



UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE SANTA CATARINA
CENTRO DE FILOSOFIA E CIÊNCIAS HUMANAS
PROGRAMA DE PÓS GRADUAÇÃO EM SOCIOLOGIA POLÍTICA

Marina Martins Chebly

**If I lift my pen and say 'Shazan' I become a dictator –
Procedural executive decrees in Brazil**

Florianópolis

2023

Marina Martins Chebly

If I lift my pen and say 'Shazan' I become a dictator

– Study on procedural decrees in Brazil

Dissertação submetida ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Sociologia Política da Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina para obtenção do grau de Mestra em Sociologia Política.

Orientador: Luís Felipe Guedes da Graça

Florianópolis

2023

Chebly, Marina Martins

If I lift my pen and say Shazan, I become a dictator : Study on procedural decrees in Brazil / Marina Martins Chebly ; orientador, Luís Felipe Guedes da Graça, 2023.

62 p.

Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Sociologia Política, Florianópolis, 2023.

Inclui referências.

1. Sociologia Política. 2. Decretos presidenciais. 3. Políticas não programáticas. 4. Desigualdade regional. 5. Paroquialismo. I. da Graça, Luís Felipe Guedes. II. Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Sociologia Política. III. Título.

Marina Martins Chebly

If I lift my pen and say 'Shazan', I become a dictator

– Study on procedural decrees in Brazil

O presente trabalho em nível de mestrado foi avaliado e aprovado por banca examinadora em 03/08/2023, composta pelos seguintes membros:

Prof. Dr. Luís Felipe Guedes da Graça

UFSC

Prof. Dr. Tiago Daher Padovezi Borges

UFSC

Prof. Dr. Fernando Meireles

UERJ

Certificamos que esta é a **versão original e final** do trabalho de conclusão que foi julgado adequado para obtenção do título de Mestra em Sociologia Política.

Coordenação do Programa de Pós-Graduação

Prof. Luís Felipe Guedes da Graça

Orientador

Florianópolis, 2023

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my parents, Vânia and Alfredo, for their unwavering support and belief in my dreams, even during the most audacious moments. They have been my pillars of strength throughout this journey, teaching me the value of self-belief. I am also grateful to my sisters, Violeta and Yasmín whose sensitivity and strength have inspired me to become a better person.

I extend my sincere appreciation to my advisor, Luís Felipe, for his invaluable technical support and guidance. His willingness to embrace and nurture my ideas has played a pivotal role in the success of this study. I am truly grateful for his mentorship.

Furthermore, I would like to express special thanks to Fernando Meireles (UERJ) and Stephanie Labou (USCD) for their invaluable contributions in pointing me in the right direction. Their insights and suggestions have significantly shaped the trajectory of this research.

ABSTRACT

This study investigates the distribution of decrees in Brazil and examines the influence of political party and bargain dynamics on their allocation. Utilizing Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), a topic modeling approach, the research identifies and categorizes nine types of decrees, including Agrarian Reform, Broadcasting, and Public Use of Land or buildings. The findings reveal significant variations in decree distribution based on political party affiliation. Specifically, Broadcasting concession decrees are more prevalent when the governor's party aligns with the president's party, while Agrarian Reform decrees show a strong effect with the proportion of federal deputies from the national coalition. The investigation finds that the proportion of federal deputies from the same party as the president does not impact the distribution of certain types of decrees. The findings suggest a clientelist nature in the allocation process, emphasizing the benefit-granting aspects of procedural decrees as non-programmatic policies within the context of coalition bargains. Further exploration of these dynamics will contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the role played by decrees in the distribution of benefits. Such insights are crucial for comprehending the broader landscape of nonprogrammatic policies and their implications for democracy and equity.

Keywords: Presidential decrees, Clientelism, Non-programmatic policies, Regional inequality, Broadcasting, Agrarian reform.

RESÚMEN

Este estudio investiga la distribución de decretos en Brasil y examina la influencia de los partidos políticos y la dinámica de negociación en su asignación. Utilizando la Asignación Dirichlet Latente (LDA), un enfoque de modelado de temas, la investigación identifica y clasifica nueve tipos de decretos, que incluyen Reforma Agraria, Radiodifusión y Uso Público de Terrenos o edificios. Los hallazgos revelan variaciones significativas en la distribución de decretos según la afiliación a un partido político. Específicamente, los decretos de concesión de Radiodifusión son más frecuentes cuando el partido del gobernador se alinea con el partido del presidente, mientras que los decretos de Reforma Agraria muestran un fuerte efecto con la proporción de diputados federales de la coalición nacional. La investigación encuentra que la proporción de diputados federales del mismo partido que el presidente no impacta la distribución de cierto tipo de decretos. Los hallazgos sugieren una naturaleza clientelista en el proceso de asignación, enfatizando los aspectos de otorgamiento de beneficios de los decretos procesales como políticas no programáticas dentro del contexto de negociaciones de coalición. Una mayor exploración de estas dinámicas contribuirá a una comprensión integral del papel que juegan los decretos en la distribución de beneficios. Estos conocimientos son cruciales para comprender el panorama más amplio de las políticas no programáticas y sus implicaciones para la democracia y la equidad.

Palabras-clave: Decretos presidenciales, Clientelismo, Políticas no programáticas, Desigualdad regional, Radiodifusión, Reforma Agraria.

RESUMO

Este estudo investiga a distribuição de decretos no Brasil e examina a influência dos partidos políticos e da dinâmica de barganha em sua alocação. Utilizando a Alocação Latente de Dirichlet (LDA), uma abordagem de modelagem de tópicos, a pesquisa identifica e categoriza nove tipos de decretos, incluindo Reforma Agrária, Radiodifusão e Uso Público de Terras ou edificações. Os resultados revelam variações significativas na distribuição de decretos com base na filiação partidária. Especificamente, os decretos de concessão da Radiodifusão são mais prevalentes quando o partido do governador se alinha com o partido do presidente, enquanto os decretos da Reforma Agrária mostram um forte efeito com a proporção de deputados federais da coligação nacional. A investigação constata que a proporção de deputados federais do mesmo partido que o presidente não impacta a distribuição de determinados tipos de decretos. Os resultados sugerem uma natureza clientelista no processo de alocação, enfatizando os aspectos de concessão de benefícios de decretos processuais como políticas não programáticas no contexto de barganhas de coalizão. Uma exploração mais aprofundada dessas dinâmicas contribui para uma compreensão abrangente do papel desempenhado pelos decretos na distribuição de benefícios. Esses insights são cruciais para compreender o panorama mais amplo das políticas não programáticas e suas implicações para a democracia e a equidade.

Palavras-chave: Decretos presidenciais, Clientelismo, Políticas não programáticas, Desigualdade regional, Radiodifusão, Reforma Agrária.

RESUMO EXPANDIDO

O trabalho analisa padrões e dinâmicas dos decretos presidenciais no Brasil, com foco em seu impacto nas conexões clientelistas entre a presidência e os atores subnacionais. O primeiro capítulo fornece uma visão abrangente do conceito e das características dos decretos presidenciais, destacando sua base constitucional no Brasil e seu significado histórico. Também examina a distribuição de decretos ao longo de diferentes presidências, identificando variações na quantidade e nos tipos de decretos emitidos por cada governo. Através dessa análise inicial, buscamos identificar padrões e tendências que podem ajudar a compreender os fatores que influenciam a distribuição de decretos, como dinâmicas políticas e considerações regionais. Em suas subseções, o capítulo se aprofunda no papel desempenhado pelos partidos políticos na negociação e distribuição de decretos presidenciais. A aliança entre o partido do governador e o partido do presidente, bem como a proporção de deputados federais da coalizão presidencial, têm um impacto significativo na emissão de decretos. Investigamos até que ponto as dinâmicas partidárias e a política de coalizão moldam a distribuição de decretos e o estabelecimento de conexões clientelistas. Na metodologia descrevemos a abordagem metodológica utilizada para classificar e analisar os decretos presidenciais. Detalhamos o processo de coleta de dados, a aplicação de técnicas de modelagem de tópicos, como o modelo Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), e a categorização dos tópicos abordados nos decretos. Esta metodologia proporciona um arcabouço sólido para a compreensão da diversidade de temas tratados nos decretos e como eles são distribuídos. Por fim, apresentamos os resultados de nossa pesquisa, que revelam a influência das dinâmicas partidárias na distribuição de decretos presidenciais no Brasil. Destacamos como a concessão de certos tipos de decretos, como as concessões de radiodifusão, está relacionada à afinidade partidária entre o governador e o presidente. Além disso, mostramos que a Reforma Agrária é fortemente influenciada pela proporção de deputados federais da coalizão presidencial. Surpreendentemente, descobrimos que a proporção de deputados federais do mesmo partido do presidente não afeta a distribuição de certos tipos de decretos. Esses resultados indicam a presença de uma dinâmica clientelista no processo de alocação de decretos.

LIST OF GRAPHS AND FIGURES

Graph 1 - Decrees per president.....16

Graph 2 - Types of decrees per president.....16

Graph 3 - Dispersion of gammas per topic.....34

Graph 4 - Scale of betas per topic.....35

Figure 1 - Structure of decrees in the website source.....30

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 - Frequency of words in the decrees.....	31
Table 2 - Statistics of gammas per topic.....	34
Table 3 - Logistic regression model of topics of interest.....	41

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

DOU – Union Official Gazette – *Diário Oficial da União*

PDL – Project of Decree from the Senate – *Projeto de Decreto Legislativo do Senado*

LDA – Latent Dirichlet Allocation – *Alocação Latente Dirichlet*

URL – Uniform Resource Location

IBAMA – Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources –
Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e Recursos Naturais Renováveis

CCJC – Committee on Constitution and Justice and Citizenship of the House of
Deputies – *Comissão de Constituição e Justiça e Cidadania da Câmara dos deputados*

PDC – Project of Decree from the House of Deputies – *Projeto de Decreto Legislativo da
Câmara dos Deputados*

SUMMARY

PREAMBLE.....	2
INTRODUCTION.....	4
1. PRESIDENTIAL DECREES IN BRAZIL	6
1.1 Analysis of a land distribution decree	12
2. DECREES AS NON-PROGRAMATIC POLITICS.....	17
3. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS	27
3.1 Classifying presidential decrees with LDA model	29
3.2 Testing hypothesis.....	40
4. CONCLUSION.....	45
REFERENCES.....	48

PREAMBLE

The idea for this project came up a few years ago, when I was working as a research assistant classifying Peruvian's presidential orders, a country with intense and volatile presidential terms, in a project on comparative presidencies at DCP-UFMG. Our task as research interns were to read the summary (*ementa*) and the entire body of the text, if necessary, to identify which ministry or government entity impacted by the executive act. After a few months of this repetitive activity, I noticed how much of the history of countries can be recorded by presidential decrees. Like reverse engineering, I realized that those presidential decrees reflected an interesting part of the troubled 80s and 90s in that country.

When I started to do more research on Brazilian presidential decrees, two things caught my attention – the first is the surprising number of presidential decrees already enacted in the country, tens of thousands. The second element that caused great curiosity is the fact that Brazilian political literature has devoted itself extensively to the analysis of budgetary decrees to the detriment of the “others”. These surpluses not studied actually comprise most of the universe of decrees enacted in Brazil and deal with the most different themes.

Fortunately, considering the myriad of software and the singular proximity of political science and quantitative methodology today, I believe that we finally have the necessary tools to understand the activity of the Planalto Palace through presidential decrees. This legal instrument that emerged as an *ad hoc* alternative to federal legislative interpretation actually became a daily habit in the Brazilian presidency, as in many Latin American countries.

With this work, I intend to open analytical doors, and publish the entire database so that my fellow researchers also have the opportunity to search for their own questions in it. When I started this work, I had many questions that, over the years, materialized in a basic need to map this entire universe, the ‘others’ neglected by the mainstream research, the non-budgetary ones, the obtuse ones that were swept under the rug of the hypotheses of all research until then.

Honestly, I still do not know if I have found answers to all the questions at the beginning, but now I'm sure that at least the data already exists, to test my hypotheses and the others that will come.

I also think of this database I created as a historical record. At the moment I write this paragraph with a mental footnote "Download everything soon before Bolsonaro deletes it". I don't know if HE could do it, but judging by the website structure where this information – our history – is available, I am afraid that all this information could easily be deleted from the planalto.gov server at any time.

INTRODUCTION

Presidential decrees hold immense power in shaping policies, allocating resources, and establishing connections with subnational governments. In Brazil, a country renowned for its complex political landscape and coalition presidentialism, the utilization of decrees plays a pivotal role in the distribution of benefits and the maintenance of clientelist relationships. Unraveling the behavior and implications of presidential decrees is crucial to grasp the intricacies of governance and the interplay between the presidency, political parties, and subnational governments.

This thesis explores the patterns and dynamics of presidential decrees in Brazil, analyzing their impact on clientelist connections between the presidency and subnational actors. By examining the distribution of decrees across various presidencies, analyzing the role of political parties and coalitions in decree issuance, and categorizing decree types, this study strives to uncover the mechanisms through which non-programmatic policies are established and reinforced.

The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 1, Presidential decrees, provides an in-depth overview of the concept and characteristics of presidential decrees, their constitutional basis in Brazil, and historical significance. This chapter lays the groundwork for comprehending the distinct nature of decrees and analyzes the distribution of decrees across different presidential administrations, observing the variations in the quantity and types of decrees issued by each presidency. By identifying patterns and trends in decree issuance, this chapter aims to identify potential factors influencing their distribution, such as political dynamics, policy priorities, and regional (dis)considerations.

The subsection “Non-programmatic politics and clientelism” focuses on the role played by political parties in the negotiation and distribution of decrees. The study posits that the alignment between the governor's party and the president's party, as well as the proportion of federal deputies from the presidential coalition significantly impact decree issuance. This chapter investigates the extent to which party dynamics and coalition politics shape the distribution of decrees and the establishment of clientelist connections.

The methodology chapter outlines the approach employed to classify and analyze the decrees. It details the data collection process, the utilization of topic modeling techniques,

and the application of Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) modeling to categorize and interpret the topics addressed in the decrees. This methodology provides a comprehensive framework for understanding the diverse range of subjects covered by decrees and their distribution.

Ultimately, this thesis aims to enhance our understanding of the intricate relationship between presidential decrees, political parties, and clientelism in Brazil. By examining their behavior, distribution across presidencies, and the role of political parties, this study offers valuable insights into the mechanisms through which non-programmatic policies are established and the implications for democratic governance.

The findings of this research hold significant implications for policymakers, scholars, and citizens interested in coalition presidentialism, policy distribution, and the dynamics of clientelism in Brazil. By investigating the strategic use of decrees, this study opens avenues for further exploration into the long-term effects of decree issuance on regional development, policy outcomes, and democratic governance.

This thesis contributes to our understanding of presidential decrees in Brazil and their implications for clientelism and governance. By examining their behavior, distribution, and the role of political parties, this study aims to provide valuable insights into the intricate connections between the presidency and subnational governments, ultimately advancing our knowledge of democratic governance in Brazil.

1. PRESIDENTIAL DECREES IN BRAZIL

Five days after January, 8th of 2022 when the three buildings of powers were depredated in Brazil, the Federal Police found a draft of a presidential decree in the house of Anderson Torres, former Secretary of Justice. In the draft, they were planning to cancel the electoral result and install a new electoral council – a *coup d'état* in its origins. The attempt to change such a structural basis of democracy using a presidential decree is not something new, the history of many countries in South America can be read through its numerous amounts of decrees. Beyond miraculous plans, this study investigates the side effects on the unequal distribution of non-programmatic policies through unilateral executive actions in Brazil and how decrees can be a hidden key to understanding clientelist connections between the presidency and subnational governments.

The distributive arrangement of a country's goods is a hidden link between macro regime analyses and investigations of electoral behavior. There are many ways to establish a relationship between the executive and the national legislature observing stability and cooperation. The assumptions to interpret these policies' networks vary according to sociocultural differences and, of course, institutional particularities. In opposition to budgeting decrees, the procedural ones constitute most of the unilateral acts issued by the presidency and transfer resources (Carey & Reinhardt, 2003) to many varied matters, from the expropriation of land to the creation of special committees.

The Brazilian political system presents a challenging operation by bringing a unique institutional design, (Abranches, 2018), mixing elements such as the predominance of large electoral coalitions to the executive power and, at the same time, a bicameral legislative power, composed of proportional open-list elections in the lower house. However, this unique combination is not a case of arbitrariness throughout Brazilian political history: it expresses the needs and contradictions of cultural, economic, and social backgrounds. According to the author, this combination of institutional and electoral designs derives from historical inequalities while intending at the same time to end such disparities.

Such inequality can be seen through the issuing of presidential decrees a very powerful tool in the hands of the presidency. A great example of the former administration of

President Bolsonaro is constituted by the numerous presidential references to his presidential power, using a single pen and the order's signature: in a Facebook streaming to his fans, once affirmed "If I lift the Bic pen and say "*Shazan*" I become a dictator"¹.

Despite the irony, this statement represents the president's perspective about decrees by publicly recognizing it as a great and vast source of power. Many other pen references were made in a more severe and threatening tone to television stations and other companies if they did not represent him more pleasantly. The threat is real; many legal matters occur exclusively under the presidential decree signature, such as concessions for broadcasting companies, authorization for power generation plants, expropriation of land, and many others. Moreover, they are fundamental to regional public administration. These narratives demonstrate the government's agenda by prioritizing some subject or region and allow us to understand better the presidential relationship with subnational governments, the legislative power, governors, and political parties.

One distinguished attribute of modern presidencies is unilateral constitutional acts (Moe & Howell, 1999). If needed, the Congress and supreme courts have limited and diffuse resources to step out against executive orders. This possibility provides the federal branch with bargaining and agenda-setting power with federated entities, congress, courts, political parties, and many political actors.

One exclusive prerogative of the president is to concede or extinguish permission to sound and image broadcasting service companies, directly or by authorization, concession, or permission. (21st Constitutional Article). It happens because sound waves are classified as limited goods in the public domain. Therefore, these decrees deal with a license grant to administer the property – in this case, a frequency wave modulated (FM) within a scale of 87.8 MHz to 108 MHz. Television channels have a similar nature of limited public good. Consequently, it is exclusively up to the federal government to grant and renew the licenses issued to the management companies, and being a limited good, the concession to one group can be seen as a punishment to the others. Similar

¹ <https://gauchazh.clicrbs.com.br/politica/noticia/2021/03/bolsonaro-se-eu-levantar-minha-caneta-bic-e-disser-shazan-eu-viro-ditador-ckm5kthhb004b01gc4snrzh2y.html>

exclusivity is assigned to expropriate land for the purpose of agrarian reform or the creation of ecological reserves.

If there is a land expropriation, restitution is offered in agrarian debt securities or its equivalency in currency. Some cases are described in the Analysis chapter, illustrating the weight of the expropriation decrees in local government and their possible use as a bargain with local agrarian elites.

The influence of local families and political groups is crucial in local elections, establishing their economic dominance and especially the political media influence (Telles & Lavareda, 2011). More specifically, through the incorporation of constitutional mechanisms, as pointed out by “In defense of the regulation of television broadcasting services”:

“The new Constitution of 1988 was an opportunity for the crystallization of local or regional powers, particularly the “gains” of the military period, and the performance of the conservative front was based on the distribution of concessions in the field of broadcasting, to maintain the benefits obtained during the military regime”.

(Scorsim, 2008, P. 51)

There is a historical relationship between politicians and broadcasting companies. To avoid this closeness, the constitutional text says, Article. 54 *“Members and Senators may not: II - from the inauguration: a) be owners, controllers or directors of a company that enjoys favor arising from a contract with a legal entity of public law, or is it to perform a paid function.”* The reality, however, (Simis, 2019) shows that even congresspersons who own media, when elected, make an artificial removal from leadership or transfer the company rights to family or friends. Even so, concessions have always been decided in a closed circle, restricted to the president and ministers.

Moreover, according to Media Ownership Monitor, a tool for mapping freedom of information created by the organization Reporters Without Borders, most Brazilian media groups, considered radio, television, and newspapers, are somehow associated with a

political actor. In a report published in October 2017, they observe that vehicles with religious interests are highly expressed: of the 50 vehicles surveyed, nine are owned by religious leaders - all Christian - and five direct all content to defend the values of their specific religiosity. In addition, at least six vehicles are not defined as religious but feature content from religious denominations on their pages or programming grades. Political interests are also at stake. In addition to politicians and family members who donate, mainly among stations affiliated with the large national radio and TV networks, most owners have close relationships (kinship, cronyism, exchange of favors, among others) with politicians and parties. Thus, politicians are often masked.

As we can see on the MOM portal², Vitorio Mediolli (PHS), the current Mayor of Betim - Minas Gerais, for example, owns a varied business conglomerate valued at R\$ 3.08 billion in 2016, according to Financial Data. In addition, his wife, Laura Mediolli, owns the “Sempre Editora” (Publishing company), which, among other media, is responsible for the newspaper Super Notícia, the newspaper with the largest circulation in the state, according to the portal mentioned above. On November 15, 2020, he was re-elected in the city, accounting for more than 72% of valid votes (Chebly, 2020). In this case, the mayor indirectly owns a journal which is also a radio news, both cases forbidden by law.

When Celina Souza (2005) analyzes the institutional transitions promulgated in the second, third, and fourth Brazilian republic, especially the conjuncture in which the 5th Constitution of Brazil was elaborated in 1946, she elucidates how the privileges of the state oligarchies were performed, especially Minas Gerais and São Paulo during the Estado Novo. The conflicts associated with the monopoly and export of commodities, especially coffee, intensified the spirits of political families, who withdrew and sought ways to engage or be absorbed by the multitude of institutions created by President Vargas. Besides adopting risky economic strategies anticipating local production breakdown, the oligarchies from those states were particularly interested in the institutional and electoral designs for the Constituent Assembly organization consequently, how the representatives would establish electoral structures.

² Media Ownership Monitor, accessed in 04/01/2023.

The interference of private interests even before placing the game rules is an inherent characteristic of the rationalization of interest groups, as well demonstrated by (Tsebelis, 2002). Theory of veto players and notoriously observed and described by (Soares, 1973) regarding the interests of political oligarchies in periods of institutional remodeling. Similar behavior is usual in countries with colonial pasts and significant development of agrarian elites, a continuous movement where the elite re-adapts or even expand their privileges in the new social-economical structure once they hold the trigger for structural changes. The armament metaphor becomes real: One manner of referring to the three most oversized legislative coalitions is “Triple B”, standing for Bullet, Bible, and Cattle (Boi).

The unilateral transference from the executive branch is an essential instrument used to implement strictly political objectives. It is the leading cause of the voluntary reallocation of Brazilian federalism (Amorim Neto & Simonassi, 2013). The researchers conclude that there is a trend to maintain inter-regional inequalities in Brazil since both the level and evolution of resources transferred to the states are defined much more by the political force than by equity criteria or by meeting local populations’ needs. It is necessary to deepen research on the motivations that lead the president to adopt unilateral actions, in this case, decrees. Political parties also express their share of influence, fighting to play the role of intermediaries of resources transferred to subnational governments (Carey & Reinhardt, 2003).

In the 1988 Constitution, several instruments were created to reduce inequalities, primarily regional development disparity, such as a minimum percentage to the North, Northeast, and Midwest regions and the regionalization of the federal budget. Unfortunately, they are still insufficient to reduce regional imbalances in absolute or relative terms (Souza, 2005). Whereas the policies against regional inequality fail, many researchers found relevant conditioning to the budgeting transferences from the federal executive to local governments. States with more federal deputies from the same presidential coalition win more discretionary budgets (Arretche & Rodden, 2003) and (Cheibub, Figueiredo, and Limongi, 2009). The coalition variable is the most influential, not the governor or party alignment.

Similar results were pointed out by (Kriner & Reeves, 2015) about presidential particularism studies of U.S. presidencies, with evidence that federal allocations increase in electoral years and in core states to pursue political goals or reward supporters. In addition to the institutional design characteristics, there is also a sizeable presidential power, with strong constitutional guarantees of unilateral acts and strong federalism (Stepan, 2004). Many specialized studies indicate a specific concern regarding regional forces in constructing or maintaining national policies, as seen in the strengthening of federalism in the 1988 Constitution. Despite analyzing budgeting allocations, in this study the same hypotheses will be tested to see if the procedural decrees also work through the same political conditioning of following the needs of the presidential coalition.

This concern comes from the difficulty in formulating and implementing public policies in specific states, whereas, on the other hand, large transfers and benefits to other subnational governments. Thus, some institutional characteristics – strong federalism and the president's great power to enact unilateral acts – play a decisive role in distributing benefits to the states and often directly to municipalities, companies, or local groups.

There are, notably, several elements that neglect or encourage regional disparities, some even climatic, such as arid zones or seasonal floods that affect local economies, however specific transfers to the regions are not fulfilled, as determined in the Complementary Law 101/2000, also known as the Fiscal Responsibility Law. In a preliminary database built for the master research, 8,887 mentions of a Brazilian state were identified from 1990 to 2018. There is a significant asymmetry of the frequency with which some are treated. São Paulo, the most frequent, appears 880 times, followed by Minas Gerais 683, while Amapá figures only 33. The difference in number of decrees among states however can be explained by specific needs of each state, and that's why the classification of those orders and deeper analysis are necessary.

1.1 Analysis of a land distribution decree

The second biggest country in America, Brazil, has the fifth biggest territory in the world, composed by over 5,570 municipalities and classified in many studies as the most unequal country in the world. (Barros, Henrique and Mendonça, 2000) bring this conclusion when analyzing the ratio between the income of the richest and the poorest in a study on how poverty responds to two immediate determinants: the **aggregate** scarcity of resources and the poor distribution of existing resources.

The distribution of land and its resulting wealth distribution is the cornerstone of political science in the study of the origin of Brazilian inequality. From the most remote agrarian oligarchies to the recent legal reformulations of land use, the agrarian/land ownership issue in Brazil is also a basic theme in electoral and institutional analyses.

Groups that maintain the current *status quo* anticipate institutional trends and reorganize themselves to maintain political relevance even with regime changes, a case that occurred in Brazil in the democratic transition that began in 1988 (Telles & Lavareda, 2011). Therefore, in this work, we argue that even before the means of political favoring are refined, it is possible to find the legal ways that are carried out. Reviewing the decrees present in the database, we decide to bring two examples for a close case study.

More than just analyzing the classifications of decrees, and to reinforce the purpose of this work – to find possible paths of nonprogrammatic policies working to reinforce political commitment between the presidency and local groups – in this section we analyze the case of a decree contested in the Federal Senate for trespassing their reglementary power, which means, that that president used inappropriately this legal tool.

In 2003, three federal deputies questioned the decree of May 18, 2001, that created a national reserve forest in the municipality of Cristópolis³, Bahia state. According to this PDC the argumentation to null the presidential decree relies on the fact that the compensation for the land was beyond fair for its measurements and more, the company should have this preservation area, as all companies in the same sector. At the time, the

³ Original source:
https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra?codteor=124079&filename=Tramitacao

wrong measurement of 12 thousand acres instead of 4 thousand, granted the company owner, Carbofix, in approximately R\$3.5 million. Bellow, the argumentation from the legislative members:

“Ocorre que o jornal "A Tarde", do estado da Bahia, na sua edição de 25 de fevereiro de 2002, divulgou a seguinte matéria. "Governo Federal cria Floresta Nacional em fazenda fantasma", na qual sustenta que a área determinada como Floresta Nacional do Cristópolis, no estado da Bahia, está localizada em uma fazenda cuja situação fundiária encontra-se completamente irregular e não possui a diversidade biológica necessária para a fundamentação do Decreto de criação da referida FLONA. Afirma ainda o jornal, com dados da superintendência estadual do INCRA na Bahia, que a área real de abrangência da referida FLONA é de 4.400 hectares e não de onze mil novecentos e cinqüenta hectares e setenta ares, como estabelecido no Decreto de Criação da FLONA de Cristópolis. Vale ressaltar que, de acordo com a Lei 9985 de 2000, que criou o Sistema Nacional de Unidades de Conservação, Lei do SNUC, determina em seu artigo 6º, inciso III, que o Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis - Ibama tem a atribuição de subsidiar as propostas de criação das Unidades de Conservação Federal e administrá-las. Na operação de desapropriação da Fazenda Estandarte, onde está localizada a FLONA em questão, o IBAMA autorizou o pagamento de 1.070.756 créditos de reposição florestal, que hoje no mercado de papéis podem valer até mais de R\$ 3,5 milhões.”

PDC 38/2003 de 8 de abril de 2003⁴

The president at the time, Fernando Henrique Cardoso did not suffer any sanctions from this decree, even after being nulled by the Senate. A very similar case, with wrong measurements and process for its nullity was found in the decree from 18 of February of

⁴ Original files: <https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=110256>

2005⁵, again neither the president of the competent governmental sectors were reviewed or suffer any sanction. However, this lost end might indicate some connection between the presidency, secretaries of state and the company owners.

The initiative to suspend the decree signed by Fernando Henrique Cardoso is based on the fact that the compensation paid to the landowner, the company Carbofix, was much greater than what the land was actually worth based on the measurements of its land. In addition, the expropriated territory was actually an area of natural vegetation that the company should, by law, have preserved within its productive domains.

Then, the congressperson Colbert Martins of the CCJC opines for the approval of the Draft Legislative Decree nº 38, of 2003 and consequent nullity of the decree in question. Thus, in the specific analysis of this decree, we realize that, in addition to the presidency of the republic taking responsibility for managing native vegetation that the responsible company should protect, it still grants an overpriced compensation amount in environmental credits, defrauding the real measures of the ground.

The issuance of decrees for agrarian reform and public use of land and buildings plays a crucial role in addressing Brazil's pressing land distribution issues and promoting a more equitable society. Brazil faces significant land inequality, with a large portion of land concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy individuals or corporations. This concentration perpetuates social and economic disparities, hampers rural development, and restricts access to resources for marginalized communities.

To achieve a true reform of the land, it is essential to prioritize the interests and welfare of the country as a whole and avoid concentrating land ownership even more. Agrarian reform decrees provide a mechanism for redistributing land to landless farmers, indigenous communities, and other vulnerable groups. By allocating land to those in need, these decrees aim to address historical injustices, empower marginalized communities,

⁵ Original source: https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=4677574&ts=1594038011215&disposition=inline&_gl=1*xm0tyy*_ga*MTgzMDgxNTg4My4xNjgzNTgyODQw*_ga_CW3ZH25XMK*MTY4MzU4ODk2NC4yLjEuMTY4MzU4OTEyNi4wLjAuMA

and foster sustainable rural development. In fact, in Brazilian constitution there is a part that mention that land not used should be distributed for those who need it. It says:

“Compete à União desapropriar por interesse social, para fins de reforma agrária, o imóvel rural que não esteja cumprindo sua função social, mediante prévia e justa indenização em títulos da dívida agrária, com cláusula de preservação do valor real, resgatáveis no prazo de até vinte anos, a partir do segundo ano de sua emissão, e cuja utilização será definida em lei.”

Art. 184. of the Federal Constitution

Decrees for public use of land and buildings contribute to the collective benefit of society by repurposing underutilized or abandoned properties for public projects such as infrastructure development, social housing, education, healthcare facilities, and environmental conservation. This ensures that these resources are utilized in a way that advances the overall well-being of the country and avoids their remaining idle or benefiting only a privileged few.

Implementing effective agrarian reform and public use decrees requires more than legal provisions; it necessitates transparency, accountability, and participatory decision-making processes. Strong institutional frameworks and robust oversight mechanisms are crucial to prevent corruption, patronage, and favoritism in the allocation and use of land and buildings.

A genuine land reform agenda must prioritize the empowerment and inclusion of marginalized communities. This involves providing support and resources for land beneficiaries, such as access to credit, technical assistance, education, and market opportunities. By enabling these communities to thrive, agrarian reform and public use decrees can contribute to reducing poverty, improving livelihoods, and fostering social cohesion.

The issuance of decrees for agrarian reform and public use of land and buildings in Brazil holds the potential to address land concentration issues and promote a more just and

inclusive society. By prioritizing the needs of the country and its citizens, these decrees can facilitate land redistribution, promote sustainable development, and ensure that land and buildings are utilized for the collective benefit of society. However, achieving these goals requires strong institutions, transparency, and empowerment of marginalized communities throughout the land reform process.

It is important to acknowledge that while agrarian reform and public use decrees have the potential to address land concentration issues, there is a need to examine the motives behind their issuance closely. It remains uncertain whether presidents and policymakers utilize these decrees to genuinely distribute land more equitably or further concentrate land ownership in the hands of the powerful. Political considerations, vested interests, and the influence of influential groups can impact the implementation of these decrees and their ultimate outcomes. Therefore, alongside the implementation of effective land reform measures, it is crucial to monitor and evaluate the actions of the government to ensure that land distribution policies are genuinely aimed at promoting social justice and reducing inequality.

2. DECREES AS NON-PROGRAMATIC POLITICS

The presidential order is a unilateral presidential act with immediate action from its enactment, and aims at regulations that ensure the faithful enforcement of laws. It is constitutionally provided among the president's duties in the Federal Constitution, Section II Art. 84⁶: *"The President of the Republic has the exclusive powers to IV. approve, promulgate and order publication of laws, as well as issue decrees and regulations for their faithful execution;"* Through this prerogative, the executive assumes a decisive role in regulations or executions related to pre-existing laws, allocation of emergency resources and the resolution of conflicts running outside the scope of other entities, like states, cities, the supreme court, or the legislative houses.

The unilateral acts of the presidency are supposed to be the last instrument available and should be used with precaution due to its great power. Despite their legal precautions, presidential decrees have become very common in the history of Brazilian governments: the Real Plan (to implement the current currency) and the construction of Brasilia, for example, were made through decrees.

In fact, not only in Brazil or Latin America. The freeing of slaves and the Louisiana Purchase in the US also were made through presidential orders (Moe & Howell 1999). The presidency, its staff, parties, and other political actors create a pattern of each government, a unique brand of management. Furthermore, it is all there, like indelible marks of the president's beliefs, political agents, and what their bureaucracy has done or tried to do – their conceptions, choices, priorities, and limits (Lassance, 2014).

Following a presential informal agenda, many resources could be transferred to states and sub-national governments, such as big state capitals. The most significant variables to the executive allocation trade-off are defined by current scholarships - The electoral-oriented pork barrel, the political party's coalition, and the executive-legislative arena (Kriner & Reeves, 2015). These papers work with a measurable object of study, budget transfers. However, our great challenge in this inaugural work is to test these results

⁶ Brazillian Constitution in English https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2017.pdf?lang=en

among non-budgetary decrees. For that, we have to understand and map their distribution and which non-financial benefits they offer.

Presidential decrees in Brazil assume the force of law from the moment they are published in the Official Gazette. If there are any unconstitutional issues, the legislative power has the prerogative to create a Draft Legislative Decree to request its suspension. This process is slow and requires a significant mobilization effort from senators and deputies, as the PDL will have to pass through their houses, and only then will the effects of the presidential decree be extinguished. The National Congress has the authority to suspend normative acts of the Executive Power that exceed regulatory power or legislative delegation limits, according to Art. 49, IV of the attributions of the National Congress.

Another aspect of unilateral acts is the possibility of negotiating with the legislative, looking for support for presidential matters and its allies. One way the President can use decrees to negotiate with the Congress is by setting the agenda. Through the strategic issuance of decrees on specific policy matters, the President can guide the legislative discussions and draw attention to the issues they wish to address. By highlighting key areas of concern or priority through decrees, the President can influence the focus of lawmakers, fostering an environment for negotiation and cooperation.

Furthermore, decrees can serve as a powerful tool for the President to demonstrate commitment to a particular policy or reform. By taking unilateral action through a decree, the President showcases their dedication and initiative on a given issue. This can signal to members of Congress that the President is serious about their policy objectives and encourage legislators to engage in discussions and find common ground.

Presidential decrees can also serve as a precursor to future legislation. By implementing policies through a decree, the President provides a practical example of how a particular law or regulation would operate in practice. This demonstration can help inform lawmakers about the potential benefits and challenges of a proposed policy, paving the way for legislative debates and negotiations on formalizing the decree into law.

In the negotiation process, presidential decrees can serve as leverage for the President. The threat of issuing or revoking a decree can be used to influence the behavior or

positions of members of Congress. The President may use decrees as a bargaining chip, indicating that certain actions will be taken if the Congress does not address specific concerns or support certain legislation.

It is important to note that while presidential decrees offer a degree of flexibility and autonomy to the President, they are subject to legislative review. The Congress has the power to reject a decree or pass a law on the same subject, which can nullify the decree. This provides an additional incentive for negotiation between the executive and legislative branches to reach a consensus and avoid potential conflicts.

In a deeper reading of Brazilian *realpolitik*, (Meireles, 2019), political party alignment and the existence of coalitions are crucial regarding presidential unilateral actions dynamics. As the primary vehicles for political representation, parties serve as platforms for various ideological, policy, and regional interests within the legislative branch. Understanding the role of political parties in this context is essential for comprehending the dynamics of negotiation and decision-making in Brazil's democratic system.

One key role of political parties in the negotiation process is the representation of diverse perspectives. Different parties embody distinct ideologies, policy positions, and socio-economic interests. When it comes to presidential decrees, party affiliations often shape the stances and priorities of lawmakers. Members of Congress, aligned with specific parties, are expected to adhere to the party's platform and support or oppose presidential initiatives accordingly. These partisan positions can influence the negotiation process as parties seek to advance their policy agendas and ensure their members act in alignment with party principles.

Political parties provide a platform for coordination and strategy, organizing and mobilizing their members within the Congress, facilitating internal communication, and formulating collective positions on key issues, including presidential decrees. Party leaders play a crucial role in rallying support or opposition among their party members, coordinating voting strategies, and engaging in negotiations with the executive branch. This internal party discipline and coordination contribute to the party's ability to influence the negotiation process and shape the outcome of debates on presidential decrees.

Political parties also play a crucial role in coalition-building. In Brazil's multipartite system, where no single party holds a majority of seats in Congress, forming coalitions is essential for achieving legislative support (Lijphart, 2003). When a President wants to advance a presidential decree, they often need to negotiate and build coalitions with multiple parties. Through these negotiations, parties may seek concessions or amendments to the proposed decree to align it more closely with their policy preferences. In return, parties may provide the necessary support to pass the decree or influence its content.


The negotiation process involving presidential decrees often requires dialogue and compromises between the executive and legislative branches. Political parties act as intermediaries in this process, representing their members' interests and facilitating discussions (Abranches, 2018). They engage in bargaining, seeking to protect their policy priorities, secure benefits for their constituents, or push their own legislative agenda. These negotiations can lead to modifications, amendments, or even the rejection of decrees, as parties seek to shape policy outcomes in line with their party platforms.

It's important to note that the role of political parties in negotiation processes can vary depending on the specific context, political dynamics, and the party system in place. Parties' influence may also be affected by factors such as party discipline, party fragmentation, and individual legislators' independence. Nonetheless, political parties remain central actors in the negotiation of presidential decrees, as they represent diverse interests, facilitate coordination, build coalitions, and shape the outcomes of legislative debates.

The presidential decrees can be used as a tool to negotiate with political parties and individual deputies if necessary, and the amount of decrees issued in Brazil is huge: Between Collor and Dilma, 27,056 decrees were enacted. In the same period, Senate approved 430⁷ proposals to cancel a presidential decree. Therefore, less than 0.02% of enacted decrees had attempted to be stopped from the legislative power. In the other hand, we can see a great asymmetry in the decrees distribution across presidencies, as shown in graph 1, "Decrees per president".


⁷ 220 legislative decrees to annul a presidential decrees were originated in in National Congress (PDL) and 210 from the Sante (PDS). Source <https://www25.senado.leg.br/web/atividade/materias>

Graph 1 - Decrees per president



More than the number of decrees, the types also vary across the presidencies, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso is the president who issued the most decrees about Agrarian Reform, in both terms, as we can see in the graph 2.

Graph 2 - Types of decrees per president



It is very important to remember that Fernando Henrique Cardoso was the first president able to be reelected after the re-democratization in 1988. The tendency of issuing Agrarian Reform decrees, however decrease over time and basically finishes on President Michel Temer term. Public use by its turn, seems to have a different behavior by being prevalent in around 10% of decrees issued by Collor and after a period of decrease, increase in Dilma's terms, especially in the second, with around 30%. Broadcasting has a peak in Lula's second term. Further in the study, we will be able to understand why the president might focus on different types of decrees.

It is interesting to observe how different presidents uses different types of decrees more often. It can be as the result of specific needs in their governments, employing a strategic approach by using different types of decrees to signal and communicate with various actors, including political parties and individual deputies. This signaling tactic allows presidents to navigate the negotiation process surrounding presidential decrees and shape the behavior and positions of key stakeholders.

One aspect of this theory suggests that presidents tailor their decrees to appeal to the interests and concerns of political parties. Political parties in Brazil represent diverse ideologies, policy positions, and regional considerations. By issuing decrees that address specific issues important to certain parties, presidents can signal their alignment with those party interests. These decrees may contain provisions or policy measures that resonate with the party's core platform, demonstrating a shared agenda and fostering a sense of collaboration.

For example, if a president wishes to secure support from a party known for its focus on environmental issues, they may issue a decree aimed at promoting sustainable development or strengthening environmental regulations. By doing so, the president signals to the party that their concerns are being acknowledged and addressed, potentially cultivating a positive disposition towards the decree and encouraging party members to support it during the subsequent legislative review.

Moreover, the theory posits that presidents can use decrees to target individual deputies within the Congress. Deputies often have diverse interests and priorities, including regional concerns or personal ambitions. Presidents may strategically issue decrees that

address specific issues or policies relevant to key deputies, signaling their attention to their individual interests. This targeted signaling can help cultivate support and cooperation from influential deputies, who may be more inclined to support the decree if it aligns with their constituents' needs or their personal political goals.

By employing this signaling approach, presidents can shape the negotiation dynamics surrounding presidential decrees. The use of tailored decrees demonstrates a willingness to engage with and respond to the concerns of political parties and individual deputies, fostering a sense of inclusion and collaboration. This signaling strategy aims to build alliances, gain support, and increase the chances of successful negotiation and approval of presidential decrees in the legislative process.

In addition to signaling and engaging with political parties and individual deputies, presidents in Brazil can strategically leverage decrees related to specific policy areas to establish beneficial connections with subnational governments. These decrees hold the potential to impact subnational territories directly, making them a valuable tool for fostering relationships, building alliances, and consolidating support.

One example of this strategy is the issuance of decrees related to broadcasting concessions. Broadcasting licenses are crucial for media companies, and their allocation or renewal can have significant implications for subnational governments, as well as local economies and political landscapes. Presidents can use these decrees to establish connections with subnational governments by considering their interests in broadcasting concessions. By engaging in consultations with subnational authorities, seeking their input, and involving them in decision-making processes related to these decrees, presidents can build collaborative relationships and foster support from subnational governments.

Similarly, decrees concerning land expropriation and agrarian reform offer another avenue for presidents to connect with subnational governments. These decrees involve decisions related to land distribution, land use policies, and agrarian issues that directly affect rural areas and subnational territories. By engaging subnational governments in the formulation and implementation of these decrees, presidents can foster collaboration and

gain support from these governments, especially in regions with a significant rural or agricultural presence.

By establishing beneficial connections with subnational governments through the strategic use of decrees, presidents can build a network of support beyond the confines of the national level. This allows them to leverage the resources, influence, and local knowledge of subnational governments to facilitate the implementation of their policies, including presidential decrees. Moreover, this approach can contribute to a more cooperative and collaborative environment between the federal and subnational levels of government, enhancing the overall effectiveness of governance and policy implementation.

Analyzing presidential decrees through the lens of clientelism raises an extensive discussion in political science regarding the commitment problem – if a favor or a good is exchanged, how will the president be able to monitor the voters and, if needed, reinforce the bargain?

When a voter's interest is aligned with the party and president, the monitoring is not necessary, and also, the reciprocity can be monitored collectively and locally – and that is the case with the provision of land (Magaloni, 2006; Hicken & Nathan, 2020). Especially in rural areas, where the electoral units are small enough to identify the share of votes, despite being territorially big, theoretically allowing a land (re)distribution as an electoral bargain. Not only conceding land but financial gratification to landowners who have their land expropriated. In this study, we found that a tremendous and very characteristic amount of decrees issues about land-owning, using a couple of legal arguments for it.

A second investigation group in this study is the decrees about broadcasting concessions because the media oligarchy is central to forming public opinion in Brazil (Stein & Belarmino, 2023). The broadcast licenses reinforce the symbiotic relationship between local elites and the federal government with clientelist relations. This was the case of Jovem Pan company, for instance, playing the exact role of Fox News in Brazilian of denying the electoral result and claiming electoral fraud on Trump's loss in the U.S. latest elections. This phenomenon, called *Coronelismo eletrônico* [Electronic coronelism] by the authors, sustains the existence of a network where the commitment problem is solved by

establishing long-term connections between the media owners and the candidate or political group, a link for iteration over mere spot transactions (Stokes, 2005). Similarly, Marta Arretche (2004) finds how political parties work as mediator guarantors to maintain long-term relationships between the congresspersons and the president – excluding the necessity of deciding on each voting session – politicians already know how to vote to guarantee their privileges from the incumbent president.

The concentrated media ownership threatens democratic accountability by limiting the diversity of voices and opinions in the media, undermining free speech and open debate, and allowing powerful interests to exert undue influence over public discourse. One of the main concerns is that media owners with political or financial interests may use their control over the media to further their own agenda and suppress opposing views. This can lead to biased reporting, selective coverage of issues, and a lack of diversity in perspectives, undermining democratic principles of free speech and open debate.

With the universe of decrees and the technology available so far, it is not possible yet to look for a second wave of benefits to establish a hook between the president and the recipient. This could be given to medium-sized political groups, who hold trust in smaller cities, and very likely also could be granted by decrees and many other unilateral executive actions, like *Medidas Provisórias* (Meireles, 2019). By granting beneficial decrees to subnational governments, the presidency not only helps allies, especially those from the national coalition, but also punish their local electoral rivals.

A broad clientelist relationship, in this study, is understood as groups of interest that work holistically to reinforce voters networks locally (Brusco et al., 2004; Magaloni, 2006). A close analysis of decrees will be performed to illustrate how this benefit path can be designed. However, considering the few studies about presidential decrees in a clientelist optic, the generalization across types and benefits cannot be secured.

Considering the unilateral nature of presidential decrees is not possible to establish the origin of the request, so we might be dealing with citizens' requests (Nichter & Peress, 2017), especially in cases when we can clearly identify a company recipient of the benefit. The other possibility is to see the decrees as an initiative from the presidency, secretary,

or political parties, looking for a first-time benefit concession or a reinforcement of political connections with subnational actors.

Clientelism has unfortunately remained a persistent issue in Brazilian politics, and its influence can extend to the negotiation process surrounding presidential decrees. This practice involves politicians and party leaders exchanging favors, resources, or patronage for political support or personal gain. Within the context of presidential decrees, clientelism can have several implications.

One manifestation of clientelism is vote trading. In this scenario, party leaders or politicians offer benefits or resources to individual legislators in exchange for their support on specific issues, including the approval of presidential decrees. As a result, the evaluation of decrees becomes less about their merits and more about personal or party interests. This transactional approach undermines the objective assessment of the decree's impact and its alignment with the broader public interest.

Clientelist practices also tend to prioritize narrow interests over the greater societal good, distorting the negotiation process. Instead of engaging in substantive policy discussions and deliberations, politicians may base their stance on presidential decrees on immediate gains they can secure for themselves or their constituents. This short-term focus compromises the quality of decision-making and hinders the implementation of long-term policies aimed at addressing societal challenges and promoting the common welfare.

Clientelism reinforces power imbalances within political parties and Brazilian regions. Party leaders who possess significant resources or have well-established patronage networks can exert undue influence over party members. This pressure can coerce legislators into supporting specific decrees, regardless of their merits. As a result, individual legislators' ability to exercise independent judgment or represent their constituents' diverse interests is limited. The prevalence of clientelism erodes democratic accountability and weakens the responsiveness of elected officials to the broader public.

3. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS

The main hypothesis in the study is that decrees can be used as nonprogrammatic policies to establish or reinforce benefit paths between the presidency and subnational governments. Because it is one of the first studies of its kind, guided by the inaugural study in such complexity by (Ribeiro *et al.*, 2022), the main purpose is to find a path, a possibility of clientelism to be explored in future investigations.

Political parties usually act as intermediaries both between voters and candidates and also between different politicians in multiple spheres of the public domain. Considering that in systems with open-list proportional representation, there is a high intraparty competition, promoting particularism over programmatic appeals (BBGN, 2022), in this study, we understand that political parties actively work to maintain electoral promises after the elections, in a way to establish iteration for voters and elected candidates.

In the case of procedural decrees, as we saw in the last section, the more evident types of decrees can actually benefit the local government, despite the already known agenda-setting power of having the presidency issuing very specific decrees for municipalities, states, or companies.

Considering all the power that political party maintains, especially in political party-fragmented democracies, where the president has to create coalitions for their own safety in power, we stipulate the following hypothesis:

HA: The distribution of decree types varies by political party

This hypothesis suggests that the distribution of decree types is influenced by the political party to which the actors involved belong. It implies that different parties may have varying preferences or priorities when it comes to the types of decrees they support or seek to implement.

HA1: Beneficial decrees are more frequently issued to states where:

1. The party of the governor is the **same** as the president. This hypothesis implies that when the governor and the president belong to the same party, there is a higher likelihood of issuing beneficial decrees to those states. It suggests a potential

alignment of interests and cooperation between the executive at the federal level and the executive at the state level.

2. The party of the governor is in the presidential **coalition**. This hypothesis suggests that beneficial decrees are more likely to be issued to states where the governor's party is part of the presidential coalition. It emphasizes the importance of political alliances and the influence of coalitions in the distribution of benefits through decrees.
3. There is a higher proportion of federal deputies from the **same** party as the president. This hypothesis indicates that states with a higher proportion of federal deputies from the same party as the president are more likely to receive beneficial decrees. It suggests that the presence and support of aligned legislators increase the likelihood of favorable treatment in terms of decree allocation.
4. There is a higher proportion of federal deputies from the **coalition** of the president. This hypothesis implies that states with a higher proportion of federal deputies from the coalition of the president are more likely to receive beneficial decrees. It highlights the significance of coalition dynamics and the influence of supportive legislators from the broader presidential coalition.

To test these hypotheses, statistical analyses will be conducted, such as logistic regression models, to assess the relationship between political party variables and the distribution of decree's types. By examining patterns and statistically significant coefficients, we can determine the extent to which political party affiliations impact the allocation of different types of decrees.

Hypotheses may generate different results based on the specific political context, the dynamics of party systems, and the nature of the decrees being analyzed. Additionally, the analysis should consider potential confounding factors and interactions between variables to ensure robust and accurate conclusions.

To test the alignment and coalition scenarios, we first classify and better understand each type of decree, using the software RStudio to elaborate a topic model. Then, run the appropriate statistics to test these hypotheses. For the classification part, were used all the 25 thousand universe or decrees, and to run the tests, we used only the decrees from Fernando Henrique Cardoso's first term, the presidency that more issued decrees, 6.621.

The number of decrees is not homogeneous across presidencies. Fernando Henrique Cardoso is the president who issued more decrees and, the first president allowed to reelection since re-democratization, which could be a major reason for the distribution of benefits to allies.


3.1 Classifying presidential decrees with LDA model

Presidential decrees are published in the government server, in the domain http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/, from where I was able to find 12.482 numbered and 13.633 not numbered decrees. Inside each numeration type, decrees are organized by year and finally inside the year level, we have access to the link for each decree. Per instance, figure 1 illustrates the structure of 2003's decrees. As observed, the URL pattern after the /ccivil_03/ changes constantly by the pattern of numeration (if it is numbered or not) and along the years as well. At this point, we can already notice differences between presidential terms in the decrees URL itself, especially in the Fernando Henrique Cardoso to Lula transition, in 2003.

Using the software RStudio and the packages RSelenium, I created a remote driver with the chrome browser to collect the name, date, description and hyperlink of each decree of all the years for both numbered and not numbered. The output format of this collection is an excel file, where I did data validation, cleaning and reformatting using RStudio and later, STATA for the descriptive statistics.

Figure 1 - Structure of decrees in the website source

Decretos 1990-2022 - planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/...



To identify the most common topics discussed in the decrees, I analyzed the summary of each one using a topic model in the software RStudio and its packages. The regular topic model indicates the most frequent words in decree's summaries, after removing⁸ articles and prepositions from the most frequent words to clean the data. In Table 1, we can see the most common words found in the decrees.

⁸ Removed terms such as: "de", "o", "a", "no", "em", "dá", "que", "da", "do", "e", "para", "nº", "ao", "outras", "providências", "sobre", "dispõe", "dos", "das", "os"

Table 1 - Frequency of words in the decrees

20 most frequent words in decree's summary		
Word (PT)	Word (EN)	Freq
estado	state	8012
social	social	7166
fins	means	6175
declara	declare	6049
município	municipality	5110
orçamento	burdgeting	4767
interesse	interest	4758
favor	favor	4693
reforma	reform	4547
agrária	agrarian	4480
decreto	decree	4392
união	Union	4288
imóvel	building	4051
república	republic	3997
crédito	credit	3902
rural	rural	3864
situado	placed	3817
valor	value	3731
abre	open	3592
ministério	secretary	3461

Looking at these words, it is possible to see some of the most frequent types of decrees: Budgeting (*Orçamento*); Expropriation/Declare social use of lands and buildings and Municipalities. At this step of the study, only the most obvious categories were defined for the decrees: Budgeting (*Orçamento*), Expropriation for Public use or Agrarian Reform (*Desapropriação*) and Broadcasting (*Rádiodifusão*)

At this point, it is possible to run a Latent Dirichlet Allocation model (LDA), that identifies which terms/words are usually together, and, therefore, the most common topics. It is important to mention that the model goes through a series of experiments to identify possible remaining intrusive words, such as “às” and “1º” and also to achieve a balanced number of topics for the model. The number of topics is defined manually, so it means that the model will fit all decrees into the pre-determined number of possible topics. Many trials were made, in order to identify the most accurate number of topics to represent the diversity of subjects in these decrees. In a preliminary manual classification, I've identified seven categories, based on the structure and the keywords:

1. Image and sound broadcasting (*Rádiodifusão/imagem e som*)
2. Electricity/Energy (*Energia elétrica e afins*)
3. Modify old decrees (*Modificação de decreto*)
4. Public use of building/disappropriation (*Utilidade pública/desapropriação*)
5. Budgeting/credit (*Orçamento/crédito*)
6. Public workers/personnel (*Pessoal do funcionalismo público*)
7. Cerimonial/grief/ public calamity/ use of federal army (*Luto / Data comemorativa / Calamidade / Forças Armadas*)

To run an LDA model usually is necessary to establish the number of topics queried. To find the best number of topics, in this study we made a test with a range of topics between seven – number found in the preliminary manual classification – and ten – used in the reference study (Ribeiro *et. al*, 2022). Comparing the likelihood between the topics in this range, we found that nine is the most accurate number of topics to show the distributions of decree types. With nine topics, the likelihood of fitting the terms in the topics is greater.


The model categorized all 27.056 decree within probabilities of fitting in a topic, which is shown by the gamma⁹ coefficient in Table 2 and Graph 3, representing the document(degree)-topic density. The gamma coefficient was generated per topic per decree, and I kept the highest probability of a decree being categorized in a topic, so this way, every decree was assigned to only one topic, instead of working with all the probabilities of fitting in a topic for every decree. Graph 3 shows the dispersion of decrees within the categories.

Table 2 - Statistics of gammas per topic

TOPIC	MEDIAN Gamma	Variance	N
Topic 1: Energy	0.772	0.030	2.544
Topic 2: Agrarian Reform	0.982	0.019	4.348
Topic 3: Decrees	0.854	0.030	5.389
Topic 4: Broadcasting	0.982	0.020	1.932
Topic 5: Public administration	0.729	0.030	3.570
Topic 6: Public Use	0.969	0.021	2.368
Topic 7: Budgeting 1	0.719	0.035	1.025
Topic 8: Budgeting 2	0.978	0.027	3.281
Topic 9: International agreements	0.974	0.016	2.599


Graph 3 - Dispersion of gammas per topic

⁹ Gamma and Beta Hyperparameters – alpha represents document-topic density and Beta represents topic-word density. Higher the value of alpha, document is more probable of fitting in a topic and lower the value of alpha, document contain less probability of being in a topic. Similarly, the higher the beta, more probability of the term/word being present in a topic.



Graph 4 brings the highest betas to each topic, with the 12 most current terms in each topic. The highest the beta, the greater the possibility of that word being in a designated topic.

Graph 4 - Scale of betas per topic



Topic 1: Energy; **Topic 2: Agrarian reform**; Topic 3: Decrees; **Topic 4: Broadcasting**; Topic 5: Public administration; **Topic 6: Public Use**; Topic 7: Budgeting 1; Topic 8: Budgeting 2; Topic 9: International agreements

Considering both gamma validation and betas disposition, now it is safe to assign categories to each decree. The strongest categories in the topic allocation model are 2, 4, 6 and 9 – despite the last one, budgeting, they are precisely the ones talking about very local aspects of the public branch: Agrarian Reform, Broadcasting and Public Use.

1. Energies: issues authorizations to energy plants, especially hydroelectric, the main source of electricity in Brazil – its mains terms are “Authorizing”, “operation,” and “energy”. It also issues authorization for sciences, such as universities and permission for studying rivers and changing energy transmission. Like broadcasting, energy companies also play a role as common carriers of public goods:

Outorga à Linha Verde Transmissora de Energia S.A. concessão para exploração do serviço público de transmissão de energia elétrica, relativa à Linha de Transmissão Porto Velho - Samuel, Circuito 3, em 230 kV, Linha de Transmissão Samuel - Ariquemes, Circuito 3, [...] e Linha de Transmissão Vilhena - Jauru, Circuito 3, em 230 kV, nos Estados de Rondônia e Mato Grosso.

DECRETO DE 9 DE NOVEMBRO DE 2009

2. Agrarian Reform: This category covers decrees related to land reform and social interest in agriculture. Terms like "reform," "interest," "social," and "agrarian" are indicative of this category. An example decree in this category involves declaring a part of a rural property as of social interest for agrarian reform in São Mateus do Maranhão, Maranhão:

“Declara de interesse social, para fins de reforma agrária, parte do imóvel rural denominado FAZENDA BOCAINA, na DATA VELOSO, situado no Município de São Mateus do Maranhão, Estado do Maranhão, e dá outras providências.”

DECRETO No 98.917, DE 1º DE JANEIRO DE 1990

3. Decrees: Represents a complex network of decrees issuing, modifying, or canceling previous decrees, with little analytical use in our analysis. Usually, when the president tries to change regulations from other past presidencies, this type of decree is very common. It is very well defined by the example below, which by the way, was signed by

president Temer when he recently assumed the presidency after a *coup d'état* (technically an impeachment) of Dilma Rousseff.

“Altera o Decreto nº 7.922, de 18 de fevereiro de 2013, que regulamenta as Gratificações de Qualificação - GQ, instituídas pelas Leis nº 9.657, de 3 de junho de 1998, nº 10.871, de 20 de maio de 2004, nº 11.046, de 27 de dezembro de 2004, nº 11.171, de 2 de setembro de 2005, nº 11.355, de 19 de outubro de 2006, nº 11.356, de 19 de outubro de 2006, nº 11.357, de 19 de outubro de 2006, nº 11.539, de 8 de novembro de 2007, e nº 11.907, de 2 de fevereiro de 2009.”

DECRETO Nº 9.124, DE 14 DE AGOSTO DE 2017

4. Broadcasting: This category includes decrees related to radio and television broadcasting, particularly regarding service concessions. Examples include granting radio concessions to organizations. The most frequent terms are “service”, “concession”, “*radiodifusão*”. Among many decrees of this type, we are able to find radio concessions to politicians, such as Ratinho Junior (SBT) and Ana Coelho (TV Aratu)¹⁰. An example decree in this category is related to renewing the radio broadcasting service in São José do Rio Preto, São Paulo:

“Renova a outorga deferida à Fundação Mater Ecclesiae-Rádio Anchieta de São José do Rio Preto, posteriormente transferida à LIDER-RÁDIO E TELEVISÃO LTDA., para explorar serviço de radiodifusão sonora em onda média, na Cidade de São José do Rio Preto, Estado de São Paulo.”

DECRETO DE 4 DE AGOSTO DE 1992

5. Public administration: This group of words expresses needs related to the federal government in creating universities and issuing permissions to federal universities and entities linked with the federal government. The words “federal”, “operation” and

¹⁰ A list of all politicians owners of broadcasting radio and/or radio companies running to the 2022 elections here: <https://intervozes.org.br/levantamento-do-intervozes-revela-quem-sao-os-politicos-donos-da-midia-nas-eleicoes-2022/>

“authorizes” illustrate this category, with the following example of a decree about normativities on the National Council for the Rights of Children and Adolescents:

“Consolida atos normativos editados pelo Poder Executivo federal que dispõem sobre a temática do lactente, da criança e do adolescente e do aprendiz, e sobre o Conselho Nacional dos Direitos da Criança e do Adolescente, o Fundo Nacional para a Criança e o Adolescente e os programas federais da criança e do adolescente, e dá outras providências.”

DECRETO Nº 9.579, DE 22 DE NOVEMBRO DE 2018

6. Public use: The group of terms in topic 6 is closely related to a “Public use” of land or building by expropriation, as we can see with the terms “Public”, “declare”, “buildings” and “expropriation”. An example decree in this category is about declaring properties of public utility for expropriation by Autopista Litoral Sul S.A. in Paraná and Santa Catarina:

“Declara de utilidade pública, para fins de desapropriação, em favor da concessionária Autopista Litoral Sul S.A., os imóveis que menciona, localizados nos Municípios de São José dos Pinhais e Tijucas do Sul, no Estado do Paraná, e nos Municípios de Garuva, Araquari, Porto Belo e Palhoça, no Estado de Santa Catarina, necessários à construção das obras de implantação das Praças de Pedágio P1, P2, P3, P4 e P5.”

DECRETO DE 14 DE JULHO DE 2008.

7 and 8. Budgeting: is the most evident in the collection, also one of most studied by scholars for its clear parameters of measurement. The terms “budget”, “union”, “credit” and value are the most used. As we can also see in the example:

“Abre ao Orçamento Fiscal da União, em favor do Ministério dos Transportes, crédito suplementar no valor de R\$ 186.525.650,00, para reforço de dotações constantes da Lei Orçamentária vigente.”

DECRETO DE 26 DE NOVEMBRO DE 2009

9. International agreements: Promulgates international agreements between countries, especially bilateral cooperations, as we can see in the perfect type of decree for this category below:

“Promulga o Acordo de Cooperação Cultural e Educacional, entre a República Federativa do Brasil e a República de Cuba.”

DECRETO No 98.784, DE 3 DE JANEIRO DE 1990.

The analysis of the decrees using the LDA topic allocation model has allowed for the assignment of categories to each decree based on the most frequent terms. The strongest categories identified are Agrarian Reform; Budgeting; Broadcasting and Public Use.

The Broadcasting category encompasses decrees related to radio and television broadcasting, with examples such as granting concessions to politicians and organizations. Agrarian Reform deals with land reform and social interest in agriculture. International Agreements focus on cooperation between countries, particularly in cultural and educational domains. Public Use involves decrees declaring the public use of land or buildings through expropriation.

By categorizing the decrees based on their most frequent terms, we have gained valuable insights into the diverse topics covered by these legal documents. This analysis provides a comprehensive overview of the different areas addressed by the decrees and highlights their relevance in specific domains such as broadcasting, agrarian reform, international cooperation, energy, subnational governance, public use, legal modifications, public personnel, and budget allocation.

3.2 Testing hypothesis

To better understand how the political parties can affect the distribution of beneficial decrees, we selected the presidency with more issued decrees, the first term of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (from 1994 to 1998) and created the following variables:

- [bin] Alignment with the governor political party (ali)
- [bin] Governor political party is in the presidential winner coalition (coligr)
- Proportion of federal deputies of the same party of the president (depf_p)
- Proportion of federal deputies in the presidential coalition (depf_c)

Considering the binary nature of the dependent variable, the decree type, a logistic model was chosen to test how much independent variables can explain the presence of the decrees. At this point, it is safe to assume that any of the three types of decree issues some benefit to the subnational government, and from this point, that is how we are going to refer to the main types of decrees – the beneficial ones.

Table 3 shows the odds ratio for a logistic regression of each of the main decree types, as binary variables, and a fourth model with a binary variable for all three types of decree. In this last model, we try to explain the amount of decree types Agrarian Reform, Broadcasting and Public Use with the party variables previously.

For Agrarian reform decree types, the alignment with the governor has a significant low coefficient, reinforcing the findings of (Arretche & Rodden, 2004), saying that states where the governor is from the same party as the president are avoided in transferring budget. With these findings, we can also point out that Agrarian Reform decrees also work in a similar pattern. The proportion of coalition deputies, on the other hand, has a high significative coefficient, and it is probably the main political reason for issuing the Agrarian Reform decrees.

Table 3 - Logistic regression model of topics of interest

VARIABLES	(1) Logit Agrarian Reform	(2) Logit Broadcasting	(3) Logit Public Use	(4) Logit ALL BENEFITS
Governor	0.403***	2.236***	1.004	0.321***
Alignment	(0.0399)	(0.260)	(0.162)	(0.0651)
Governor	0.951	1.099	1.445**	1.898***
Coalition	(0.0955)	(0.133)	(0.234)	(0.400)
% Congress	1.030	1.411	2.606	3.797
Alignment	(0.414)	(0.577)	(1.672)	(3.114)
% Congress	9.010***	0.172***	0.186***	5.095***
Coalition	(2.521)	(0.0589)	(0.0949)	(2.787)
Constant	1.256**	0.284***	0.112***	6.949***
	(0.134)	(0.0362)	(0.0201)	(1.350)
Observations	3,438	3,438	3,438	3,438

Odds ratio. Standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Broadcasting, on the other side, presents a similar tendency seen previously: The coefficient indicates that this type of decree is more frequent when the governor is from the same party as the president. This finding reinforces the importance of the discussion in this study about the proximity of broadcasting company owners and politicians. It is important to remember that local radios and television companies receive a concession from the main distributor channel, which was granted with the federal concession for broadcasting. The cascade effect of these concessions inside each state is something with big political and electoral potential. The low coefficient for the proportion of deputies variable shows that for Broadcasting decrees, the governor's party matters the most.

The Public Use model shows the only case where the governor party only matters if it is in the presidential coalition. With a statistical significance with an alpha of .95, the significant coefficient for the governor coalition indicates that, in this case, decrees of Public Use are issued more to states where the governor is from a party belonging to the presidential coalition.

The fourth model brings all three types of decrees that concede benefits. In this case, the governor's party has some effect if it is in the presidential coalition and if it is the same party as the president. It reinforces the hypothesis that presidents issue these types of decrees to bargain with allies, which also can be noticed by the inexistence of statistical significance for deputies of the same party as the president. Just like the Agrarian Reform decrees, the final model with all three types also points out a strong effect for the congress coalition – the governor or deputy receives more beneficial decrees for their states if they are in the presidential coalition.

Considering that our decrees of interest are the ones that transfer benefits to subnational governments, we reinforce the premise of coalition presidentialism – the president needs to maintain a healthy relationship with their deputies and governor from the coalition, and based on this study, conceding decrees is one way of doing it.

Returning to the main hypothesis presented at the beginning of this work, let us see how they resist the tests: First, *beneficial decrees will be more frequent when the party of the governor is the same as the president*: Partially true - It happens only for Agrarian Reform and Broadcasting. Public Use is not significantly affected by the party alignment between the president and the governor.

The second hypothesis says that the decrees of interest will be more frequent when *the governor is from a presidential coalition party*: It only happens for Public Use type, and it seems to belong to a very complex net of local demands channelized by the governor and its allies.

Third, *States with more deputies from the same party as the president receive more beneficial decrees*: Not true. This is an interesting case because it shows how the president does not feel compelled to support politicians from the same party through procedural decrees.

The fourth hypothesis says that *beneficial decrees will be issued to states with more deputies in the presidential coalition* – and this is completely true for the Agrarian Reform type, with the strongest coefficient in the test.

Overall, we can see that even among the close list of three procedural decrees, each one seems to behave differently - Agrarian Reform is explained by higher proportions of congress coalition and not much for the governor party, which is the opposite take for Broadcasting concession that is conditioned by the governor's party and not much by the congress coalition. Issuing Public Use decrees is explained by the governor and congress coalitions.

With these findings is possible to reinforce the thesis that procedural decrees are part of a presidential toolbox, and each type of decree have a different benefit to be offered to different political allies – governors, party, coalition, congress – depending on what relationship the president choose to establish and how valuable are their support. Apparently, if the president needs more support from the state governor, broadcasting concessions can be made, and if support is needed from Congress, Agrarian Reform decrees can be issued to benefit subnational actors.

One of the prominent themes that emerged from our examination is the significant role played by presidential decrees in shaping the broadcasting sector. We have observed how these decrees grant concessions and licenses, which, unfortunately, have been prone to issues of political favoritism, leading to concerns about fairness and impartiality. The examination of specific examples, such as the concession of radio and television rights to politicians, highlights the need for transparency, accountability, and equitable decision-making processes in the allocation of broadcasting resources.

Our analysis has underscored the importance of a true agrarian reform and its connection to social welfare and land ownership. Presidential decrees related to agrarian reform have the potential to address longstanding issues of land inequality and support sustainable development. However, it is crucial to ensure that these decrees are implemented effectively, with a focus on empowering marginalized communities, protecting the rights of landless farmers, and promoting social justice, instead of reinforcing regional inequalities and granting benefits to political allies.

Another key area of focus has been the subnational governance and administrative aspects influenced by presidential decrees. We have observed how these decrees impact the allocation of resources, public use of land and buildings, and the functioning of regional governments. However, the potential for corruption, misuse of power, and regional inequality poses significant challenges to effective governance. It is crucial to strengthen institutional frameworks, enhance transparency, and promote citizen participation to ensure that presidential decrees serve the public interest and contribute to equitable development across regions.

The analysis of presidential decrees in managing land and airwaves in Brazil has shed light on critical issues of corruption, misuse of public power, and regional inequality. By identifying these challenges, we hope to contribute to the ongoing discussions on strengthening governance, promoting social justice, and fostering equitable development. It is essential to address these issues comprehensively, through effective policy reforms, enhanced oversight mechanisms, and a commitment to social justice, to ensure that presidential decrees positively contribute to the overall well-being and prosperity of the Brazilian society.

These findings reinforce the notion that procedural decrees are part of the president's toolbox in coalition presidentialism. Presidents strategically use these decrees to build and maintain alliances, secure support, and advance their political agenda. The study points out the intricate interplay between the president, governors, parties, coalitions, and congress, emphasizing the need for effective governance, transparency, accountability, and citizen participation to ensure that these decrees serve the public interest and contribute to equitable development across regions.

4. CONCLUSION

This thesis aimed to investigate the behavior of presidential decrees in Brazil and their implications for clientelist connections between the presidency and subnational governments. To achieve this objective, the study was divided into several chapters, each focusing on different aspects of presidential decrees and their relationship with political parties, coalitions, and regional dynamics.

In the introduction, the significance of presidential decrees as a powerful tool in the hands of the executive branch was highlighted. The institutional design of the Brazilian political system, characterized by large electoral coalitions and a bicameral legislative power, was discussed as a backdrop for understanding the use of decrees in the country. The introduction also presented the research questions and hypotheses that guided the study – that political parties act as conditioning for the amount and type of presidential decree issued, following the coalition needs with subnational governments.

Chapter 1, Presidential Decrees, delved into the concept and characteristics of presidential decrees, emphasizing their unilateral nature and immediate action. The constitutional basis for presidential decrees in Brazil was explored, highlighting the exclusive powers granted to the President of the Republic. The chapter also provided examples from Brazilian and international history to illustrate the significant role that decrees have played in shaping policy and implementing major reforms.

Later, we focused on the distribution of decrees across presidencies and their varying types. Through an extensive analysis of decrees issued by different presidents, the study revealed that the number and types of decrees varied significantly across administrations. It was found that certain types of decrees, such as agrarian reform and public use, exhibited distinct patterns across presidencies, indicating the influence of political dynamics and policy priorities.

The study hypothesized that the alignment between the governor's party and the president's party, as well as the proportion of federal deputies from these parties, would influence the issuance of decrees. The findings supported these hypotheses and highlighted the strategic use of decrees to establish and reinforce political alliances.

It was found that broadcasting decrees were more frequent when the governor belonged to the same party as the president, suggesting the influence of close relationships between broadcasting company owners and politicians. In contrast, agrarian reform decrees showed a strong coefficient when for the deputy coalition, showing that this type of decree is probably used to establish good connections with deputies in order to help the president enlarge their support in the Congress.

In the methodology chapter, the approach used to classify and analyze the decrees was outlined. The study employed a topic model to identify the most common topics discussed in the decrees and assign them to specific categories. The classification process involved data collection, data validation, and the use of Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) modeling. This allowed for a comprehensive understanding of the different topics and their distribution among the decrees.

Based on the findings from the analysis, it can be concluded that presidential decrees in Brazil play a significant role in establishing and reinforcing clientelist connections between the presidency and subnational governments. The alignment between political parties, the composition of coalitions, and the distribution of resources through decrees all contribute to the complex dynamics of clientelism in the country.

The study's findings have important implications for understanding the functioning of coalition presidentialism in Brazil and its impact on policy distribution and governance. The research highlights the need for further investigation into the long-term effects of decrees on regional development and political dynamics.

In conclusion, this thesis contributes to our understanding of the intricate relationship between presidential decrees, political parties, and clientelism in Brazil. The findings provide valuable insights into the behavior of presidential decrees and their implications for democratic governance. The study demonstrates the strategic use of decrees by presidents to establish and reinforce political alliances, allocate resources, and shape policy outcomes.

The findings support the hypothesis that the distribution of decree types varies by political party alignment. The analysis of specific types of decrees, such as broadcasting and agrarian reform decrees, reveals distinct patterns and preferences across presidencies.

Broadcasting decrees are more frequent when the governor is aligned with the president's party, suggesting close relationships between broadcasting company owners and politicians.

The research also highlights the importance of understanding the broader context of coalition presidentialism in Brazil. The study underscores the significant role of political parties and coalitions in the negotiation process surrounding presidential decrees. Parties serve as intermediaries, representing diverse interests and facilitating coordination and bargaining between the executive and legislative branches.

The methodology employed in this study, including the use of topic modeling and Latent Dirichlet Allocation, provides a robust framework for classifying and analyzing decrees. This approach allows for a comprehensive understanding of the topics discussed in the decrees and their distribution across different administrations.

In conclusion, this thesis contributes to our knowledge of presidential decrees in Brazil and their implications for clientelism and governance. The findings underscore the complex dynamics of decree issuance, highlighting the role of political parties, coalitions, and strategic considerations in resource allocation. Further research in this field is warranted to explore the long-term effects of decrees on regional development, policy outcomes, and democratic governance in Brazil.

REFERENCES

- ABRANCHES, Sérgio. **Presidencialismo de coalizão: raízes e evolução do modelo político brasileiro**. Editora Companhia das Letras, 2018.
- AMORIM NETO, Octavio, & SIMONASSI, Andrei Gomes. (2013). **Bases políticas das transferências intergovernamentais no Brasil (1985-2004)**. *Brazilian Journal of Political Economy*, 33(4), 704-725.
- AMORIM NETO, Octavio, & TAFNER, Paulo. (2002). **Governos de Coalizão e Mecanismos de Alarme de Incêndio no Controle Legislativo das Medidas Provisórias**. *Dados*, 45(1), 5-38.
- ARRETCHE, Marta, & RODDEN, Jonathan. (2004). **Política distributiva na Federação: estratégias eleitorais, barganhas legislativas e coalizões de governo**. *Dados*, 47(3), 549-576.
- BARROS, R. P. D., HENRIQUES, R., & MENDONÇA, R. (2000). **Desigualdade e pobreza no Brasil: retrato de uma estabilidade inaceitável**. *Revista brasileira de ciências sociais*, 15, 123-142.
- BOBONIS, G. J., GERTLER, P. J., GONZALEZ-NAVARRO, M., & NICHTER, S. (2022). **Vulnerability and clientelism**. *American Economic Review*, 112(11), 3627-59.
- BRUSCO, V., NAZARENO, M., & STOKES, S. C. (2004). **Vote buying in Argentina**. *Latin American research review*, 39(2), 66-88.
- CAREY, John M., & REINHARDT, Gina Yannitell. (2003). **Impacto das instituições estaduais na unidade das coalizões parlamentares no Brasil**. *Dados*, 46(4), 773-804.
- CHEIBUB, José Antonio; FIGUEIREDO, Argelina; LIMONGI, Fernando. **Partidos políticos e governadores como determinantes do comportamento legislativo na câmara dos deputados, 1988-2006**. *Dados*, Rio de Janeiro , v. 52, n. 2, p. 263-299, June 2009.
- HICKEN, A., & NATHAN, N. L. (2020). **Clientelism's red herrings: dead ends and new directions in the study of nonprogrammatic politics**. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 23, 277-294.

FIGUEIREDO, Argelina; LIMONGI, Fernando. **Executivo e Legislativo na Formulação e Execução do Orçamento Federal**. Trabalho apresentado na reunião anual da Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política–ABCP, São Paulo, 2000.

KRINER, D. L., & REEVES, A. (2015). **Presidential particularism and divide-the-dollar politics**. *American Political Science Review*, 109(1), 155-171.

LASSANCE, A. **Padrões de governança presidencial e desenvolvimento brasileiro**. In: MONASTÉRIO, L; NERI, M.; SOARES, S. (Eds.). *Brasil em desenvolvimento: Estado, planejamento e políticas públicas*. Brasília: Ipea, 2014.

LAVAREDA, J. A., & de Souza TELLES, H. (Eds.). (2011). **Como o eleitor escolhe seu prefeito: campanha e voto nas eleições municipais**. FGV Editora.

LEAL, Vítor Nunes. **Coronelismo, enxada e voto: o município e o regime representativo, no Brasil**. São Paulo: Alfa. Omega, 1975.

LIJPHART, Arend. **Modelos de democracia: desempenho e padrões de governo em 36 países**. Editora Record, 2003. Capítulo 5 “Sistemas partidários: Padrões bipartidários e multipartidários”

LIMONGI, Fernando, & FIGUEIREDO, Argelina. (2017). **A crise atual e o debate institucional**. *Novos estudos CEBRAP*, 36(3), 79-97.

MAGALONI, B. (2006). **Voting for autocracy: Hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico** (Vol. 296, p. 30). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

MAINWARING, Scott. **Sistemas partidários em novas democracias: o caso do Brasil**. Mercado Aberto, 2001. Capítulo 5 “Partidos fracos e políticos autônomos: a organização dos partidos *catch-all*”

MEIRELES, Fernando. **A política distributiva da coalizão**. 2019.

NICHTER, S., & PERESS, M. (2017). **Request fulfilling: When citizens demand clientelist benefits**. *Comparative Political Studies*, 50(8), 1086-1117.

RIBEIRO, A. L., ARAÚJO, O. R., OLIVEIRA, L. B., & INÁCIO, M. (2022). **The Executive Branch decisions in Brazil: A study of administrative decrees through machine learning and network analysis**. *PloS one*, 17(7), e0271741.

SANTOS, M. L. (2008). **Teoria e método nos estudos sobre o Legislativo brasileiro: uma revisão da literatura no período 1994-2005**. Revista Brasileira de Informação Bibliográfica em Ciências Sociais, 66, 1-31.

SCORSIM, Ericson Meister. **Em defesa da regulação dos serviços de televisão por radiodifusão**. Revista de Direito Administrativo, Rio de Janeiro, v. 249, p. 49-61, set. 2008. ISSN 2238-5177.

SOARES, Gláucio Ary Dillon. **Desigualdades eleitorais no Brasil**. Revista de Ciência Política, v. 7, n. 1, p. 25-48, 1973.

STEPAN, A. (2004). **Toward a new comparative politics of federalism, multinationalism, and democracy**. Federalism and democracy in Latin America, 29-84.

SIMIS, A. (2006). **A Legislação Sobre As Concessões Na Radiodifusão**. Unirevista.

SOUZA, Celina. (2003). **Federalismo e conflitos distributivos: disputa dos estados por recursos orçamentários federais**. *Dados*, 46, 345-384.

SOUZA, Celina. **Federalismo, desenho constitucional e instituições federativas no Brasil pós-1988**. Rev. Sociol. Polit., Curitiba, n.24, p. 105-121, Junho, 2005.

STEIN, E. A., & BELARMINO, K. (2023). **The Past and Future of Media Giants in Latin America: The Legacy of Clientelism in Brazil's Broadcast Television Development**. In *The Future of Television in the Global South: Reflections from Selected Countries* (pp. 131-168). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

STOKES, S. C. (2005). **Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina**. *American political science review*, 99(3), 315-325.

TSEBELIS, George. **Veto players**. Princeton University Press, 2011.

<https://www2.camara.leg.br/transpnet/consulta>

<https://www25.senado.leg.br/web/atividade/materias>