwise glossed, by the teller/narrator. She claims, in fact, that author's reports of openings and closings as well as of parts of exchanges that can be non-verbally realized in real conversation can serve as evidence that "represented interaction" is, indeed, reduced/simplified in narrative.

My own view of the role played by such elements of the reporting discourse is that they are not marginal aspects of "represented interaction." Rather, they are as much a part of it as are the utterances themselves. In other words, if one is to regard characters' utterances as actions performed in the fictional reality, one should consider the context in which characters are said to have produced and interpreted those utterances. The reporting discourse may, then, function as the means by which the story recipient can have access to the context surrounding those actions.

This established, I can now say that the phrase "represented dialogue" I have provisionally incorporated in the present discussion acquires a new dimension; a dimension in which both dialogue (turns at talk) and its surrounding narrative discourse operate together in organizing characters' performance. Having this in mind, I now

propose to call the phenomenon with which this study is concerned "represented conversational exchanges" or simply "represented interaction." Such a characterization is, then, a *sine qua non* condition to approaching the phenomenon both from a theoretical and a methodological interactional sociolinguistic stance.

If we aim at examining the extent to which represented interaction can be regarded as similar to the way people in the real world use language, all relevant aspects of context must be taken into account. Thus, context should be understood as referring to diverse, yet interrelated, sorts of environment: the sequential position of utterances in relation to one another, how those utterances have been produced and interpreted, the socio-situational setting where utterances have been produced, and, finally, the position of the utterances in the main narrative discourse, that is, within the story itself.

My reasons for claiming this is grounded in the findings of ethnomethodologists, conversation analysts, and interactional sociolinguists concerning how face-to-face interaction is achieved, as well as in their discussion of the import of context both in ordinary conversation and particularly in storytelling. I shall now turn to the discussion of the various senses in which context is relevant for the investigation of talk-in-interaction.

Schegloff (1995), in arguing for the crucial significance of social action over the informative content of utterances, cogently argues that sequential context cannot be left out of the analysis of talk-in-interaction:

> Especially (but not exclusively) in conversation, talk is constructed and is attended by its recipients for the action or actions it may be doing. (...) There is virtually always an issue (for the *participants* and, accordingly, for professional analysts) of what is getting done by [the] production [of an utterance] in some particular here-and-now. (p. 187)

where "here-and-now" refers to and emphasizes the sequential position of the turn at talk, or the discourse environment in which the utterance is placed. So, in this sense, to

talk about context is to invoke "the systematic properties of the sequential organization of talk" (Levinson, 1983, p. 287).

As I have mentioned earlier (section 2.1.3), the basic mechanisms operative in sequential organization of talk-in-interaction are the turn-taking system, adjacency pairs, the notions of conditional relevance and preference, and topic progression. These mechanisms work in tandem with one another in structuring the organization of talk in a local basis in the sense that "an action done by a speaker—*taken as an action*—has decisive consequences in shaping the trajectory of the talk's development" (Schegloff, 1995, p. 192).

This means that such mechanisms determine conversationalists' local (moment-by-moment) choices among a range of possible alternatives for turn-construction, or choices among alternative actions. In other words, what one party says is interpreted by the recipient both in terms of the job its production fulfills (the intended action) and in terms of the limited range of possible appropriate actions the recipient is expected to produce next, and so on and so forth. Thus, conversationalists gradually build up a series, or sequence, of interdependent actions which can only be interpreted within this specific sequence, or context, in which they occur.

To this sense of context as sequential organization, another should be added, namely the human and physical settings in which talk-in-interaction takes place, that is, the social situation (Goffman, [1964] 1972). According to Goffman, "talk is socially organized, not merely in terms of who speaks to whom in what language, but as a little system of mutually ratified and ritually governed face-to-face action, a social encounter" (p. 65). What he is referring to is the fact that there are certain constraints imposed on conversationalists' behavior by virtue of their finding themselves in a social encounter, which is established as such the moment at least two people in a given

situation "jointly ratify one another as authorized co-sustainers of a single, albeit moving, focus of visual and cognitive attention" (p. 64).

Such constraints ultimately influence both the "production format" (Goffman, 1981, p. 145) of utterances and the "participation framework", or the relationships "of all persons in the gathering" (p. 137). Thus, whoever is present in the physical setting where interaction occurs, how they relate to one another in terms of how accessible their actions are to the other(s), who is ratified as an authorized participant as opposed to mere bystanders, who is being addressed, and so on, play a decisive role in how actions are both shaped and interpreted.

There is also a third sense in which context plays a crucial role in the organization of talk-in-interaction. A sense in which the notion of context includes social phenomena and, most significantly, is extended to encompass a range of culturally established conventions. Such conventions allow parties to make inferences about one another's actions so that they can make sense of the communicative activity they are engaged in.

For Gumperz (1982), meaning is determined not just by participants knowing the sort of activity they are currently engaged in. Yet, the activity type restricts the range of possible interpretations "by channeling inferences so as to *foreground* or make relevant certain aspects of background knowledge and to underplay others" (p.131). That is to say, besides having the activity type defined, there are a number of features which are systematically attended to by participants to produce and make sense of their actions. As Gumperz (1982) puts it:

> This channeling of interpretation is effected by conversational implicatures based on conventionalized co-occurrence expectations between content and surface style. That is, constellations of surface features of message form are the means by which speakers signal and listeners interpret what the activity is, how semantic content is to be understood and *how* each sentence relates to what precedes or follows. These features are referred to as *contextualization cues*. (p.131)

Later Gumperz extends the concept of contextualization cues so as to comprehend paralinguistic and nonlinguistic features as well.

Among the linguistic features which may function as contextualization cues are aspects such as lexical and syntactic options, semantic content and topical progression, and code, style and topic switching. As for paralinguistic features, they include prosodic elements such as voice tone, pitch and loudness, and intonation, among others. Finally, nonlinguistic features refer especially to interpersonal distance, posture, gestural signs, facial expression and gaze direction (Erickson & Schultz, 1981, 1982; Gumperz, 1982).

The foregoing discussion suffices to highlight the importance of context in the structuring of real, naturally occurring interaction. It also provides me with a touchstone against which fictional characters' actions can be judged in terms of the similarities and differences they bear with their naturally occurring counterparts.

However, there is still one more sense of context which is of utmost significance to this study: how characters' utterances are contextualized within the story itself. This contextualization establishes a dynamic interrelationship between the narrative discourse which surrounds utterances and the elements which function as contextualization cues within the fictional universe. Such an interrelationship constitutes the means by which the story recipients can have access to the intratextual reality and, thus, be able to perceive ordinariness in represented interaction.

Buttny (1998) claims that prior talk is evoked in a current storytelling activity because it "seems to be reserved for capturing the most crucial or interesting parts of the narrative"(p. 49). He also draws attention to the fact that the actions being reported can only be interpreted in connection with their context: "The reported speech conveys the 'what was said', but some context for the reported speech is necessary to indicate 'what actions were done' along with their social significance" (p. 49). He also emphasizes that

"context is continually oriented to by participants" (p. 49), therefore, it "works for recipient design and contextual framing purposes" (p. 49). Moreover, this contextual framing is accomplished linguistically, by means of discourse itself: "context involves utterances [or discourse] designed to tell recipients how to hear the reported speech" (p. 49).

Most significantly, discourse so designed does a further job in storytelling than merely to provide factual information to the recipient, as Sacks (1992) argues:

> Stories may be designed for their listener, now not simply in the sense of what their listener knows and doesn't know in general but what their listener might or might not have in mind at the moment (...) It's not just that sometimes a fact might be asserted which the other party doesn't know, but that whether the other party knows it or not, the issue is would they *use* it now. So what we have is a sense of context being employed by the teller, which involves fitting to the story, in carefully located places, information that will permit the appreciation of what was transpiring. (p. 274)

Here, "carefully located places" means that this sort of contextual framing is signaled by discourse placed either "directly before or after" (p. 274) the event being focused on by the teller.

It follows that, if this sort of contextual framing plays such a crucial role in conversational storytelling, it is reasonable to expect it to play an even more important role in written storytelling, for, in this case, teller and recipient are spatially and temporally removed from one another. As a result, tellers are expected to allow the readers to see things as they have happened in the projected reality. This, I believe, supports my own claim that the surrounding reporting discourse can, and actually should, be regarded, not as peripheral to the phenomenon, but as an indication that the integrity of represented interaction is being attended to both by the writer and by the analyst interested in describing it.

3.2 An emic perspective to the investigation of represented conversational exchanges

As I have pointed out in the previous section and in chapter 2, conversational analytic and interactional sociolinguistic research provides concepts which allow for the characterization of the object of inquiry of this study, namely represented conversational exchanges, as an interactional phenomenon rather than a merely linguistic one. Such a characterization justifies the use of an interactional sociolinguistic approach to the analysis of represented interaction.

I am aware, however, that full-fledged conversation analytic or interactional sociolinguistic methodology cannot be incorporated into the present study due to the fact that the sort of represented interaction I am looking at occurs in written fictional narrative discourse, thus, out of the usual empirical scope of either of those perspectives.

Ethnomethodologists, ethnographers of communication, conversation analysts, and interactional sociolinguists may disagree on aspects such as: 1) corpus constitution and transcription systems, which may depend on whether the focus of analysis falls on how utterances fit into a small number of sequences or on why a particular feature occurs in multiple sequences; and 2) whether or not paralinguistic and, especially nonlinguistic contextual information is systematically attended to (Schiffrin, 1988).

Yet, their methodological positions converge in two fundamental aspects: the nature of the object of analysis and the rigorous constraint imposed on analytical work by the strictly emic perspective employed. Regarding the first aspect, emphasis is placed on using naturally occurring conversation as data. As for the adoption of an emic perspective, Schiffrin (1988) observes that:

It is speakers and hearers whose conversational procedures are the focus of inquiry and the analyst's perspective should aim to replicate the language user's perspective. (p. 254)

Indeed, she points out that ethnomethodologists argue that users, or rather, conversationalists, are themselves analysts in the sense that they are constantly monitoring the other party's actions in order to make inferences about how these actions should be understood and to project their own possible next actions (Schiffrin, 1988).

Therefore, this research departs from an orthodox interactional sociolinguistic standpoint in aiming at the sort of interaction represented in written narrative. Nevertheless, the perspective which I adopt in the analysis of such data is that of interactional sociolinguistics: an emic view. This means that the categories of analysis are not determined *a priori*, but are recognized and explicated as they emerge in the course of the on-going represented interaction. Thus, what are regarded as emergent categories are those which participants, or characters, themselves can be demonstrably orienting to. This stance allows me to compare the mechanisms and techniques employed in fictional interaction to those that have been found to be operative in the organization of real, ordinary conversation, and to point out the similarities and differences between them.

My foundation for claiming that applying an emic perspective to the analysis of represented interaction is the most appropriate approach is grounded in Clark's (1996) notion of "layering," which he claims to derive from Bateson's (1972) notion of frame (see section 2.1.1), Goffman's (1981) lamination (see section 2.1.3), Walton's (1973, 1976, 1978, 1983, 1990, cited in Clark, 1996, p. 355) claim that make-believe lies at the very foundation of fiction, and Bruce's (1981, cited in Clark, 1996, p. 355) analysis of levels in written fiction.

For Clark (1996), layering is a pervasive phenomenon which characterizes all instances of nonserious use of language, that is, when one appears to say one thing while he is actually doing another. Also, Clark asserts that "all nonserious actions are created in the course of serious actions" (p. 354). Thus, nonserious actions are, in fact, dependent on the occurrence of serious actions, but the former take place in a "domain of action" (layer 2) other than that where the latter happen (layer 1) (p. 355).

Clark provides an enlightening example of such a relationship between the two domains and the actions that take place within each domain:

> It is San Francisco in 1952, and two ten-year-olds named Alan and Beth are playing a game of make-believe in Alan's back yard. From a book they have read, they decide to be Wild Bill and Calamity Jane, living in Deadwood, Dakota Territory, during the gold rush of 1876. They designate a pile of dirt in the corner of the yard as placer diggings and an old kitchen plate as a gold pan, and they pan for gold. Soon they find a few nuggets (small stones), go off to Saloon Number Ten (the patio), sit down at a poker table (a picnic table), and play a few hands with an invisible deck of cards. After a while Beth is called home, and their game ends. (p. 354)

According to Clark's analysis of this example, real kids (Alan and Beth) are playing make-believe in a particular place (Alan's back yard in San Francisco) at a particular moment in time (1952) and all this is taking place in layer 1, the real world domain. However, it is also true that Alan and Beth are engaged in a "joint pretense" (p. 360) which allows them to become Wild Bill and Calamity Jane, respectively. It follows, therefore, that Alan and Beth's actions also take place in layer 2, the projected reality domain, in the sense that it is what they actually do that is construed as the actions in layer 2. On the other hand, whatever the actions performed by Wild Bill and Calamity Jane and the experiences they go through take place exclusively in layer 2.

Clark observes that: "Each domain is characterized by its participants, their roles, the place, the time, the relevant features of the situation, the possible actions, and other (...) things" (p. 355). Thus, each domain constitutes a complete world in itself.

Nevertheless, only domain 1 is autonomous: all other possible domains (such as domain 2) inevitably depend on domain 1. As a result, "access to domains 1 and 2 is asymmetrical" (p. 357) in that "the participants in 1 have access to elements of 2, but the participants in 2 have no access" (p. 357) to domain 1 at all.

Goffman's (1981) model of participation framework is particularly useful to clarify this point. Taking the first layer of communication, or domain, as a point of reference, teller and recipient(s) act as official, ratified participants in the storytelling activity. Story characters play no role at all in this interactional layer. They cannot even be regarded as nonparticipants, for they simply do not exist in domain 1. If, on the other hand, we move the focus to the second layer/domain, characters assume the official status as ratified participants. Yet, their interaction is accessible to both participants in domain 1. Due to this, teller and story recipient(s) assume the status of nonratified participants, or bystanders, in relation to domain 2. Now, since they are purposely poking into domain 2 in order to "see" and/or "hear" what is going on there, teller and story recipient(s) are actually working in collusion with one another as eavesdroppers (Goffman, 1981, pp. 132-134). This is why participants in domain 1 may know a lot more about characters' feelings and circumstances than the characters themselves do.

Both Clark's and Goffman's considerations on layering/lamination apply to language use in general. Yet, layering is an essential "feature of all types of stories" (Clark, 1996, p. 360). Additionally, storytelling is, in fact, a joint activity in which one participant invites the other participant to join her/him in the creation and/or maintenance of a "joint pretense" (p. 360). Joint pretenses are, thus, ultimately achieved by means of layered actions.

This is true for any storytelling activity, including written narrative. In this case, layered actions may take place in several layers, or domains. However, discussing

complex issues which underlie possible author-narrator-reader relationships is beyond the scope of the present study. Therefore, I do not venture into tackling those layers of action peopled by such beings as the implied author, projected narrator(s), or the like. For the purpose of the analytical perspective adopted here, namely an emic approach, it suffices to focus on only two layers, or domains. I, then, consider the primary communicative layer that in which the author and reader interact with each other. The second communicative layer is the one in which characters interact with one another.

Since the latter happens to be the main concern in this study, I zoom straight into the intratextual reality to examine the actions being performed there. Occasionally, though, the primary layer is invoked, especially due to the fact that the reporting discourse employed in this layer serves as the representation of paralinguistic, non-linguistic and situational features which are relevant for the actions characters perform on the course of their interaction (see section 3.1).

Before I can proceed with the analysis, there are some methodological issues that deserve some consideration, for they originate in the severe constraint imposed on this work, as in any analytical work having an emic perspective at its basis. These issues concern the procedures I followed and the difficulties I found in the process of data collection, corpus constitution and corpus segmentation.

3.2.1 Data collection

When I set off the search for appropriate material which could be used as data for this study, I had to face some problems posed by the nature of the phenomenon which is being focused upon, as well as by the emic perspective adopted here. In aiming at the investigation of an interactional phenomenon which lies within a literary fabric, the first

difficulty I had to face was that of establishing clear criteria to guide the selection of the material for analysis.

Since my main concern in this study was, from the outset, fictional characters' interaction, I decided that the adequate criterion for selection of fictional works to compose my corpus was that the animation of characters' voices should figure prominently among the strategies employed by the authors to develop their narratives. Since occasional, isolated utterances do not characterize conversational activity, by no means would they serve the purpose of the present investigation. Therefore, I concentrated on those narratives in which writers resorted to the animation of characters' utterances in such a way as to characterize a conversation, or at least one stage in a conversation (see section 3.2.3). Preferably, characters' voices should be connected to some situational, or contextual, information in the form of reporting discourse in their vicinity.

Moreover, the selected pieces should conform to the perspective which supports the present analytical work. Consequently, in selecting the stories, I was cautious enough so as to avoid any kind of choice that could possibly be misrelated to specific literary issues such a: esthetic taste, values and judgements; literary genres; literary schools and movements; or any other sort of strictly literary concern. Drama, thus, was intentionally excluded simply because of its straightforward, obvious basis on interactional phenomena—although, of course, that can only be fully achieved on stage. Apart from this, I made no attempt to distinguish between shorter and longer pieces of narrative.

Another preoccupation which motivated the selection of material regards the choice of authors. I chose to work with a variety of authors so as to prevent the results

of the analysis from being attributed to one (or two) particular author's style or esthetic and ideological orientations.

Therefore, the narratives collected include 3 short stories and 3 novels, both canonical and non-canonical literary works, from which represented conversation exchanges were excerpted for analysis.

3.2.2 Constitution of the corpus

Since stories are usually recipient-designed, in the sense that tellers aim at structuring their narratives in such a way as to promote and sustain their audience's involvement, it is not infrequent that storytellers resort to different and varied strategies (e. g. narration, description, as well as both direct and indirect speech) in the course of one single story. Authors of written fictional works are no exception to this rule.

Deriving from this and from the results of preliminary analysis carried out on the short stories and novels selected, a problem arose of where to draw the line that would allow me to segment stretches of represented interaction from the main flow of narrative. Additionally, there was the issue concerning the surrounding reporting discourse which, when used by authors, functions as a means of providing the reader with relevant contextual material for the understanding of characters' actions, as I have discussed it in section 3.1. These difficulties had to be overcome before I attempted to carry out further analysis.

As the interaction between writer and readers of the story is not a synchronic event, authors' control of the flow of narrative is constrained by the fact that stories are recipient-designed. One means by which authors can control the unfolding of the events in the story is by alternatively assigning voice either to the narrator alone or to two or

more characters, one of which may be the narrator. When voices are assigned to two or more characters, represented interaction occurs.

As Buttny (1998) suggests, characters tend to be assigned voices at the most crucial or interesting parts of the story, that is to say, at those parts where the author invites the readers to take up a more active role in interpreting and/or assessing the events being highlighted. Readers' involvement, then, is intimately connected to the fact that a secondary communicative layer is being invoked through represented interaction.

However, before characters can actually start taking turns at speaking, the narrator must yield the floor. On the other hand, as interpersonal involvement is at stake, this cannot happen randomly or hastily. So, one should really expect that the narrative displays some indication that the narrator is about to be silenced, and another layer will be introduced. In other words, the writer must somehow signal to the recipients that a change in his footing will soon occur so that readers can align accordingly.

Preliminary analysis of the stories I had selected suggested that authors appear to signal to the reader that the narrator's voice will be replaced by the voices of others by means of introducing subtle changes in the narrative discourse. Such changes seem to function, then, as transitions between the primary and the secondary communicative layers in the story. Also, I could perceive that similar transitions seem to occur, even more recurrently, when the author is about to go back to layer 1 to resume the prose narrative.

In fact, it was more difficult for me to locate the exact place where the conversational exchanges started than where they ended, or could be viewed as complete. This was due to the fact that the authors of the pieces selected have employed a greater variety of devices to signal the transition from layer 1 to 2 (henceforth **in-transition**) than they did from layer 2 to 1 (**out-transition**).

In the stories selected, authors used a number of in-transition devices which establish a gradual, stepwise progression into represented interaction, as well as a few others which accomplish the in-transition in a more abrupt manner. The first type of in-transition devices is explicated in examples 1-3 below. Examples 4-6 illustrate the second type of in-transition devices. Among the in-transition devices in which we have a gradual shift into layer 2, the use of a short descriptive/narrative paragraph was the author's most frequent choice[10], as we can see in the examples that follow.

1) In *The cask of Amontillado*, the author employed a paragraph in which features of the situation and the opening of the encounter (which coincides with the narrative itself) are described: the paragraph reproduced below follows the three first paragraphs at the beginning of the story, in which the author describes the narrator's attitude and feelings in relation to Fortunato and how these led the former into plotting against the latter. Note also the use of a prefatory form of the sort described in section 2.1.1 to signal the aimed shift into layer 2, namely "I said to him:"

> **It was about dusk, one evening during the supreme madness of the carnival season, that I encountered my friend. He accosted me with excessive warmth, for he had been drinking much.** The man wore motley. He had on a tight-fitting parti-striped dress, and his head was surmounted by the conical cap and bells. **I was so pleased to see him, that I thought I should never have done wringing his hand.**
> *I said to him:* [utterances are introduced here] (*The cask of Amontillado*, p. 191)[11]

2) In the same narrative, the author also employed a paragraph briefly describing a transition between two stages in a major on-going conversational activity: this example shows that, after having talked for a while, characters are, at this point, maintaining an open state of talk (Goffman, 1981), that is, they are attending to the walking further into the vaults without speaking, but still having the chance to address each other. This is what happens eventually, when the narrator makes the first move to seize Fortunato by an arm, thus making him stop and focus attention on what the narrator is going to say:

The wine sparkled in his eyes and the bells jingled. My own fancy grew warm with the Médoc. We had passed through walls of pilled bones with casks and puncheons intermingling into the inmost recesses of the catacombs. **I paused again, and this time I made bold to seize Fortunato by an arm above the elbow.** [utterances are introduced in the next paragraph] (*The cask of Amontillado*, p. 194)

3) In the novel *Nancy Drew on campus # 24: In the* spotlight, author Carolyn

Keene employed a brief description marking a change from one encounter into the next

one, that is, at least one character exits a previous encounter and joins other character(s)

in a new encounter. In the illustration below, Montana has just left Kara and Nikki to go

backstage in search of Ray. Here, we have the second of a set of two paragraphs

describing Montana's behavior and thoughts while she is walking to meet Ray: [12]

Ray was heading into the hallway that led to club offices and pay phones. As Montana followed him, she felt her nerve slipping. Maybe I'll just make a phone call, she told herself, but before she could alter her course, someone beat her to the phone. She had no choice.[utterances are introduced in the next paragraph] (*Nancy Drew on campus # 24: In the spotlight*, p. 65-66)

This device may also indicate that participants are managing an unstable state of

talk which later acquires what Goffman (1981) refers to as "a more sustained

regrouping" (p. 136), or a more stable configuration. [13]

While the above examples show gradual in-transitions, the following are

illustrations of devices in which in-transition is not accomplished in so smooth a

manner. In example 4, transition is not completely brisk, whereas in examples 5 and 6 it

occurs abruptly. In these two examples, however, the author employs what I perceive as

a signaling device within the interaction proper ("said . . . one day"), which may

perhaps function as a later compensation for such an abrupt shift in layer. This signaling

is introduced early on in the interaction: as soon as one character performs a summons

(uttering the term of address), whose aim is to engage the other character in

conversational activity. Therefore, it may well be the case that both summons and

reporting discourse could work in tandem to signal the shift in layer. In addition, the

link between the series of short preceding paragraphs and the conversational exchange itself can only be established much later in the interaction, when characters allude to (example 5) or start to talk about the topic (example 6) which was introduced in those paragraphs. Note also that examples 4 and 6 are, respectively, the very beginning of the short story and of the novel.

4) In *A good man is hard to find*, the author employed a paragraph in which situation and characters' description is interspersed with the interaction proper; later on, the description is gradually dropped, and interaction proceeds then:

> The grandmother didn't want to go to Florida. She wanted to visit some of her connections in east Tennessee and she was seizing at every chance to change Bailey's mind. **Bailey** was the son she lived with, her only boy. He **was sitting on the edge of his chair at the table, bent over the orange sports section of the *Journal*. "Now look here, Bailey," she said, "see here, read this," and she stood with one hand on her thin hip and the other rattling the newspaper at his bald head. "Here this fellow that calls himself The Misfit is aloose from the Federal Pen and headed toward Florida and you read here what it says he did to these people. Just you read it. I wouldn't take my children in any direction with a criminal like that aloose in it. I couldn't answer to my conscience if I did."** (*A good man is hard to find*, p. 137)

5) In *The rocking-horse winner*, the paragraphs preceding the conversational exchange contain no description of the situation or of the characters; no indication that characters' voices will soon be introduced is provided either. The only indirect link these paragraphs bear with the interaction that follows is the "unspoken topic: *There must be more money!*" Yet, after the first utterance is said, the author inserts an internal, and very economical, way of in-transition signaling, namely "said . . . one day." In this specific case, this device turns out to be highly economical because it also introduces the boy's name, which has not been mentioned before. Additionally, the term of address informs us about the party who the boy is trying to engage in interaction (in italics). The paragraph reproduced below is the last in a series of three such short paragraphs:

Yet nobody ever said it aloud. The whisper was everywhere, and therefore no one spoke it. Just as no one says: "We are breathing!" in spite of the fact that breath is coming and going all the time.

"*Mother*," said the boy Paul one day, "why don't we keep a car of our own? Why do we always use uncle's, or else a taxi?" (*The rocking-horse winner*, p. 306)

6) In *Pride and prejudice*, there are two short paragraphs introducing the general topic which will be later developed by the characters on the course of their interaction (lasting for almost the entire chapter in the novel). Note the use of "said . . . one day," after the character used the term of address which serves to introduce both the characters themselves and their relationship with each other—Mr. and Mrs. Bennet (in italics):

> It is a truth universally acknowledged that a single man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife.
>
> However little known the feelings or views of such a man may be on his first entering a neighbourhood, this truth is so well fixed in the minds of the surrounding families, that he is considered as the rightful property of some one or other of their daughters.
>
> **'*My dear Mr Bennet*,' said his lady to him one day, 'have you heard that Netherfield Park is let at last?'** (*Pride and prejudice*, p. 1)

In addition to the use of the in-transition devices explicated above, authors also employed out-transition devices. These devices differ from the preceding ones in that out-transition devices encompass a smaller number of phenomena. In all selected pieces, out-transitions systematically coincide with the closing of: a stage in a major on-going conversational activity (example 7); a section or chapter in the narrative (examples 8a and 8b); or an encounter (example 9). Sometimes indirectly telling of an utterance appears at the very end of the interaction, maybe to signal that the narrator is about to seize the floor once again (example 8a). At other times, the sort of closing in question may be followed by a transition paragraph in which some sort of assessment/recapitulation is provided and which, in its turn, leads to the closing of a section/chapter in the narrative (example 10).

7) In *The cask of Amontillado*, we have an instance of the first type of out-transition device mentioned above. Here, there is coincidence between the end of the conversation exchange and the end of a stage in the major on-going interaction. Note the gradual change between situational features of the interaction which is being closed into the main description of the events in the story itself:

> **"Be it so,"** **I said, replacing the tool beneath the cloak, and again offering him my arm.** He leaned upon it heavily. We continued our route in search of the Amontillado. We passed through a range of low arches, descended, passed on, and descending again, arrived at a deep crypt, in which the foulness of the air caused our flambeaux rather to glow than flame. (*The cask of Amontillado*, p. 194)

8a) In *A good man is hard to find*, the author represents the girl's final reply to her grandmother indirectly, which, as suggested above, may be indicative that a shift to layer 1 is about to take place. Immediately after the girl's reply there is a new paragraph which advances the main narrative. Note that this paragraph starts by explicitly mentioning a change in time, thus, a change in the scene, or rather, a change in section of the narrative:

> **"All right, Miss,"** **the grandmother said. "Just remember that the next time you want me to curl your hair."**
> *June Star said her hair was naturally curly.*
> The next morning the grandmother was the first one in the car, ready to go. She had her big black valise (...) (*A good man is hard to find*, p. 138)

8b) In *Wild Hearts: On the edge*, we can find the sort of out-transition which signals the closing of a chapter in the novel. Here, there is a one-line paragraph which describes the subsequent actions that follow the girl's last utterance. These actions clearly mark the close of the encounter as well as the end of the chapter:

> **"I love you, too,"** **I finally said, "but I don't want either one of you to take care of me, Darryl. I want to take care of myself."**
> **Then I started my Jeep, and I drove away.** (*Wild Hearts: On the edge*, p. 59)

9) In *Nancy Drew on campus # 24: In the spotlight*, the interaction closes down when participants change their configuration and move away in a clear sign that the encounter has come to its end. In the following illustration, as Montana turns and starts to leave, Cory tries to engage her in another encounter but fails:

> **"Look, I'd better go. I just wanted to say you guys were great. I'd stick around, but I've got a ton of homework to do. Good luck with your second set." Montana turned around and started walking.** She felt she might die of embarrassment unless she got outside immediately. Ray wasn't interested in her— at all! She heard the door to Jason's office open and close behind her as Ray stepped inside.
> **Go upstairs, Montana coached herself. Get your coat—**
> **"Montana?" Cory stepped away from the pay phone mounted on the wall, "Hey, I—"**
> **Montana didn't hear another word.** Cory'd been in the hall all the time, she realized, (...) (*Nancy Drew on campus # 24: In the spotlight*, p. 67)

10) In *Pride and prejudice*, the out-transition device employed encompasses the closing of the interaction and of the encounter. It also happens to preface the end of the chapter itself, which takes just another narrative paragraph to end:

> **'Depend upon it, my dear, that when there are twenty, I will visit them all.'**
> Mr Bennet was so odd a mixture of quick parts, sarcastic humour, reserve, and caprice, that the experience of three and twenty years had been insufficient to make his wife understand his character. *Her* mind was less difficult to develope. [14] She was a woman of mean understanding, little information, and uncertain temper. When she was discontented, she fancied herself nervous. The business of her life was to get her daughters married; its solace was visiting and news. (*Pride and prejudice*, pp. 2-3)

In short, it seems that these transition devices function as a means by which authors accomplish changes in footing, which eventually determine a re-framing of the main interaction. In fact, these devices appear to function in a similar way as the coordinated changes in the contextualization cues that Erickson and Shultz (1981, 1982) have demonstrated to be deployed during junctures, or transitions from one stage in an interactional event to the next. In addition, as I have suggested before, through the re-framing of current interaction, authors mark off the boundaries which distinguish one

communicative, or discursive, layer from the other. As a result, the layer in which characters' performance takes place (and where the narrator's turn is temporarily suspended) can be isolated and an interactional sociolinguistic analysis of what participants are doing in this layer becomes feasible. For this reason, I used these transitions to help me segment the conversational exchanges from the main narrative discourse.

Yet, it is also clear from the foregoing illustrations that such transition devices may also contain contextual material which is relevant to the understanding of the conversational exchanges whose boundaries they mark off. This posed another difficulty concerning what exactly could be considered as part of the interaction, or rather, how to distinguish those glossing materials which make up surrounding reporting discourse relevant to the understanding of the exchange from those other, irrelevant materials which constitute general descriptive or narrative discourse.

Considering what has been discussed in section 3.1, and having the emic perspective of analysis in mind, I decided to include all contextualization material which participants (characters) could be demonstrated to be orienting to and, consequently, omit any other kind of material perceived as belonging exclusively to the main discursive layer. By "relevant to participants," I mean any item, action or situational feature, which influence the production and interpretation of characters' actions, thus determining the course of their interaction. In examples 1, 2, 4, 7, 8a, 8b, and 9 above, I have used bold type to highlight the items which are regarded as relevant to, thus as part of, the interaction in question.

Finally, there were times in which the exchanges in the story were too long to be used entirely. Therefore, I had to stop their progression at certain places. When this was necessary, I made an effort to segment them further in those places where I perceived

that a certain event or speech activity had come to an end and another one would start. I tried, thus, to follow a similar procedure to the one I perceived that authors themselves used in separating events in a major interaction.

3.2.3 Preparation of represented conversational exchanges for analysis

In preparing the selected pieces for analysis, I had to face a problem that many researchers working in the fields of conversation analysis and interactional sociolinguistics have already described: the issue of how to transcribe and present data (Ochs, 1979; Psathas, 1995).

Differently from analysts in those fields, I had to deal with particular difficulties concerning the nature of the material used in this study, in which, for example, glossing material may appear either interspersed with the turns at talk or within the transition devices described in the previous section. Due to this, I had to consider, first, the import of the glossing for the actions being performed. When the relevance of such glossing was apparent, I had to decide whether the glossing would accompany the utterance which it preceded or followed, and whether it was being perceived by interactants as an action on its own—and thus, as an individual turn. What I needed, then, was a compromise solution which could enhance the process of analysis while allowing the data to be recognized as represented interaction. In order to attain this, I have devised a set of conventions which are used throughout the analysis of the excerpted pieces.

These conventions are summed up as follows (see Appendix):

1) Each piece of represented conversational exchange is numbered, and indication of the source from which it has been excerpted is provided;

2) All lines in the transcribed excerpt are progressively numbered;

3) Characters' actions are indicated sequentially in turn-by-turn manner:

3.1) turns at talk are indicated by characters' initials;

3.2) quotation marks have been eliminated from utterances;

4) Relevant situational or contextual features of the surrounding reporting discourse appear in italics, in double square brackets—e.g. [[*he said*]]:

4.1) at the same place in which they appeared in the narrative, in cases when they supply additional information to the action being performed in a particular turn; or

4.2) in isolation, in a line of their own, when they represent an action which is intrinsic neither to the previous, nor to the following turn;

5) Items of the main narrative discourse constituting elements of characters' prior knowledge made relevant to the on-going interaction appear in italics, in double braces—e.g. {{*Oh, God*}};

6) Irrelevant items of the surrounding reporting discourse appearing on the course of the interaction are suppressed, and this is indicated by three dots in parentheses—(...).

All these changes in the excerpts of the narratives have been devised in order to make referencing to the stretches under analysis clear and easy to follow. Apart from that, the conversational exchanges suffered no further changes.

CHAPTER 4

EMPLOYING INTERACTIONAL SOCIOLINGUISTIC CONCEPTS AND AN EMIC PERSPECTIVE TO THE ANALYSIS OF REPRESENTED CONVERSATIONAL EXCHANGES

4.1 Analysis of fictional characters' conversational exchanges

In this chapter, I employ interactional sociolinguistic concepts and an emic perspective to the analysis of excerpts from three short stories and three novels. The excerpted segments were taken from the following works: Edgar A. Poe's *The cask of Amontillado*, Flannery O'Connor's *A good man is hard to find*, D. H. Lawrence's *The rocking-horse winner*, Jane Austen's *Pride and prejudice*, Cherie Bennett's *Wild Hearts: On the edge*, and Carolyn Keene's *Nancy Drew on campus # 24: In the spotlight*.

Analysis of the pieces selected is carried out in several stages. First, the excerpted pieces are analyzed in terms of the mechanisms and techniques that the author projected into and are displayed in characters' interaction. In other words, in this first stage of the analysis, I explicate what participants are doing through what they utter, how this is done, and their nonlinguistic behavior as well. Characters' emergent interactional mechanisms/actions are, then, compared to those which previous conversation analytical and interactional sociolinguistic research has demonstrated to be operative in real, naturally occurring face-to-face interaction. Similarities or differences which arise from this comparison are emphasized as analysis of the excerpts proceeds. In aiming at attempting to describe the extent to which the two sorts of interaction can be regarded as

similar, I focus on the discussion of those emergent mechanisms/actions which seem to work in a similar way as in real interaction.

I start up the report of the analysis by presenting a detailed—turn-by-turn—analysis of the first two excerpts. This is done because, as I have suggested in section 2.1.3, an issue was raised as to whether or not there may be a specific kind of turn-taking system which is employed in represented interaction. If so, then it is profitable to see if this "projected turn-taking system" (as I have provisionally termed it) still bears enough similarities with its naturally occurring counterpart—the "basic" turn-taking system as described by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson ([1974] 1978).

Yet, since this does not constitute the primary focus of this study, in the remaining excerpts, I concentrate on the analysis of specific mechanisms/actions, thus also avoiding unnecessary repetition, for, whatever the features of the "projected turn-taking system," they are assumed to be systematically employed in all the excerpted pieces. Of course, if there are any deviations from it or if other features appear in the remaining excerpts, they will be eventually attended to. Otherwise, the conventionalized transcription can suffice to indicate how characters' actions are sequentially organized in the excerpted exchanges.

The remaining excerpts, thus, are further segmented, and only the segments being focused on are transcribed in this chapter. Full-scale excerpts are provided in the Appendix at the end of this thesis.

4.1.1 Conversational exchange 1: E. A. Poe's *The cask of Amontillado*

This short story is a piece of writing in which the feature of lamination/layering has been fairly explored. It is mainly developed through the two characters—the narrator (Montresor) and Fortunato—interacting with each other. Narration and

description of events are actually very brief. Additionally, layering has been managed so as to foreground participants' asymmetric access to the two layers, or domains. On the one hand, at the beginning of the story, readers are told about the narrator's intention of satisfying his strong desire of revenge due to Fortunato's having allegedly insulted him. On the other hand, Fortunato, who only has access to the events that happen in layer 2, is utterly unaware of Montresor's feelings and what he has plotted against him, because "neither by word nor deed had [Montresor] given Fortunato cause to doubt [his] good-will" (p. 191).

Thus, in spite of Montresor's hidden agenda, when he and Fortunato meet, he behaves in his usual manner—from his own and Fortunato's point of view. Fortunato, who, as any real person in the world, cannot possibly know what is going on in his party's mind—unless, of course, the other lets it show—, has no reason to suspect the other's intentions. As a result, he also displays his usual conduct. For readers, who also have access to characters' interaction in layer 2, the fact that this interaction can be perceived as normal is in sharp contrast with what readers are told in layer 1.

Therefore, from readers' perspective, the contrast between the two layers is what causes the effect of horror towards the narrator's pathologic attitude and behavior in general. This is also significant from an analytical stance. An analyst whose concern is the actions performed by characters should be careful enough to look at characters' interaction from their own perspective, and avoid judgement based on the discursive elements to which readers (but not the characters) can have access. This is the stance I take in the present analysis.

There is yet an element which has an important role in both layers and which, for this reason, should receive analytical attention: the situational setting. The fact that characters meet each other during carnival season and that Fortunato, who had been

drinking, is already drunk. Together these two features of the situation set up (in readers' and in characters' minds alike) the expectation that some degree of unusualness or strangeness is likely. This turns out to be relevant for characters' interaction in the sense that it can justify parties—especially Fortunato—letting pass a few "odd" elements in the other's behavior which otherwise could turn into an issue for participants—in the story universe as out in the real world too. I also integrate this element to the emic perspective of the analysis that follows.

The point of the present analysis, though, goes beyond merely reiterating the ordinariness of characters' interaction from their standpoint and the specific situation where the interaction takes place. It aims at demonstrating what degree of ordinariness is displayed in the mechanisms and techniques employed by interactants as the interaction unfolds. I shall now turn to this.

As suggested in section 3.2.2, the short story in question consists of one single encounter, or interaction, which unfolds on a stage-by-stage basis. The following excerpt depicts the moment when Montresor (the narrator) and Fortunato first meet and start interacting. The opening of this encounter is partly narrated in the paragraph which immediately precedes the introduction of the characters' utterances (see example 1 on p. 67) and is partly accomplished in the narrator's first turn at speaking:

01 M: [[*I said to him:*]] My dear Fortunato, you are luckily met. How

02   remarkably well you are looking to-day! But I have received a pipe

03   of what passes for Amontillado, and I have my doubts.

Here, the narrator's first utterances in turn 1 (*l.* 1-3) function as a transition between the exchange of initial greetings (the end of the opening section) and the discussion of the topic which is presently Montresor's worry—the issue of whether or not what he had purchased is genuine Amontillado. Since Fortunato claims to be a wine

connoisseur, Montresor has reasons to be glad to have the opportunity of sharing his problem and hopefully having the issue settled. This explains why Fortunato is "luckily met" (*l.* 1). This rushed introduction of the topic does not seem inappropriate for Fortunato, who shows no such concern in his next turn (*l.* 4-5)—just as it would not in the real world. For, as we can see later (*l.* 6-7), the topic involves financial affairs ("I was silly enough to pay the full Amontillado price"), and all this is going on "in the middle of the carnival" (*l.* 4-5), which makes the issue both relevant and urgent.

The last utterance in this first turn is designed both to inform Fortunato about the deliverance of the wine ("I have received a pipe of what passes for Amontillado") and, most significantly, to highlight Montresor's suspicion that the sherry might not be authentic: "what passes for Amontillado" and "I have my doubts." This latter sentence in particular also does a further job, that of prefacing a request (Levinson, 1983).

Levinson, following Schegloff (1979), observes that in real, naturally occurring talk-in-interaction "prompting an offer is an action preferable to performing a request" (1983, p. 343). Thus, "a turn designed to prefigure a request," a pre-request, "provides the possibility of recipient performing an offer instead" (p. 343). Moreover, this sort of pre-sequence only accomplishes the task it was designed to fulfill contingently, that is, when the recipient displays "uptake and assessment of a speaker's in process talk" (Schegloff, 1995, p. 192).

Now, what we have in this specific interaction is evidence that Fortunato does not orient to the pre-request in Montresor's prior turn. Rather, Fortunato prioritizes the informational content of "I have received a pipe of what passes for Amontillado" (*l.* 2-3) over the implied doubt and consequent need for **his** help in Montresor's utterances: "you are luckily met," "what passes for" and "I have my doubts." We can confidently say so, based on what Fortunato produces in his next turn (*l.* 4-5), which ratifies the

relevance of the topic for Fortunato and also indicates that the narrator's doubts may be well-founded for the unexpectedness of the situation. Another reason why we can say so is the insistent repetition of "I have my doubts" in the narrator's subsequent turns. First, in line 6, when Montresor adds an account of why, despite the doubt, he had paid for the wine (*l.* 6-8): "You were not to be found, and I was fearful of losing a bargain," an account which is also designed to emphasize his need for Fortunato's help in the matter ("without consulting you in the matter. You were not to be found..."); Secondly, in a turn of its own (*l.* 10), which makes the doubt most evidently the focus of attention; and, finally, in line 12, when Montresor explicitly says that he must satisfy his doubts:

04 F: How? [[*said he.*]] Amontillado? A pipe? Impossible! And in the

05   middle of the carnival!

06 M: I have my doubts, [[*I replied,*]] and I was silly enough to pay the full

07   Amontillado price without consulting you in the matter. You were

08   not to be found, and I was fearful of losing a bargain.

09 F: Amontillado!

10 M: I have my doubts.

11 F: Amontillado!

12 M: And I must satisfy them.

13 F: Amontillado!

As we can see, in all these occasions, Fortunato fails to recognize Montresor's pre-request and, thus, to produce the offer made relevant when "I have my doubts" was first uttered. Instead, he keeps marveling about the unexpectedness of the event: "Amontillado!" (*l.* 9, 11, 13). Now, not only does the repetition of this echo-sentence indicate that Fortunato did not hear the pre-request as such, but, in fact, it suggests that he did not hear it at all. For it is designed in such a way that it appears to be a response to Montresor's first turn (*l.* 1-3) rather than to his insistent attempts to prompt the offer.

"Amontillado!" does not connect with any of Montresor's actions in lines 6-8, 10, or 12. Yet it seems to connect back to his utterances in lines 1-3.

As a result, a sort of vicious circle originates, preventing the interaction to unfold smoothly. Neither does Fortunato's utterance constitute the offer made relevant before, nor does it give Montresor the opportunity to go on and formulate a request for help. Therefore, Montresor's next turn (*l.* 14-15) is intended to break this circle and allow for either action to be accomplished:

14 M:	As you are engaged, I am on my way to Luchesi. If any one has a
15	critical turn, it is he. He will tell me—
16 F:	Luchesi cannot tell Amontillado from Sherry.

The turn in lines 14-15 is evidence that Montresor—as any ordinary person—assumes that Fortunato's not orienting to the pre-request signals his unwillingness to help. What Montresor produces in this turn, then, is shaped to challenge Fortunato's expertise in the matter, maybe in the hope that the offer will eventually come. This is done by the suggestion that somebody else (Luchesi) may be more willing to cooperate, besides being knowledgeable enough on the subject.

As we can see (*l.* 16), Fortunato's reaction is quick this time. He produces his turn in partial overlap with the narrator's utterance, interrupting it mid-course. But still what Fortunato produces is not the desired offer. Rather, he responds to the possibility that Luchesi's expertise can be regarded as superior to his own.

In other words, the narrator's challenge (*l.* 14-15) opens the possibility for Fortunato—as any ordinary person in the real world—performing one (or both) of the following actions: either responding to the literal challenge or displaying his disposition to solve the issue himself. Fortunato takes up only the first option (*l.* 16).

Seeing that he has finally managed to attract Fortunato's attention to the issue, Montresor presses him. By challenging him further, Montresor manages to prompt the "offer" in the end:

> 17 M: And yet some fools will have it that his taste is a match for your
>
> 18   own.
>
> 19 F: Come, let us go.

Yet, the "offer" does not come out as such at all. Instead, it takes a command format (*l*. 19). This evidences that Fortunato is not really being sympathetic to Montresor's plight. If so, he would have produced the offer made relevant much earlier on in the interaction. Fortunato's command comes out because, as his vanity has been provoked, he now wants to prove his superiority over Luchesi.

Moreover, the fact that Montresor has repeatedly refrained from explicitly requesting Fortunato's help, together with Fortunato's authoritarian action—when he could have taken a more egalitarian stance—, suggests an uneven power relation between them, both in terms of social status and knowledge. This is confirmed later in the interaction by Montresor's next turns (*l*. 21-22, and 24-26) as well as by Fortunato's repetition of the command "come" (*l*. 23). Therefore, Fortunato is portrayed as a member of a social and intellectual élite, to which Montresor seems not to belong. This sort of uneven power relation that pours into their interaction can also appear in real talk-in-interaction. Uneven power relations can ordinarily be projected into real people's interaction by means of the identities parties assume through, for instance, their footings (Aronsson, 1998).

Also, Fortunato's command (*l*. 19) comes out so unexpectedly, at a moment when going to Luchesi's has turned into the current topic, that it makes Montresor—as it could make anyone in the real world— confused:

20 M: Whither?

21 F: To your vaults.

Montresor's question, then, makes it relevant for Fortunato to produce an answer and

clarify the ambiguity perceived in his previous turn (*l.* 19), which he does in line 21.

This turn also functions as the closing of the extended sequence which was initially

designed as a pre-sequence but which took longer than usual to be fully realized. In real

interaction, pre-sequences are generally accomplished in fewer turns and require less

effort on interactants' part (Levinson, 1983). However, Schegloff (1995) demonstrates

that, when a party fails to recognize the action being performed by the other—such as a

pre-request—, those sequences can be considerably extended, as in this interaction.

The next turn (*l.* 22-23) launches another interactional sequence in which

Montresor tries to convince Fortunato that the need to have the issue about the

authenticity of the wine settled seconds Fortunato's welfare:

22 M: My friend, no; I will not impose upon your good nature. I perceive

23   you have an engagement. Luchesi—

24 F: I have no engagement;—come.

25 M: My friend, no. It is not the engagement, but the severe cold with

26   which I perceive you are afflicted. The vaults are insufferably

27   damp. They are encrusted with nitre.

28 F: Let us go, nevertheless. The cold is merely nothing. Amontillado!

28   You have been imposed upon. And as for Luchesi, he cannot

29   distinguish Sherry from Amontillado.

30   *[[Thus speaking, Fortunato possessed himself of my arm. Putting on a mask*

31   *of black silk, and drawing a roquelaire closely about my person, I suffered him*

32   *to hurry me to my palazzo.]]* [15]

First, Montresor attempts to dissuade Fortunato from going to the vaults by showing deference to the other. Montresor seems to realize that he might probably have been too pushy, for he acknowledges Fortunato's superior position and backdowns from imposing himself on Fortunato (*l.* 22-23). But, as soon as Montresor begins to suggest that he can content himself with the opinion of a second best, Fortunato interrupts him once more (*l.* 24). Now Fortunato quickly dismisses the possibility of being engaged ("I have no engagement") and assures Montresor that he is actually determined to check things over: "come."

Montresor, then, foregrounds his worry in relation to Fortunato's health condition as a means to dissuade the other, which is another sign of deference (*l.* 25-27). Fortunato, however, quickly dismisses Montresor's worries as unimportant compared to his urgency of solving the issue (*l.* 28-30). Thus, Fortunato takes Montresor by the arm and prompts him to move (*l.* 30-32). This action is demonstrably perceived by Montresor as a proposal to close the discussion because he prefers not to argue and follows the other.

In short, as I have emphasized throughout the above analysis, this interaction displays some mechanisms and techniques which previous research has demonstrated to be operative in the sequential organization of ordinary talk-in-interaction. I have highlighted how the interpretation of each turn determines the shape of the forthcoming turn and how turns connect to topic, conditional relevance and preference to determine the course of the interaction. I have concentrated on showing how a sequence can be extended when one party fails to recognize and orient to the action performed by the other in a prior turn. Also, I have showed evidence that social identities can be realized in represented interaction as in the ordinary world.

I shall now proceed to the analysis of the second excerpt taken from the same short story. After this analysis, I will be able to resume the issue concerning what I am referring to as "the projected turn-taking system."

4.1.2 Conversational exchange 2: E. A. Poe's *The cask of Amontillado*

The core of the analysis of this exchange concerns the sequence which is launched by Fortunato's first turn (*l.* 5-6) and which extends itself until line 23. This sequence evidences how characters' interaction representation can be attuned to issues of local management of talk-in-interaction.

In the following excerpt, the two characters are in the vaults in the narrator's palazzo and are going farther into them. Due to the nitre all around them, the narrator had unsuccessfully tried to persuade Fortunato to go back twice. Fortunato, however, insisted that his cough is not serious enough to prevent them from checking the authenticity of the Amontillado. Montresor, then, made him drink some wine in order to keep him warm.

At this point, Montresor has just made Fortunato stop and listen to him (see example 2 on p. 68). Montresor is once again urging Fortunato to give up their enterprise for his health's sake:

01 M: The nitre! [[*I said;*]] see, it increases. It hangs like moss upon the

02   vaults. We are below the river's bed. The drops of moisture trickle

03   among the bones. Come, we will go back ere it is too late. Your

04   cough—

05 F: It is nothing, [[*he said;*]] let us go on. But first, another draught of

06   the Médoc.

As we can see from Fortunato's reply (*l.* 5), produced once more in partial overlap with and interrupting Montresor's prior turn (*l.* 4), he will not give it up: "It is nothing,

let us go on." This can once again be viewed as a sign of Fortunato's higher power status over Montresor's (see section 4.1.1, p. 83). In producing his utterance like that, Fortunato is actually issuing a strong disagreement with what Montresor said in his prior turn.

Such a disagreement, according to Pomerantz (1984a), constitutes a dispreferred action in real face-to-face conversation inasmuch as it happens after a turn where an agreement is ordinarily relevant and preferred as a next action. Due to this, when disagreements occur instead, they are usually mitigated by being shaped as partial disagreements often prefaced by delay devices such as silence, repair initiators, requests for clarification, and so on (Pomerantz, 1984a).

Now, as we have seen, Fortunato's turn does not include any such devices. On the contrary, his utterance as well as the fact that it characterizes an interruption forestall Montresor's probable argumentation. Besides that, Fortunato immediately introduces another utterance in the same turn, which briskly closes down the topic concerning his health and introduces another topic.

The second utterance in this turn ("But first, another draught of the Médoc.") triggers off the sequence mentioned above. A sequence which is realized both verbally and non-verbally, just as sequences can be thus realized in ordinary, face-to-face interaction.

Goffman (1981) argues that, in some occasions, conversation itself may "be subordinated to an instrumental task at hand," thus allowing for "stretches of silence" which are neither "interludes between different encounters [nor] pauses within an encounter" (Goffman, 1981, p. 134) [16]. According to Goffman (1981), such conditions favor the development of what he terms an "open state of talk" (p. 134), where parties have "the right but not the obligation to initiate" talk (p. 135).

In this conversational exchange, the task that the characters are presently engaged in, and which assumes a dominant status over that of talk, is realized in the turns in lines 7 to 11:

07 M:	[[*I broke and reached him a flagon of De Grâve.*]]
08 F:	[[*He emptied it at a breath. His eyes flashed with a fierce light. He laughed*
09	*and threw the bottle upward with gesticulation I did not understand.*]]
10 M:	[[*I looked at him in surprise.*]]
11 F:	[[*He repeated the movement—a grotesque one*]] You do not comprehend?
04	[[*he said.*]]
13 M:	Not I, [[*I replied.*]]

Here, it is characters' behavior, rather than utterances, which conveys communicative meaning. The significance of the non-verbal actions in these turns, especially gestures and eye gaze, evidences the crucial role played by the reporting discourse in the narrative. It renders such non-verbal actions, which in ordinary, face-to-face interaction (as in layer 2 reality) are readily available to parties' visual sense, accessible to the eyes of readers. Otherwise, it would be hard, if not impossible, for readers to make sense of the verbal sequence that follows it (from line 11 on), or even to make sense of the interaction as it were.

It is clear that "He laughed and threw the bottle upward with gesticulation I did not understand." (*l.* 8-9) determines Montresor's behavior in line 10. Also, the action he produces in this turn, and which is accomplished solely by his eye gaze and expression ("I looked at him in surprise."), has further interactional consequences. It prompts Fortunato's repetition of his previous gesture (*l.* 11) which, then, functions as an answer to Montresor's unspoken question (*l.* 10). The fact that Fortunato formulates a verbal action, besides repeating the gesture, makes it quite clear that he perceives Montresor's look as a question—a question designed so as to ask for an explanation for the

production of such a "grotesque" gesture, perhaps because it was unexpected. Yet, instead of supplying the explanation made relevant by Montresor's prior turn, Fortunato formulates another question ("You do not comprehend?"—*l.* 11) to ask for confirmation whether the inference he has drawn from Montresor's gesture is right; Montresor's answer ("Not I"—*l.* 13), then, supplies such confirmation.

The above segment demonstrates that characters appear to do just as parties in ordinary conversation, who co-construct their interaction by making inferences about each other's local (turn-by-turn) actions and by, then, producing their own actions based on those inferences. Moreover, this can be accomplished by means of turn constructional units which function (as I have shown throughout the analysis of the segment in question) in a rather similar way as in real interaction.

By looking once again at Fortunato's question in line 11, for instance, we can see that it starts another sequence which constitutes an example of a quite elaborate interactional mechanism operative in ordinary conversation: an embedded sequence of adjacency pairs (Levinson, 1983; Schegloff, 1972; Schegloff and Sacks, 1973).

Here, "You do not comprehend?" evidences how the production of a second pair part made relevant after the first part has been produced (an answer—second part—to Montresor's question—first part) can be suspended because a first pair part of yet another adjacency pair has been produced instead (again a question-answer type of pair). Its production, thus, prompting the other party (Montresor) to supply the now much more conditionally relevant second part of the second pair ("Not I"). After this has been produced, parties can then resume the suspended pair.

In the case of the present interaction, this means that, upon having his question answered, Fortunato can provide the explanation Montresor is still expecting to get. The explanation does come eventually, however, it is provided in an indirect way.

Fortunato's previous question (*l.* 11) also functions as an introduction to the relevant explanation. Montresor's answer (*l.* 13) to this question allows Fortunato to get where he intends to, that is, to conclude that Montresor cannot recognize and understand his gesture because he does not belong to "the brotherhood." This can be seen in his next turn:

14 F: Then you are not of the brotherhood.

15 M: How?

16 F: You are not of the masons.

Yet, Montresor cannot make sense of Fortunato's explanation in line 14. Hence his initiation of repair in line 15. Fortunato, then, edits his previous utterance, this time making his point explicit: "You are not of the masons" (*l.* 16).

Taken together, these three turns constitute an instance of a sequence designed to perform a specific interactional task: "repair." For Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks (1977), "repair" encompasses a wide range of phenomena concerning how parties deal with local problems of communication, including self-editing—which is precisely the phenomenon in question here.

Furthermore, repair can be accomplished in several ways, ranging from self-initiated self-repair to other-initiated other-repair (Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977). In the above sequence, the sort of repair being performed by the characters can be characterized as "other-initiated self-repair," ordinarily accomplished in three subsequent turns: a turn in which the trouble-source is first produced; a second turn, where another party prompts the producer of the trouble to repair it; and a third turn in which the producer has the chance to provide a repaired version of his previous turn (Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1997; Levinson, 1983). This is precisely the structure of the sequence above (*l.* 14-16), including the production of the repair initiator in line 15.

Montresor's next turn (*l.* 17) demonstrates that he could finally understand Fortunato's point. However, this turn, shaped as a series of emphatically repeated "yes's," carries some ambiguity. In ordinary conversation, a yes-initiated turn following a turn where information is provided signals that its producer is claiming prior knowledge regarding the information in question (Heritage, 1984). Not only does Fortunato's next turn (*l.* 18) demonstrate that he understood Montresor's "yes's" this way, it also shows that he understood Montresor to be claiming more, that is, to be claiming to be a member of the masons himself. Hence Fortunato's bafflement in line 18:

> 17 M: Yes, yes, [[*I said;*]] yes, yes.
>
> 18 F: You? Impossible! A mason?
>
> 19 M: A mason, [[*I replied.*]]

Montresor's answer in line 19 suggests that he is taking advantage of Fortunato's misunderstanding of what he has said previously. By asserting his membership, he ratifies Fortunato's inference. Yet, Fortunato perceives it as a contradiction in relation to Montresor's not recognizing his gesture before, which constitutes grounds enough for him to ask for further, and convincing, evidence for such an assertion:

> 20 F: A sign, [[*he said.*]]
>
> 21 M: It is this, [[*I answered, producing a trowel from beneath the folds of my*
>
> 22 *roquelaire.*]]

Here, it is worth highlighting the fact that, routinely, when people "make declarative assertions, they are proposing to represent actual states of affairs and are accountable for" that (Pomerantz, 1984b, p. 609). Therefore, Fortunato's challenge (*l.* 20) sounds quite ordinary in the context in which it is produced. In his next turn (*l.* 21-22), then, Montresor provides the relevant evidence; which is done both verbally and, most significantly, non-verbally.

At this point, it is clear that the interactants have been talking at cross-purposes without perhaps even noticing it. The narrator has understood Fortunato's utterances "You are not of the masons." and "A mason." not as a "freemason," which was the meaning intended by Fortunato, but as a "stonemason" or "bricklayer." So, it makes perfect sense for him to show Fortunato the trowel he has been carrying. But, of course, the trowel makes no sense at all for Fortunato, at least initially.

Now, one thing that I have argued for all through this thesis is that characters' interaction can be represented in such a way so as to suggest the impression that they are, in fact, co-constructing it. Jacoby and Ochs (1995) define co-construction as "the joint creation of a form, interpretation, stance, action, (...) or other culturally meaningful reality" (p. 171). Furthermore, they emphasize that, in being a joint project, co-construction of coherence in discourse presupposes "collaboration, cooperation, and coordination" (p. 171) between interactants.

Fortunato's first actions in the next turn are additional and definite evidence of the fact that, in represented exchanges, characters appear to be co-constructing their interaction:

23 F: You jest, [[*he exclaimed, recoiling a few paces.*]] But let us proceed to the

24   Amontillado.

25 M: Be it so, [[*I said, replacing the tool beneath the cloak, and again offering him*

26   *my arm.*]]

In line 23, Fortunato's effort in collaborating and cooperating with his party in making sense of their interaction is clear. "You jest" turns out to be the most plausible interpretation for the production of such an oddly concrete sign of membership; a sign which apparently has nothing to do with "the brotherhood." Therefore, in spite of his moving backwards and the astonishment coloring his utterance (*"he exclaimed recoiling*

a few paces"), Fortunato seems to reason that it is carnival season, after all, so it may well be the case that Montresor is acting appropriately in the end. Thus, Fortunato lets it pass what could otherwise be made an issue.

This is also evidenced in his next utterance in the same turn "But let us proceed to the Amontillado." With this, Fortunato proposes to close the matter regarding the trowel and Montresor's possible membership as a Mason by bringing them back to their initial concern. The narrator quickly takes up Fortunato's proposal (*l.* 25), and they once again turn their attention to walking farther into the vaults. (*l.* 25-26). This means that this stage in the interaction is also closed down.

This last segment not only is crucial for the characters' interaction but also for the narrative as a whole. The moment when Montresor removes the trowel from underneath his costume is actually a potential turning point in the course of both interaction and story. Here, Fortunato's suspicion as for Montresor's intentions could have been raised to the point of his demanding an explanation for the absurdity of the "membership sign." The narrator's plan of revenge could, then, have been put at risk, if not totally spoilt. As a result, the outcome of both the interaction and the story could have been altered.

To reiterate, what the foregoing analysis serves to evidence is that the essentially collaborative nature of real talk-in-interaction can be preserved in represented conversational exchanges, since we can see that character's actions are projected in such a way that they appear to be monitoring and analyzing each other's moves in order to plan their own next moves.

I have also showed that this is accomplished in a local (turn-by-turn) basis and by means of complex and elaborate mechanisms and techniques which previous conversation analytic research has demonstrated to be operative in real, face-to-face

interaction. Such mechanisms include: embedded sequences of adjacency pairs, agreement/disagreement sequences, and repair sequences; all of which having the possibility of being realized linguistically, non-linguistically, or both.

I have also showed that, just as in real interaction, the occurrence of overlap, interruption, repetition, and requests for evidence play a significant role in determining the course of events.

Finally, I have demonstrated that just as real social actors' identities can be projected in their on-going interaction, so can characters' identities, especially their statuses, be projected into their conversational exchanges.

As I have said before, in the analysis of the exchanges that follow, I shall concentrate on examining sequences where specific mechanisms are employed by authors to represent specific actions accomplished by characters.

4.1.3 Conversational exchange 3: Flannery O'Connor's *A good man is hard to find*

In this excerpt, there are two interactional moments. The first concerns the old lady's unsuccessful attempts to engage in conversation, alternatively, her son (Bailey) and her daughter-in-law (*l.* 1-15). Following this, there is the activity which her grandchildren (John Wesley and June Star) jointly engage in: the "picking-on-the-old-lady job" (*l.* 16-28).

However, the focus of the analysis of this excerpt does not fall on explicating how those moments are accomplished. Rather, I focus on specific features that emerge on the course of the activities in question. I start by looking into how silence and body posture concur to defining the first interactional moment—just as in real, face-to-face interaction. Then I concentrate on the issue of parties' speaking rights and how this

transpires in the interaction. I also focus on the use of innuendo (and the related participation framework operative in it) needed for "picking-on-the-old-lady."

The interaction in this excerpt starts in the middle of the very first paragraph of the short story (see example 5 on p. 71), where readers are told that the old lady does not want to go to Florida. Presumably it has already been decided that they are all going to Florida. Instead, she would rather go to east Tennessee, and "she was seizing at every chance to change Bailey's mind" (p. 137).

In the segment below, although the family members are presently engaged in different activities, the fact that they are all gathered up in the living area makes them accessible to one another, which means that talk can be initiated by any of them at any moment.

The old lady and her son Bailey are sitting at the table reading the newspaper when she breaks the silence to address her son:

01 OL:		Now look here, Bailey, [[*she said,*]] see here, read this,
→	02	[[*and she stood with one hand on her thin hip and the other rattling the*
→	03	*newspaper at his bald head.*]] Here this fellow that calls himself The
	04	Misfit is aloose from the Federal Pen and headed toward Florida
	05	and you read here what it says he did to these people. Just you read
	06	it. I wouldn't take my children in any direction with a criminal like
	07	that aloose in it. I couldn't answer to my conscience if I did.
——→	08 B:	[[*Bailey didn't look up from his reading,*]]
→	09 OL:	[[*so she wheeled around then and faced the children's mother, (...) She was*
	10	*sitting on the sofa, feeding the baby his apricots out of a jar.*]] The children
	11	have been to Florida before, [[*the old lady said.*]] You all ought to
	12	take them somewhere else for a change so they would see different

13   parts of the world and be broad. They never have been to east

14   Tennessee.

⟶ 15 B's W: [[*The children's mother didn't seem to hear her*]]

The short arrows in the above segment indicate the lines in which the old lady's body posture and movement as well as her gestures are being described. These descriptions evidence the role played by such postures, movements and gestures in the framing of the interactional situation. They allow parties to establish and "maintain differentiated access to one another and [facilitate] the maintenance of a common focus of attention" (Kendon, 1990, p. 209). In other words, such non-verbal behavior concur both to the establishment of participants' footings and of the participation framework (Goffman, 1981).

That the old lady is trying to engage Bailey in conversation is quite clear in her utterances in line 1. The use of the vocative indicates that, among those who are candidate participants in a likely conversation, Bailey is selected as her addressed recipient, the others being left in the position of mere bystanders (Goffman, 1981). The fact that the old lady, who was sitting at the table, now stands and gets closer to Bailey ("and she stood...") ratifies the establishment of such a participation framework.

The second short arrow in the segment in question (*l.* 9) points to yet another evidence that body posture and movement are attended to by authors in representing how a situation can be defined. Here, in seeing Bailey ostensibly not engaging in conversation with her, the old lady goes on to select another member of the gathering as her addressed recipient. This can clearly be seen in the way she re-arranges her body and especially her face so as to bodily address Bailey's wife. According to Kendon (1990), in an on-going encounter, "a new beginning in an interactive system is

associated with the establishment of a new orientation often of the trunk (...) or of the head" (p. 220).

Moreover, in discussing contextualization cues in talk-in-interaction, Gumperz (1992) claims that both body postures and facial movements serve to reflect and signal a transition from one stage of an encounter to another. He also argues that these non-verbal signs are coordinated with verbal signs (see also Erickson & Shultz, 1981, 1982). In the segment in question, this coordination of verbal and non-verbal signs becomes clear in the utterances that follow the old lady's new configuration. First of all, there is a marked change in the general tone of her discourse in relation to the utterances directed to Bailey (*l.* 1 and 3-7). Secondly, there is also a slight shift in topic in relation to her first turn. Now she is resorting to another sort of argument against their destination, an argument which has more to do with the business of the children's mother (the children's education) than the previous one (the family safety)—the business of a father—, in the story as out in the real social world.

Still in the same segment, the longer arrows indicate the two turns (*l.* 8 and 15) where narrative discourse represents a stretch of no talk which can be characterized as silence. In this case, attributable silence; for in both occasions it would be appropriate for the party being addressed (Bailey and his wife, respectively) to seize the floor after the old lady has completed her turn at speaking (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, [1974] 1978).

However, these silences happen at moments when the old lady is trying to engage Bailey and, later, his wife in the discussion of the topic concerning their trip to Florida. It seems that this is a matter which has already been settled. Still the old lady is insisting on attempting to impose her own will on everybody. In such circumstances, it is not surprising that both Bailey and his wife refuse to engage in a discussion which could

perhaps lead them into a direct confrontation with the old lady. Therefore, their silence is being used as a strategy to avoid such a confrontation.

Tannen (1990) has also showed evidence of the use of silence as a conflict management strategy in drama and fiction. Her analysis of such use was supported by the works of interactional sociolinguists who demonstrated that in real face-to-face interaction silence is a functional equivalent of noisy speech in "the management of strong but problematic emotions" (Saunders, 1985, p. 165, cited in Tannen, 1990, p. 260). That is to say that people may resort to silence in order to avoid potential conflict or confrontation, both in real and represented interaction. This is precisely how Bailey's and his wife's silence functions in the segment above.

I shall now turn to the analysis of the second interactional moment in this excerpt. As I said before, John Wesley and June Star have been assigned the position of bystanders, or, rather, overhearers, in relation to the dominant encounter (Goffman, 1981). This position limits their speaking rights: although they are entitled to (over)hear what is being said, they are not supposed to talk. Therefore, if the children are to be incorporated in the current established interactional system as official participants, they need to find a means to warrant them this status.

Sacks (1972) argues that, due to socio-cultural constraints, children's right to talk, especially to adults, is restricted. Thus, children need "to have a good start if [they are] going to get further than that" (Sacks, 1972, p. 343). Sacks also points out that questions are good starts in that whoever asks a question "has 'a reserved right to talk again,' after the one to whom he has addressed the question" answers it (p. 343).

The shorter arrows in the segment below indicate the moment when one of the kids, John Wesley, produces his first turn in the on-going interaction. John Wesley's turn is evidence of the sort of job children should do to warrant their right to talk,

particularly when they have the status of mere bystanders (in represented as in real interaction). First of all, the turn in question (*l.* 16-17) is produced after the old lady's unsuccessful attempts to engage the two adults in discussing the trip to Florida. In fact, John Wesley's turn is subsequent to his mother's silence (*l.* 15). Here, the addressed recipient (the mother), in having been selected as next speaker, declines to take the floor. This provides for a candidate next speaker to self-select (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, [1974] 1978), which justifies John Wesley's venture into speaking at this precise moment. Besides that, the boy's turn is shaped in a question format. As stated previously, this format consists of "a good start," which warrants him the right to go on speaking in a forthcoming turn.

→	16 JW:	[[*but the eight-year-old boy, John Wesley, (...) said,*]] If you don't want to
→	17	go to Florida, why dontcha stay at home? [[*He and the little girl, June*
	18	*Star, were reading the funny papers on the floor.*]]
⟶	19 JS:	She wouldn't stay at home to be queen for a day, [[*June Star said*
	20	*without raising her yellow head.*]]
	21 OL:	Yes and what would you do if this fellow, The Misfit, caught you?
	22	[[*the grandmother asked.*]]
	23 JW:	I'd smack his face, [[*John Wesley said.*]]
⟶	24 JS:	She wouldn't stay at home for a million bucks, [[*June Star said.*]]
⟶	25	Afraid she'd miss something. She has to go everywhere we go.
	26 OL:	All right, Miss, [[*the grandmother said.*]] Just remember that the next
	27	time you want me to curl your hair.

Finally, the first longer arrow in the above segment points to June Star's first turn at speaking (*l.* 19). June Star's producing her utterance at this specific point is evidence that, once one kid has breached the previously existing interactional framework and

secured a warrant to his right to speak, the other can feel confident enough to adhere to the new framework now under way. Also, since John Wesley has started the "picking-on-the-old-lady" job by shooting a provocative question at their grandmother (*l.* 16-17), the girl can now join him in this activity.

Goffman (1981) refers to the sort of communication in which at least two parties deal with each other, excluding a third party, "collusive byplay" (p. 134). The arrowed utterance in line 19 evidences that June Star is doing such a collusive work with her brother. Moreover, she accomplishes this by means of making the old lady the target of innuendo[17] (Goffman, 1981, p. 134)—just as any ordinary person in the real world could.

Finally, we can confidently say that the girl's use of innuendo is intended as a provocative action; an action designed to invite a confrontation with the old lady. Initial evidence to this lies in the offensive utterance the girl produces (*l.* 19). The girl's employing innuendo once more in lines 24-25, this time rephrasing and expanding her utterance, is further evidence to this. Last, the fact that the old lady promptly takes up the girl's challenge and engages in direct confrontation with her (*l.* 26-27) reinforces this claim.

To sum up, the analysis of the foregoing excerpt demonstrates that the author has employed a number of complex interactional mechanisms and strategies (body posture and movement, facial expression and eye gaze, silence, parties' asymmetric speaking rights and participation framework, collusion, and innuendo) to represent how characters—as ordinary people in the real world—establish interactional situations and accomplish certain interactional tasks. In the next conversational exchange, I go on analyzing how other tasks are realized in represented interaction.

4.1.4 Conversational exchange 4: D. H. Lawrence's *The rocking-horse winner*

In this segment, I focus on the examination of a repair sequence (see section 4.1.2, p. 90) embedded in the major on-going interaction and which is demonstrably characterized as a correction event. I also concentrate on the examination of the role played by the particle "Oh" in the segment in question.

In the major conversational activity in this exchange, young Paul has become aware of and is trying to understand the relationship between his family lifestyle and their financial conditions. So he starts asking his mother questions which could shed some light on the matter.

The segment in question happens after Paul has been told that their lifestyle differs from that of his uncle because they are "the poor members of the family" (*l.* 3 in the Appendix). Since Paul still cannot figure out why this is so, his mother goes on to explain to him that "it's because [his] father has no luck" (*l.* 6 in the Appendix).

At this point, the use of the lexical item "luck" causes a slight shift in the topic of the conversation. This shift, then, leads the characters into a discussion concerning the term "luck" which lasts until line 24 (see Appendix). The segment below happens at the beginning of this discussion, just after the term has been introduced:

	07 P:	[[*The boy was silent for some time.*]]
	08	Is luck money, mother? [[*he asked rather timidly.*]]
	09 M:	No Paul. Not quite. It's what causes you to have money.
→→	10 P:	Oh! [[*said Paul vaguely.*]] I thought when Uncle Oscar said *filthy*
→	11	*lucker*, it meant money.
→	12 M:	*Filthy lucre* does mean money, [[*said the mother.*]] But it's lucre, not
→	13	luck.
→	14 P:	Oh! [[*said the boy*]]. Then what *is* luck, mother?
	15 M:	It's what causes you to have money. If you're lucky you have

16	money. That's why it's better to be born lucky than rich. If you're
17	rich, you may lose your money. But if you're lucky, you will always
18	get more money.

Here, the longer arrows indicate the turns in which the repair sequence occurs and the shorter arrows locate the occurrence of "Oh."

As I have demonstrated elsewhere (p. 90), repair sequences operative in real, face-to-face interaction can also be represented in characters' exchanges. The above segment constitutes one more evidence to this. The sort of repair in this sequence can be characterized as an instance of "other-initiated other-repair" (Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977), which is ordinarily accomplished in the subsequent turn to that in which the trouble-source has been produced.

If we look at lines 10-14 again, we can see that "filthy lucker" (the trouble-source item) comes out in the boy's utterance in lines 10-11. Immediately after that, Paul's mother provides the repaired version of the item ("Filthy lucre," *l.* 12), followed by an utterance designed to reiterate and highlight the trouble-item which is being repaired: "But it's lucre, not luck" (*l.* 12-13).

Apart from the location and format of this sequence, another evidence that it is intended to be taken as a repair event lies in the fact that both "filthy lucker" and "Filthy lucre" have been italicized by the author himself. The use of italics in "Filthy lucre" can easily be attributed to the representation of the woman's shift in prosody (see section 2.1.1). Yet in "filthy lucker" prosody does not justify the use of italics, for there is no apparent interactional reason (in layer 2) for a shift in the boy's prosody. Therefore, the italics here may well be taken (by readers, in layer 1) as an index that there is an additional meaning associated with the production of this item.

Now, other-repair issued from other-initiation is ranked as the least preferred alternative in talk-in-interaction (Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977). This means that conversationalists tend to avoid performing such an action because, in doing so, the producer of the repair is claiming knowledge to himself. The producer of the trouble-source is, then, put in the position of not-so-knowledgeable a member. In other words, the footings involved in such a repair mechanism provide for its characterization as a correction event. Therefore, there must be a strong interactional reason for one party to do correction, otherwise he may be held accountable.

As I have suggested above, Paul's mother is demonstrably doing correction, which is ratified by the alignment Paul takes up to himself in this sequence. The reasons why we can say so are as follows. First of all, it is a socially and culturally established fact that children's education is part of the business of any mother—here, as in the real, ordinary world. Correction is certainly likely to occur when teaching/learning are at stake, and it is ordinarily performed by the most knowledgeable party, the one who is "doing teaching." Secondly, the whole interaction in this excerpt concerns Paul's resorting to his mother as an authoritative source of information: out of Paul's 9 turns at speaking, 8 contain either an information question (*l.* 1-2, 4, 14, and 22) or a yes/no question designed to ask for clarification/confirmation of previous information (*l.* 8, 19, and 25). Finally, there is the particle "Oh" initiating the subsequent turn to that in which correction is performed (*l.* 12-13), to the discussion of which I now turn.

According to Heritage (1984), "the work accomplished by the particle 'oh' in natural conversation (...) is (...) to propose that its producer has undergone some kind of change in his or her locally current state of knowledge, information, orientation or awareness" (p. 299). Heritage also puts it that "oh" ordinarily occurs in a turn following a turn/turns in which "informing" is done (p. 301). That is exactly the job "oh" performs

in Paul's turns in lines 10 and 14 above (as well as in line 19 in the Appendix). In line 10, "Oh!" is a response to his mother's informing him that luck is "what causes you to have money" (*l.* 9). Thus, "Oh!" is a sign that Paul, who had thought luck to be the same thing as money (*l.* 8), **now** knows them to be different, that is, after being thus informed. In line 14, again "Oh!" functions as a change of information status token: after having been informed that "lucre" and "luck" (or "lucker") are not the same thing, the boy's proffering "Oh!" informs us that now he knows something that he did not before.

The foregoing considerations serve as evidence that, just as in ordinary interaction, such phenomena as correction and change of state of knowledge can also occur in represented interaction. In addition, the representation of these phenomena tend to display very similar features to those found in naturally occurring face-to-face conversational activity.

The phenomena referred to above have been located within a specific sort of interactional sequence, namely a repair sequence. In the next section I analyze yet another kind of mechanism operative in both represented and in actual interaction: a pre-announcement sequence.

4.1.5 Conversational exchange 5: Jane Austen's *Pride and prejudice*

The excerpt below is, in fact, a segment of a major interaction which takes almost the entire chapter in the novel to be accomplished. I have selected this segment to focus on because it evidences the representation of another specific type of sequence, a pre-announcement. Besides functioning as a pre-sequence to another interactional activity, the sequence in question is designed in such a way so as to demonstrably perform an additional work, that of providing the opportunity for the characters to "do annoying each other."

The excerpt below is a segment of the sort of interaction which I have discussed in section 3.2.2, where the author provides no initial information about the situation, nor does she previously introduce the characters (see example 7 on p. 72). Thus, the excerpt starts at the very opening of the interaction (see section 2.1.3):

01 Mrs B: My dear Mr Bennet, [[*said his lady to him one day,*]] have you heard

02   that Netherfield Park is let at last?

03 Mr B: [[Mr Bennet replied that he had not.]]

04 Mrs B: But it is, [[*returned she;*]] for Mrs Long has just been here, and she

05   told me all about it.

06 Mr B: [[*Mr Bennet made no answer.*]]

07 Mrs B: Do not you want to know who has taken it? [[*cried his wife*

08   *impatiently.*]]

09 Mr B: *You* want to tell me, and I have no objection to hearing it.

10   [[*This was invitation enough.*]]

Here, after performing the summons ("My dear Mr Bennet," *l.* 1) designed to engage her husband in conversation, but without waiting for him to give an indication that he is attending to her talk, Mrs Bennet goes on to produce an utterance which functions as the opener of a sequence that takes all this segment to be completed. Such a sequence is demonstrably a pre-announcement sequence, a sequence designed to preface an announcement.

In discussing pre-announcements in real talk-in-interaction, Levinson (1983), following Terasaki (1976, cited in Levinson, 1983, p. 349), states that they function as a preface to the telling of news, stories, and so on. Such telling being constrained by the recipient's current state of knowledge regarding the news or story, pre-announcement sequences allow for "a prospective teller" to check whether or not the recipient already knows the news/story (Schegloff, 1995). Therefore, such sequences are usually realized

in two adjacent turns. The first of which contains the opener of the sequence, or the offer to tell the news/story, and the second, a response to this offer (Levinson, 1983; Schegloff, 1995). The offer typically includes items such as "Guess what" or "Have you heard..." (Levinson, 1983). As for the possible responses, they can either include a "go-ahead" which forwards the sequence to the telling (e. g., "What," or "No. What," or the like) or a blocking, that is, an action designed to forestall the telling. Such an action can be realized as, for instance, "I heard" or any other item which signals a claim of knowledge (Levinson, 1983; Schegloff, 1995).

Looking back at lines 1-2 in the segment above, we can see that the format of the utterance "have you heard that Netherfield Park is let at last?" matches the description of a proper pre-announcement opener. Also, it does actually elicit a response from Mr Bennet: "No." His response (l. 3), however, is not understood by his wife as a go-ahead, nor as a blocking to the telling. Due to this, the pre-announcement sequence ends up being extended.

According to Schegloff (1995), in naturally occurring face-to-face interaction, it is possible for such sequences to be extended when the recipient fails to perceive the additional intended meaning in its opener and, thus, attends only to its informative propositional meaning. In part, Mrs Bennet's next utterance, "But it is" (l. 4), is evidence that she took Mr Bennet's negation token as just a response to the information she has initially provided, that Netherfield Park is let at last.

I say in part because this is not all there is to the turn in question here. Mrs Bennet's adding "for Mrs Long has been here, and she told me all about it" (l. 4-5) signals that she also (and most significantly) took Mr Bennet's "no" as a challenge to her claim of knowledge. Her resorting to describing an authoritative source as evidence

to support her claim—just as people may ordinarily do during a dispute (Pomerantz, 1984b)—demonstrates that.

Nevertheless, Mrs Bennet still withholds the information: she refers to the news by means of the generic "it" (*l.* 5), which does not say much about the news. This evidences that her initial offer to tell this piece of news still holds, that is, she is still waiting for her husband's request to hear it.

Mr Bennet's silence (*l.* 6) again does not constitute the relevant response: the go-ahead his wife has been waiting for him to produce. And his not producing it raises his wife's temper and causes her to hold him accountable for that. Both the utterance she produces next and the tone of her voice (*l.* 7-8) are evidence to this.

Mr Bennet's next turn, then, indicates that he, too, perceives her to be holding him accountable for his non-compliance with her insistent leads. In this turn (*l.* 9), he finally obliges to what he perceives as her imposition of telling him things he did not request to hear ("I have no objection to hearing it," *l.* 9). But not without turning the table against her: now it is his turn to hold **her** accountable for imposing on him by insisting on the telling. The stressed "*You*" in "*You* want to tell me" (*l.* 9) demonstrates that. Now, whether he is willing to hear the news or not, Mr Bennet does produce the so expected go-ahead in the end, which finally closes the pre-sequence.

I have said before that Mr Bennet's only orienting to the informational content of the pre-announcement opener could partly account for the sequence being thus extended. A second reason why this happens lies in the other, and most important, job the characters are jointly engaged in, namely that of annoying each other. We can confidently say that this is so based on the following.

Let us consider Mr Bennet's last utterance, "*You* want to tell me, and I have no objection to hearing it" (*l.* 9) once again. First of all, "I have no objection to hearing it"

explains why he did not perform a blocking to her telling when he had occasion to do so (*l.* 3 and 6). Secondly, in uttering "*You* want to tell me," he acknowledges that he has been aware of both Mrs Bennet's intention to tell him the news and of her expectation for his requesting her to tell it from the start. Therefore, his not performing the request is done on purpose, to upset his wife, not because he failed to understand the interactional meaning of her actions. This is how he manages to "do picking on his wife." As for Mrs Bennet, the above analysis demonstrates that she "does annoying her husband" by imposing on him. What annoys him most is that his wife wants to tell him things without, however, being accountable for that. That is why she insists in making his the urge to listen to what she has to say.

To recap, in this excerpt I have demonstrated that pre-announcement sequences operative in real, face-to-face interaction can be represented in narrative. Such a representation can also display complex techniques real conversationalists employ and which account for the sequence taking longer than just two turns to be completed. Last, I have showed evidence of how the accomplishment of such sequence can be affected by the additional job it does, that is, participants' teasing each other. I shall now turn to the examination of an instance of how overt confrontation is represented in characters' interaction.

4.1.6 Conversational exchange 6: Cherie Bennett's *Wild Hearts: On the edge*

In the following segment, I concentrate on examining how accusations are performed and dealt with by characters at the moment which precedes their direct confrontation. I also demonstrate the relationship between the representation of interruption and the conflict situation in which characters find themselves. Before doing

this, however, I provide some contextual information that helps us better understand the segment under analysis.

This novel consists of many stories which intermingle all through. The main story among these involves the female character featured below, Sandra, who is both the protagonist and the narrator in the story. Sandra is a teenager who lives with her mother and stepfather. Her birthfather, who had walked out on her when she was a young girl and never even saw her again, is now back and has been trying to re-establish contact with Sandra after so many years have elapsed.

In the segment below, Sandra has just told her boyfriend Darryl that she has decided—against everybody's will or expectations—to accept her father's invitation to dine out, which leads them into a progressively overt confrontation:

01 D: You're *what?* [[*he asked in shock.*]]

02 S: Having dinner with my birth father, [[*I repeated. I gave him a short*

03   *version of the story to date, then I took his hand and waited for his reaction.*]]

→ 04 D: So you're telling me he just showed up here? [[*Darryl asked.*]]

——▶ 05 S: [[*I nodded.*]]

→ 06 D: And you're going to have dinner with him?

——▶ 07 S: [[*I nodded again.*]]

→ 08 D: Excuse me, Sandra, but have you lost your mind?

→—▶ 09 S: [[*I dropped his hand.*]] I don't think so, [[*I said evenly.*]]

10 D: Why would you want to let this loser into your life? [[*Darryl asked*

11   *me incredulously.*]]

→▶▶ 12 S: He's my father— [[*I began.*]]

13 D: Oh bull, [[*Darryl exploded.*]] Lawrence is your father, that's what you

14   always say.

→▶▶ 15 S   Of course, but—

16 D: But nothing, [[*Darryl said*.]] I'll tell you what you should do. You

➤➤➤ 17   should tell this fool to go back to wherever the hell he came from—

18 S: Why? Because you say so? [[*I asked heatedly*.]]

We can see from the outset that Darryl's reaction to Sandra's announcement is that of protest (*l.* 1). After learning the "version of the story to date" (*l.* 2-3), Darryl becomes really annoyed. His annoyance transpires in the accusations he shoots at Sandra in the lines indicated by the short arrows (*l.* 4, 6, and 8).

In discussing how attributions of responsibility are accomplished in ordinary talk-in-interaction, Pomerantz (1978) says that they are accomplished in two-turn sequences. The first turn in such a sequence contains "an announcement or report of an 'unhappy incident'" (p. 115), which occasions a subsequent turn where the attribution of responsibility (blamings, excuses, denials, accusations, and so forth) for the "unhappy incident" is done. The utterance(s) in this turn is characterized as "on-topic" (p. 115), because it refers "to some same referents referred to in prior turns" (p. 115). The standard format such utterances take when preceded by announcements/reports is that of "a construction in which the candidate blamed party is referenced in subject position (actor-agent) with an active predicate" (p. 116).

If we look back at the previous segment, we can see that its initial structure (*l.* 2-4) matches every feature of the above description. Sandra's turn in lines 2-3 contains both an announcement ("[I'm] having dinner with my birth father") and a story ("I gave him a short version of the story to date"). Darryl's subsequent turn being where he performs the first two in a series of four accusations: "So you're telling me he just showed up here?" (*l.* 4). By uttering this, Darryl is attributing responsibility both to Sandra ("you're telling me") and to her birthfather ("he just showed up here"), the same "referents referred to" in Sandra's prior turn. Moreover, both accusations are structured

as an "actor-agent + active predicate" construction. The same applies to Darryl's next turns (*l*. 6 and 8). Therefore, we can confidently say that Darryl is, in fact, "doing accusing."

Another job Darryl's accusations do is "doing assessment" inasmuch as, by uttering them, Darryl is also giving his opinion regarding what he has been told before. Just as in real, face-to-face interaction, such assessments have further interactional consequences, namely that of providing a slot for Sandra to do second assessments.

Pomerantz (1984a) characterizes assessments as sequentially constrained actions, that is, actions which occur in certain loci. One of these loci can be "in next turn to initial assessments" (p. 59). Assessments occurring in such location are referred to as "second assessments" (p. 59). Pomerantz also states that the production of an "initial assessment provides the relevance of the recipient's second assessment" (p. 61). Furthermore, second assessments are ranked according to their preference statuses in relation to the initial assessment. For instance, when a participant proffers an initial assessment that invites an agreement as a preferred next action, recipient's disagreement is seen as dispreferred. In proffering a disagreement, its producer may be held accountable. Thus, the turn containing a disagreement tends to be marked by delay devices such as "'no talk,' requests for clarification, partial repeats, repair initiators," (p. 70) among others.

Looking back at the actions Darryl performs in lines 4, 6 and 8, we can see they are taken up by Sandra as assessments which makes it relevant for her to produce subsequent assessments. Moreover, the series of assessments both characters perform in the sequence from lines 4 to 9 can be characterized as a sequence which starts just as "a reasonable discussion," but which gradually mounts up to an overt confrontation, an argument.

The first evidence to this is found in line 5, Sandra's response to Darryl's disapproving her birthfather's behavior: after so many years and not even a word, the guy simply shows up again. Sandra's nodding signals that she is reluctantly agreeing—a weak form chracterizable as a partial agreement-partial disagreement (Pomerantz, 1984a)—with Darryl, or better, she is withholding an overt disagreement by delaying its production. A nod also means "no talk" or silence. Since Darryl goes on showing his disapproval by blaming Sandra for her decision to see her birthfather in spite of "the story to date" (*l.* 6), Sandra's second assessment/agreement is a repetition of the actions in her previous turn: "*I nodded again*" (*l.* 7). Now, Darryl's next accusation is an explicit and upgraded negative assessment which formulates criticism: "have you lost your mind?" (*l.* 8). This time, then, Sandra gives up her defensive position and proffers the disagreement she has been withholding.

Another evidence lies in the role played by silence and gestures in this sequence. As I have said in section 4.1.3, silence may be employed as a conflict management strategy both in real and in represented interaction. Sandra's nod/silence in lines 5 and 7 does function as such a strategy. Her resorting to verbally proffering a disagreement in line 9, thus, characterizes her willingness to "do confrontation." This is reinforced by the gestures in lines 3 and 9. When Sandra tells Darryl about her decision to meet her birthfather, she "*took his hand*" (*l.* 3). Such gesture indicates that she is "with" Darryl. Now, in line 9, when overt confrontation starts, Sandra's dropping Darryl's hand is a clear indication of the new footing she is assuming. She is not "with" Darryl anymore, but "against" him, or at least "without" him.

From this point on, characters jointly "do arguing." One of the evidences we have to this claim is provided by the occurrence of a series of interruptions. According to Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson ([1974] 1978), in the management of the basic turn-

taking system operative in real, face-to-face interaction, interruptions are avoided inasmuch as they constitute dispreferred, thus accountable, actions. It is so because interruptions may indicate that a party is usurping the other's right to hold the floor.

In the segment I have reproduced earlier, the three-pointed arrows indicate three occasions on which interruption is done by, alternatively, one character and the other (*l.* 12, 15, and 17)—and there are two more instances of such interruptions in lines 25 and 29 in the Appendix. Therefore, characters' repeated competition for the floor clearly signals that confrontation is being accomplished in this interaction.

In short, the preceding considerations demonstrate that confrontation/argument can be accomplished in represented interaction by means of the use of mechanisms which are operative in the real construction of such a joint action. These mechanisms include parties' proffering assessments and accusations as well as parties' silence and competition for the floor, that is, interruptions. In the next section, I focus on the examination of the job performed by delay devices such as silence, pauses, gestures, false starts, repair initiators and reformulation in an exchange involving a sensitive matter.

4.1.7 Conversational exchange 7: Carolyn Keene's *Nancy Drew on campus # 24:*

In the spotlight

In the following excerpt, I characterize the conversational activity characters are engaged in as an uncomfortable occasion where parties are managing a "touchy or sensitive matter" (Pomerantz, 1984b, p. 617). This claim is based on the occurrence of a number of features which index participants' orientation to displaying caution (Pomerantz, 1984b). Such features include delay devices such as silence, pauses, gestures, false starts, repair initiators and reformulation as well as misplaced,

incomplete sequences. In short, a set of actions for which parties could be held accountable if it were not for the sensitive vein of the interaction in which characters are presently involved.

This conversation happens in a place called Club Z, where the band "Radical Moves" is doing a performance. Ray is the lead singer in the band and Montana is a friend of his who has come to see their performance. In fact, Montana has "a crush on Ray" and has made up her mind that she would tell him all about her feelings this night. The first set of the performance is finished, and the band members have gone offstage. Montana has left her group in the audience and has gone backstage in search of Ray. She finds him on his way to the owner of the club's office. In the segment below, they have met and done some small talk about the band's performance:

	09	[[*A small, awkward silence descended between them, which Montana took as*
	10	*her cue.*]]
	11 M:	Ray, there's something I've been wanting to ask you for a really
→	12	long time. [[*She took a deep breath.*]] Would you go out with me?
	13	Like, on a date? Because I'm crazy about you, [[*Montana confessed.*]]
——→	14 R:	You are? [[*Ray bit his lip.*]] I don't think . . . I mean, I hadn't
→→	15	thought about . . .
→→	16 M: [18]	[[*Montana's heart broke.* ((Don't say anything more,)) *she wanted to*
→→	17	*say, but Ray kept going.*]]
	18 R:	Montana, you're beautiful. And I'm really flattered that you like
→→→	19	me. [[*He took her hand and squeezed it firmly.*]] I like you, too. But as a
	20	friend, not more.
	21 M:	Oh. S-ure, [[*Montana stammered.*]] I understand.

We can see that the segment under analysis already starts with an "awkward silence." This is so because Montana has finished congratulating Ray on their performance and

he has accordingly thanked her (see Appendix), which indicates that the activity which supposedly motivated their meeting is over. But, since it was Montana who came to meet Ray, the silence that follows (*l.* 9-10) is the appropriate slot for her to propose the closing of the encounter (Schegloff & Sacks, [1973] 1974).

Montana's next action (*l.* 11-12), though, does not constitute the opener of a recognizable closing sequence. Rather, it proposes the insertion of another topic into the on-going conversation. In fact, this topic happens to be the actual reason why Montana approached Ray during the break. Thus, the insertion of such topic does not occur at the appropriate interactional moment.

Moreover, "there's something I've been wanting to ask you for a really long time" opens a pre-announcement sequence. Such an opener provides for the recipient (Ray) performing either a go-ahead or a blocking to the candidate announcement (see section 4.1.5). However, as we can see from line 12 (indicated by the short arrow), Montana's in-breath signals that she is not yielding the floor. Ray has no opportunity to produce either action, because, actually, Montana goes on talking. This may constitute a strategy to delay the production of the question.

Montana's action immediately following the in-breath is somewhat awkwardly placed. Instead of making the announcement made relevant by her previous pre-announcement, she prefaces it with an unexpected invitation: "Would you go out with me? Like, on a date?" (*l.* 12-13). Such an invitation is unexpected inasmuch as it is not preceded by a pre-invitation sequence—in real, face-to-face interaction, a sequence designed to preface an invitation and forestall its production in the case of a likely rejection by its recipient (Levinson, 1983). Therefore, when the announcement is finally made ("I'm crazy about you," *l.* 13), we can say that it has been considerably delayed.

As I have mentioned before (section 4.1.6), delays are associated with the production of delicate actions. A girl telling a fellow that she is crazy about him is one such action—in this excerpt, as in the real world—in that it is socially constrained. Due to this, we can say that Montana's withholding the crucial announcement for so long is evidence that she is managing a touchy or sensitive matter.

Ray's next turn ratifies this. This turn also contains a number of delay devices whose occurrence is justified by the even more sensitive task he has in his hands: that of turning Montana down. In line 14 (indicated by the longer arrow), there is a series of such delays starting with a partial repeat, "You are?" Following this, there is Ray's biting his lips, a gesture which also indicates a deliberate spell of self-imposed no-talk. Next, there comes a false start and its accompanying slight pause ("I don't think . . ."), now followed by a self-repair initiator and yet another shorter pause ("I mean,"), and the reformulation of the previously unfinished utterance: "I hadn't thought about" (*l.* 14-15). This utterance is also interrupted mid-course and a longer spell of no-talk, a silence, occurs (indicated by the two-pointed arrows in lines 15, 16, and 17).

Finally, Ray proffers a positive assessment about Montana and her feelings towards him ("You're beautiful. And I'm really flattered that you like me," *l.* 18-19), reinforced by his friendly gesture (*"He took her hand and squeezed it firmly,"* *l.* 19). Ray, then, adds a positive assessment of his own feelings towards Montana: "I like you too," *l.* 19. All these three actions being themselves delay devices to his final and crucial announcement: "But as friend, not more" (*l.* 19-20).

To put it another way, in saying "I'm crazy about you" (*l.* 13), Montana is actually proffering an initial assessment concerning Ray himself, her feelings towards him, and possibly his feelings towards her. As I have said earlier (section 4.1.6), this sort of assessment provides for the recipient performing a second assessment. I have also

pointed out that an agreement with an initial positive assessment constitutes the preferred next action (see section 4.1.6). Ray's second assessment, though, is crucially in disagreement with Montana's possible notion/expectation that he could feel the same for her. Proffering such a disagreement is, nonetheless, a sensitive job. That is why Ray is so cautious as to preface his disagreement with partial agreements. Such preface also contains the typical agreement token "too" (Pomerantz, 1984a, p. 66), "conjoined with the disagreement component with a contrast conjunction (...) 'but'" (Pomerantz, 1984a, p. 72), as indicated by the three-pointed arrow.

To reiterate, the foregoing considerations demonstrate that, in represented, as in ordinary, talk-in-interaction, when characters are managing sensitive matters/actions, they demonstrably orient to displaying caution by employing a number of delay devices. In the segment above, such devices include: misplaced, incomplete/suspended sequences, a partial repeat, a false start, pauses and silence, a repair initiator, reformulation and a disagreement turn structured so that the crucial disagreement component is carefully prefaced by a weak form of agreement.

This finding, considered together with the results of the analyses of all other excerpts in the current chapter, point to an overwhelming similarity between represented and real, face-to-face interaction in terms of the mechanisms and techniques employed to their construction.

In the next chapter, I resume the discussion of such similarity. I also add some considerations about the sort of turn-taking system which seems to be operative in fictional characters' conversational exchanges. Finally, I address the implications suggested by the findings in the present study.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION: FINAL REMARKS AND IMPLICATIONS

The question I set out to answer in the present study was the extent to which represented interaction can be regarded as "ordinary" in terms of the mechanisms and techniques employed by parties in the production and sense-making of their interaction.

My point of departure was the assumption that storytellers manage to promote and sustain audience involvement by means of employing certain strategies to develop their narratives. One of such strategies being the animation of characters' voices. A strategy used to cause an impression of familiarity, a sense of usualness/ordinariness, on the story recipient. Also, a strategy which allows recipients to take up a more active participation role (that of eavesdroppers) in the co-construction of the story they are being told.

The two other fundamental assumptions which guided this study derive from the above. The first is the assumption that oral and written storytelling activities have a lot in common with each other, especially in regard to the animation of characters' voices. Of course, the different possibilities and constraints posed by each medium account for the peculiar features each of them displays.

The second assumption is that, due to the involvement between author and reader being established and maintained by the author's making the animation of the story characters' voices perceivable as "ordinary" by his recipient, then what stands for both author's and reader's sense of "ordinariness" is their membership in a given language community. Therefore, it is expected that the animation of voices in stories displays features or mechanisms which are also displayed by "ordinary" animation of voices, that is when speakers animate their own voices. In other words, it was assumed that

characters' exchange of utterances should share a number of organizational mechanisms and techniques with its naturally occurring, ordinary, counterpart.

I have surveyed previous studies which dealt, from different theoretical and methodological traditions, with the animation of voices other than the teller's. This provided me with the opportunity to discuss some of the basic interactional sociolinguistic concepts which constitute the necessary theoretical support for this work. Such concepts include Bateson's (1972) "frame," Goffman's (1981) "footing" and "lamination," Gumperz (1982) "contextualization cues," and Clark's (1996) "layering."

The above mentioned survey also helped me to gradually and better characterize the phenomenon "animation of voices other than the teller's" as an essentially interactional one. So, starting from the notion of "direct reported speech/DRS," I upgraded this notion by incorporating some design features and concepts which emerged during the discussion. Thus, "DRS" was initially replaced by the notion of "constructed dialogue," which, on its turn, was later better characterized as "represented dialogue." Finally, a crucial notion was also incorporated, namely "context." This notion was understood broadly as encompassing phenomena such as sequential location of utterances in relation to one another, social and situational features relevant to the interaction, contextualization cues which account both for the production format and the interpretation of the utterances, and, the location of the interaction within the story itself. Incorporating such notions, then, provided me with the means to characterize the phenomenon in question as an interactional one. Thus, the idea of "represented dialogue" was eventually reshaped as "represented interaction," which involves characters utterances in turns at talking as well as the context in which they occur.

Characterizing represented interaction as such was the necessary first step to employing interactional sociolinguistic concepts to the analysis of the selected data.

Furthermore, the concept of "lamination"/"layering" provided me with the grounds that allowed me to use a strictly emic perspective to the analysis of such data.

Having thus established both a theoretical and a methodological foundation for the discussion of the mechanisms operative in the representation of characters' interaction in my corpus, I set out to describe such mechanisms and the similarities they displayed in relation to those previous research has found to be operative in real, ordinary face-to-face interaction.

The research and its findings demonstrated that the mechanisms employed in the organization of character's on-going interaction in the excerpted pieces which constitute the corpus of this study display an overwhelming similarity with those mechanisms operative in ordinary talk-in-interaction. It also showed that the mechanisms operating in characters' conversational exchanges may include a number of subtle interactional and structural details which can ordinarily occur in actual interaction. The theoretical framework built up mainly on the works of Bateson (1972), Caldas-Coulthard (1984, 1988, 1992, 1994), Clark (1996), Goffman (1981), Gumperz (1982), Holt (1996), Sacks (1972, 1984, 1992), and Tannen (1989, 1990) as well as the works of interactional sociolinguists on the organization of talk-in-interaction such as Pomerantz (1978, 1984a, 1984b), Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson ([1974] 1978), Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks (1977), among others, proved to be extremely appropriate to the description of the data and to its analysis.

Before concluding this work, I would like to make some considerations on aspects that affect the interpretation of my findings. Initially, I will discuss two issues that have a bear on the extent of the claim I am making, namely the issue concerning the neatness of the representation of characters' exchanges and the sort of turn-taking system that seems to be operative in represented interaction. At a second stage, I will discuss the

limitations of the present study as well as the possible suggestions for further research arising from its results. Finally, I will discuss the implications that can be derived from the findings reported here both for those concerned with the study of language use and for those concerned with the study of "language-use-in-literature."

5.1 The scope of the findings in this study

As I have demonstrated in the preceding chapter, the results of the analysis of characters' interaction showed that the mechanisms employed in its representation are amazingly similar to those operative in real, face-to-face, naturally occurring conversation. One possible, or even "natural," interpretation that can be derived from it is that what I am claiming is that represented interaction can operate in the same way as its naturally occurring counterpart. In order to avoid the pitfall this interpretation represents, the following discussion can help clarify the scope assigned both to the findings in this study and to the claim I make based on these findings.

In the works of researchers who have worked on the relationship between represented interaction (or "constructed dialogue," or "composed dialogue") and its naturally occurring counterpart, I have found a recurrent argument against their similarity, namely that represented interaction is neatly arranged, whereas **transcripts** of real talk-in-interaction reveal that face-to-face conversation is generally not so neat (Caldas-Coulthard, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1994; Tannen, 1990). Caldas-Coulthard (1984) draws special attention to the noticeable absence of features such as "hedges, initiators, reformulations, backtracks, fillers, repetition, hesitations, interruptions, pauses, and false starts" (p. 89). Tannen (1990), on her turn, observes that represented interaction contains "occasional rather than pervasive repetition, hesitations, slips, false starts, and

so on" (p. 261). She adds that "accurate transcripts of actual conversation often strike unaccustomed readers (...) as repetitive, obscure, inarticulate, and generally unrealistic," because they display "the chaff of [conversation:] hesitations, fillers, hedges, and repetitions" (p. 261).

My own data do contain an example (out of seven) of an interaction where many of the above mentioned features occur (see section 4.1.7). Moreover, as I have also demonstrated, their occurrence plays a crucial role in the interpretation of the activity characters are engaged in as a "sensitive event." This is one first observation.

A second observation concerns transcripts of naturally occurring interaction. In discussing the issue of represented interactions being tidied-up versions of talk (see section 2.1.3, p. 45-46), I have sketched that, on this respect, represented interaction in written narrative and transcripts of actual interactions are similar in that both presuppose and reflect their producer's decision while adapting a typically oral event to the already highly conventionalized written medium.

These two observations lead me to the following questions. Is it the case that all those features simultaneously occur in **each and every** conversational activity? And is it the case that in **all** transcripts used by analysts **all** those features are **always represented**? (Note that I say "represented," for, inasmuch as transcripts are conventionalized, they are not actual interaction, but they can only stand for it.) Or could it be the case that sometimes those features may not be relevant to the purposes of the analytical work to be endeavored and then such features are not so often represented?

In asking such questions, I am drawing attention to why, how, by whom and to what purpose these features of actual interaction should be expected to occur during an

on-going conversation, in transcripts and, above all, in written fictional narrative as well.

First of all, given the number of items included in the lists I reproduced previously, I don't believe all of them should necessarily occur in one single naturally occurring interaction or even in one single stage of such an interaction. In fact, I cannot recall one single instance of an interactional sociolinguistic corpus where one could find all such features either occurring simultaneously or being focused on at the same time, or both.

In addition, for general analytical purposes, other major features or mechanisms of actual interaction play a much more relevant role and should, then, be represented in transcripts. For storytelling purposes, which happens to be the reason why represented interaction is ever used in literature, why should such details be so relevant? Of course, they are not really. In represented (as in actual interaction) there are other means available, other sorts of contextualization cues, to the depiction of characters' stances and actions. Such means can be effectively employed (as I have demonstrated they are) without obliging the author to represent every possible interactional feature or detail. Something which is, indeed, impossible due to the fact that written discourse, especially literary texts, is constrained by the conventions which regulate its production.

In this respect—and especially in this respect—, my findings do not allow me to say that represented interaction is just like actual interaction. Actually, this is not at all the claim I am making, or ever intended to make. On the contrary, I acknowledge that it is a contingent aspect of represented interaction that it is constrained by the same conventions which regulate the written medium in general and by those which regulate the production of literary texts in particular.

Therefore, my claim is that, as far as those conventions provide for it and according to how the author perceives the features in question to be relevant for his story/stories as a whole, as well as for the particular situation characters are in, such features as repetition, hesitation, pauses, silence, false starts, and so on and so forth may also be represented (but not reproduced) in characters' exchanges. And, as I hope to have made it clear from the detailed analysis of my data, when they are employed in represented interaction, they do display a great similarity with their employment in actual interaction regarding the interactional job(s) they perform.

I shall now turn to the discussion of the turn-taking system employed in represented interaction and its relationship with the basic turn-taking system as described by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson ([1974] 1978), an issue that was raised by Caldas-Coulthard (1984, 1988, 1992, 1994) in her discussion of the reduction/simplification of the properties of real talk in represented interaction.

5.2 Basis for a "projected turn-taking system"

The issue raised by Caldas-Coulthard (1984, 1988, 1992, 1994) regarding the relationship between the turn-taking system in represented interaction and the basic turn-taking system operative in actual interaction has already been addressed (section 2.1.3). In that occasion, I argued against the fact that author's control of some of the features of the turn-taking system could provide grounds enough for one to consider it as either reduced or simplified (see section 2.1.3, pp. 42-45).

Attention was also drawn to two important facts regarding the "simplest systematic form" used by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson ([1974] 1978) in describing this basic mechanism operative in real, face-to-face interaction. The first important fact was that such a description is meant to apply only to "the basic setting of language use"

(Clark, 1996, p. 8). The second fact mentioned was that Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson ([1974] 1978) themselves provided for the possibility of such "basic" form of turn-taking system being adapted to the interactional phenomenon parties are involved in and which the analyst is concerned with describing.

It was then suggested that the turn-taking system employed in the representation of characters' exchanges might well be subject to further constraints by virtue of its "projected" status. I proposed to call this turn-taking system which seems to be operative in represented interaction the "projected turn-taking system." Finally, it was observed that such system seemed to be author-organized in such a way as to allow authors to simulate characters' local management of their turns at speaking.

At this point I would like to add two relevant considerations which reinforce my initial claim for a "projected turn-taking system." First of all, as I have recurrently said all through chapter 4, the analysis of my data demonstrated that not only does characters' interaction appear to be locally co-constructed by them but also that their turns at talking are managed in tandem with other basic structures also operative in actual interaction such as adjacency pairs, preference and conditional relevance organizations, and topic progression techniques. All this constitutes evidence of the great similarity with parties' local management of actual interaction in forms of the co-construction of both individual turns and of sequences of turns.

Another important element to be considered is the locus where represented interaction occurs and its relationship with the form the turn-taking system managing such interaction takes. From the outset of this thesis and all through it, I have repeated over and over again that represented interaction (or "constructed dialogue," or "DRS") is not an autonomous sort of discourse. It only and always happens in a discursive layer which is embedded in, and thus dependent upon, another layer, the primary

communicative layer which, in the case of written storytelling, is the layer where the interaction between author and reader(s) takes place.

This means that inside the projected layer, and only there, characters manage **their** words during **their** turns at talking. In the primary layer, however, what one can see is the author pulling the strings of his dummies to make them animate the words/actions he is projecting onto them.

Therefore, the sort of turn-taking system designed to account for these facts seems to be inherently and inevitably dependent on the major interactional activity between writer and reader(s). If so, the turn-taking system operative in represented interaction seems to be designed in such a way that it breaks through the barrier of the projected layer and extends itself out into the primary discursive layer. In fact, one evidence this study provides for a "projected turn-taking system" is the fact that sometimes elements of the reporting discourse, to which readers, but not characters, have access, can demonstrably function as turn constructional units, and can thus be integrated into the on-going interaction mainly as the realization of a turn in its own (see section 3.2.3). This points into the direction that one possible feature of this sort of turn-taking system might be that, while organizing the activity going on in the projected layer, such system simultaneously handles aspects of the major activity on which represented interaction is dependent.

I believe the foregoing considerations are reasonable enough so as to suggest the existence of one such thing as a "projected turn-taking system," conceived of as a possible adaptation to the sort of interactional activity which storytelling is, be it written or oral. Therefore, describing the features that might be employed in the design of such a mechanism can perhaps be the endeavor of future research.

A second avenue of studies which could perhaps be undertaken by future research concerns the systematic description of the phenomenon alluded to in section 3.2.2. For the purposes of this study, such phenomenon has been termed "transition devices." It was suggested that these transition devices seem to be systematically employed by authors as a means of signaling to the reader a forthcoming change in footing and in frame in the on-going storytelling activity. In addition, these devices can signal shifts from one communicative layer to another. Two major types of transition devices have been identified: those which signal a shift from layer 1 to layer 2 (thus prefacing the beginning of characters' interaction) and those signaling a return to layer 1, that is, marking the local end of characters' conversational exchange. The former were termed "in-transition devices" and the latter, "out-transition devices." Perhaps a systematic description of such devices could provide a characterization of the phenomenon in general as well as of the features which distinguish the in-transition devices from those which perform out-transition.

Another possible path for further research could be that of investigating the role played by specific phenomena such as repair sequences, agreement/disagreement sequences, and a number of other sequences across a greater and perhaps more significant number and variety of texts. This proved not to be feasible in the present study due to the limitations of the data which comprise its corpus.

In addition, I have suggested that both my findings and current claim ought to be viewed as limited by the conventions which regulate the production and reception of literary written narrative. However, I did not endeavor to look into such matter in a systematic way. This, too, constitutes yet another limitation of the present study. Maybe in the future, researchers could take advantage of the methodological contribution of the present work to investigate and clarify the extent to which such forces as literary canon,

stylistics, and other normative "big C" Cultural agents affect the representation of fictional characters' exchanges.

5.3 Implications of this research

However limited the findings of this research, its greatest contribution to students of language use derives from the fact that, in spite of the powerful forces which regulate the production and reception of written, especially literary, texts, the power of "the technology of conversation" (Sacks, 1984, p. 413) is such that allows for represented interaction to display a great number of the organizational mechanisms which are operative in actual interaction. In other words, the "big C" Cultural forces which control such social artifacts as artistic production and scholarship are not powerful enough as to override the pervasive human impulse to accomplish the basic job of "doing 'being ordinary'" (Sacks, 1984, p. 416) even in a represented, or projected, layer of reality.

I shall conclude this work by re-stating that the extraordinary similarity found between represented interaction and its actual counterpart in that one can find in the former a number of mechanisms which operate in its production and interpretation as a conjoint ordinary achievement of the characters in the story as well as of the writer and reader(s) in the actual world, opens up new possible paths to the understanding of language use in general and to "language-use-in-literature" in particular.

NOTES

1. It is not my intention to examine Holt's sources in depth for I believe they would not be particularly enlightening to the interactional sociolinguistic standpoint adopted in this thesis. Nevertheless, I will be addressing some sources quoted by Holt later in this section when I discuss issues such as "accuracy," "objectivity," "authenticity," and "reliability."

2. Holt's (1996) "prosody" seems to subsume all aspects of intonation as well as voice loudness, pitch, and tone. I will be using "prosody" in the same sense as Holt's.

3. Since storytelling *per se* is not my present concern, discussing the specific mechanisms which are operative in this activity is beyond the scope of this thesis. As a starting point, details on conversation analytic descriptions of these mechanisms can be found in the works of Goodwin (1984), Jefferson (1978), Ryave (1978), and Sacks (1972, 1992).

4. While Bateson's assertion is made within a strictly psychological standpoint, Ribeiro (1994) has demonstrated the validity of such an assertion within an interactional sociolinguistic perspective.

5. Erickson and Shultz (1982) have studied cases of cross-cultural communication in gatekeeping interviews and have found out that "inferential incongruity and lack of behavioral mutuality" could be perceived when arhythmia occurred (p. 143). They argue that rhythmic regularity "may be prima facie evidence of shared interpretive frameworks among those engaged in interaction" (p. 143). Similarly, the absence of rhythmic regularity (arhythmia) points to the fact that there may inadequate sharing of interpretive grounds. This is what can ultimately lead participants to inferring "not 'withness' at an overall, global level of interpretation and impression formation" (p. 143).

6. This example is particularly interesting because it is an instance of prosody being graphically represented, especially in an utterance that has never actually been spoken before. This suggests that, whoever wrote down what was said by current speaker was finely attuned to the fact that, from current speaker's standpoint, whether the "reported" words are one's actual words or not makes little difference to its representation.

7. Neal Norrick (1998) has examined retellings of stories, or rather separate tellings of a single story, and has demonstrated that in a later telling "the basic form of the story remains very similar to the initial telling" (p. 80), and that the sort of differences which were identified between the separate versions "simply would not lead recipients to hear them as discrete stories in the conversational context" (p. 80). This serves as evidence that recounting may actually be accurate, or faithful as it were.

8. Unfortunately, Tannen did not provide the reaction (next turn) of any of the recipients in the situations depicted. It would be interesting, however, to be able to have access to their interpretations of the utterances provided. Nevertheless, I believe Holt's (1996) findings and my own previous discussion suffice to illustrate my point.

9. Since Caldas-Coulthard's arguments and conclusions concerning fictional representation of interaction are restated in her previous (1984) and later (1992 and 1994) works, all references made from this point on in this section—unless otherwise stated—will be to her 1988 Ph.D. dissertation, in which she deals with the phenomenon in question in a more comprehensive fashion.

10. Such in-transition was also found to be accomplished by means of graphical representation of the beginning of a section or chapter in the narrative. The

beginning of a new section was usually signaled by means of larger spacing between the last line in the previous section and the first line in the new on, the conversational exchange proper. The beginning of a new chapter was indicated by the chapter number.

11. In this and in all other examples in this section, emphasis has been added. I will refer to the highlighted elements later in this section.

12. In fact, these two paragraphs, taken together, function simultaneously as an out-transition from previous interaction and an in-transition to the next.

13. The following extract from the novel is a clear instance of an unstable state of talk. Here, the characters are in the college cafeteria for brunch, and they are simultaneously trying to attend to talk (the main topic they have been discussing as well as instrumental talk concerning the activity) and other requirements of the situation such as moving forward along the line while choosing food and filling their trays, and so on. They can only focus their conversation solidly on a particular topic after they sit at the table and thus reach a more stable configuration.

> "Two steps forward, if you please," Bess said, nudging Marisa's tray along. "You're doing great. Just keep telling yourself that, because it's true." They followed George and Nancy to a large, round table near the window. [utterances within the more stable configuration are introduced at this point] (*Nancy Drew on campus # 24: In the spotlight*, p. 140)

14. This term is explained by the editor of the novel in the section *Notes on the text*. The explanation reads: "'Her mind was less difficult to develope'. *Develope* is not the modern sense of causing her mind to unfold or grow (impossible in Mrs Bennet's case) but in the sense of unfolding and disclosing it in a description or depiction. We perhaps preserve something of this sense when we develop a photograph" (p. 292).

15. The underlined words appeared originally in italics in the text. I assume italics to have been employed to indicate that the items are foreign words. Since I am using

italics in the excerpted segments for a distinct purpose, I decided to use underlining in order to maintain that indication.

16. I will be dealing with pauses later in this chapter. In the forthcoming excerpts there are some occurrences of stretches of silence which are analyzable as pauses, lapses or attributable silences.

17. Goffman (1981) defines "innuendo" as a sort of communication "whereby a speaker, ostensibly directing words to an addressed recipient, overlays his remark with a patent but deniable meaning, a meaning that has a target more so than a recipient, is typically disparaging of it, and is meant to be caught by the target, whether this be the addressed recipient or an unaddressed recipient, or even a bystander" (p. 134).

18. I chose double parentheses to indicate the representation of thought occurring within the exchange. I did not include this in section 3.2.3, however, because it only occurs once in the whole corpus. In addition, I decided to represent this line as Montana's turn because it can be demonstrably interpreted as silence.

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APPENDIX

Conversational exchange 1: E. A. Poe's *The cask of Amontillado*

M: Montresor (the narrator) and F: Fortunato

01 M: *[[I said to him:]]* My dear Fortunato, you are luckily met. How
02   remarkably well you are looking to-day! But I have received a pipe
03   of what passes for Amontillado, and I have my doubts.

04 F: How? *[[said he.]]* Amontillado? A pipe? Impossible! And in the
05   middle of the carnival!

06 M: I have my doubts, *[[I replied,]]* and I was silly enough to pay the full
07   Amontillado price without consulting you in the matter. You were
08   not to be found, and I was fearful of losing a bargain.

09 F: Amontillado!

10 M: I have my doubts.

11 F: Amontillado!

12 M: And I must satisfy them.

13 F: Amontillado!

14 M: As you are engaged, I am on my way to Luchesi. If any one has a
15   critical turn, it is he. He will tell me—

16 F: Luchesi cannot tell Amontillado from Sherry.

17 M: And yet some fools will have it that his taste is a match for your
18   own.

19 F: Come, let us go.

20 M: Whither?

21 F: To your vaults.

22 M: My friend, no; I will not impose upon your good nature. I perceive
23   you have an engagement. Luchesi—

24 F: I have no engagement;—come.

25 M: My friend, no. It is not the engagement, but the severe cold with
26   which I perceive you are afflicted. The vaults are insufferably
27   damp. They are encrusted with nitre.

28 F: Let us go, nevertheless. The cold is merely nothing. Amontillado!
29   You have been imposed upon. And as for Luchesi, he cannot
30   distinguish Sherry from Amontillado.

31   *[[Thus speaking, Fortunato possessed himself of my arm. Putting on a mask*
32   *of black silk, and drawing a roquelaire closely about my person, I suffered him*
33   *to hurry me to my palazzo.]]*

Conversational exchange 2: E. A. Poe's *The cask of Amontillado*

01 M: The nitre! *[[I said,]]* see. It increases. I hangs like moss upon the

02		vaults. We are below the river's bed. The drops of moisture trickle
03		among the bones. Come, we will go back ere it is too late.
04		Your cough—
05	F:	It is nothing, [[*he said,*]] let us go on. But first, another draught of
06		the Médoc.
07	M:	[[*I broke and reached him a flagon of De Grâve.*]]
08	F:	[[*He emptied it at a breath. His eyes flashed with a fierce light. He laughed*
09		*and threw the bottle upward with gesticulation I did not understand.*]]
10	M:	[[*I looked at him in surprise.*]]
11	F:	[[*He repeated the movement—a grotesque one*]] You do not comprehend?
12		[[*he said.*]]
13	M:	Not I, [[*I replied.*]]
14	F:	Then you are not of the brotherhood.
15	M:	How?
16	F:	You are not of the masons.
17	M:	Yes, yes, [[*I said,*]] yes, yes.
18	F:	You? Impossible! A mason?
19	M:	A mason, [[*I replied.*]]
20	F:	A sign, [[*he said.*]]
21	M:	It is this, [[*I answered, producing a trowel from beneath the folds of my*
22		*roquelaire.*]]
23	F:	You jest, [[*he exclaimed, recoiling a few paces.*]] But let us proceed to the
24		Amontillado.
25	M:	Be it so, [[*I said, replacing the tool beneath the cloak; and again offering him*
26		*my arm.*]]

Conversational exchange 3: Flannery O'Connor's *A good man is hard to find*

OL: the old lady; B: Bailey; B's W: Bailey's wife; JW: John Wesley; and JS: June Star

01	OL:	Now look here, Bailey, [[*she said,*]] see here, read this,
02		[[*and she stood with one hand on her thin hip and the other rattling the*
03		*newspaper at his bald head.*]] Here this fellow that calls himself The
04		Misfit is aloose from the Federal Pen and headed toward Florida
05		and you read here what it says he did to these people. Just you read
06		it. I wouldn't take my children in any direction with a criminal like
07		that aloose in it. I couldn't answer to my conscience if I did.
08	B:	[[*Bailey didn't look up from his reading.*]]
09	OL:	[[*so she wheeled around then and faced the children's mother, (…) She was*
10		*sitting on the sofa, feeding the baby his apricots out of a jar.*]] The children
11		have been to Florida before, [[*the old lady said.*]] You all ought to
12		take them somewhere else for a change so they would see different
13		parts of the world and be broad. They never have been to east

14	Tennessee.
15 B's W:	[[*The children's mother didn't seem to hear her*]]
16 JW:	[[*but the eight-year-old boy, John Wesley, (...) said,*]] If you don't want to
17	go to Florida, why dontcha stay at home? [[*He and the little girl, June*
18	*Star, were reading the funny papers on the floor.*]]
19 JS:	She wouldn't stay at home to be queen for a day, [[*June Star said*
20	*without raising her yellow head.*]]
21 OL:	Yes and what would you do if this fellow, The Misfit, caught you?
22	[[*the grandmother asked.*]]
23 JW:	I'd smack his face, [[*John Wesley said.*]]
24 JS:	She wouldn't stay at home for a million bucks, [[*June Star said.*]]
25	Afraid she'd miss something. She has to go everywhere we go.
26 OL:	All right, Miss, [[*the grandmother said.*]] Just remember that the next
27	time you want me to curl your hair.
28 JS:	[[*June Star said her hair was naturally curly.*]]

Conversational exchange 4: D. H. Lawrence's *The rocking-horse winner*

P: Paul; and M: Paul's mother

01 P:	Mother, [[*said the boy Paul one day*]], why don't we keep a car of our
02	own? Why do we always use uncle's, or else a taxi?
03 M:	Because we're the poor members of the family, [[*said the mother.*]]
04 P:	But why *are* we, mother?
05 M:	Well—I suppose, [[*she said slowly and bitterly,*]] it's because your
06	father has no luck.
07 P:	[[*The boy was silent for some time.*]]
08	Is luck money, mother? [[*he asked rather timidly.*]]
09 M:	No Paul. Not quite. It's what causes you to have money.
10 P:	Oh! [[*said Paul vaguely.*]] I thought when Uncle Oscar said *filthy*
11	*lucker*, it meant money.
12 M:	*Filthy lucre* does mean money, [[*said the mother.*]] But it's lucre, not
13	luck.
14 P:	Oh! [[*said the boy*]]. Then what *is* luck, mother?
15 M:	It's what causes you to have money. If you're lucky you have
10	money. That's why it's better to be born lucky than rich. If you're
11	rich, you may lose your money. But if you're lucky, you will always
12	get more money.
19 P:	Oh! Will you? And is father not lucky?
20 M:	Very unlucky, I should say, [[*she said bitterly.*]]
21 P:	[[*The boy watched her with unsure eyes.*]]
22	Why? [[*he asked.*]]
23 M:	I don't know. Nobody ever knows why one person is lucky and

24	another unlucky.
25 P:	Don't they? Nobody at all? Does *nobody* know?
26 M:	Perhaps God. But He never tells.

Conversational exchange 5: Jane Austen's *Pride and prejudice*

MrB: Mr Bennet; and Mrs B: Mrs. Bennet

01 Mrs B:	My dear Mr Bennet, [[*said his lady to him one day,*]] have you heard
02	that Netherfield Park is let at last?
03 Mr B:	[[Mr Bennet replied that he had not.]]
04 Mrs B:	But it is, [[*returned she;*]] for Mrs Long has just been here, and she
05	told me all about it.
06 Mr B:	[[*Mr Bennet made no answer.*]]
07 Mrs B:	Do not you want to know who has taken it? [[*cried his wife*
08	*impatiently.*]]
09 Mr B:	*You* want to tell me, and I have no objection to hearing it.
10	[[*This was invitation enough.*]]

Conversational exchange 6: Cherie Bennett's *Wild Hearts: On the edge*

S: Sandra (the narrator); and D: Darryl (Sandra's boyfriend)

01 D:	You're *what*? [[*he asked in shock.*]]
02 S:	Having dinner with my birth father, [[*I repeated. I gave him a short*
03	*version of the story to date, then I took his hand and waited for his reaction.*]]
04 D:	So you're telling me he just showed up here? [[*Darryl asked.*]]
05 S:	[[*I nodded.*]]
06 D:	And you're going to have dinner with him?
07 S:	[[*I nodded again.*]]
08 D:	Excuse me, Sandra, but have you lost your mind?
09 S:	[[*I dropped his hand.*]] I don't think so, [[*I said evenly.*]]
10 D:	Why would you want to let this loser into your life? [[*Darryl asked*
11	*me incredulously.*]]
12 S:	He's my father— [[*I began.*]]
13 D:	Oh bull, [[*Darryl exploded.*]] Lawrence is your father, that's what you
14	always say.
15 S:	Of course, but—
16 D:	But nothing, [[*Darryl said.*]] I'll tell you what you should do. You
17	should tell this fool to go back to wherever the hell he came from—
18 S:	Why? Because you say so? [[*I asked heatedly.*]]
19 D:	No, because you have a brain! [[*Darryl replied.*]] What, you think he
20	wants to be your daddy all of a sudden?
21 S:	No, [[*I replied defensively.*]] He just wants to get to know me, he said . . .
22 D:	[[*Darryl sighed.*]] Sandra, this is the man who walked out on you and

23	your momma. This is the man who never, ever found the time to
24	call you or write you or send one thin dime to help support you.
25	He's an alcoholic and a drug addict—
26 S:	He was. He isn't now.
27 D:	What, are you defending him now? *[[Darryl asked me, his voice rising.]]*
28 S:	No, I'm just trying to explain—
29 D:	Sandra, baby, this guy is out to use you for something. That's what
30	I think, *[[Darryl said intensely.]]* And here you are, too busy to do all
31	the things you have to do as it is, and you want to let this no-
32	account fool into your life to mess you up even more?
33 S:	All I'm doing is having dinner with him! *[[I yelled.]]* God, I'm sorry
34	I even told you!
35	*[[We sat there, breathing hard at each other, not saying a word.]]*
36 S:	Look, just take me back to school so you can get your car, *[[I finally*
37	*said.]]*
38 D:	Fine, *[[Darryl replied tersely, and he turned on the ignition.]]*
39	*[[We drove in silence, both of us too mad to talk.]]*
40 D:	*[[He pulled my Jeep up next to his car, shut it off, and turned to me.]]* Look,
41	maybe I overreacted.
42 S:	No kidding, *[[I muttered.]]*
43 D:	I just don't want him to hurt you, *[[Darryl said softly.]]*
44 S:	I don't think you should judge someone you don't even know, *[[I*
45	*told him, taking my car keys from him.]]*
46 D	*[[Darryl got out the Jeep and stuck his head back in.]]* I know everything
47	about a guy like him that I need to know, Sandra.
48 S:	Well, maybe I don't, *[[I replied.]]* Maybe there's all kinds of things
49	about him I need to know.
50 D:	You don't need him, baby, *[[Darryl said earnestly.]]* I love you, and
51	I'll take care of you. I'll always take care of you.
52 S:	I love you, too, *[[I finally said,]]* but I don't want either one of you
53	to take care of me, Darryl. I want to take care of myself. *[[Then I*
54	*started my Jeep, and drove away.]]*

Conversational exchange 7: Carolyn Keene's *Nancy Drew on campus # 24: In the spotlight*

R: Ray; and M: Montana

01 M:	Ray! I'm so glad I found you, *[[Montana said, catching him just outside*
02	*Jason's office. She reached out and put her hand on his arm.]]* That was a
03	great first set.
04 R:	Thanks, Montana, *[[Ray said.]]* Thanks for coming.
05 M:	Are you kidding? I don't think I've missed a single performance of
06	Radical Moves.

07 R: You've been there since the beginning, haven't you, [[*Ray said with*
08   *a smile.*]] I really appreciate that.

09   [[*A small, awkward silence descended between them, which Montana took as*
10   *her cue.*]]

11 M: Ray, there's something I've been wanting to ask you for a really
12   long time. [[*She took a deep breath.*]] Would you go out with me?
13   Like, on a date? Because I'm crazy about you, [[*Montana confessed.*]]

14 R: You are? [[*Ray bit his lip.*]] I don't think . . . I mean, I hadn't
15   thought about . . .

16 M: [[*Montana's heart broke.* ((Don't say anything more,)) *she wanted to*
17   *say, but Ray kept going.*]]

18 R: Montana, you're beautiful. And I'm really flattered that you like
19   me. [[*He took her hand and squeezed it firmly.*]] I like you, too. But as a
20   friend, not more.

21 M: Oh. S-ure, [[*Montana stammered.*]] I understand.

22 R: Montana, I'm sorry, [[*Ray said.*]] Are you okay?

23 M: I'm fine! [[*Montana said, blinking back a tear.*]] Phew, it's smokey
24   back here, you know? [[*She raised her hand to her eye and caught the tear*
25   *just before it fell.*]] Look, I'd better go. I just wanted to say you guys
26   were great. I'd stick around, but I've got a ton of homework to do.
27   Good luck with your second set. [[*Montana turned around and started*
28   *walking.*]] (...)